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The sheer size of China's economy, its rapid growth and its increasing integration into the 
global economy will make China a crucial player on the world markets for agricultural 
products. Small adjustments in China's agricultural supply and demand will have signifi-
cant implications on world agricultural trade and on its trading partners, including the EU 
countries. This makes China's long-term agricultural development an issue of both national 
and international significance. 
  This report aims to provide a better understanding of China's growing economy and 
the implications for China's food demand, supply and trade as well as for the global food 
economy, and to explore agribusiness trade and FDI (Foreign Direct Investments) opportu-
nities between China and EU countries, the Netherlands in particular. Issues covered are 
the development of the Chinese food economy and of Chinese agricultural policies, im-
pacts of China's accession to the WTO and the phasing out of the Multi Fiber Agreement, 
the impacts of policy proposals of major participants in the WTO-Doha round, impacts of 
Chinese green policies, economic perspectives of biotechnology in China, and trade and 
investment opportunities 
  This report is the result of a cooperation of the Center for Chinese Agricultural Pol-
icy (CCAP) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute (LEI) of Wageningen University and Research Center (WUR). The 
study is carried out by a project group that consisted of Dr. Jikun Huang (CCAP), Dr. 
Ninghui Li (Institute of Agricultural Economics (IAE) of the Chinese Academy of Agricul-
tural Sciences (CAAS), Dr. Frank van Tongeren, Dr. Hans van Meijl, Dr. Xiaoyong Zhang 
and Jaap Post (all LEI). Paul Veenendaal (LEI) participated in an earlier stage in the pro-
ject group. The team has also benefited from inputs by Scott Rozelle (UC Davis, USA). 
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Contrary to some expectations, China has hitherto succeeded in feeding its population with 
its limited resources. More than twenty percent of world population is living in China 
while its share in arable land is less than ten percent. The performance of China's agricul-
ture is impressive in the light of a growing population and high-income growth rates. Both 
developments result in an enormous growth in food demand. However, will China also be 
able to feed its population in the future? There are some good reasons to pose this question. 
China's population will grow from almost 1.3 billion people to about 1.5 billion people in 
2030. Increasing income per capita and continued urbanization imply a considerable in-
crease in the demand for food per head, in particular as a consequence of the rising 
consumption of meat. In addition, China faces a number of supply-side issues, as agricul-
ture has to compete with other sectors for scarce natural resources. 
  The question mentioned above is not only of importance for China's population and 
its political leaders but also for the rest of the world. Since the start of the economic reform 
in 1978 China is gradually opening its windows to the world. The accession of China to the 
WTO in November 2002 is an important milestone in this development. Being a member 
of the WTO, China will benefit from further liberalization of world markets by getting 
more export opportunities and offering better access to the Chinese market. A next step in 
further liberalization is foreseen as result of the Doha-round of trade negotiations. In a lib-
eralized world, shortages in food supply in China can have disrupting effects on world 
markets and consequently on the food economy of other countries. 
  This study aims to provide some answers on the question if China can feed its popu-
lation in the period 2001-2020 and to which extent it will participate in world trade. 
Particular attention is paid to effects on the trade of the European Union. 
  In the first part of the study a picture is sketched of the developments of Chinese ag-
riculture and of the policy changes since 1978. Next, the results of a so-called baseline are 
presented. This baseline describes the development of the Chinese food economy and its 
impact on world markets until 2020 under the assumption that no policy changes will take 
place. In the baseline attention is paid to the effects of the accession of China to the WTO 
and the phasing out of the Multi Fiber Agreement. The second part analyses the impact of 
assumed policy changes. This involves both external as well as internal policy changes. 
The external changes are studied by means of scenarios for the Doha-round of trade nego-
tiations in the framework of the WTO. The internal changes are studied by assumptions for 
the Chinese agricultural policies with regard to 'green box' policies. In particular attention 
will be paid to the national and international impact of the development of biotechnology 
in China. 
  Two models are used for the analysis: the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) and 
the Chinese Agricultural Projection Simulation Model (CAPSiM). The first model is a 
general equilibrium model that is adapted for this study. The second is a partial equilibrium 
model for the Chinese agricultural sector making use of an adjusted set of data.   14
China's food economy and its agricultural policies in the past 25 years 
Food demand in China increased during the last decades by strong economic growth and 
further increase in population. Nevertheless China succeeded in improving food security. 
The annual growth rate of agricultural production was about four times higher than annual 
population growth in the past 25 years. Per capita food availability rose from 2300 kcal per 
day in 1980 to more than 3000 kcal per day in the late 1990s. In particular the intake of 
protein and fat rose considerably. The share of animal products rose from 4% in the sixties 
to 19% in the late nineties. After decollectivisation access to food was primarily defined 
through access to land, nowadays real income is a decisive factor. The degree of market in-
tegration still growing. China even became a net exporter of food products, in particular of 
labor-intensive products as horticultural products and animal products (including aquatic 
products). The export of agricultural and food products increased threefold in the period 
1985-2000. Soybean became an important import product. 
  Policy changes delivered an important contribution to this development. The intro-
duction of the household responsibility system (HRS), which granted every rural 
household a piece of agricultural land, delivered an important contribution in the im-
provement of the efficiency of agriculture in the early 1980s. A next contribution followed 
by the liberalization of input markets as for respectively machinery, fertilizers and pesti-
cides. The liberalization of the seed market is still in progress. Agricultural product 
markets are to a large extent liberalized. The biggest government intervention occurred in 
the grain market. Agriculture was implicitly taxed by grain policies, and the transfer of 
surplus has contributed to the development of the industry and of the urban area. Nowa-
days the procurement quota for grains, by which agriculture has to deliver part of the 
harvest many years against low prices, is abolished. The policies to stimulate the develop-
ment of rural enterprises have promoted rural employment and increased rural income. The 
share of farmers involved in off-farm employment increased from 15% in 1980 to more 
than 40% in 2000. The reforms in policy for agricultural technology delivered also an im-
portant contribution to agricultural development and in particular to the increase of yields. 
  The exchange rate policies improved the international terms of trade for the agricul-
tural sector. In addition, in the pre-accession period of the WTO, China relaxed access to 
import and export markets. After the accession to the WTO the AMS (aggregate measure-
ment of support) will decrease to less than 8.5% of agricultural output value. A trade quota 
system exists only for grains, edible oils, cotton sugar and wool.  
 
Model instruments to gain better understanding of China's future food economy. 
Two model instruments are used in this study: the Global trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
and the Chinese Agricultural Policy Simulation Model (CAPSiM). The standard GTAP 
model is a multi-region, computable static general equilibrium model, with perfect compe-
tition and constant returns to scale. Each single region is modeled along relatively standard 
lines of multi-sector AGE models. Important assumptions are perfect competition on factor 
markets and output markets. This kind of models does not necessarily attempt to capture 
all detail but are flexible to allow elaborations in face of specific policy questions. The 
standard GTAP model is adapted in this study to be able to analyze the questions that are 
central in this study. 
  The China Agricultural Policy Simulation Model (CAPSiM) is a partial equilibrium 
model for the agricultural sector. CAPSiM is a comprehensive model for China's food de-  15
mand, supply and trade analysis. The model explicitly accounts for urbanization and mar-
ket development, technology, agricultural investment, environmental trends and 
competition for labor and land use, as well as the price responses of both demand and sup-
ply. The model can be used both for policy simulation and projection over time for key 
agricultural variables in response to exogenous shocks. The major components of CAPSiM 
include the modules for production, consumption specified separately for rural and urban 
consumers, stocks changes, trade and market clearing for 20 commodity (groups) that ac-
count for 90% of China's agriculture. 
 
Models and data problems 
The reliability of the outcomes of the models not only depends on the characteristics of the 
models and the linkage between the models but also to a large extent on the data used in 
the models. It is demonstrated that China's livestock supply and demand statistics are not 
consistent with even the most basic criteria: supply does not equal demand and the implied 
derived demand for feed does not equal the supply of feed. To overcome this problem a 
number of data sources are used to create new supply and demand series. Demand is cor-
rected upward to make up for three omissions in the data and supply is corrected 
downward. The changes, which are all carefully documented, narrow the gap for all live-
stock products. Since livestock makes up 30 percent of agricultural GDP (AGDP), and 
since the growth rate of livestock was overstated by 37 percent, the reported growth rate of 
AGDP between 1987 and 1999 would have to be lowered by 1 percentage point to 3 per-
cent annually. GDP growth would have to be lowered by 0.11 percent. The adjusted supply 
and demand series meet the criteria mentioned above. A decomposition analysis shows that 
the single largest source of the discrepancy was the adjustment to account for the out-of-
home consumption that the survey of the National Statistical Bureau of China (CNSB) 
failed to include. Making corrections to China's livestock statistics, however, may not be 
the end of the story. Li and Liu (2002) show that fishery statistics are subject to similar sta-
tistical problems. Zheng (2001) says that township and village enterprise output and 
employment statistics were overstated. All of these would support the recent findings by 
Rawski (2001) that China's overall growth data are overestimated.  
 
China's agricultural development and impact of Green policies 
Over the last four decades, per capita availability of food, household food security, and nu-
trition all have improved significantly. Increased domestic production is almost solely 
responsible for increased per capita food availability and significantly contributes to pov-
erty alleviation and farmers' income. 
  China's experience demonstrates the importance of technological development, insti-
tutional change, price and market liberalization, rural economic development and other 
conducive policies in improving agricultural productivity, farmer income, and food secu-
rity in a nation with limited land and other natural resources. Among various factors, 
technology has been one of major driving forces of productivity growth and the engine of 
China's agricultural economy development. New technologies contributed over half of the 
increase in rice yields between 1975 and 1990. More than 50 percent of the growth of grain 
production and nearly 40 percent of the growth of the output of cash crops between 1978 
and 1992 can be associated with research expenditures.    16
  However, the expenditures for agricultural research are relatively low. The agricul-
tural research intensity is much lower than that of the developed countries. 
  A baseline projection with CAPSiM for the period 2001-2020 shows that the self-
sufficiency rate for grain will remain as high as 90 percent. Only for feed grains, such as 
maize, the self-sufficiency level will fall below 75 percent in the long run. In the non-grain 
crop sector the imports of soybean, edible oils, sugar and cotton will increase. In the live-
stock sector the annual growth rates of pork and poultry will exceed demand. Pork, poultry 
and fish will be important export products. 
  The development of production, demand and self-sufficiency rates depend on many 
factors. As mentioned above, one of these factors is investment in agricultural research. 
Two scenarios show this. One with an increase of investment in agricultural research of 2 
percent and another with an increase of 7 percent per year throughout the projection pe-
riod. Under the high research investment scenario the self-sufficiency rate for grain will 
rise from 90 percent in 2002 to 95 percent. In the low growth scenario the self-sufficiency 
rate for grains will drop to 84 percent and for maize even to 65 percent. The impacts on the 
other crops are also substantial.  
  The expansion of production in the past is partly gains arising from the mobilization 
of inputs. However, for the future China's agriculture can rely less on inputs for a further 
increase in production. Furthermore, decollectivization and fiscal reform have already been 
tapped for most of their gains. However, improved technology has been the largest factor, 
by far, behind agricultural production growth, and as such is a major source of increased 
food availability in China. Based on the results of this study and the experience in the rest 
of the world, if China wants its agriculture to continuously supply sufficient food for the 
growing population with rising income and under trade liberalization, China has to in-
crease its agricultural research investment. The current agricultural research investment 
intensity (0.44%) can be characterized as low. 
 
Future development of China's food economy and implications to Global Trade  
In this study a GTAP model simulation is made of the developments in the periods 2001-
2005, 2005-2010 and 2010-2020 to analyze China's capacity to feed itself in the future and 
its relation with the world market. The most important assumption for this simulation, the 
so-called baseline, is that during this period policy changes in the past will be fully imple-
mented but that no new policy changes will take place. In this baseline we distinguish the 
effects of the accession of China to the WTO, the phasing out of the Multi Fiber Agree-
ment (MFA) and the enlargement of the EU with 10 new member states.  
  The projection for 2000-2005 shows an important growth of the output of labor-
intensive products as fish, meat and horticultural products. The growth figures of the land 
intensive products as grains are much lower. Also the processed food industry is a strong 
growth sector. Outside the agricultural sector the labor-intensive manufacturing sectors are 
fast growing, in particular the textiles and garments industries. Backward linkages also al-
low the cotton output to grow steeply in the wake of the impressive growth rates of 
textiles. The accession of the WTO has only a limited effect on this development, most 
important is the negative effect on the production of some land intensive products and a 
positive effect on the production of the food industry. The phasing out of the Multi Fiber 
Agreement boosts the production of the textile industry and that of cotton.   17
  Imports of all groups of products will increase with more than twenty percent in the 
period 2001-2005, except for the products of the labor-intensive industry. For most prod-
ucts there exist a close relation with the accession of China to the WTO and to a lesser 
extent with the phasing out of the MFA. 
  We expect China's exports to decrease in land intensive products as wheat, coarse 
grains and cotton. On the other hand we expect ring exports of horticultural products, fish, 
products of the food industry. Besides the labor-intensive industries, and in particular tex-
tiles, will show a big increase in exports. These changes have only partly to do with the 
accession of China to the WTO and the phasing out of the MFA. Both factors play signifi-
cant role in the decrease in the exports of coarse grains and of cotton and in the increase of 
the exports of horticultural products, meat, food and textile. 
  On the longer term China's self sufficiency ratios will decrease for most of the agri-
cultural products and in particular for coarse grains and oil seeds. Due to rising 
consumption and lack of own resources the self-sufficiency ratio for energy products will 
show a further decrease. Especially the imports of oil are expected to rise further. On the 
other hand the self-sufficiency rate of textile and that for products of the labor-intensive 
industry will show important increases. 
  The impacts of these changes on the world market are limited. For most product 
groups the share of China's export in the world market will be below ten percent. However, 
there are some exceptions. The most impressive one is textile; the share of China in the ex-
port market will increase from less than twenty percent in 2001 to more than forty percent 
in 2020. For fish and labor-intensive industrial products the share of China will increase to 
more than ten percent but will remain below twenty percent. The share of food industry 
products will rise also above ten percent but will decrease below this level afterwards. 
 
What can China expect from the WTO Doha development round? 
What can China expect from the new Doha development round? To address this question, 
this study provides insights in the economic effects of the new WTO Doha round for China 
on the basis of the policy proposals of the major participants in the negotiations: the USA, 
the EU and the CAIRNS group. The analysis for China with the help of simulations of the 
GTAP model is put against the background of worldwide effects and provides insights into 
the nature and magnitude of the impacts of the WTO Doha Round for international trade 
and the resulting welfare improvements. The study focuses on agricultural liberalization, 
but also includes liberalization in industrial tariffs and liberalization in services trade. It 
uses the baseline developed in chapter 5 as the benchmarks against which the effects of a 
new WTO round are assessed. 
  The results of the analysis show that China belongs to the countries that gain most 
from the new round of trade negotiations. China is estimated to capture about 8% of the 
global income gains in 2010 while its share in world GDP is around 3%. For all proposals 
is estimated that China's export trade will grow relatively more than that of World export 
trade. 
  The effects on China's agricultural incomes are, however not estimated to be very 
large. The USA and the CAIRNS proposal have comparatively greater effects on agricul-
tural income than that of the EU, because they more aggressively open the protected 
markets of Japan and Korea. The effects on Chinese agricultural production are limited. 
For sugar we estimate decrease in production for all three proposals. As a consequence the   18
imports of sugar will increase. The self-sufficiency ratio's for strategic agricultural prod-
ucts will hardly change, in other words the level of food security will be barely affected.  
  More important are the negotiations for the manufacturing sector. More than seventy 
percent of the gains for China are attributed to liberalisation in this sector. As far as the 
textile industry and the food industry are concerned this will increase the demand for agri-
cultural products like cotton and raw materials for the food processing industry. Expanding 
labor-intensive industries, fostered also by new export opportunities, may be part of a rural 
development strategy that includes labor absorption into industries outside primary agricul-
ture. 
  
Prospects of biotechnology in rice and cotton: trade and welfare implications 
China has the fourth largest GM crop area, after the USA, Argentina and Canada. The Chi-
nese government views agricultural biotechnology as a tool to help China improve the 
nation's food security, increase agricultural productivity and farmers' incomes, foster sus-
tainable development and improve its competitive position in international agricultural 
markets. On the other hand, there is growing concern among policy makers regarding the 
impact of the ongoing global debate about biotechnology on China's agricultural trade, bio-
safety and the potential opposition derived from public concerns about the environmental 
and the food safety of GM products. Because of these three new regulations on the bio-
safety management, trade and labeling of GM farm products came into effect on 20 March 
2002 and require importers of GM agricultural products to apply to China's Ministry of 
Agriculture for official safety verification approval. 
  China has recently developed insect-resistant Bt cotton and is putting a lot of efforts 
in the development of transgenic rice resistant to insects. In 2001, approximately four mil-
lion small farmers in China adopted Bt cotton. The largest part of the potential productivity 
gains from Bt cotton will be realized already by 2005. In contrast, GM rice is not yet avail-
able to farmers on a commercial basis, and our estimates indicate that large productivity 
gains are yet to be realized between 2005 and 2010.  
  Chinese factor markets for labor and land will witness different effects, depending on 
the type of biotechnology being adopted. The scarce land resources can be utilized more 
effectively with land-saving technologies. The adoption of somewhat laborsaving GM 
crops does not necessarily lead to falling wages. This is especially the case in Bt cotton. 
Here, the expansion of the cotton sector itself, together with rising labor demand from the 
unskilled labor intensive textiles sector more than compensate for the savings in labor in-
puts obtained by adopting the GM crop. 
  The economic gains from GMO adoption are substantial. In the most optimistic sce-
nario, where China commercializes both Bt cotton and GM rice, the welfare gains 
calculated with the GTAP model amount to an additional annual income of about 5 billion 
US$ in 2010. This amounts to about 3.5 USD per person. If actual adoption rates are lower, 
we still observe an income gain of 3 billion USD in 2010. Given the importance of rice for 
agricultural production, employment and food budget shares, the gains from GM rice adop-
tion are orders of magnitude larger than the Bt cotton gains. 
  Although the productivity gains for China translate to rising exports or reducing im-
ports, the patterns of global trade in both the textiles and garments and the rice sectors are 
not affected very much. The impact is negligible on major rice importers, but major rice 
exporters (i.e., Thailand, Vietnam and Burma) may experience a drop in net export reve-  19
nues. Rice exports from China represent only a small share in international rice trade. 
There is an immediate impact on the export revenues of major cotton exporters, most nota-
bly India and Pakistan. The cost savings and yield increases from Bt cotton translate into 
lower production cost for the Chinese textiles and garments industry, but these cost reduc-
tions are not of such orders of magnitude that other garments producers (e.g., India, 
Bangladesh, but also Mauritius) are affected very much. The phasing out of the multifiber 
agreement by 2005 is of greater importance for global textiles and garments trade than Bt 
cotton commercialization in China.  
  Our results indicate that trade restrictions do not significantly lower the gains from 
biotechnology research in China. A trade ban on GM rice (food crop) has only a minor ef-
fect since the portion of rice exported is very small. The effects of unilateral labeling of 
soybean imports are larger. If China wants to label GM products, this raises the domestic 
price of soybeans, and benefits Chinese soybean farmers. However, domestic labeling also 
raises the price of domestic GM rice, and this affects rice consumers.  
 
Trade and FDI relations between China and The Netherlands 
The development into a socialist market economy and the gradual opening of the Chinese 
market for foreign companies after 1978, have had an important positive impulse on 
China's strong economic growth in the past 25 years. Both international trade and foreign 
direct investments (FDI) contributed to this development. China attracted substantial 
foreign direct investments (FDI) in the last decades; in 2002 it became the most important 
recipient of FDI in the world. Although its FDI inflow only accounts for around 3% of its 
GDP, it delivers an important contribution in the growth of productivity. More than 60% of 
FDI is in the manufacturing sector. FDI has been pouring into the coastal regions although 
recent policy is shifting to the western part of China to exploit its rich resources and 
stimulate domestic demand there. 
  Dutch FDI in China began in the 1980s, but it took off in 1992 after the opening up 
policy was formally adopted national wide. The Dutch FDI stock accounts for less than 1% 
of China's total FDI. Also Dutch FDI is strongly skewed toward manufacturing which ab-
sorbed two third of the total. The direct investments of the Netherlands in Chinese 
agriculture account for 4,5% of Dutch FDI in China. In terms of regional preference, Ji-
angsu is their first choice, followed by Shanghai.  
  The Netherlands is one of the largest trading countries in the world. The Dutch share 
in China's import is limited. China, on the other hand, has a huge trade surplus with the 
Netherlands. Dutch exports to China are concentrated in industrial machinery, while im-
porting office machines and automatic data processing equipment from China. As far as 
agricultural trade is concerned edible offal and flower bulbs are the major Dutch export 
categories to China. China's exports of agricultural products to the Netherlands are very 
limited.  
  It is expected that China's strong economic growth will continue and that China will 
remain one of the most hottest investment destinations. Some observers expect (e.g. the 
Economist Intelligence Unit) forecasts that China's annual FDI inflow will be over 60 bil-
lion US$ during 2003-2007. FDI and export opportunities for the Dutch agribusiness exist 





1.1  Background and objectives 
 
In 2001, China had a population of almost 1.3 billion. The annual increase in population is 
about 12 million, and China's population is expected to reach 1.5 billion by 2030. Twenty 
years of economic reform have brought about rapid income growth. As a result, the de-
mand for food - and particularly for meat - has continued to grow. In turn, the increase in 
demand for meat has accelerated the demand for feed grain (Huang, Rozelle & Rosegrant, 
1999). Previous projections show that the food requirements in 2030 will be nearly double 
those of the early 1990s (Zhang, 2003). Moreover, the growing demand for energy in 
China calls for increased biofuel production, and meeting these needs will compete with 
food production for natural resources.  
  On the supply side, the increase in the agricultural supply and the food supply in 
China during the 1970s and 1980s is one of the most remarkable success stories in science, 
technology, and policy-making. Several factors have contributed to the sharp increase in 
production. Technological changes - which have increased the availability of water, inor-
ganic fertilizers, and other farm chemicals - have meant that agricultural production growth 
has exceeded population growth (Huang, Rosegrant & Rozelle, 1996). Institutional change 
stimulated production, particularly in the early reform period (Lin, 1992). The impacts of 
price and marketing reforms and trade-related policies on agricultural production were 
generally positive (except for macro-economic policy), but the impacts vary among crops 
and over time (Huang & Rozelle, 2002). 
  Future gains, however, may not have as many sources and may rely mostly on fur-
ther technological breakthroughs. High input levels and diminishing marginal returns mean 
that increasing inputs will not provide large increases in output. Water shortages and in-
creasing competition from industry and commercial cash crops do not provide much hope 
for large gains in yield from investment in water control. Institutional change in many 
cases provides only one-time changes and has been shown to be largely exhausted in China 
(Huang & Rozelle, 1996). Many have predicted that in future almost all gains will have to 
come from second- and third-generation Green Revolution technologies (Pingali et al. 
1997; Huang et al., 2002).  
  Trade liberalization further challenges China's agricultural economy. China's recent 
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) has led to a large-scale debate about its 
effects on both the domestic and the global economy. China's accession affects all areas of 
its economy, but is widely expected to have a particularly dramatic effect on agriculture. 
Some argue that the impacts of accession on China's agriculture will be substantial (Carter 
& Estrin, 2001; Li et al., 1999). There are two reasons for this: The reforms in China over 
the past 25 years have largely ignored trade policies for key farm products, and therefore 
much remains to be done; and China has committed itself to major changes in farm trade 
policies by 2005 - commitments that are far greater, and much faster, than any other devel-  22
oping country committed itself to in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(Anderson et al., 2002). 
  However, others believe that the overall effects on agriculture will be modest, with 
the exception of a few commodities (Anderson & Peng, 1998; Huang et al., 2000). The di-
versified views on the implication of China's accession for the country's domestic 
agricultural economy can partly be attributed to a lack of understanding of the current pol-
icy distortions and the likely policy changes that may follow accession (Martin, 2002; 
Huang & Rozelle, 2002).
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  The sheer size of China's economy, its rapid growth, and its increasing integration 
into the global economy will make China a crucial player in the future development of the 
world markets for inputs and outputs of agricultural products. Small adjustments in China's 
agricultural supply and demand will have significant implications for world agricultural 
trade and for China's trading partners, including the EU. This makes China's long-term ag-
ricultural supply, demand, and international trade an issue of both national and 
international significance. 
  Against this background, the overall goal of this report is to provide a better under-
standing of China's growing economy and the implications for China's food demand, 
supply, and trade, as well as for the global food economy, and to explore agribusiness trade 
and FDI (foreign direct investments) opportunities between China and the EU, and particu-
larly the Netherlands. Specifically, this report seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
 
1)  To identify and document China's major domestic policies, development strategies, 
and long-term economic plans; and to develop several logical, consistent, and plausi-
ble scenarios in both international and domestic contexts. In generating these 
scenarios, food and agriculture are regarded as an integral part of the economy. 
2)  To determine the structure of demand for agricultural products and sources of de-
mand growth, with a special emphasis on livestock products, within the domestic 
market. New estimates of demand parameters based on recent micro level informa-
tion of both urban and rural households will be incorporated into the analysis.  
3)  To determine the capability of the Chinese agricultural sector to meet domestic mar-
ket needs and to identify the factors that significantly contribute to the domestic 
supply of agricultural products, as well as the factors that may prevent China from 
being able to increase production as domestic demand increases in the future. 
4)  To project China's demand for, supply of, and trade in major food products in the 
early 21st century under various development scenarios, and to make projection out-
comes for the years 2005, 2010 and 2020. 
5)  To examine China's potential export products and its demand for imports, and to in-
vestigate the impact of these export potentials and demand projections on world 
markets and trade flows and, through these international effects, examine the conse-
quences for the EU. Furthermore, to assess both the up- and downstream 
opportunities for China and the EU in international trade and FDI. 
                                                 
1 A review of previous studies on the projections of China's food economy is summarized in the project work-
ing paper, 'A Comparison Study of Projection Models in China's Food Economy' by Zhang (2001) and in 
Zhang (2003).    23
1.2 Methodology 
 
The use of models is instrumental in gaining a better understanding of the capacity of 
China to feed its growing population with its limited natural resources, and of the impacts 
of China's growing economy on world markets and the EU. The models used in this study 
comprehensively and simultaneously account for the major driving forces and policies de-
termining China's domestic food demand and supply, and influencing the linkages of 
China's economy with the rest of the world, and particularly with the EU. These linkages 
are examined and simulated through the models established, which reflect trade relations, 
the impacts of China's agricultural and trade policies on the rest of the world, and the im-
pacts of agricultural and trade policies of the EU and other major trading partners on 
China's food economy. In this regard, two models are used: China's Agricultural Policy 
Simulation Model (CAPSiM) and an adapted version of the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) model. CAPSiM was developed by the Chinese Center for Agricultural Policy 
(CCAP) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). The GTAP model was developed by 
an international group of economists and adapted for this study by the Dutch Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute (LEI) of Wageningen University and Research Center 
(WUR).  
  Thus, to achieve the overall objective of this report, methodologies are used and de-
veloped for each of the specific project objectives, namely: 
-  Objective 1 (policy identification and scenario development) is achieved through 
performing a thorough review of the existing literature with respect both to China's 
long-term policy and development plans, and to the international trade environment. 
The key issues and relationships in these fields are identified and scenarios are de-
veloped. A distinction is made between policy scenarios for world trade based on the 
discussions in the WTO Doha Round, and scenarios for Chinese agricultural policy. 
In these scenarios, the agricultural and food sector are regarded as an integral part of 
the economy.  
-  Objective 2 (domestic demand analysis) is achieved through estimating demand (fo-
cusing on food products and distinguishing between rural and urban households) 
using the demand module of the CAPSiM model. The identification of structural 
changes in food consumption patterns is a major contribution of this sub-study. Once 
the demands for meat (pork, beef, mutton, chicken, eggs, milk), fish, and other ani-
mal products are known, the implied feed demand (and hence the overall demand for 
grain) is calculated by applying a set of feed conversion ratios. These ratios may 
change over time as a result of technological changes and substitution possibilities.  
-  Objective 3 (domestic supply analysis) requires an examination of the effects of 
technology, public investment, agricultural price and marketing policies, infrastruc-
ture development, comparative advantage of agriculture, environmental stress, and 
other supply-related factors influencing agricultural and food supply.  
-  Objective 4 (domestic projections). In addition to price response of both demand and 
supply, a series of important structural factors and policy variables are explicitly ac-
counted for in CAPSiM. These variables include urbanization and market 
developments on the demand side, technology, agricultural investment, environ-
mental trends, and major agricultural production constraints, such as the availability 
of water and land for agricultural use and barriers to international technological   24
transfer on the supply side, and major pricing and marketing trade policies on the in-
ternational trade side.  
-  Objective 5 (international trade analysis) is achieved by using an adapted version of 
the world trade model (GTAP) to assess the impacts China's trade potential will have 
on world market prices and on the trading opportunities of both China and the EU. 
The GTAP model is also used to identify the impacts of the WTO Doha Round: Sce-
narios concerning trade with the EU and the impacts of the external trade 
environment on China's economy are assessed.  
 
 
1.3  Contents of this publication 
 
This publication is composed of eight chapters. In the following chapter (Chapter 2), the 
development of China's agriculture and food supply since the reform of 1978 is described, 
as are the internal and external policies of the Chinese government as far as they are rele-
vant to the agricultural sector and to food supply. Particular attention is paid to the 
implementation of policies and their impact on agricultural development. Dr. Jikun Huang 
and Dr. Scott Rozelle wrote this chapter. 
  Chapter 3 deals with the methodologies used for the study. Particular attention is 
paid to the GTAP model and its adaptation for this project, and to CAPSiM. In addition, 
available time series are analyzed and improved in order to make the data used in the pro-
ject more consistent. The authors of this chapter are Dr. Frank van Tongeren, Dr. Hans van 
Meijl, Dr. Jikun Huang, and Dr. Li Ninghui.  
  Chapter 4 addresses the future development in China of the demand and supply of 
food with the help of a 'business as usual' baseline scenario. Additional scenarios are pre-
sented for alternative developments of rural and urban household income. This chapter also 
focuses on the impact on the food supply of 'green box' policies, namely those policies that 
are allowed within the framework of the WTO. Of particular interest are the impacts of re-
search investment policy, irrigation investment policy, and policies aimed at reducing the 
increase of erosion and salinization. The scenarios are simulated with CAPSiM. Dr. Jikun 
Huang, Dr. Li Ninghui, and Dr. Scott Rozelle wrote the chapter. 
  In Chapter 5 the results of the construction of the baseline with the GTAP model are 
presented. In this model, the relations with the world market are also taken into account. 
This global baseline is a projection of the developments in the periods 2001-2005, 2005-
2010, and 2010-2020 if no new policy changes occur. The baseline takes into account 
China's accession to the WTO, the phasing out of the Multi Fiber Agreement, and the ac-
cession of ten new Member States to the EU. The impacts of these recent policy decisions 
are given separately. In addition, the changing relations with other parts of the world - and 
particularly with the EU - are sketched. Dr. Hans van Meijl and Dr. Frank van Tongeren 
wrote this chapter.  
  Chapter 6 deals with the possible effects of the further liberalization of trade within 
the framework of the Doha Round. The focus is on the effects both on world markets and 
on China, and particularly as far as agricultural products and food are concerned. The sce-
narios are based on the WTO proposals made by the USA, the EU, and the CAIRNS 
group. The effects are the results of simulations with the GTAP model. The authors of this 
chapter are Dr. Frank van Tongeren and Dr. Hans van Meijl.   25
  An important domestic Chinese policy is the development of biotechnology, and this 
is the subject of Chapter 7. The effects of the application of GM cotton and GM rice on 
economic welfare in China and on world trade are estimated with the help of the GTAP 
model. This chapter also deals with the possible impacts on China of the introduction of 
the labeling of GM products. Dr. Frank van Tongeren, Dr. Jikun Huang, Dr. Hans van Me-
ijl, and Dr. Li Ninghui wrote the chapter. 
  Chapter 8 deals with trade and foreign direct investments (FDI), and describes the 
Chinese trade in food and agricultural products as well as FDI in the Chinese agricultural 
sector as a part of global trade and FDI. There is a special focus on the relations between 
China and the Netherlands. Some opportunities for trade with China and for FDI in China 
are identified. The authors of this chapter are Dr. Xiaoyong Zhang and Mr. Jaap Post.  
  Lastly Mr. Jaap Post wrote Chapter 1, the summary and the conclusions. Besides he 
did a large part of the editing in cooperation with Mrs. Tania Ravensbergen. 
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Agricultural development and food security are among the central issues of concern of pol-
icy makers in many developing countries, including China. However, the progress made in 
developing countries differs across regions and among countries. China is one of the most 
interesting cases to explore when studying agricultural development. For the past 25 years, 
the annual rate of growth of agriculture at the national level has been about four times 
higher than that of population growth. In contrast to many earlier analysts who expected 
China to become more dependent on agricultural imports as a result of the rapid industri-
alization and liberalization of its economy, net food import growth has not occurred. In 
fact, even after more than 20 years of reforms and rapid growth, China continues to be a 
net exporter of food and agricultural products (NSBC, 1981-2002). 
  At the micro level, China has also made remarkable progress during the last 20 years 
in improving household agricultural production and food security and in reducing the inci-
dence of malnutrition. According to China's measure of poverty, the incidence of rural 
poverty fell from over 30 percent in the late 1970s to around 10 percent in 1990, and to 
only 3 percent in 2001 (NSBC, 2002).  
  Successful past efforts, however, do not guarantee future agricultural production 
growth and food security. While most recent studies have concluded that the increases in 
China's food and grain imports will not starve the rest of the world, China still faces an 
enormous challenge to supply its growing population with high-quality, reasonably priced 
food and to steadily increase rural income in the future (World Bank, 1997). Agricultural 
productivity growth and the availability of resources (i.e. water and land) for agricultural 
production will determine the extent of China's ability to feed itself in the future, because 
rapid industrialization and urbanization will lead to competition for resources between ag-
ricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  
  Recent events have brought the agricultural development issue even more to the fore-
front of the agenda of many policy makers. China's recent accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) promises many changes. It will undoubtedly make China's agricul-
tural economy even more dynamic. Moreover, before there was time to analyze the 
impacts of the nation's accession, the Doha Ministerial Conference launched a new round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. Trade negotiators have been given a mandate in the next 
round of WTO negotiations to further liberalize the world economy, including agriculture.  
  Several key questions arise for policy makers when they address the challenge of 
how to increase farm income and food security. What is the current status of agricultural 
development? What policies have contributed to or hindered agricultural production 
growth and farm income in the past? Can the successful policies of the past be continued in 
the future? What are the major constraints and challenges faced by China's agricultural sec-
tor? How will trade liberalization affect China's agricultural production, domestic market 
and national household food security? How can China formulate effective policies to   27
achieve the sustainable growth of agricultural supply and productivity, farm income and 
food security in the decades ahead?  
  The aim of this chapter is to answer some of the above questions, that is, to evaluate 
the performance of the agricultural sector, review the role of policies in agricultural devel-
opment and identify the key issues related to agricultural production that need further 
interventions. In section 2 an overview of the national's economy, including agricultural 
and rural sectors, is provided. Section 3 presents an evaluation of the previous achieve-
ments and sources of growth in agricultural production and food security in China. Section 
4 contains a review of China's development strategies and policies and the reforms it has 
pursued in order to increase agricultural productivity and farm income. The impacts of re-
forms on agricultural production incentive, trade, market integration and rural labor 
employment are evaluated in section 5, which concludes this chapter.  
 
 
2.2  An Overview of National Economy and Agricultural Growth 
 
2.2.1 Economic Performance 
 
Since the late 1970s, remarkable progress has been made in the performance of the agricul-
tural sector, even though its growth rate does not match that of the overall economy; 
growth in all sectors are highly correlated with the periods in which China's leaders im-
plemented the various reform measures that have gradually liberalized the institutional and 
market structure of the economy (Table 2.1). Although there is a cyclical pattern in China's 
growth rates (Figure 2.1), the Chinese economy outperformed almost all other countries in 
Asia. Indeed, China has been one of the fastest growing countries in the world since 1980 
(World Bank, 2002). The rapid growth has been accompanied by sharp structural changes 
in the economy. Whereas agriculture accounted for more than 30 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP) prior to the economic reforms of 1979, by 2000 the share of agriculture had 
fallen to 16% (Table 2.2).  
 
Economic Growth Before the Early 1990s 
In the early reform period, annual GDP growth rates increased dramatically from 4.9 per-
cent in 1970-78 to 8.8 percent in 1979-84 (Table 2.1). During this period, as economic 
growth and family planning effectively lowered the nation's population growth rates, the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita more than doubled between the pre-reform period 
(1970-78: 3.1 percent) and 1979-84 (7.1 percent). During the early reform period, also the 
growth in the agricultural economy was remarkable (7.1 percent annually, Table 2.1), 
which provided the foundation for the successful transformation of China's reform econ-
omy (Perkins, 1992). 
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Table 2.1  The annual growth rates (%) of the Chinese economy, 1970-2000 
 
 
 Pre-reform  Reform  period 
    
  1970-78 1979-84 1985-95  1996-2000 
 
 
Gross domestic products  4.9  8.8  9.7  8.2 
 Agriculture  2.7  7.1  4.0  3.4 
 Industry  6.8  8.2  12.8  9.6 
 Service  n/a  11.6  9.7  8.2 
       
Foreign Trade  20.5  14.3  15.2  9.8 
       
 Import  21.7  12.7  13.4  9.5 
 Export  19.4  15.9 17.2  10.0 
       
Rural enterprises output   n/a  12.3  24.1  14.0 
       
Population 1.80  1.40  1.37  0.90 
       
Per capita GDP  3.1  7.1  8.3  7.1 
 
 
Note: the figure for GDP in 1970-78 is the growth rate of national income in real terms. Growth rates were 
computed using the regression method. 
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Figure 2.1  Annual growth rate (%) of GDP, 1979-2001 
Source: NSBC, 2002. 
 
  After reaching its peak growth in 1984 (15 percent), the pattern of rapid economic 
growth continued into the later reform period in the late 1980s (Figure 2.1). In fact, growth 
may have been too fast. In response to an overheated economy and unprecedented inflation 
rates, China's leaders were forced in the late 1980s to adopt a set of stringent, macro-
economic contraction policies (Naughton, 1995). As a consequence, after two years of high 
inflation, in 1989-1990 the economic growth slowed sharply. The annual GDP rate in 
1989-1990 reached only about 4 percent, the lowest rate in the entire reform period. After   29
the brief slowdown, the government responded promptly by implementing a series of pol-
icy measures to stimulate the economy through the use of fiscal and financial expansions, 
the devaluation of the exchange rate, the expansion of special economic zones and the im-
position of higher agricultural prices. The economy soon rebounded: the annual GDP 
growth rate increased to 14 percent in 1992 and then remained steady at 10-13 percent in 
1993-96 (Figure 2.1). While the economy was growing at top speed during the mid 1990s, 
inflation rates increased again (Figure 2.2). 
 
 
Table 2.2  Changes in the structure (%) of the Chinese economy, 1970-2000 
  1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Share  in  GDP        
  -  Agriculture  40 30 28 27 20 16 
  -  Industry  46 49 43 42 49 51 
  -  Services  13 21 29 31 31 33 
Share  in  employment        
  -  Agriculture  81 69 62 60 52 50 
  -  Industry  10 18 21 21 23  22.5 
  -  Services  9 13 17 19 25  27.5 
S h a r e   i n   e x p o r t         
  -  Primary  products  n/a 50 51 26 14 10 
  -  Foods  n/a 17 14 11  7  5 
Share  in  import        
  -  Primary  products  n/a 35 13 19 18 21 
  -  Foods  n/a  15 4 6 5 2 
Share  of  rural  population  83 81 76 74 71 64 




Recent Economic Growth 
Although the economy was growing rapidly in the mid 1990s, inflation was high and in or-
der to avoid a repetition of the economic slowdown that occurred in the late 1980s, China's 
leaders implemented a range of measures aimed at achieving a soft landing (Zhu and 
Brandt, 2001). As before, financial and credit policies were tightened, and administrative 
controls over new investments were implemented. To keep the economy from flagging too 
much, China's leaders increased urban wages and invested heavily in agriculture in an at-
tempt to counterbalance the contraction measures. The growth decelerated gradually, but 
unlike in the late 1980s, it slowed only marginally. During the late 1990s, annual economic 
growth remained high, namely at about 8 percent (Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.2  Annual changes (%) in agricultural output, input and consumer price indices, 1979-2001 




Throughout the reform era, foreign trade has been expanding even more rapidly than GDP. 
Annual growth rates of foreign trade reached nearly 15 percent in both the 1980s and the 
early 1990s (Table 2.1). Although the Asian economic crisis adversely affected China's 
foreign trade growth rate, it still grew at nearly 10 percent a year between 1996 and 2000. 
During 2000 and 2001, the average annual growth rate of foreign trade reached 19 percent. 
Although the growth rate of agricultural exports declined, so did those of all other Asian 
countries. Most observers believe the slower growth rates occurred because of the de-
pressed world commodity markets and the general slowdown of the world economy (ADB, 
2002). 
  With the rapid growth of China's external sector, foreign trade has been playing an 
increasing role in the national economy since the beginning of the reforms in the late 
1970s. China's trade to GDP ratio increased from less than 13 percent in 1980 to 45 percent 
in 2001 (NSBC, 2002). During the same period, the total value of China's primary goods 
trade (mainly agricultural products) increased from USD 16.1 billion to USD 72.1 billion, 
an annual growth rate of 7.4 percent (NSBC, 2002). Now that China has joined the WTO, 
the growth of foreign trade is likely to remain high and even accelerate in the coming 
years. 
 
Inflation and Agricultural Prices 
Over the past two and a half decades, China's consumer prices have increased by about 400 
percent. Prices underwent two periods of notably high inflation, namely 1988-89 (an aver-
age of 18 percent) and 1993-95 (19 percent) (Figure 2.2). During the rest of the years of 
the reform period between 1979 and 2001, the average inflation rate was only 3.6 percent 
(NSBC, 2002). During both periods of high inflation, efforts to control the increasing 
prices proved to be effective. The price inflation in 1988-89 was quickly reduced to 2.1 
percent in 1990 and to 2.9 percent in 1991. Likewise the high inflation rates in 1993-95 
were rapidly reduced to 8.3 percent in 1996 and to 2.8 percent in 1997. Indeed, during re-  31
cent years China has experienced a negative rate of inflation (in 1998-99) and one that was 
almost zero (0.4% in 2000 and 0.7% in 2001). 
  The changes of agricultural input and output prices followed the same pattern experi-
enced in the rest of the economy (CPI, Figure 2.2). Despite these similarities, the terms of 
trade have varied from period to period. To promote agricultural production, agricultural 
procurement prices had been increased continuously until the late 1980s. During this pe-
riod, the real prices of agricultural output increased more than those of agricultural inputs. 
Rising terms of trade provided a favorable policy environment and high incentives to 
farmers (Swinnen and Rozelle, 2003). In contrast, agricultural output prices have declined 
more than input prices in all years since the late 1980s (with the exception of 1994), even 
though the real prices of agricultural inputs underwent a slight decline.  
 
Agricultural and Non-agricultural Employment 
The structural changes in the economy have had a substantial impact on employment. 
While the share of employment accounted for by the industrial sector has remained at 
about 40-50 percent for the last three decades, employment in the service sector increased 
rapidly from 13 percent in 1970 to 21 percent when the economic reforms were started 
(Table 2.2). By 2000, the share of employment accounted for by the service sector had 
reached 33 percent. During this period, employment in the agricultural sector (including 
part-time agricultural labor) fell from 81% in 1970 to 69% in 1980 (Table 2.2). Employ-
ment in agriculture has continued to fall throughout the reform era, reaching about 50 
percent in 2000. In the late 1990s, more than 40 percent of the rural labor force was em-
ployed in the non-agricultural sector (de Brauw et al., 2002). A large and increasing part of 
the rural labor force is self-employed (the rate increased from 8% in 1990 to 13% in 2000; 
de Brauw et al., 2002). In addition it has to be mentioned that a recent survey suggests that 
more than 100 million rural workers found employment in the urban sector in the late 
1990s (de Brauw et al., 2002). Expanding non-agricultural employment has contributed 
substantially to the growth of farm income (Rozelle, 1996). Non-agricultural income ex-
ceeded agricultural income in 2000 for the first time, accounting for just over 50 percent of 
the total income of farmers. In 2001, the share increased to 51 percent (NSBC, 2002).  
 
2.2.2 Challenges and Development Objectives 
 
While China is often recognized as of one the most rapidly growing economies in the 
world, its economy is facing a number of challenges. The nation's high-growth economy is 
currently suffering from an increasing inventory, excess capacity and weak aggregate de-
mand. The economy's success in creating new jobs in the nation's urban and rural 
enterprises has slowed (CNBS, 2002). Rural income growth has also slowed since the mid 
1990s, as both agricultural prices and the growth of employment in the off-farm sector de-
clined.    32
Table 2.3  Per capita income changes for the rural and the poorest 20% of the population, 1980-2001 










1980 100  100 1.97  0.24 3.4
1985 175  157 2.20  0.23 2.2
1990 183  154 2.34  0.31 2.3
1995 239  179 2.62  0.34 2.8
2000 317  219 2.85  0.35 2.8
2001 330  224 2.89  0.32 2.9
Source: CNSB, various editions and rural household income and expenditure surveys conducted by CNSB. 
 
 
  The rapid economic growth has been accompanied by increasing income disparity 
(World Bank, 1997). The income gap among regions, between urban and rural, and among 
households in the same location has been continually increasing since the mid 1980s (Ta-
ble 2.3). The rural to urban income ratio exceeds 3.4, the level it was at in 1980. Although 
the rural reforms increased rural incomes at a faster pace than urban ones during the 1980s, 
since the one-off impact of the institutional reforms was exhausted in the mid 1980s, urban 
income growth has been consistently higher than that of the rural sector. Recent falls in ag-
ricultural prices and the slowdown in the growth of off-farm employment have further 
constrained rural income growth.  
  Income disparities have also increased in rural areas (World Bank, 1997). On aver-
age, per capita rural income increased by 330 percent between 1980 and 2001 (Table 2.3). 
While the income levels of the poorer farmers (the bottom 20 percent of the population) 
increased by 224 percent, this growth was more than 30 percent less than the national aver-
age. Rising Gini coefficients, which increased from 0.24 in 1980 to 0.35 in 2000 and 0.32 
in 2001, illustrate the increasing income disparity among rural residents in 2001 (Table 
2.3). 
  In response to the sluggish growth of rural incomes and widening disparities, the 
government has taken a number of policy actions. The major policies implemented include 
providing investments to assist in the restructuring of the economy, privatizing rural enter-
prises, reforming financial institutions, easing monetary policy, increasing fiscal spending 
on R&D and infrastructure investment, and increasing aid to poor areas, including imple-
menting the western development plan. The efforts have not been minimal. For example, 
fiscal spending on infrastructure increased by CNY 100 billion in 1998, CNY 110 billion 
in 1999 and CNY 150 billion in 2000 (ADB, 2002). Investments were targeted at stimulat-
ing demand and at increasing the efficiency of the nation's business environment. The 
government spending plan will be continued for the next fine years.  
  Despite the significant reduction of rural poverty during the past two and a half dec-
ades (Table 2.4), China's fight against poverty is far from over. Recently China issued a 
new 10-year Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2000-2010, focused on assisting the 30 mil-
lion rural people with an income under the official poverty line (an annual income of CNY 
625 per capita). It is worth noting that the official poverty line was established in the mid 
1980s and is substantially lower than the international norm. The World Bank estimates   33
that in the late 1990s, over 18 percent of China's population lived below the international 
norm (i.e. about USD 1 per day; World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2002).  
 
 
Table 2.4  Rural poverty in China, 1978-2001 
Year   Absolute  poverty  (millions) Incidence  (%) 
1978   260  32.9 
1979   239  30.2 
1980   218  27.6 
1981   194  24.4 
1982   140  17.5 
1983   123  15.3 
1984   89  11.0 
1985   96  11.9 
1986   97  11.9 
1987   91  11.2 
1988   86  10.4 
1989   102  11.6 
1990   85  9.4 
1991   94  11.0 
1992   80  8.8 
1993   75  8.3 
1994   70  7.7 
1995   65  7.1 
1996   58  6.3 
1997   50  5.4 
1998   42  4.6 
1999   34  3.9 
2000   32  3.4 
2001   29  3.2 
Sources: the data for 1978-1988 are from World Bank (China: Strategies for Reducing Poverty in the 1990s, 
1992); the 1989-2001 data are from Rural Social and Economic Survey Service of CNSB (2002). 
 
 
  In the midst of the rural income slowdown, the accession of China to the WTO has 
raised new concerns about China's food security. While most studies show that China's 
WTO accession may contribute to GDP growth, policy makers worry about the negative 
effect on the service and agricultural sectors. The main concern is whether or not China's 
small farmers can compete in international markets. 
  In this environment, food security has been and will continue to be a central goal of 
China's agricultural policy. Both the Tenth Five-year Plan for 2001-2005 and the National 
Long-term Economic Plan for the coming 15 years call for the continued expansion of ag-
ricultural production and increases in farm income growth. The nation's commitment to 
eliminate absolute poverty is also reaffirmed. Our review of recent policy changes shows 
that China has already positively responded to the challenges that confront it as a result of 
its accession to the WTO (Huang and Rozelle, 2002). If done well, China's policies can 
play an important role in improving its food security and in helping the nation to achieve 
its other development goals.   34
2.3  Role and Performance of Agriculture 
 
2.3.1 The Changing Role of Agriculture in the Economy 
 
The average annual growth rate of agriculture has been about 5 percent throughout the re-
form period (Table 2.1). Despite the expansion of agriculture, the even faster growth of the 
industrial and service sectors during the reform era has begun to transform the rural econ-
omy from one based on agricultural production to one focused on industry.  
  Successive transformations of China's reform economy are based on economic 
growth in the agricultural sector (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). During this process, the share 
of agriculture in the national economy has declined significantly. Agriculture has made 
important but declining contributions to national economic development in terms of gross 
value added, employment, capital accumulation, urban welfare, foreign exchange earnings 
and poverty alleviation. Before 1980, agriculture contributed more than 30 percent of the 
nation's GDP and half of its export earnings. By the mid 1990s, the share of agriculture in 
the economy and the share of agricultural exports in total exports fell below 20 percent 
(Table 2.2). In 2000 agriculture's share of GDP was only 16 percent.  
  The shifts in the economy can also be seen in employment (NSBC, 2001): agricul-
ture employed 81 percent of the labor force in 1970, but only 50 percent in 2000. Such a 
sharp shift in the structure of employment shows that China is shifting from a rural-based 
to an urban-based society. 
  The declining importance of agriculture is historically common to all developing 
economies. China is densely populated; farm sizes averaged less than one ha as early as the 
1950s. Population growth and limited land resources will shift China's comparative advan-
tage from land-intensive economic activities (e.g. agriculture) to labor-intensive 
manufacturing and industrial activities (Anderson 1990).  
 
2.3.2 Agricultural Production Performance  
 
Growth Patterns 
The growth of agricultural production in China since the 1950s has been one of the main 
accomplishments of the country's development and national food security policies. Except 
during the famine years of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the country has enjoyed rates of 
production growth that have outpaced the increase in population. 
  After 1978, decollectivization, price increases and the relaxation of trade restrictions 
on most agricultural products accompanied the take-off of China's agricultural economy. 
Between 1978 and 1984, grain production increased by 4.7 percent per year and the output 
of fruit increased by 7.2 percent (Table 2.5). The highest annual growth rates were in the 
oilseed, livestock and aquatic product sectors; these sectors expanded in real value terms 
by 14.9, 9.1 and 7.9 percent, respectively. 
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Table 2.5  Annual growth rates (%) of the agricultural economy by commodity,  
  1970-2000 
Commodity  Pre-reform   Reform  period 
 1970-78 1978-84 1985-95  1996-2000
Grain total  
 Production   2.8 4.7
 
1.7 0.03
 Sown area  0.0 -1.1 -0.1  -0.14
 Yield  2.8 5.8 1.8  0.17
Rice    
 Production   2.5 4.5 0.6  0.3
 Sown area  0.7 -0.6 -0.6  -0.5
 Yield  1.8 5.1 1.2  0.8
Wheat  
 Production  7.0 8.3 1.9  -0.4
 Sown area  1.7 -0.0 0.1  -1.4
 Yield  5.2 8.3 1.8  1.0
Maize    
 Production  7.4 3.7 4.7  -0.1
 Sown area  3.1 -1.6 1.7  0.8
 Yield  4.2 5.4 2.9  -0.9
Cotton   
Production -0.4 19.3 -0.3  -1.9
 Sown area  -0.2 6.7 -0.3  -6.1
 Yield  -0.2 11.6 -0.0  4.3
Soybean  
 Production  -2.3 5.2 2.8  2.6
 Sown area  -2.2 1.1 0.8  2.5
 Yield  -0.1 4.1 2.0  0.1
   
Edible oil crops  2.1 14.9 4.4  5.6
Rapeseed  
 Production  4.3 17.3 5.4  2.6
 Sown area  6.4 7.2 4.3  1.4
 Yield  -2.0 10.1 1.1  1.2
   
Vegetable area  2.4 5.4 6.8  9.5
Fruits   
Orchards area  8.1 4.5 10.4  1.5
Outputs 6.6 7.2 12.7  8.6
   
Total cash crop area   2.4 5.1 2.1  3.5
   
Meats (pork/beef/poultry)  4.4 9.1 8.8  6.5
Fishery 5.0 7.9 13.7  10.2
   
Note: growth rates were computed using the regression method. Growth rates of individual and groups of 
commodities are based on production data; sector growth rates refer to value added in real terms. 
Sources: CNSB, 1980-2001 and MAO, 1980-2001. 
 
 
  However, as by the mid 1980s the one-off efficiency gains from the shift to the 
household responsibility system (HRS) essentially had been reaped, the growth rate of the 
food and agricultural sectors decelerated (Table 2.5). The declining trend was most pro-
nounced for grain crops. While dropping below the rate of growth generated in both the   36
pre-reform and the early reform periods, the production of rice, other grains and cash crops 
has continued to expand since 1985 (Table 2.5). In the meantime, rapid economic growth, 
urbanization and food market development have boosted the demand for meats, fruits and 
other non-staple foods, changes that have stimulated sharp shifts in the structure of agricul-
ture (Huang and Bouis, 1996; Huang and Rozelle, 1998). For example, the share of 
livestock output value more than doubled (from 14 to 30 percent) between 1970 and 2000 
(Table 2.6). Aquatic products increased even more rapidly. One of the most significant 
signs of structural changes in the agricultural sector is that the share of cropping in total ag-
ricultural output fell from 82 to 56 percent. 
 
 
Table 2.6  Changes in the structure (%) of China's agricultural economy, 1970-2000 
  1970 1980 1985 1990 1995  2000 
Share in agricultural output         
  Crop  82 76 69 65 58  56 
  Livestock  14 18 22 26 30  30 
  Fishery  2 2 3 5 8  11 
  Forestry  2 4 5 4 3  4 




  In the cropping sector, the importance of the three major crops, rice, wheat and 
maize, have waxed and waned. The share of the major cereal grains in sown area increased 
from 50 percent in 1970 to a peak level of 57 percent in 1990, and then gradually declined 
to less that 50 percent in 2001 (Table 2.7). Most of the fall has been due to the decreasing 
wheat-sown area. The area share of rice declined marginally. In contrast, the sown area of 
maize grew by about 50 percent between 1970 and 2000 (Table 2.7). The increase in maize 
area - China's main feed grain - is correlated in no small way with the rapid expansion of 
the nation's livestock production during the same period.  
  In addition to maize area expansion, other cash crops such as vegetables, edible oil 
crops, sugar crops and tobacco have expanded. In the 1970s, vegetables accounted for only 
about 2 percent of total crop area; by 2001, the share had risen to 10 percent (Table 2.7). 
The area share of edible oil also grew by 200-300 percent. 
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Table 2.7  Share of crop-sown areas, 1970-2001 
  1970 1980 1985 1990 1995  2000  2001 
           
Rice  22.1 23.1 21.9 22.3 20.5  19.2  18.5 
Wheat  17.4 19.7 20.0 20.7 19.3  17.1  15.8 
Maize  10.8 13.7 12.1 14.4 15.2  14.8  15.6 
Soybean  5.5 4.9 5.3 5.1 5.4  6.0  6.1 
Sweet  potato 5.9 5.1 4.2 4.2 4.1  3.7  3.3 
Cotton  3.4 3.4 3.5 3.8 3.6  2.6  3.1 
Rapeseed  1.0 1.9 3.1 3.7 4.6  4.8  4.6 
Peanut  1.2 1.6 2.3 2.0 2.5  3.1  3.2 
Sugar  crops  0.4 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.3  1.0  1.1 
Tobacco 0.2  0.3  0.9 0.9 0.9  0.8 0.8 
Vegetable  2.0 2.2 3.2 4.3 6.3  9.7  10.5 
Others  30.1 23.5 22.5 17.4 16.3  17.2  17.4 
Total  100 100 100 100 100  100  100 




Sources of Growth 
Past studies have demonstrated that there are a number of factors that have simultaneously 
contributed to agricultural production growth during the reform period. The earliest em-
pirical efforts focused on measuring the contribution of the implementation of the HRS 
(McMillan et al. 1989; Fan, 1991; Lin, 1992). These studies concluded that most of the in-
crease in productivity in the early reform years was a result of institutional innovations, 
particularly the HRS, which gave individual farmers control and income rights in agricul-
ture.  
  More recent studies show that since the HRS was completed in 1984, technological 
change has been the primary engine of agricultural growth (Huang and Rozelle, 1996; Fan, 
1997; Fan and Pardey, 1997; Huang et al., 1996). Improvements in technology contributed 
by far the largest share of crop production growth even during the early reform period. The 
results of these studies show that further reforms outside the decollectivization process also 
have high potential for affecting agricultural growth. Price policy has been shown to have a 
sharp influence on the growth (and deceleration) of both grain and cash crops during the 
post-reform period. Favorable output to input price ratios contributed to the rapid growth in 
the early 1980s. However, this new market force is a double-edged sword. A deteriorating 
price ratio caused by slowly increasing output prices in the face of sharply increasing input 
prices was an important factor behind the slowdown in agricultural production in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s. Rising wages and the higher opportunity cost of land have also 
held back the growth of grain output throughout the period, and that of cash crops since 
1985. 
  Irrigation has played a critical role in establishing the highly productive agronomic 
systems in China (Wang, 2000). The proportion of cultivated area under irrigation in-
creased from 18 per cent in 1952 to approximately 50 percent in the early 1990s. (NSBC, 
2001). However, increasing demand for domestic and industrial water uses poses a serious 
threat to irrigated agriculture, and increasing water scarcity is now seen as a major threat to 
the future food security and well-being of people especially in the northern region. Wang 
and colleagues (1993) show that the water management reform has helped increase the ef-  38
ficiency of water use in northern China, although the scope for such reform in the long run 
is somewhat limited. 
  Trends in environmental degradation - including erosion, salinization and the loss of 
cultivated land - suggest that considerable stress is being put on the agricultural land base. 
Erosion and salinization have increased since the 1970s, and the area of land under cultiva-
tion has decreased. A number of recent studies (Huang and Rozelle, 1995; Huang et al., 
1996) have shown that these factors affect the output of rice, other grains and other agricul-
tural products. 
 
2.3.3 Agricultural Trade Performance 
 
Although agricultural production was growing rapidly, agricultural trade was growing even 
more rapidly. Agricultural trade (both imports and exports) nearly tripled between 1980 
and 1995 (Table 2.8). During this period, exports increased faster than imports. Since the 
early 1980s, China has been a net food exporter.  
  In the same way that trade liberalization has affected growth in the domestic econ-
omy (Lardy, 2001), changes in the external economy have affected the nature of China's 
trade patterns (Huang and Chen, 1999). Whereas the share of primary (mainly agricultural) 
products in total exports was over 50 percent in 1980, it fell to only 10 percent in 2000 
(Table 2.2). In the same period, the share of food exports in total exports fell from 17 to 5 
percent. During the same period, the share of food imports fell from 15 to 2 percent.  
  Product-specific trade trends reveal equally sharp shifts and suggest that exports and 
imports are increasingly moving in a direction that shows that China is trading goods in a 
manner that is consistent with its comparative advantages (Table 2.8). In general, the net 
exports of land-intensive bulk commodities - such as grains, oilseeds and sugar crops - 
have decreased (or imports have increased). At the same time, exports of higher-valued, 
more labor-intensive products - such as horticultural and animal (including aquaculture) 
products - have increased. Grain exports, nearly one third of food exports in the mid 1980s, 
were less than 10 percent of what they were during most years of the 1990s. By the late 
1990s, horticultural, animal and aquatic products accounted for 70-80 percent of food ex-
ports (Huang and Chen, 1999; Table 2.8). 
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Table 2.8  Structure of China's food and feed trade (USD millions), 1980 to 1999 
  SITC 1980 1985 1990  1995  1999 
E x p o r t s :           
  Live  animals  00 384 304 430  473  374 
  Meat  01 361 448 791 1349 1054 
  Dairy  products  02 71 57 55  61  71 
  Fish  03 380 283  1370 2875 2969 
  Grains  04 423  1065 614  281 1273 
 Fruit and vegetable  05  746  825  1759  3399  3150 
  Sugar  06 221  79 317  321  214 
 Coffee and tea  07  328  435  534  523  561 
 Animal feeds  08  58  241  623  351  239 
  Other  foods  09 49 66  107 290 541 
Oilseeds  22 n/a n/a n/a  522  373 
  Vegetable  oils  4 n/a n/a n/a  454  132 
  Total  food   3021 3803 6600 10,899 10,951 
          
Imports:          
 Live animals  00  5  18  14  18  22 
  Meat  01 1 6  54 97  503 
  Dairy  products  02  5 31 81  60 160 
  Fish  03 13 44  102 609 890 
  Grains  04 2458  982 2353  3631  574 
  Fruit  and  vegetable  05 48 52 83 185 384 
  Sugar  06 316 274 390  935  183 
 Coffee and tea  07  56  40  30  74  72 
 Animal feeds  08  14  83  182  423  620 
  Other  foods  09  2 23 46  92 182 
  Oilseeds  22 n/a n/a n/a  110 1531 
  Vegetable  oils  4 n/a n/a n/a 2596 1352 
  Total  food   2918 1553 3335  8828  6474 
          
N e t   e x p o r t s :           
  Live  animals  00 379 286 416  455  352 
  Meat  01 360 442 737 1252  551 
  Dairy  products  02 66 26  -26  1  -89 
  Fish  03 367 239  1268 2266 2079 
  Grains  04 -2035  83 -1939  -3350  663 
 Fruit and vegetable  05  698  773  1676  3214  2766 
  Sugar  06 -95  -195 -73 -614  31 
 Coffee and tea  07  272  395  504  449  489 
 Animal feeds  08  44  158  441  -72  -381 
  Other  foods  09 47 43 61 198 359 
  Oilseeds  22 n/a n/a n/a  412  -1158 
  Vegetable  oils  4 n/a n/a n/a  -2142  -1220 
 Total food    103  2250  3265  2071  4477 
Source: Mathews (2002), based on UN COMTRADE statistics. 
 
 
2.3.4 Food Security 
 
Food security at the macro national level implies that adequate supplies of food are avail-
able through domestic production and/or through imports to meet the consumption needs 
of the country's population. China's per capita food consumption has increased substan-  40
tially over last three decades. Per capita food availability increased from 1717 kcal in the 
early 1960s to 2328 kcal per day in 1979-81 (Table 2.9). By the late 1990s, per capita food 
availability reached more than 3000 kcal per day, a level near to that achieved in most de-
veloped countries. During the same period (between the 1960s and late 1990s), other 
indicators of nutrition also improved. For example, protein intake and fat consumption 
measures on a per capita per day basis increased significantly. Protein intake increased 
from 45 to 84 grams, and fat consumption increased from 17 to 82 grams. Table 2.9 also 
shows that most of the improvement in the quality of China's diet has been achieved since 
1980. In the early 1960s, nearly 96 percent of calories came from grains and other non-
livestock products. By the 1990s, the reliance on non-meat food products had been reduced 
to about 81 percent. During the same period, the share of calories contributed by animal 
products increased from 4 to 19 percent . Similar trends during the last four decades can be 
established for the changing sources of protein and fats. 
 
 
Table 2.9  Per capita supply and sources of calories, protein and fat per day in China, 1961-2000 
 1961-1963  1969-1971  1979-1981  1989-1991  1998-2000 
Supply            
Calories 1716.7  1993.3  2328.0  2683.3  3033.0 
Protein (grams)  44.8  47.5  54.5  65.0  84.3 
Fat (grams)  16.8  23.5  32.5  53.0  81.9 
Sources (%)           
Calories          
 -Vegetable products   95.9  94.1  92.6  88.4  81.3 
 -Animal products  4.1  5.9  7.4  11.6  18.7 
Protein          
 -Vegetable products   90.5  87.9  86.4  77.7  65.6 
 -Animal products  9.5  12.1  13.6  22.3  34.4 
Fat          
 -Vegetable products   66.1  56.8  53.4  49.0  41.4 
 -Animal products  33.9  43.2  46.6  51.0  58.6 
Sources: FAO database. 
 
 
  At the micro level, household or individual food security depends on a number of 
factors. These are mostly related to various forms of entitlements to income- and food-
producing assets, as well as to the links between domestic and external markets, and the 
transmission effects of the latter on small, low-income and resource-poor producers and 
consumers.  
  Access to food in China has changed over time. In the early years of the reform, de-
collectivization policies gave all farm households in China a piece of land. During this 
time, however, markets did not function well (de Brauw et al., 2003). As a result, most 
farmers produced primarily for their own subsistence. Access to food was primarily 
through the land that was allocated to them by the state. 
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2.4  The Reform Experience 
 
The focus of this section is on China's major reforms, as this will provide a better under-
standing of the policy initiatives that have helped create China's agricultural economy and 
the environment in which the nation is trying to achieve a degree of food security. The re-
form strategy will be examined by looking at its various components, their implementation 
and the objectives of and rationality for each reform component. How the reforms have af-
fected agricultural performance and food security will also be examined. 
 
2.4.1 Institutional Reform 
 
China's rural economic reform, first initiated in 1979, was founded on the HRS. The HRS 
reforms dismantled the communes and contracted agricultural land to households, mostly 
on the basis of family size and number of people in the household's labor force.  
  The HRS reforms were completed in 1984. At their conclusion, the average farm size 
in terms of cultivated land was about 0.6 ha. Because of regional variations in land en-
dowments, however, the size of farms varies among regions, ranging from over 1 ha in the 
northeast and nearly 1 ha in northern China, to about 0.5 ha in the southwest and 0.2-0.3 ha 
in southern China. Because the multiple cropping index (the number of crops planted each 
year on the same plot of land) increases from 1 (= 1 per year) in the northeast to 2-3 in 
southern China, variations of sown area among China's regions are less than those of farm 
size.  
  China's land rights are both complicated and changing (Brandt et al., 2002). The first 
term of the land contract was 15 years. During this time, although the ownership of the 
land remained with the collective, income and control rights were given to the farmers. The 
effects of such a land policy on the equitable distribution of land to farmers and its effect 
on food security and poverty alleviation have been both obvious and well documented. The 
land policy has also contributed greatly to efficiency. Specifically, the income and control 
rights contributed significantly to the agricultural production and productivity growth in 
the early 1980s (Lin, 1992; Huang and Rozelle, 1996). Huang, Rosegrant and Rozelle 
(1996) demonstrate that agricultural output and yields grew as a direct result of decollec-
tivization. 
  Although local leaders were supposed to have given farmers land for 15 years in the 
early 1980s and for 30 years as from the late 1990s, the collective ownership of land has 
resulted in the frequent reallocation of village land. Many people are concerned that such 
moves by local leaders could result in insecure tenure and negative effects on investment 
(Brandt et al., 2002). Many authors have shown, however, that in fact there has been little 
effect on either short- or long-term land productivity. Officials are still concerned that col-
lective ownership and weak alienation and transfer rights could have other effects, such as 
impacts on migration and rural credit (Johnson, 1995). As a result, China recently passed a 
new land law, the Rural Land Contract Law (which came into effect on 1 March 2003), 
which is intended to greatly increase tenure security.  
  Above all, the government is now searching for a mechanism that will allow those 
who stay in farming to gain access to additional cultivated land and to increase their in-
come and competitiveness. Even without much legal protection, over the past decade, 
researchers are finding increasingly more land in China is rented in and out (Brandt et al.,   42
2002). In order to accelerate this process, the new Rural Land Contract Law further clari-
fies the rights for transfer and exchange of contracted land. The new legislation also allows 
family members to inherit the land during the contracted period. The aim of this new set of 
policies is to encourage farmers to use their land more efficiently and to increase their farm 
size.  
 
2.4.2 Input Price and Marketing Policies 
 
The reforms in fertilizer, seed and other input markets follow China's gradual reform strat-
egy (Huang, Rozelle and Hu, 1997). In the first stage, reformers only implemented 
measures that provided incentives to sets of individuals and for less important commodi-
ties, and did not alter the institutional structure that had been set up to provide abundant 
and inexpensive food to the urban economy. Decollectivization and administrative output 
price hikes improved incentives to farmers. China's leaders, who remained responsible for 
meeting the same ambitious food sector goals, made few adjustments to the rest of the rural 
economy in the early 1980s, leaving machinery, fertilizer and the seed systems virtually 
unchanged and heavily planned. Since the mid 1980s, the market liberalization has been 
gradually implemented, starting with machinery, and pesticides. The meaningful liberaliza-
tion of strategically important inputs, such as fertilizer, occurred only in the early 1990s. 
The reform of the seed industry did not begin until the late 1990s. 
 
Fertilizers 
Throughout most of the 1980s, the Agricultural Inputs Corporations (AICs) - state-owned 
enterprises with local trade and retail sales monopolies - rationed subsidized fertilizers and 
controlled the flow of fertilizers into and out of each jurisdiction in almost the same way 
they had in the 1970s (Stone, 1988). In the early years of the reforms, however, poorly de-
veloped markets often meant that government sales agencies were the only viable 
marketing channel for agricultural inputs, and it is doubtful whether the input markets 
would have emerged quickly or effectively even had the sector been liberalized. The state-
owned trading arm of the AIC handled rationed and subsidized fertilizers before fertilizer 
markets were liberalized. China's leaders kept the nominal price of subsidized fertilizers 
constant throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and the state-run system dominated fertilizer 
markets even when trade was allowed. For example, urea retail prices were about CNY 
450-500 per ton between 1970 and 1985 (Huang and Rozelle, 2003). In real terms, how-
ever, urea prices declined by 50 percent between 1970 and 1990. 
  Like the rest of the economy, however, reform gradually spread to input markets (Ye 
and Rozelle, 1994). Fiscal deterioration and commercialization of the state-owned fertilizer 
industry started in the late 1980s and induced policy makers to liberalize fertilizer markets. 
Although farmers lost access to the inexpensive fertilizer from the state, when officials re-
duced the quantity of subsidized fertilizer, removed price controls and formally allowed 
private individuals to sell fertilizer, they created new opportunities for markets to develop. 
  One of the most important policy reforms was the fundamental shift in incentives 
provided to the state-owned fertilizer trading and retailing enterprises in the late 1980s and 
the early 1990s (Xiao and Fulton, 1997). Government officials offered AIC managers and 
employees the use of the system's trucks and warehouses and a share of trading profits in 
return for keeping workers on the payroll, supporting retirees and carrying out a limited   43
number of policy duties, such as keeping their local-input retail outlets open. Following a 
pattern similar to that of the grain marketing reform, a two-tiered price system was imple-
mented. Fertilizer became available at in-quota and above-quota prices. Above-quota 
prices of fertilizer were about twice as much as in-quota ones. For example, urea prices 
during the transition period of the late 1980s and early 1990s became available at a low 
price from the AIC if individuals had access to fertilizer coupons; above quota fertilizer 
was also increasingly available from private traders or from agents from the commercial-
ized branches of local AICs. The amount of fertilizer a farmer could purchase at in-quota 
prices depended on the amount of grain he sold to the government grain procurement 
agency.  
  Although there were few traders in the late 1980s, gradually the liberalization of the 
fertilizer market seemed to work well. Private traders multiplied quickly. Fertilizer became 
more available to farmers, even those in poorer areas, than ever before (Stone, 1993). Even 
the presence of the government in the fertilizer market, which could have dampened the ef-
fectiveness of markets to convey demand-driven price signals, did not slow down 
liberalization. Competition in the sales of out-of-plan fertilizer helped AIC employees to 
learn about operating outside the plan and to develop procurement and sales networks 
(Xiao and Fulton, 1997; Ye and Rozelle, 1994). Soon, AIC-based companies were compet-
ing with not only private individuals, but also each other. 
  In the early 1990s, two key decisions gave perhaps the strongest impetus to the 
emergence of competitive fertilizer markets, which initially had been less developed than 
grain markets: private trading was authorized and China's leaders issued a clear central pol-
icy document allowing other state agencies to join in the commercial fertilizer trade. 
Hence, after the implementation of the policies, and with surprisingly little disruption, fer-
tilizer markets supplanted planned distribution networks (Xiao and Fulton, 1997). 
Increasing competition improved the efficiency of markets, made traders more responsive 
to consumer demands and reduced transactions costs. Fertilizer markets, like those for 
grain, soon saw the entrance of a large number of private firms, and fertilizer availability 
became less of a concern for farmers. 
  The only perceived disruption caused by the reforms occurred only in the mid 1990s 
when the country experienced an imbalance between the supply and the demand for food 
and fertilizer. Fertilizer prices doubled between 1993 and 1996. In part, this was a result of 
China's phasing out of the in-quota fertilizer program. In part, subsidies to production units 
in China were eliminated and factory managers had to increase prices for the fertilizer that 
was being sold on the market. During this time, local, regional and national policy makers 
asked the quasi-commercialized traders and retailers to reduce their prices. China's leaders 
appealed to the commercialized AIC employees to refrain from increasing prices on the 
distribution of goods that fell under their formal areas of government-designated duty. 
However, since such policies reduced the profit margins of the commercial operations, in 
most cases policy directives were ignored. Attempts to keep locally produced fertilizers in-
side a region also met with only partial success, as the already fluid markets made it 
impossible to enforce marketing restrictions. By the late 1990s, the government was once 
again officially encouraging fertilizer market integration. After liberalization, fertilizer 
prices stabilized and then declined. At first this was due to increasing availability through 
domestic production and imports. Later, imports leveled off and most of the increase in 
supply of all but potash fertilizers came from China's own producers. As a sign of the sec-  44
tor's success in increasing supply, the retail price of urea dropped from CNY 2209/tonne in 




Efforts to build a national seed system began in the 1950s, shortly after the Communist re-
gime took control. Following several reorganizations, China's seed production and 
distribution system is now the largest in the world (Hu, 1995). The state seed supply or-
ganization (part of which has recently been commercialized) currently consists of 
approximately 2,200 county seed companies, 500 prefecture seed companies, 30 provincial 
seed companies, the National China Seed Corporation and hundreds of seed companies 
owned by the public plant-breeding and other agricultural research institutes and universi-
ties. The size of seed companies has increased over time and varies across regions. On 
average, provincial seed companies now employ 30 staff and county seed companies em-
ploy about 20; both figures represent an increase since the mid 1980s (Huang et al., 1997).  
  Over the past several decades, Ministry of Agricultural officials have developed a 
number of rules and regulatory institutions to administer the seed industry (World Bank, 
1996). In contrast to the common practices in many other countries, until the late 1990s 
policy makers limited the ownership of seed companies that produced and distributed hy-
brid rice and maize seeds to state-owned enterprises. According to the policy, the 
regulations were needed to ensure high seed quality. As part of a reform package created 
partly in response to the financial stress that affected many public agricultural research 
units, China has allowed research institutes and universities to distribute the hybrid varie-
ties they produce. In recent years, private firms have been allowed to do the same. 
According to the policy, seed companies attached to the breeding stations are only sup-
posed to sell the material they have bred in their own breeding programs.  
  Meaningful reform of the seed industry and related legislation began later than in al-
most any other sub sector, namely only after the mid 1990s. Recently, however, the laws 
governing the seed industry have been changed such that this industry in general is now 
being commercialized by encouraging the entry of new domestic firms. The law has also 
allowed foreign investment to trickle into the seed industry. In 1997, China passed its Plant 
Variety Protection Act and signed the UPOV (Union Internationale pour la Protection des 
Obtentions Vegetales; International Union for the Protection of New Plant Varieties) 
agreement. A few large Chinese firms have been allowed to raise money by selling some 
of their shares on the stock market. The latest new seed law (2000) defines the role of the 
private sector: any investor who meets the minimum requirement for capital investment 
and facilities can sell seed. Companies are now allowed to sell all crop seeds that were 
bred by public institutes. Such legislation has begun to erode the local monopolies held by 
county seed companies for so long. Companies that meet certain criteria can get permits to 
sell seed in all of the counties of a province or in all provinces in the country instead of 
having to apply to each county and province separately.  
  While significant reform has taken place, numerous constraints continue to limit the 
development of China's seed industry. Thousands of small, local seed companies dominate 
the industry. Many are publicly owned. Although markets often are competitive in a re-
gion, in some cases local markets are isolated by a number of measures adopted by local 
government. In many cases, only small local firms are able to participate. While many of   45
the firms produce, sell and distribute a number of high quality seeds, the products and ser-
vices they provide vary across regions. Not allowing farmers access to a larger selection of 
new varieties inhibits efficiency, and limiting the market size of larger firms inevitably 
harms R&D. As a consequence, the system is likely to result in the slow spread of new ma-
jor varieties across large regions. The current seed system also appears to affect the rights 
and ability of breeders to profit from the development and sale of their varieties. Seed 
regulations require the breeder to hand over parent lines and all breeding information at the 
start of the registration process. With the information in the public domain and the founda-
tion seed in the hands of seed companies, breeding institutes earn almost no revenue from 
their varieties over the long run, a factor that has reduced breeders' incentive to search for 
new breakthroughs. 
  The lack of separation between policy functions and commercial activities is one of 
the main problems facing seed industry managers, who under complete liberalization might 
take a number of positive steps to make their firms more efficient and service-oriented 
(Rozelle et al., 2000). Although prices have increased recently, in international terms they 
are still low and many international observers believe this is a major constraint on the ex-
pansion of China's seed industry (Pray et al., 1998). The prices of hybrid rice and maize 
seed in China are among the lowest in the world. China's seed companies charge rates 
similar only to seed agencies in sub-Saharan Africa, and only 30-50 percent of the price 
charged in other parts of Asia, Latin America and other developing countries (Huang et al., 
1997). Judging by the prevailing level of seed prices, the government appears to have 
achieved its goal of keeping crop seed affordable for farmers (particularly poor farmers) 
and has only just begun the process of making seed companies more profitable. However, 
it is by no means clear that the current low level of seed prices is desirable. Low seed 
prices obviously benefit farmers, but they also have several disadvantages. In an era in 
which research institutes and seed companies are being asked to help support themselves 
through commercial sales of their products, low seed prices undermine their ability to gen-
erate increased revenues. Denied opportunities to earn profits, research institutes and seed 
companies have less incentive to generate new products and/or improve their services. 
  The lack of competition in many counties and continuing subsidies for local seed 
companies may be at the root of the reform problems faced by the seed sector. Weak plant-
breeder rights have kept the research institutes from becoming serious competitors. With-
out fully commercialized county seed companies and without reducing administrative 
intervention in local seed markets, firms do not have much of an incentive to increase ser-
vices to farmers and will not search hard for innovations and cost-saving techniques. Even 
if entry restrictions were relaxed, however, high current levels of support and priority ac-
cess to new products and local distribution networks for state companies may make it 
impossible for new entrants to survive and expand. Serious reform must address both sides 
of this issue: they must both encourage competition and ensure that new firms can compete 
on equal terms.   46
2.4.3 Commodity Price and Marketing Policies 
 
Grains Marketing Policies 
Price and market reforms are key components of China's transition strategy to shift from a 
socialist to a market-oriented economy. The price and market reforms initiated in the late 
1970s aimed at increasing farm level procurement prices and gradually liberalizing the 
market. These reforms included gradual increases in the agricultural procurement prices 
towards market prices, reductions in procurement quota levels, the introduction of above 
quota bonuses for cotton, tobacco and other cash crops, negotiated procurement of surplus 
production of rice, wheat, maize, soybean, edible oils, livestock and most other commodi-
ties at price levels higher than those for quota procurement, and flexibility in the marketing 
of the surplus production of all categories of agricultural products by private traders.  
  Although most of the many liberalization efforts have been partial, in most cases 
they have had a significant impact on productivity and crop selection decisions at the 
household and the national level (Huang, Rosegrant and Rozelle, 1996). The shift from the 
collective system to the HRS also increased the price responsiveness of farm households 
(Huang and Rozelle, 1996). While few works document the effect of market reform, Lin 
(1992) shows that there was a small, positive impact in the early 1980s.  
  As the right to private trading was extended to include surplus output of all catego-
ries of agricultural products after contractual obligations to the state were fulfilled, the 
foundations of the state marketing system began to be undermined (Rozelle et al., 2000). 
After a record growth in grain production in 1984 and 1985, a second stage of price and 
market reforms was announced in 1985 aimed at radically limiting the scope of govern-
ment price and market interventions and further enlarging the role of market allocation. 
Other than for rice, wheat, maize and cotton, the intention was to gradually eliminate the 
planned procurement of agricultural products; government commercial departments could 
only continue to buy and sell at the market. For grain, incentives were introduced by reduc-
ing the volume of the quota and increasing the procurement prices. The share of 
compulsory quota procurement in grain production reached 29% in 1984, but decreased to 
18% in 1985, 13% in 1990 and 11% in 1995-1997. While the share of negotiated procure-
ment at market price increased from only 3% in 1984 to 6% in 1985 and 12% in 1990. 
  Because of the sharp drop in the growth rate of grain output and the increase in food 
prices in the late 1980s, the pace of marketing reform stalled. The mandatory procurement 
of rice, wheat, maize, soybean, oil crops and cotton continued. To provide incentives for 
farmers to increase productivity and to encourage sales to the government, quota procure-
ment prices were increased over time. The increase in the nominal agricultural 
procurement price, however, was less than the inflation rate, which led to a decline in the 
real grain price (Huang and Rozelle, 2003). 
  As grain production and prices stabilized in the early 1990s, however, another at-
tempt was made to abolish the grain ration system. Urban officials discontinued sales at 
ration prices to consumers in early 1993. For a year and a half, the liberalization move suc-
ceeded. Then, while it appeared that both the state grain distribution and procurement 
systems had been successfully liberalized, food prices increased sharply – as did other 
prices in the economy. Some people blamed the nation's inflation on the increases in food 
prices. As a result, the state's compulsory quota system was reimposed in most parts of   47
China in 1995, but at a lower procurement level. The share of grain compulsory quota pro-
curement in total production remained at only 11% in 1995-97. 
  Since the mid 1990s, several new policies have been implemented. Immediately after 
the price increases in the mid 1990s, China announced that it would introduce the provin-
cial governor's 'Rice Bag' responsibility system.
1 The policy was designed to strengthen 
food security and grain markets by making provincial governors and governments respon-
sible for balancing the supply and demand of cereals in their provinces and for stabilizing 
local food markets and prices. Policies under the system included reimposing grain ration-
ing to poor consumers, investing in production bases inside the province and attempting to 
keep grain from being shipped outside the province. Had it been implemented, this policy 
may have reduced short-term agricultural price fluctuations; however, it would not have 
been without costs. It is widely believed that the policy may have had an adverse impact on 
the efficiency of resource allocation, diversification of agricultural production and farm in-
come. Moreover, a great number of efforts to restrict the flow of grain were not successful. 
Market flows continued as the share of total government procurement (both quota and ne-
gotiated procurement) in domestic production dropped from 26% in 1994 to 22% in 1996, 
driven by the profits that traders could earn by shipping grain from low- to high-priced ar-
eas (Huang et al., 2003). 
  With three record levels of grain production in China in the late 1990s, and almost 
zero or negative inflation since 1997, increasing grain stocks and declining food prices 
showed that the economy had bounced back. However, in some sense the government's 
policies were a victim of their own success. With prices falling sharply, China's leaders 
were worried about a repeat of the mid 1990s. Thus, instead of proceeding with market re-
form, they opted to try to exercise greater control over grain prices by means of price 
protection policy.  
  In fact, in the late 1990s China's leaders attempted to curb market forces more than in 
earlier retrenchments, but this time they applied a completely different measure. Market in-
tervention policy shifted from taxing grain producers by setting a lower government quota 
procurement price (lower than market price), to preventing the price of grain falling by set-
ting a grain protection price (higher than market price). To reduce the financial burden of 
protection price policy, in 1998 the central government initiated a controversial policy 
change prohibiting individuals and private companies from procuring grain from farmers.
2 
In contrast to past policies, grain quota procurement prices were set at a level higher than 
market prices, which meant a transfer in favor of those farmers able to sell at that price 
(Huang, 1998; Lu 1999). China's leaders thought that they could monopolize the grain 
markets through the commercial arms of grain bureaus, and that the grain bureaus would 
be able to sell the procured grain at an even higher price in the market and meet the na-
tion's goal of increasing farm income. If the state could have exercised monopoly power in 
grain markets, it is possible that they could have implemented the price support while ena-
bling the state grain companies (i.e. the commercial arms of the grain bureaus) to earn a 
profit, while reducing the government's financial burden of maintaining the state-run grain 
procurement and marketing system. The loser under this policy would have been the con-
sumer, who would have had to pay a higher price for grain. 
                                                 
1 In China, 'rice' sometimes means staple food: 'Rice Bag' includes rice, wheat, maize and soybean.  
2 Farmers were supposed to deal solely with the commercial arm of grain bureaus and the grain reserve sys-
tem - although traders were allowed to operate in wholesale and retail markets.    48
  Such win-win policies did not work, however, primarily because the government 
could not suppress the market activities of traders and of the employees of the commercial-
ized grain system. While above market prices were offered to farmers in some years, cash-
strapped grain bureaus could not procure all the grain that farmers wanted to sell. Grain 
production increased, but since grain bureaus were trying to sell grain to urban and com-
mercial users at above market prices, they had few takers. Unable to stop the activities of 
millions of private grain traders, urban users continued to buy from their original channels 
at market-set prices. Not surprisingly, stocks started to accumulate, the real price in the 
market fell even further, and the commercialized grain bureaus that had been forced to buy 
grain at high prices now had huge stocks of grain that were worth less than they had paid 
for them and their debts became greater than ever.  
  Perhaps most surprisingly, commodity markets have steadily strengthened in rural 
China through these recurring cycles of reform and retrench. The proportion of retail 
commodity sales sold at market prices has kept increasing. According to Lardy (2001), the 
share of agricultural goods sold through the market was just 6 percent in 1978. By 1995 it 
had increased to 79 percent and by 1999 to 83 percent. Transaction costs have fallen while 
the degree of integration has increased (Park et al., 2002). As seen, markets are also robust. 
Despite attempts to intervene, the government has increasingly been unable to halt grain 
flows in their attempts to implement local price controls.  
  However, the cost of good markets is that China's time-tested methods of executing 
grain policies no longer work. In 2000, China's leaders found that the retrenchment policies 
started in 1998 had achieved few, if any, of the originally intended objectives. The incomes 
of farmers from agriculture were falling as market prices declined, the financial position of 
the grain bureaus continued to deteriorate and the government's fiscal burden increased to 
historical highs as stock accumulated. In 1998, the government's grain marketing subsidies 
in the form of payments to farmers reached nearly CNY 100 billion. Although the program 
was scaled back, in 1999 and 2000 subsidies remained at a level of CNY 60-80 billion an-
nually. Yielding once again to market forces, another round of liberalization was launched 
in 2000. China's leaders decided to eliminate the grain procurement quotas in grain deficit 
regions (e.g. the coastal provinces of Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Shandong). By 2001, the liber-
alization efforts spread to inland, surplus regions.  
  In addition to the development of China's grain markets, the gradual, albeit stop and 
go marketing reforms have also slowly reduced the tax burdens of grain farmers. Huang 
and Rozelle (2003) show that grain farmers, in general, have been taxed heavily by grain 
procurement policy. Importantly, however, with marketing reform, the degree of taxation 
has been declining significantly over time. Indeed, although historically China's tax on 
farmers through the procurement system has been high, since 2000 with the elimination of 
procurement quota and the initiation of the payment of subsidies to farmers and traders, we 
may be witnessing the beginning of a regime shift from taxation to subsidization.  
 
Livestock and Feed Marketing  
Livestock is one of the few major agricultural commodities to have been mostly liberalized 
since the mid 1980s. Currently, the market prices of livestock are based entirely on domes-
tic demand and supply, as well as on a limited amount of trade. Pork is the major meat 
product, accounting for about two-thirds of total meat supply in China. Household produc-
ers dominate the livestock industry. Most households with hogs raise them in traditional   49
ways in their backyard. Nearly two-thirds raise fewer than three hogs per year (RERC, 
1997). In 2000, household backyard production accounted for nearly 80 percent of all hogs 
raised in China; the remainder was produced by farm households that specialize in live-
stock production (15 percent) and intensive, large-scale commercial producers (around 5 
percent; CCAP, 2002). Households raise backyard hogs with a variety of feed mixes that 
include maize, sweet potato, other low quality food and feed grains, meal and waste prod-
ucts from home-produced crops (e.g. potato vines). 
  With the rise of specialized households and the evolution of backyard hog raising in 
many areas, the way farmers feed livestock has changed over time. Most prominently, the 
role of maize as a feed has increased over time. It accounted for more than 75 percent of 
feed in the late 1990s and reached 78 percent in 2000 (CCAP, 2002). Currently, the mar-
keting and pricing policies concerning maize as a feed are the same as those concerning 
maize as a food, namely it is being increasingly liberalized, which has been fully dis-
cussed. 
  While policies historically have affected maize - China's most important feed grain- 
there has been only minimal policy interference in the other feed crops. Sweet potato and 
soybean meal are the second and the third most important sources of feed in China's feed 
sector. Grain policy has virtually ignored the sweet potato and the soybean. About the only 
type of direct policy influence has been a result of the effect of the marketing and pricing 
policies for soybean meal. Since soybean in China is categorized as grain, during the 1980s 
and 1990s when dealing with soybean meal in international trade issues, it was treated as a 
grain crop and subject to tight control by the government. However, in the late 1990s, re-
strictions on soybean meal imports were relaxed earlier than those on grain were. As a 
result, there have been times when livestock producers have imported large quantities of 
soybean meal, perhaps at levels beyond what they would have done had all markets been 
liberalized. More recently, large volumes of soybeans have been imported to supply the 
large, modern soybean oil plants in the coastal regions. 
  The role of the sweet potato in the Chinese economy has also been changing rapidly 
on both the supply and the demand side. Sweet potato is the fourth major staple crop and 
the second largest feed grain in China. While production has remained fairly stable at 20-
23 million metric tons (mmt) annually since the 1970s, the sweet potato area has declined 
significantly. Hence, the yield growth of sweet potato has generally been lower than maize, 
except in the past few years.  
  On the demand side, the utilization of sweet potato also has changed rapidly. As a 
food staple, like maize, it has also declined. In the mid 1980s, the proportion of sweet po-
tato used as feed and for food processing surpassed the proportion used for direct 
consumption. Between the 1980s and the end of the 1990s, the proportion used for food 
fell from about 50 percent of total production to less than 15 percent. In contrast, the use of 
sweet potato for feed and industrial purposes grew significantly (Huang et al., 2001). By 
the late 1990s, feed use accounted for more than 40 percent and processing demand ac-
counted for one-third of total sweet potato production. In 2000, sweet potato accounted for 
about 7 percent of all feed used in China (CCAP, 2002).    50
2.4.4 Fiscal and Financial Investment Policy 
 
To gain a better understanding of government policy bias among sectors, we need to look 
at both the state's agricultural product procurement policy (implicit tax) and its investment 
and tax policies. Table 2.10 shows that government fiscal expenditures on agriculture have 
been consistently higher than the fiscal revenues from agricultural taxes and other fees col-
lected from agriculture. However, the fiscal revenue from agriculture based on explicit tax 
and fees is only small portion of the capital contribution of agriculture to industry and to 
the urban sector. It is also interesting to note that since the early 1980s rural enterprise de-
velopment has provided the government with significant fiscal income and has led to a net 
capital outflow from rural to urban areas. 
 
 
Table 2.10  Capital flows (CNY billions in 2000 prices) from agriculture to industry and from rural to ur-
ban through fiscal, financial and grain procurement systems, 1980-2000 
  Fiscal system  Financial system  Grain Cash flow from 
  Agric. to  Rural to Agric. to Rural to marketing Agric. to  Rural to
 industry  urban industry urban (implicit  tax) industry  urban
1980 -33.6  -25.8 15.9 7.2 39.3 21.6 20.7
1985 -14.9  13.2 29.5 9.2 11.3 25.9 33.7
1990 -29.6  14.5 62.5 28.8 33.3 66.2 76.6
1995 -18.4  115.8 131.7 89.1 33.5 146.8 238.4
2000 -46.5  153.2 206.9 247.8 -0.1 160.3 400.9
Total:  
1980-2000 -533.2  1069.7 613.4 1734.7 613.9 1289.3  2297.0
Note: values are in real terms in 2000 prices (general retail price index used as price deflator). 
Source: authors' estimates. 
 
 
  When taken together, a significant capital outflow from agriculture to industry oc-
curred in the last 20 years through financial systems, particularly rural credit cooperatives. 
A much higher value of capital outflow from rural to urban than agriculture to industry 
clearly shows that capital accumulated from agriculture not only supports industrialization 
in the urban sector but also provides notable financial resources for the successful devel-
opment of rural industry. After accounting for the implicit agricultural taxes that are levied 
on farmers through the government's procurement system, China extracted a total value of 
about CNY 1,289 billion (at 2000 prices) of capital from the agricultural sector for use in 
the nation's industrialization between 1980 and 2000. About CNY 2,297 billion flowed 
from the rural sector for the urban economy during the same period (Table 2.10). The shift-
ing of capital from agriculture to industry and that from the rural sector to the urban sector 
has accelerated since the 1980s. In this respect it is interesting to mention that although 
government expenditures in most areas of agriculture have increased gradually during the 
reform period, the ratio of agricultural investment to agricultural gross domestic product 
(AGDP) has monotonically declined since the late 1970s. In 1978, the government sector 
invested 7.6% of AGDP (NSBC, 2001). By 1995, the proportion had fallen to 3.6% 
(Huang and Ma, 1998; Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999).  
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2.4.5 Rural Credit 
 
Although the movement of capital from agriculture to industry is to be expected, mobiliz-
ing and efficiently using available financial resources in rural areas is important for 
achieving high rates of economic growth, especially in the rural areas of developing coun-
tries where such funds typically are in short supply (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). Evidence 
is strong that greater financial intermediation accompanies higher incomes. As economies 
grow, financial institutions often play an important role in directing resources to their most 
productive use. However, governments in developing countries often use state control of 
the banking system to pursue policy goals that are not always consistent with efficient in-
termediation. The fear is that few funds are available for farmers and the activities they 
want to pursue. 
 
 
Table 2.11  Percentage of households engaged in various activities financed with loans, and average size  
    of these loans per activity  
          





Percent of households engaged in activity 
1988   30  25 32 38 56  25
1995 22  18 34 37 56  24
          
Average loan amount of households receiving loan (CNY, in 1988 prices) 
1988 125  238 1205 494 1667  499
1995 90  143 3767 849 2161  550
          
Note: 32 observations for Zhejiang, Sichuan, Hubei, Shaanxi, and Shandong, and 24 for Yunnan.  
Source: Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999. 
 
 
Concern over China's rural financial institutions stems from several factors. Despite a 
number of important financial sector reforms, financial markets have been liberalized more 
slowly than most sectors (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). Regulated interest rates imply credit 
rationing, making private entrepreneurs and farmers, especially the poor, likely to have dif-
ficulty gaining credit access. If rural enterprises have had difficulty gaining access to bank 
credit, farmers have had even more. Even without interest rate deregulation, small farmers 
are often rationed out of formal credit markets. Field researchers observe that in many poor 
villages, local credit cooperatives have stopped lending to farmers, although in the last 
couple of years the government has made an effort to expand lending. Between 1988 and 
1995, farmers reduced credit financing for such key activities as fertilizer and livestock 
purchases (Table 2.11). 
  Park, Brandt and Giles (2002) have shown that without access to formal credit in ag-
riculture, informal credit has taken its place. In China, most informal credit in the 
agricultural sector is in form of loans from relatives and friends. Most loans do not bear 
any interest, but there is often an implicit obligation to provide an interest-free loan to the 
relatives/friends if there is a need in the future. Interestingly, although credit constrains the 
plans of many households to invest in businesses and large consumption goods (such as   52
housing), there is little evidence that farmers - even those in poor areas - are constrained in 
their day-to-day agricultural production activities (Park and Wang, 2001). 
 
2.4.6 Labor Market Development Policies 
 
China's experience in the development of rural enterprise illustrates the importance of ex-
panding non-agricultural sectors in rural areas to generate employment for rural labor, and 
increasing agricultural labor productivity and farm income (Table 2.12). Rural industriali-
zation plays a vital role in reducing the agricultural labor surplus. The share of rural 
enterprises (REs) in GDP increased significantly from 2-4 percent in the 1970s to 30 per-
cent in 1999; already by the mid 1990s, REs dominated the export sector (Table 2.12). REs 
now employ 35 percent of the rural labor force and are the major source of creating rural 
employment. With the rapid growth of REs in China, the diversification of farm income 
has been remarkable. The non-farm-income proportion of total farm income increased 
sharply from 17 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 1999 (Table 2.12). 
 
 
Table 2.12  Farm and rural enterprise (RE) development in China, 1980-99 
 Share  of  RE 
in rural labor 
Share of RE 
in total GDP 
Share of RE 






 (%)  (%)  (%)    (ha/farm)  (%) 
1980 9  4  0    0.56  17 
1985 19  9  15    0.51  25 
1990 23  14  43    0.43  26 
1995 34  25  48    0.41  37 
1999 35  30  48    0.40  47 
Source: SSB, Statistical Yearbook of China, and China's TVE's Yearbook, various editions. 
 
 
  Prior to the rural reforms, underemployment had been a persistent problem in rural 
China. This became more apparent as efficiency gains in agriculture during the reforms re-
duced the labor input needed for crop production. During the same period, the rural labor 
force grew annually by 2-2.5 percent, with more than 10 million new entrants each year 
during the 1980s. The increase in rural labor resources combined with land scarcity limited 
the absorptive capacity of agricultural employment and could have caused an enormous la-
bor surplus, slowed down farm income growth and limited the extent of poverty reduction 
had the non-agricultural sector not developed.  
  At the same time, a number of factors are still hindering the adjustment process of 
labor. There are natural barriers, such as moving costs, which exist in all economies, re-
gardless of the nature of its structure. China's labor markets still contain a number of 
structural imperfections, such as employment priority for local workers, housing shortages 
and the urban household registration system (Lin, 1991b; Lyons, 1992; Rozelle, 1994; 
Lohmar, 1999). One of the costs of these kinds of barriers is that they may slow down the   53
mobility of factors among alternative economic activities, reducing the efficiency of the 
sector's producers and preventing the poor from sharing the benefits of general economic 
growth. 
 
2.4.7 Exchange Rate Policy 
 
Macroeconomic policies can have a significant influence on the overall incentives of pro-
ducers in the agricultural sector (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). One of the main mechanisms 
by which that influence is created is through the nation's exchange rate policy (Huang and 
Rozelle, 2002). Exchange rates can have great implications for trade. Other external trade 
policies, for example the management of flows across the border, can also affect trade. 
China's policies governing the nation's external economy have played a highly influential 
role in shaping the growth and structure of agricultural production and trade for many dec-
ades. During the reform years, new policies have sought to counteract some of the earlier 
distortions and have themselves contributed to lower levels of protection. 
  Before economic reform, China adopted a state-monopolized, unified system of for-
eign exchange management to support the nation's import-substitution industrialization 
strategy (Lardy, 1995). Under this system, the government strictly controlled the earnings 
and allocation of all foreign exchange. In 1979 with the implementation of economic re-
form, China introduced the foreign exchange retention system, aimed at providing 
incentives to various enterprises and local governments to increase foreign exchange earn-
ings through the expansion of exports. Under the system, enterprises and local 
governments were able to retain a certain proportion of the foreign exchange they earned 
through their exports. 
  In 1988, additional reforms were introduced in an attempt to strengthen the earlier 
incentives. In particular, China's leaders began allowing local governments and enterprises 
to control and use all the foreign exchange they earned as long as they did so in accordance 
with state regulations. While the implications were wide-ranging, the policy shifts pro-
vided strong incentives to local leaders in north-eastern China to encourage exports. This 
applied to many agricultural commodities, such as maize. For example, when maize ex-
ports led to increased foreign exchange earnings, officials were able to relax the severe 
constraints on the importation of technology, capital and other commodities. In the late 
1980s - soon after the incentives had been put into place - annual maize exports reached an 
average of about 4 mmt. In the early 1990s - after the incentives had been strengthened - 
exports nearly doubled (7.7 mmt).  
  Even during this time, however, the foreign exchange market was highly regulated. 
Exchange rate management was controlled by a two-tiered foreign exchange rate system. 
One rate - the official one - was set by policy. The other rate was set by a swap center, 
where units with extra foreign currency could exchange it with units that needed additional 
allotments. The foreign exchange rate from the swap center was based mainly on supply 
and demand forces. The swap rate was about 20 percent higher than the official rate in the 
mid 1980s, and as much as 75 percent higher in the late 1980s (Table 2.13, column 4). 
When China's leaders devalued the official rate by more than 40 percent in the early 1990s, 
the gap between the swap and officials rates fell to only about 25 percent. 
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Table 2.13  Official and swap market exchange rates and the real effective exchange rate indices,  
  1979-2001 
 
 
Year  Official exchange rate  Black market or swap  Real effective   Ratio 
  (CNY/USD)  center (CNY/USD)  exchange rate 
     (1994=100) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)=(2)/(2) 
 
 
1979 1.56  2.33  397  1.50 
1980 1.50  1.95  403  1.30 
1981 1.70  2.05  359  1.20 
1982 1.89  2.27  343  1.20 
1983 1.98  2.39  337  1.21 
1984 2.32  2.69  299  1.16 
1985 2.94  3.05  254  1.04 
1986 3.45  4.03  185  1.17 
1987 3.72  4.40  160  1.18 
1988 3.72  6.50  133  1.75 
1989 3.77  6.60  154  1.75 
1990 4.78  6.60  137  1.38 
1991 5.32  6.60  121  1.24 
1992 5.51  6.92  108  1.26 
1993 5.76  8.28  94  1.44 
1994 8.61  8.70  100  1.01 
1995 8.35  8.50  109  1.02 
1996 8.31  8.60  117  1.03 
1997 8.29  8.60  123  1.04 
1998 8.28  8.60  123  1.04 
1999 8.28  8.60  117  1.04 
2000 8.28  8.50  118  1.03 
2001 8.28  8.40  121  1.01 
 
 
Source: From IMF database. 
 
 
  In its efforts to further liberalize the foreign exchange rate system, China's leaders 
unified the official exchange rate and the swap market exchange rate and adopted a single-
currency, managed exchange rate system. The rate was supposed to be managed at the rate 
that was consistent with supply and demand in 1994. As a result, the rate was effectively 
devalued from the official exchange rate of CNY 5.76 per USD 1 in 1993 to the managed 
floating market exchange rate of CNY 8.61 per USD 1 in 1994. This shift was a one-off 
devaluation of more than 50 percent (Table 2.13). In December 1996, after the currency 
stabilized at that rate, the Yuan became convertible on China's current account. Since 1996, 
black-market or unofficial secondary markets for foreign exchange have moved closely 
with the official exchange rates and stayed remarkably constant.  
  The impacts of the devaluation of the Yuan on the country's trade are substantial. 
Foreign reserves increased from USD 28.6 billion in 1990 to USD 73.6 billion in 1995 and 
reached USD 166.5 billion in 2000 (MOFTEC, 2002). Such large increases in reserves 
have actually caused a gradual appreciation of the Yuan since the mid 1990s. Since 1996, 
China has been the world's second largest foreign reserve holder (just behind Japan).   55
  China's exchange rate policy changes have significantly affected the production and 
trade incentives for producers and traders of imported and exported agricultural commodi-
ties. While a nominal exchange rate devaluation is only effective in increasing the price of 
tradable relative to non-tradable goods, if inflation does not erode the increase in the ex-
change rate, a real depreciation of the domestic currency increases the local currency prices 
of tradable relative to non-tradable and contributes to the price competitiveness of domes-
tic exports (Table 2.13). Since agricultural products are generally tradable, agricultural 
incentives may be expected to increase with real depreciation of the domestic currency.  
  Table 2.13 shows that China's exchange rate policy during the reform period has 
clearly been successful in effecting substantial depreciation (i.e. increase) in the real ex-
change rate. Whereas nominal exchange rates remained constant, and even appreciated, 
over three decades prior to the reform period (the reforms started in 1979), real exchange 
rates rapidly depreciated during the entire reform period, with the exception of a couple of 
years after 1985. From 1979 to 1993, the real exchange rate depreciated by 422 percent 
(397/94). Evidently, nominal exchange rate depreciation was not eroded by inflation de-
spite significant expansion in the money supply. 
  The success of the exchange rate adjustments stemmed mainly from the productivity 
effects of economic reforms and technological innovations in agriculture, foreign trade and 
industry, which contributed to the relatively low inflation. China was second only to Indo-
nesia in pursuing aggressive adjustments in the real exchange rate in Asia before the mid 
1990s or prior to the Asian economic crisis. The favorable trends in the real exchange rate 
also sharply increased export competitiveness, and thus contributed significantly to the ex-
port growth record on the whole and also contributed to the spectacular economic growth 
performance of the country in the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
  However, since the adoption of the managed floating exchange rate system in 1994, 
the value of the Yuan has appreciated slightly (Table 2.13). The official exchange rate de-
clined from CNY 8.61 per USD 1 in 1994 to about 8.28 in 1998-2001. It is widely believed 
that the domestic currency has gradually become overvalued since 1994, and as such has 
provided a disincentive to the tradable agricultural sector.  
 
2.4.8 Trade Policy 
 
The changes in the exchange rate system were implemented at the same time that China 
began to liberalize its international trading system. Lower tariffs and increasing imports 
and exports of agricultural products began to affect domestic terms of trade in the 1980s. In 
the initial years, most of the fall in protection came from a reduction in the commodities 
that were controlled by single-desk state traders (Huang and Chen, 1999). In the case of 
many products, competition among non-state foreign trade corporations began to stimulate 
imports and exports (Martin, 2002). Although many major agricultural commodities were 
not included in the move to decentralize trade, the moves did spur the export of many agri-
cultural goods. In addition, policy shifts in the 1980s and 1990s changed the trading 
behavior of state traders. China's leaders allowed the state traders to increase imports in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
  Moves to relax rights of access to import and export markets were matched by ac-
tions to reduce the taxes assessed at the border. After the reduction of restrictions on 
imports and exports of many of China's agricultural commodities, a new effort began in the   56
early 1990s to reduce the level of formal protection. The simple average agricultural im-
port tariff fell from 42.2 percent in 1992 to 23.6 percent in 1998, and then to 21 percent in 
2001 (MOFTEC, 2002).  
  Changes in trade and domestic marketing policies have resulted in dramatically shift-
ing trade patterns. Agricultural exports and imports have both soared (see previous 
sections). Huang and Chen (1999) also note that the net exports of land-intensive bulk 
commodities - such as grains (except for maize), oilseeds and sugar crops – have de-
creased, while exports of higher-valued, more labor-intensive products – such as 
horticultural and animal (including aquaculture) products – have increased. In the 1990s, 
the proportion of grain exports (around 20 percent of total agricultural exports) was less 
than half of what it was in the early 1980s. By the late 1990s horticultural products and 
animal and aquatic products accounted for about 80 percent of agricultural exports. These 
trends are even more evident when the trade data are grouped on the basis of factor inten-
sity. 
  Overall, trade distortions in the agricultural sector have declined in the past 20 years 
(Huang and Rozelle, 2002). Much of the reduced protection in agriculture has come from 
decentralizing authority for imports and exports and relaxing licensing procedures for 
some crops (e.g. moving oil and oilseed imports away from state trading firms) and foreign 
exchange rate changes. Other trade policies have reduced the scope of NTBs, relaxed the 
real tariff rates at the border and changed quotas (Huang and Chen, 1999). Despite this real 
and, in some areas, rapid set of reforms, the control of a set of commodities that China's 
leaders consider to be of national strategic importance (e.g. rice, wheat and maize) remain 
with policy makers to a much larger extent (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). 
  For example, in the case of grain prior to China's accession to WTO, although the 
import tariff rate was low, China's leaders did not allow the importation of grain except by 
those agencies and enterprises that held licenses and import quotas. When traders imported 
grain that was specified as being within the quota, the tariff rate was only about 3 percent. 
The tariff rate for grain imported above the quota, however, was as high as 114 percent. No 
above-quota grain entered China, however, because grain imports have to be arranged by 
state traders. During the entire reform period, China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs 
Import & Export Corporation (COFCO) has been the nation's single-desk state trading 
company for grain. It also manages the imports of edible oils. COFCO is one of the largest 
state trade enterprises (STEs) not only in Asia but also in the world. The value of food and 
non-food goods imported by China's STEs probably exceeds the value of such goods im-
ported by all other STEs in all current WTO member countries. Over the past decade, 
COFCO has imported as much as 16 percent of the world's traded wheat, and has exported 
as much as much as 20 percent of the world's traded maize (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999). 
Even after China joined the WTO, COFCO continued to act as a key agent in the interna-
tional grain trade for national and provincial grain trading companies and still has 
preferential access to import quotas. 
  However, COFCO itself has undergone a series of reforms since the late 1990s. Spe-
cifically, since the late 1990s, officials have tried to streamline importing procedures by 
commercializing COFCO and de-monopolizing the trade of a number of commodities. For 
example, soybeans have been completely liberalized with a single tariff management 
scheme. Since 1999, the effective tariff rate on soybean imports has been only 3 percent. 
For rice and maize, the Jilin Grain Group Import and Export Company (JGIEC) - a provin-  57
cial level of STE established in April 2001 - has taken over the import and export respon-
sibilities of COFCO for most maize and rice exports from north-eastern China. The 
establishment of JGIEC marked the end of COFCO's complete monopolization of China's 
grain trade. Moreover, competition has also been introduced in the COFCO network 
(COFCO has always had branches in each province and key municipality). Better incen-
tives have been given to managers and branch officials to increase their attention to the 
activities that affect profitability. In addition, an agency system has been imposed to im-
plement a payment for services policy. COFCO traders are supposed to trade only on 
behalf of their clients for a fee, and not on their own account.  
  Despite the above efforts to commercialize the grain trade, there has been minimal 
trade liberalization of grains, and particularly of maize (Huang and Rozelle, 2003). Eco-
nomic logic and casual observation gives reason to believe that China's current system of 
grain trading causes substantial inefficiencies and creates distortions in the domestic econ-
omy. It is possible that such a system could even create uncertainty in world markets. 
Provincial grain companies serving China's domestic markets complain incessantly about 
the inconvenience and financial burdens associated with their dealings with COFCO (Ny-
berg and Rozelle, 1999). Although price stabilization has often been stated to be a goal of 
trade policy, COFCO has failed in its bid to insulate China from fluctuations on interna-
tional markets (Lu, 1999). As national and regional monopolies, neither COFCO nor 
JGIEC faces competition in their dealings on global markets. They also often have consid-
erable rents to protect. Lack of information also characterizes China's maize trade 
transactions, frustrating both domestic and international traders.  
  China has also subsidized certain agricultural commodities from time to time. For 
example, China used export subsidies in the years prior to its WTO accession to increase 
the exports of two commodities, namely maize and cotton. By providing exporters with 
payments to encourage the export of maize, China's leaders have increased the protection 
of domestic producers by increasing the price of domestic commodities. Interviews carried 
out in the field in 2001 revealed that maize exporters, especially those in north-eastern 
China, received subsidies that averaged 34 percent of the export price. One trader said that 
for each ton of maize his company exported in 2001, it received CNY 378 (USD 45.7) per 
ton after it produced an export bill bearing the export sales price. 
 
2.4.9 Technology Development 
 
After the 1960s, China's research institutions grew rapidly, from almost nothing in the 
1950s to a system that now produces a steady flow of new varieties and technologies. 
China's farmers used semi-dwarf varieties several years before the release of green revolu-
tion technology elsewhere. China was the first country to develop and extend hybrid rice. 
Chinese-bred conventional rice varieties, wheat and sweet potatoes were comparable to the 
best in the world in the pre-reform era (Stone, 1988).  
  Agricultural research and plant breeding in China is almost completely organized by 
the government. Reflecting the urban bias of food policy, most crop-breeding programs 
have emphasized fine grains (rice and wheat). For national food security considerations, 
high yields were the major target of China's research program until recent years, when 
quality improvement was introduced into the nation's development plan.    58
  A nationwide reform of research was launched in the mid 1980s. This reform was in-
tended to increase research productivity by shifting funding from institutional support to 
competitive grants, supporting research useful for economic development and encouraging 
applied research institutes to support themselves by selling the technology they produce. 
  Today, the record on the reform of the agricultural technology system is mixed and 
its impact on new technological developments and crop productivity is unclear. Empirical 
evidence demonstrates the declining effectiveness of China's agricultural research capabili-
ties (Jin et al., 2002). Our previous work found that while competitive grant programs 
probably increased the effectiveness of China's agricultural research system, the reliance 
on commercialization revenue to subsidize research and compensate for reduced budgetary 
commitments weakened the system.
1 It is possible that imperfections in the seed industry 
partly contributed to the ineffectiveness of research reform measures in crop-breeding. 
 
2.4.10 China's  WTO  Accession 
 
In its most basic terms, the commitments in the agricultural sector can be classified into 
three major categories, namely market access, domestic support and export subsidies. The 
commitments linked to WTO accession will lower the tariffs on all agricultural products, 
increase access to China's markets by the foreign producers of some commodities through 
tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and remove quantitative restrictions on others. In return, China 
will gain better access to foreign markets for its agricultural products, and receive a num-
ber of other indirect benefits. Domestic support and export subsidies are the other two 
critical issues that arose during the course of negotiations. Together with a number of other 
market-access commitments, these make China's WTO accession unique among all other 
developing countries that have been admitted to the WTO's new environment.  
  Some of the direct-import market access commitments that China has made to WTO 
members actually do not appear to be substantial. Overall agricultural import tariffs (in 
terms of its simple average) declined from about 21 percent in 2001 to 17 percent in 2004. 
A continuance of earlier trends, the simple average agricultural import tariff fell from 42.2 
percent in 1992 to 23.6 percent in 1998. Although important, when taken in the context of 
the discussion in the previous section about China's external economy reforms of the last 
20 years one has to conclude that the commitments are merely an extension of China's past 
changes. WTO in this way can be seen as just another step on China's road to opening up 
its economy. 
  The details of the commitments in the agricultural sector are elaborated in Chapter 4 
(section 4.3.2). These commitments play an important role in the formulation of the policy 
assumptions for the baseline projection. 
 
 
2.5 Impacts  of  Reforms 
 
Both domestic and external economic and institutional reforms are expected to have wide 
impacts on China's agricultural and rural economies. This section is focused mainly on the 
                                                 
1 Findings based on a series of intensive interviews and on survey data gathered from a wide range of Agri-
culture Ministry personnel, research administrators, research staff and others involved in China's agricultural 
research system.   59
impacts on agricultural production incentives, trade, market integration and rural labor em-
ployment.  
 
2.5.1 Changes in Agricultural Protection 
The first step in analyzing the impact of reform on agricultural production, prices and con-
sumption in China is to understand how protection has changed over time. An aggregate 
measure of protection (i.e. an index that measures the combined distortion from all poli-
cies) can be generated by comparing China's domestic prices with international ones. The 
measure that we use is called the nominal rate of protection (NPR). The analysis in the 
case of China, however, is a little more complicated because during its 20 years of reform, 
it has had several prices, namely a quota price, a negotiated price and a market price. 
Hence, three different measures can be calculated. Table 2.14 shows the protection of cere-
als and soybeans using the quota, negotiated procurement and wholesale market prices 
since the early 1980s. Table 2.15 uses only market prices (or the state administered price in 




Table 2.14  Nominal protection rates (NPR) for grain, China, 1978-early 2000 

















1978-79 -42  15 12 2    -6 72 65 22 10 89 92 40
1980-84 -43  -3 -15  13   2 50 28 25 9 58  46 44
1985-89 -30  4 -13  -13    -5 34 17 15 -4 52  37 39
1990-94 -37 -14 -35  -32    -16 14 -7 7 -7 30  12 26
1995-99 -13  1 2  -7    -6 7 10 17 -7 22  26 26
2000-01 2 5 6  10    0 2 5 9 -2 18  26  19
Note: border prices are average prices of exports (rice and sometimes maize) or imports (wheat, soybean  
and sometimes maize) for the varieties that are comparable with domestic grains. Official exchange rates  
are used to convert border prices. 
 
 
  This analysis makes it clear that for most of the early reform period, the requirement 
that farmers submit a mandatory delivery quota of grain and soybean at below market 
prices has represented a lump-sum tax on farmers and lump sum subsidy for the urban con-
sumers who were able purchase grain from state rationing outlets at below market value 
(Table 2.14). Before the mid 1990s the average price farmers received for compulsorily de-
livered grains and soybean was far below the border price. Although all of China's major 
crops were affected by the state grain quota procurement policy, wheat – the nation's main 
imported farm commodity – in most periods received favorable treatment relative to rice. 
For example, in the early 1990s, its rate of taxation, or negative protection (-14), was less 
than that of rice (-37; row 4). The same bias appears in the other price categories (columns 
5-12). The bias is even greater than shown by the within price category comparisons, since 
a higher proportion of rice production is procured at the low quota procurement price than 
is the case of wheat, maize and soybean (Huang, 2001). In the late 1990s, however, there 
was a marked change in the rate of protection. Quota prices moved closer to border prices 
and in some cases (wheat and maize) rose above them. An examination of China's NPRs   60
based on negotiated procurement and market prices between 1995-99 and 2000-01 (except 
for the case of rice), shows that China's domestic prices have begun to rise above the bor-
der price.  
 
 
Table 2.15  Nominal protection rates (NPR) for cotton and livestock products, China, 1995-2001 
Year Cotton Pork Beef  Chicken
1995 17 -14 -14  -22
1996 23 -16 -8  -15
1997 28 -18 -3  -16
1998 18 -25 -15  -16
1999 -3 -13 0  -15
2000 14 -16 -2  -15
2001 14 -21 -11  -17
Note: export prices of pork, beef and chicken, and import prices of cotton are used as border prices. Domestic 
prices are prices at urban wholesale markets. The cotton wholesale price is estimated as the state procurement 
price times 1.25. Official exchange rates are used to convert border prices. 
 
 
  Interestingly, the case of livestock is markedly different (Table 2.15): the NPRs are 
negative for all the major commodities, namely pork, beef and chicken. In all periods, meat 
producers received less than they would have had they sold their output on domestic and 
world markets at international prices. 
  When examining the NPRs for almost all commodities over time, as discussed in an 
earlier section, we can see the impact of China's agricultural trade policy. In the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, the domestic wholesale price of China's four major commodities far 
exceeded the world price (measured at China's border; Table 2.14). For example, China's 
rice market price was 10 percent above the world market price (row 1). The nation's wheat 
and maize prices exceeded the world price by around 90 percent. However, in the subse-
quent 20 years, the protection rate for rice became negative and that for wheat and maize 
fell to around 30 percent (row 6). 
  The driving force behind this fall in protection was the gradual but sustained effort to 
implement trade liberalization policies during the last 20 years (Martin, 2002; Lardy, 
1995). Published agricultural tariff rates fell from more than 40% in the early 1990s to 
21% in 2001. Assessed tariff rates have fallen even more. During this period, the interven-
tion by state traders and the use of NTBs also gradually fell. In the case of some 
commodities, there has been a sharp increase in the number of trading firms, both exporters 
and importers. China has tried to gain access to markets for some commodities outside 
China. In sum, distortions have declined significantly in the past 20 years, and based on the 
timing of China's trade policy efforts, much of the reduced protection appears to have 
come from decentralizing authority and relaxing licensing procedures for some crops (e.g. 
taking oil and oilseed imports away from state trading firms), reducing the scope of NTBs, 
relaxing real tariff rates at the border and changing quotas (Huang and Chen, 1999; Huang 
and Rozelle, 2002).   61
2.5.2 Changes in Agricultural Trade 
 
One immediate effect of reduced protection has been the shift in trade patterns that China 
has experienced. For example, except for rice in the late 1980s and pork in recent years, 
exports of exportable commodities (including, rice, vegetables, pork, poultry and fish) 
have increased substantially since the late 1980s (Tables 2.16 and 2.17). In contrast, im-
ports of most importable commodities (including, coarse grains, soybean, edible oils, 
cotton and sugar - except for late 1990s - and milk) have increased in the same period.  
  Although Tables 2.16 and 2.17 illustrate the general trends for each of the commod-
ity groups, in some of the groups there is heterogeneity among commodities in terms of 
their trade patterns. It also shows that shocks in the economy have affected imports from 
time to time. For example, in addition to the increasing levels of rice exports, China also 
imports some rice. The imported rice varieties, however, are different from the exported 
varieties. Traders import certain high-quality varieties (e.g. Thai Jasmine) that are not 
available in China. The quantity of imported rice, however, has been small, averaging less 
than 0.3 mmt annually in the 1980s and the early 1990s. The increase in rice imports in the 
mid 1990s occurred because of rising domestic rice prices and the fear of grain shortages 
that led to grain export restrictions in 1995 and 1996. Despite these aberrations, however, 
rice exports show a general rising trend over time, except for in the late 1980s. Exports 
reached a historical high (3.74 mmt) in 1998.  
  Vegetable, fish and most livestock commodities have become the major exportable 
products from China's agricultural economy. Trade reform has resulted in the large expan-
sion of vegetable (Table 2.16) and fish (Table 2.17) exports. Most of these commodities 
are exported to East Asia, Southeast Asia and other international markets. Since the early 
1980s, exports of these commodities have nearly doubled every five years. Pork exports – 
traditionally one of China's largest exportable livestock commodities – expanded steadily 
from the early 1980s until the mid 1990s. In recent years, however, growing international 
concern about meat quality and other sanitary/phytosanitary concerns reduced China's pork 
exports in the late 1990s. Poultry exports, in contrast, grew steadily through the late 1990s. 
The increasing trends made poultry China's top livestock export product. The annual ex-
port of poultry recently reached 0.3-0.4 mmt. Interestingly, because of taste preferences 
both in and outside China and favorable price ratios, the nation not only exports poultry 
meat (e.g. chicken breasts), but also imports significant amounts of specialty parts (e.g. 
chicken feet). Of the three main livestock commodities, beef has been the least traded 
commodity in recent years. In part, the small volume of beef trade is related to the China's 
livestock structure, where beef accounts for less than 5% of the livestock economy in value 
terms.  
  While China has been developing export markets for horticulture, fish and livestock 
products during the last 20 years, it has been gradually increasing imports of a number of 
crops (Table 2.16). China was a net importer of soybean for most of the last 20 years (im-
porting, on average, 0.5-1.3 mmt), and soybean has been the top ranked imported 
commodity in China since the mid 1990s. Most of the increase in imports can be traced to 
external policies that liberalized soybean trade in the late 1990s (Huang et al., 2003). In 
2001, China imported nearly 15 mmt of soybean to meet its increasing domestic demand. 
Trade liberalization has also affected imports of edible oil. When examining the affect of   62
trade liberalization on imports and the rest of the economy, the trade patterns of soybean 
and edible oil are particularly important to understand. 
 
 
Table 2.16  Imports and exports (x 1000 ton) of major crops, 1985-2000 
Commodity Period
* Import Export Net  export 
Rice 1985  210 1034 824 
 1990  467 450 -17 
 1995  973 613 -360 
 2000  226 2503 2277 
Wheat 1985  7336 64 -7273 
 1990  13434 109 -13325 
 1995  9047 672 -8374 
 2000  672 116 -556 
Maize 1985  245 4315 4071 
 1990  146 4897 4751 
 1995  1876 3123 1247 
 2000  35 6871 6836 
Sweet potato  1985  2 309 307 
 1990  68 478 410 
 1995  3 214 210 
 2000  8 24 16 
Other grains  1985  96 514 418 
 1990  356 619 263 
 1995  1460 323 -1137 
 2000  2111 253 -1858 
Soybean 1985  97 1113 1016 
 1990  1 1107 1106 
 1995  485 467 -18 
 2000  10346 210 -10136 
Cotton 1985  326 346 20 
 1990  738 214 -524 
 1995  630 45 -585 
 2000  59 207 148 
Edible oils  1985  160 152 -8 
 1990  506 97 -408 
 1995  483 271 -212 
 2000  1405 15 -1391 
Sugar 1985  1538 282 -1256 
 1990  1139 788 -351 
 1995  1917 697 -1220 
 2000  445 253 -192 
Vegetable 1985  0 761 761 
 1990  1 1432 1431 
 1995  23 2510 2487 
 2000  97 3423 3326 
* All figures are a three-year average centered on the years indicated (e.g. the figure for 2000 is the  
average for 1999-2001). 'Other grains' include millet, sorghum, barley and other minor coarse grains.   63
Table 2.17  Imports and exports (x 1000 ton) of major animal products, 1985-2000 
Commodity Period  Import Export Net  export 
Pork 1985  0 286 286 
 1990  1 443 443 
 1995  9 592 584 
 2000  127 201 75 
Beef 1985  29 46 18 
 1990  52 225 173 
 1995  70 125 55 
 2000  35 34 -1 
Mutton 1985  9 4 -5 
 1990  14 3 -11 
 1995  20 2 -19 
 2000  25 2 -22 
Poultry 1985  3 25 22 
 1990  68 53 -14 
 1995  240 298 58 
 2000  798 398 -400 
Egg 1985  0 59 59 
 1990  3 43 40 
 1995  2 28 27 
 2000  1 45 44 
Milk 1985  195 16 -178 
 1990  238 32 -206 
 1995  286 95 -192 
 2000  437 164 -273 
Fish 1985  53 164 111 
 1990  101 284 183 
 1995  144 607 462 
 2000  510 1067 557 
 
 
  Although from a net protection standpoint, maize and cotton appear to be importable 
commodities, their trade patterns behave differently (Table 2.16). Even though the world 
market price of maize is lower than that in China, the nation has been a net exporter of 
maize in most years since the mid 1980s. Unsurprisingly, this can happen only because 
China has maintained monopoly control over maize imports and exports (Lardy, 1995). 
The patterns also can be explained by the fact that since the late 1990s China's leaders have 
used export subsidies to increase exports (Huang and Rozelle, 2002). Export subsidies 
have increased, reaching in 2001 one-third of the maize export price. Because of these in-
terventions, maize is one of the few major crops that have not experienced falling NPRs 
since 1995.  
  Although for the last 20 years China has been one of the world's largest wheat im-
porters, the nation has tended to protect wheat farmers. Wheat imports averaged about 10 
mmt a year until the late 1990s (Table 2.16). Wheat imports, however, have exhibited a 
sharp cyclical pattern, increasing for three or four years before declining for three or four   64
years. Rozelle and Huang (1998) believe that this pattern closely follows the way China's 
leaders intervened in the wheat trade and slowed down the growth of domestic demand.  
  In sum, although policy distortions of external trade for some commodities are still 
high, and in some cases have even increased (or not fallen over time), overall trade liber-
alization has gradually continued during the last 20 years. In aggregate terms (as shown in 
Table 2.8), both imports and exports have been increasing for the last 20 years. Total trade 
in the food sector more than tripled between 1985 and 2000 (Table 2.8). Because the share 
of agricultural commodities that China trades with the rest of the world is so small (espe-
cially when one compares the volume of food trade of China with the volume of food that 
moves through its domestic market), we should not be surprised that trade does not have a 
large impact on domestic prices.  
 
2.5.3 Changes in Market Integration and Price Transmission 
 
While important in determining the level of the protection and trade at the national level, 
the impacts of reforms on farmers in different regions depend not only on the average im-
pacts but also on the size of the area across which it will be felt. This second factor, in turn, 
is a function of the size and nature of China's market. For example, if large areas of the 
country are isolated from coastal markets where imports land, then the effects of trade may 
be circumscribed to restricted parts of the country and should not be expected to have 
highly adverse impacts on the poor, who are largely located in inland areas far from major 
urban centers. While being isolated from negative shocks is a plus, there is also a cost: 
those living in poor, isolated areas also do not benefit from the price rises and opportunities 
to export. However, if markets exist that link distant regions with the coast, and price 
changes in one part of the economy quickly ripple through the economy, even though im-
ports are infused into (and exports flow out of) areas concentrated around a few large 
coastal cities, they can have ramifications for poor households thousands of kilometers 
away. 
  To assess how integrated and developed markets are in rural China, we will first de-
scribe the data. We will then test for integration and conduct direct tests of how well prices 
in different markets move together and whether prices are integrated between the market 
town and China's villages. 
 
Data 
The data come from a unique price data set collected by China's State Market Administra-
tion Bureau. Nearly 50 sample sites from 15 of China's provinces report prices of 
agricultural commodities every 10 days. The prices are the average price of transactions 
that day in the local rural periodic market. We will examine rice, maize and soybean prices 
from late 1995 to 2000 (except for maize, which was available only through 1998). The as-
sessment of market integration before 1996 is based our previous studies of the same 
commodities (Park et al., 2002). The three crops are produced and consumed in nearly 
every province in China. 
  Rice price data are available for 31 markets. Because of quality differences among 
rice varieties in different regions of China, we will look at price integration between mar-
kets in four regions, namely southern China (South), the Yangtze Valley (YV), the North 
China Plain (and northwest China; NCP) and northeast China (NE). For the provinces in-  65
cluded in the sample, rice prices are available for over 90 percent of the time periods. 
Prices for maize and soybean data are available for 13 and 20 markets, respectively.
1 Prod-
uct homogeneity makes it possible to include a broader geographic range of buyers and 
sellers in a single analysis, and we are able to assess the integration of markets spread out 
over thousands of kilometers. We will compare these results with those from 1988-1995 
that were produced with the same sources of data (Park et al., 2002). 
 
Price Trends 
To show how prices change over time and differ across regions, we will use maize as an 
example. Figure 2.3 shows the trends of maize prices in the selected local markets in major 
producing provinces (Liaoning and Shandong) and consuming provinces (Guangdong and 
Sichuan). The data presented Figure 2.3 are maize prices that are reported every 10 days by 
enumerators who visit rural wholesale markets. Although maize prices fluctuate across 
seasons, they follow a general downward trend between 1995 and 2000. Moreover, the an-
nual price variation has declined and the price gaps between producing and consuming 
regions have declined over time. Huang and Rozelle (2002) found that not only maize 
prices but all other grain prices - including those of rice, wheat and soybean – have moved 
together across far-reaching localities in China. Similar changing trends were also found 
for pork (Figure 2.4), though the data presented in Figure 2.4 are at a more aggregated 
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We use cointegration statistics to test market integration. Cointegration statistics measure 
the proportion of movement in one price that is transmitted to another price during the pe-
riod of observation. The coefficient on the 'causing' price is bounded between 0 and 1, 
                                                 
1 Since we use data over time, we need to convert prices to a real basis. Nominal prices from our data set are 
deflated using monthly consumer price indices calculated and reported by the China National Statistical Bu-
reau. Deflation facilitates transaction cost comparisons across time and allows us to disregard transaction cost 
increases in periods associated with inflation.   66
where 0 indicates that there is no impact on the 'affected' price variable (and markets are 
not integrated), and 1 indicates that markets completely adjust in the analysis period. A co-
efficient inside the 0-1 intervals indicates that prices adjust only partially during the period 
of observation (or that markets are integrated but frictions slow down price transmission). 
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Figure 2.4  Real retail prices (in 2001 prices) of pork in the rural markets by provinces, 1985-2001 
 
 
  Using the results from the early 1990s as the baseline, our current analysis shows that 
during the late 1990s China's markets continued along their previous path of maturation, 
and that markets in China are now remarkably integrated. Examining the co-movement of 
prices between pairs of markets in the late 1990s, we see a large increase in the number of 
integrated markets. In the case of maize, for example, in 89 percent of the cases prices in 
one market moved at the same time as in another (Table 2.18). This is up from only 28 
percent of the time in the early 1990s. The number of pairs of markets for soybeans, japon-
ica and indica rice show similar increases (rows 2-4). The integration of these markets is 
notable because in many cases the pairs of market are over 1000 kilometers apart. For ex-
ample, prices in almost all years were integrated between markets in Shaanxi and 
Guangdong provinces, and between those in Sichuan province and southern Jiangsu.  
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Table 2.18  Percentage of market pairs that test positive for being integrated based on the Dickey-Fuller  
    test in rural China, 1988-2000 
 
 
Commodity 1989-1995  1996-2000 
 
 
  (percentage of market pairs) 
 
Maize 28  89 
 
Soybeans 28  68 
 
Japonica rice 
 (Yellow River Valley)  25  60 
 
Indica rice  
 (Yangtse Valley and southern China)  25  47 
 
 
Note: results for two periods from same data set. For results from 1989 to 1995 for maize and rice, see Ro-
zelle et al. (2000). Rice results are for the whole country in 1989-1995. Results from soybeans are for 1989 to 
1995, and all results from 1996 to 2000 are by the authors. 
 
 
  Despite the significant progress in terms of integrations, our results also show that 
there are pairs of markets during different years that are not integrated. For example, in 
one-third of the cases, japonica rice prices moved in one market but not in another. The 
case of indica rice trade is even more notable. In more than half of the times (and places), 
prices do not move together in China's indica rice producing and consuming regions. While 
one explanation for such a result is that there is some kind of institution (policy or infra-
structure/communication) breakdown that is creating China's fragmentation, as shown by 
Park and colleagues (2002), it is also the case that since every province in China has rice 
production and consumption, if during a certain year in a certain area, supply in that region 
is just equal to demand, moderate price movements in another area may not necessarily in-
duce a flow into or out of the region that is in equilibrium.  
  Even with the non-trivial number of cases in the late 1990s in which market prices in 
pairs of markets do not move together, based on each of the market performance analyses, 
one must conclude that the impacts of trade on China's agriculture was experienced across 
wide regions of the nation from coastal to inland areas in the late 1990s. However, this is 
only half of the story. While the above analysis demonstrates a remarkable degree of inte-
gration between markets on the coast and those inland, such an analysis is not sufficient to 
indicate that many of China's villages will be affected by the shocks that hit the coast and 
are transmitted inland.  
  To establish such, we will examine the extent to which villages are integrated into 
regional markets. Our test of integration will essentially test whether farmers in China's vil-
lages are price takers or the villages are isolated, meaning that prices are determined by 
local supply and demand. In the briefest terms, if variables that affect local supply signifi-
cantly affect prices, we will assume villages are isolated and markets are not integrated to 
the village level; in contrast, if the local supply shock does not affect the price, villagers 
are price takers and markets will be thought to be integrated.   68
  The data for this study were collected by the China National Rural Survey (CNRS). 
The survey was of a randomly selected, nearly nationally representative sample of 60 vil-
lages in 6 provinces of rural China. A total of 1,199 households were surveyed. The CNRS 
project team gathered detailed information on both the production and the marketing be-
havior of all of the farmers in the sample, as well as on the characteristics of each village 
and the accessibility of the nearest regional market. From these data, we construct an aver-
age village price for each month in CNY per kilogram. A community questionnaire reveals 
how far the village's center is from the nearest paved road and the distance to the county 
market. Finally, for each crop the farmer cultivated, we know whether it suffered a shock, 
recording both the incidence and the percentage by which the yield fell. We do not include 
any variable that controls for the presence of a community buffer stock system, primarily 
because such an institution is almost never observed in modern China. In addition, sales 
between farmers in a village are rare (less than 5 percent of sales, according to our data). 
  Our regression analysis clearly shows that markets in China are integrated down to 
the village level (Table 2.19). The signs and level of significance of the coefficients on 
variables demonstrate that the further a village is from a market, the lower the price the 
farmer receives, which is the expected result. More importantly for our purposes, the t-
ratios of the coefficients of the village supply shock variables are all lower in absolute 
value terms than 1.35, signifying that the output of the local village's crops do not affect 
the local price. One implication of this result is that it is factors outside the village that af-
fect the price that farmers receive, making them price takers. In other words, farmers - 
even in China's remote villages - are linked to the markets of its main commodities. 
 
 
Table 2.19  Soybean, corn and wheat village price regression, 2002 
Explanatory (1) (2)  (3)
variable  Soybean price Corn price  Wheat price
   
Distance to the nearest county market  -0.029 -0.00064  -0.0095
 (2.37)** (-1.63)*  (3.24)**
   
Village-level shock to production  -0.04 0.12  0.081
 (-0.17) (-1.34)  (-1.02)
  
Other variables not shown  timing of sales / net purchase or seller / 
 
 
  Given the average impacts at national level and market integration presented above, 
when one examines the benefits or costs for certain groups of farmers due to trade, one 
only needs to examine their production mixes and match them to the extent the prices of 
the products rose or fell over the period and whether farmers have been moving into or out 
the production of those products, which will be presented in Chapter 4. Given the results of 
market integration analyses presented above, we can conclude that the changes in national 
prices due to trade in the late 1990s were largely transmitted into different regions except 
for most remote areas in China.  
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2.5.4  Rural Labor and Off-farm Employment 
 
Since economic and political reforms began in China 20 years ago, the country has experi-
enced rapid economic growth (Naughton, 1995). The expansion of the rural economy has 
driven a large part of this growth (Putterman, 1992; Perkins, 1994). In turn, rural labor 
markets have changed dramatically over the past 20 years and have significantly contrib-
uted to the success of the rural economy and household food security (World Bank, 2001). 
Without well-functioning labor markets, the economy cannot be transformed from one 
based on agriculture to one based on industry. Hence, it would seem that more important 
than assessing how well they have contributed to per capita rural incomes and food secu-
rity, is the question whether or not rural labor markets have emerged in a way that will 
allow them to more effectively facilitate China's transformation.  
  In this section, we estimate the nation's aggregate off-farm participation rates. We 
will also decompose the growth in off-farm employment, examining what segments of the 
rural labor force, particularly the poor, are growing and where each segment is growing. 
The main data for this study are those from the survey presented in the previous section. 
The survey gathered detailed information on household demographic characteristics, 
wealth, agricultural production, non-farm activities and investment. Several parts of the 
household survey were designed to learn about migration from the household and other la-
bor market participation across time. For roughly half of the households surveyed (610 out 
of 1,199), a 20-year employment history form was completed for each household member 
and each child of the household head, some of whom were no longer considered household 
members. In total, the survey divided off-farm jobs into four types: migrant wage earners 
(henceforth, migrants), self-employed migrants, wage earners and local self-employed. We 
also asked about the extent of the participation of each member, in each year, in the house-
hold's on-farm activities. As a supplement to this household data set, we also collected 215 
villages' community level data set that traced labor allocation and movement in 1988 and 
1995. 
 
The Evolution of Rural Labor Markets in China 
The data show the off-farm labor force expanded steadily between 1981 and 1995. From 
around 15 percent in 1981, our survey estimates that in 1995, 32 percent of the rural labor 
force had some employment off-farm (Figure 2.5, Panel A). By assuming that neighboring 
provinces similar to those surveyed have identical rates of off-farm labor participation, we 
estimate that off-farm rural employment increased from fewer than 40 million farmers in 
1981 to more than 150 million in 1995, a growth of more than 100 million. Although based 
on a relatively small sample, these numbers demonstrate the consistency of our data with 
much larger national studies by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSBC, 1996) and 
our own 1995 national village survey. Our estimate in 1995 is almost the same as both the 
SSB's estimate of the non-farm labor force (31 percent) and our own estimates of rural off-
farm employment calculated from estimates of village leaders of the participation in the 
off-farm sector of their villagers (34 percent; Rozelle et al., 1999).
1 
                                                 
1 Our data are also consistent with the estimates of SSB in the late 1980s and with Parrish's study (Parrish, 
Zhe and Li, 1995) in the early 1990s. For example, our data set estimates that 20 percent of the rural labor 
force worked off-farm in 1988. This figure nearly agrees with the SSB estimates for that year, namely 21 
percent. Our 1993 labor force participation rate - 29 percent - is only three percentage points higher than the   70
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Figure 2.5  Level of participation by individuals, 1981-2000 
 
  Despite the Asian financial crisis, China's own structural reforms and a general slow-
ing of economic growth in the late 1990s, our data show that rural off-farm employment 
                                                                                                                                                    
best guess made by Parrish, Zhe and Li's national study, a difference that can partly be explained by Parrish's 
slightly broader definition of off-farm labor.    71
growth continued to expand between 1995 and 2000 (Figure 2.5, Panel A). By 2000, 41 
percent of rural individuals participated in off-farm work, 9 percent more than in the late 
1990s. If so, our data imply that more than 200 million rural individuals worked off-farm 
in 2000 - an increase of more than 50 million workers in just 5 years. If employment gen-
eration and the ability to create jobs during a period of relatively slow growth were 
indicative of a healthy labor market, then China's labor markets would have to be given a 
high mark for maintaining rural incomes.  
  An examination of disaggregated trends provides an initial basis for demonstrating 
that China's labor markets may be doing more than just providing off-farm income for rural 
workers. Trends by job type clearly show that the focus of workers over the past 20 years 
has shifted from rural to urban destinations (Figure 2.6, Panel A). In 1981, most rural indi-
viduals (nearly 85 percent) not only spent all of their time in farming, but those who 
worked off the farm were almost three times as likely to live at home and work in or close 
to the village (7 percent were local self-employed, and 4.2 percent were wage earners) than 
to work outside the village (less than 1 percent were self-employed migrants, and less than 
4 percent were migrants). By 2000, almost as many off-farm workers were living away 
from home (more than 85 percent in cities or suburban villages of major metropolitan ar-
eas) as were living in the village. Migrants comprised both the largest and the fastest 
growing component of the rural labor force.  
  The rise in labor markets has already begun to have a positive impact on increasing 
the farm participation rates of women (Figure 2.5 and 2.6). Although women participated 
at rates far below those of men throughout the entire 20-year sample period, since the early 
1990s participation rates have risen (Figure 2.5, Panels B and C). In the 1980s, consistent 
with the findings based on our national community survey study (reported in Rozelle et al., 
1999), the participation rates of men (more than 25 percent in 1981) far exceeded those of 
women (less than 5 percent). Moreover, despite these low initial levels of involvement in 
the off-farm sector, the growth of the participation rates of women remained below those 
of men in the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, the rate of growth of the participation of 
women rose faster than that of men. 
  The increasing participation rates of women have been driven by the entry of women 
into all job categories, although the most striking absolute gains have occurred in migration 
(Figure 2.6). Throughout the 1980s, less than 1 percent of women left their home to work 
for a wage or become engaged in self-employment. Since 1990, however, the rate of 
growth has been higher than that for any other category of job type for either men or 
women. By 2000, nearly 6 percent of the female labor force was working as a wage earn-
ing migrant and nearly 3 percent was working as a self-employed migrant. One 
interpretation of this increase in the participation of women is that as labor markets have 
become more competitive, the scope for managers to exercise their discriminatory prefer-
ences has declined, thus opening up new employment opportunities for those who 
previously had not been able to participate. Multivariate analyses performed by Rozelle 
and colleagues (Rozelle et al., 2001) are consistent with these results.   72
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Figure 2.6  Total labor force in different types of off-farm work (%) 
 
 
  A community-level data set we collected in 1996 reveals an even more significant 
development, namely a shift to higher education Table 2.20. In 1988, 61 percent of mi-
grants nationwide had at least a middle school education. By 1995, the national average 
climbed to 64 percent. The percentage of high-school-educated migrants nationwide in-
creased from 7 to 8 percent between 1988 and 1995. Although rural men generally have a 
higher level of education than rural women do, the education of male and female migrants 
is roughly equivalent. Male migrants are slightly more likely than female migrants to have 
either a high school or an elementary education, which suggests that the range of opportu-
nities for male migrants is wider. 
  In the 2000 household data set, the propensity of the more educated to enter the mi-
grant and local off-farm wage sector is confirmed. Multivariate analysis shows that in the 
1980s, for each additional year of education, the probability of becoming a migrant in-
creases by 10 percent, and the probability of working in a local wage-earning job increases 
by 6 percent. By the 1990s, the probability of becoming a migrant increases by 18 percent 
for each year of additional education, and the probability of finding and off-farm job in-  73 
Table 2.20 Education Level of Male and Female Rural Migrants, 1988 and 1995 
a
No More Than Elementary Lower Middle School Upper Middle School
School Education Education Education
Male Female Male Female Male Female
1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
(percent)
Zhejiang 58 42 49 54 38 47 45 39 4 10 6 7
S i c h u a n 3 83 72 53 3 5 75 77 16 2 6 6 4 5
H u b e i7 04 15 74 2 2 65 04 35 0 4 9 0 8
Shaanxi 32 40 18 31 55 49 78 62 12 11 4 8
Shandong 31 22 50 29 66 60 50 66 3 17 0 5
Yunnan 40 47 ~ 45 58 47 ~ 51 3 6 ~ 4
National
Average 
b 47 39 45 42 46 51 50 51 7 10 5 7
Source:  Author's Study
a A migrant is defined as one who leaves the village for wage earning employment for at least 1 month and maintains ties with the village by returning a
festivals, agricultural peak seasons, etc., at least once a year.
b National estimates are generated by summing provincial estimates weighted by estimated proportion of migrants.   The estimated proportion of 
migrants is calculated using the total labor force represented by each province and the estimated percent of migrants from table1.  Zhejiang represents 
Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and itself.  Sichuan represents itself.  Hubei represents Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, and itself.  Shaanxi 
represents Ningxia,Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and itself.  Yunnan represents Guangxi, Guizhou, and itself.  Zhejiang, Sichuan, Hubei, Shaanxi, 
Shandong, and Yunan are weighted .14, .145, .34, .275, .06, and .04 respectively for male migrants in 1995; .16, .16, .25, .35, .06, and .02 respectively 
for male migrants in 1988; .30, .12, .30, .20, .04, and .04 respectively for female migrants in 1995; and .62, .11, .18, .08, .01, and 0 respectively for fem
migrants in 1988  74
creases by 17 percent. The participation in formal training and apprenticeship programs 
also has a large and significant effect in increasing the participation in all forms of labor 
market activity. To the extent that we would expect well-functioning labor markets to pro-
vide more employment opportunities to those with higher levels of human capital, labor 
markets appear to have played some role during the whole reform period. 
  Drawing on our earlier community-level data set, the destinations of migrants, both 
men and women, also changed between 1988 and 1995 and differ from region to region 
(Rozelle et al., 1999). In coastal areas such as Zhejiang, more migrants stay in their home 
county than is the case in non-coastal areas. Migrants from inland provinces move outside 
their own provinces more frequently than others. Surprisingly, most migration destinations 
were short and medium distance, except in Sichuan and Hubei in 1995.  
  The number of long-distance migrants, especially women, has increased sharply (Ta-
ble 2.21). Nationwide, the proportion of migrant men moving to remote destinations 
increased from 28 to 42 percent between 1988 and 1995, while the proportion of women 
increased from 7 to 41 percent. Some areas had exceptionally high levels of out-migration. 
The proportion of men migrating to destinations outside the province increased from 61 to 
74 percent in Sichuan and from 14 to 46 percent in Hubei. If these figures are relatively ac-
curate estimates of provincial migration, then nearly 15 percent of male laborers from 
Sichuan work outside the province. The proportion of women in the long-distance labor 
market increased sharply in all surveyed provinces except Shandong. In Zhejiang, for ex-
ample, few women left for work in Shanghai or Fujian in 1988. By 1995, 17 percent had 
left Zhejiang in search of wage work. Over half of the female migrants from Hubei and Si-
chuan left their home province. 
  While China's success at generating off-farm work opportunities for its rural workers 
is well known, what is less well known is that many of the new jobs are in rural areas and 
go to workers from other villages. In 1988, only about 1 percent of the rural labor force 
found employment in another rural village (Table 2.22, row 9, column 4). By 1995, 5 per-
cent of rural workers were employed in a rural village, which was not their home village 
(column 1). 
  The increase in the size of the rural labor force, the rapid increase in the proportion 
of rural workers who leave their home village for work and the increasing share of those 
workers heading to other rural villages have contributed to the expansion of the rural-to-
rural labor movement, which now represents the fastest growing off-farm employment sec-
tor in rural China, with an annual growth rate of 27 percent compared to 13 percent growth 
in local employment and 9 percent growth in rural-to-urban movement (Table 2.22, rows 3, 
6 and 9, column 7). Growth in rural-to-rural migration was especially high at 38 percent 
annually (row 11). We estimate that there were 12.9 million rural-to-rural migrants in 
1995, up from 2 million in 1988.
1 An additional 9.8 million rural workers in 1995 com-
muted to other villages, up from 3 million in 1988. The 22.7 million workers who found 
non-agricultural employment through rural-to-rural labor movement (12.9 plus 9.8) make 
China's development unprecedented. We are unaware of a development experience in any 
                                                 
1 These estimates come from the percentage of rural labour going into villages (estimated by the survey) mul-
tiplied by China's total rural labour force as published by the National Statistical Bureau of China (NSBC). 
The NSBC reports 403 million rural workers in 1988 and 446 million in 1995.   75 
 
 
Table 2.21  Destination of Male and Female Migrants in China, 1988 and 1995 
Within the County Within the Province Out of the Province
(but outside the county)
Male Female Male Female Male Female
1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995 1988 1995
(percent)
Zhejiang 29 47 74 49 34 24 25 33 38 29 1 17
Sichuan 21 9 28 8 18 17 21 14 61 74 51 78
H u b e i 3 12 49 82 4 5 53 0 1 8 1 44 6 1 6 7
Shaanxi 15 14 33 16 67 50 65 55 18 36 3 29
S h a n d o n g 2 1 3 0 7 6 65 75 07 6 3 23 05 01 3
Yunnan 25 30 0 44 75 56 0 41 0 7 0 15
National Average
b 22 22 69 28 51 35 24 30 28 42 7 41
Source:  Author's Study
a A migrant is defined as one who leaves the village for wage earning employment for at least 1 month and maintains ties with the village by returning at festivals,
       agricultural peak seasons, etc., at least once a year.
b National estimates are generated by summing provincial estimates weighted by estimated proportion of migrants.   The estimated proportion of migrants is 
       calculated using the total labor force represented by each province and the estimated percent of migrants from table1.  Zhejiang represents Guangdong,
       Fujian, Jiangsu, Shanghai, and itself.  Sichuan represents itself.  Hubei represents Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui, and itself.  Shaanxi represents Ningxia,
       Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and itself.  Yunnan represents Guangxi, Guizhou, and itself.  Zhejiang, Sichuan, Hubei, Shaanxi, Shandong, and Yunan
       are weighted .14, .145, .34, .275, .06, and .04 respectively for male migrants in 1995; .16, .16, .25, .35, .06, and .02 respectively for male migrants in 1988;
       .30, .12, .30, .20, .04, and .04 respectively for female migrants in 1995; and .62, .11, .18, .08, .01, and 0 respectively for female migrants in 1988  
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Summary of Rural Labor Market Findings 
In summary, we have provided evidence of how labor markets are clearly acting in a way 
consistent with an economy that is in transition from agriculture to non-agriculture and a 
population that is shifting from rural to urban. Our descriptive analysis illustrates that labor 
markets have allowed migration to become the dominant form of off-farm activity, have 
expanded the fastest in economies or areas that are relatively well-off, and have increas-
ingly drafted workers from sub sectors of the population (e.g. women), who earlier had 
been excluded from participation. Rural workers also showed signs of specialization, espe-
cially when examined by education. In 2000, better-educated workers worked much less on 
the farm than did older workers. Finally, our data show that workers are moving further 
from home and developing ties in other rural areas.  
  When we talk about the impact of a rise in manufacturing in rural areas on farm in-
come and food security due to liberalization, we can see that this has an impact on some, 
but not necessarily all, rural residents. First-order impacts are felt by those in the richest 
villages and in the villages nearest to the core, since these areas, based on their historical 
ability to manufacture and export these goods, should be able to expand production. How-
ever, rural migrants, or those in the lower-middle-income, more remote regions, might also 
benefit, since they are ones who are providing a lot of the labor in the richer, more cen-
trally located villages. However, we would not expect first-order or immediate benefits for 
those in middle-income or the most remote villages.  
 
2.6 Concluding  Remarks 
 
We can now answer the following key questions. During China's reform era, how has the 
economy in general and agriculture in particular performed? What agricultural sector and 
macro-economic policies and reforms has China introduced? What have been the impacts 
of reforms on production incentives, market integration and rural employment? What are 
the major constraints and challenges faced by China's agricultural sector? 
  Food security has long been one of the central goals of China's agricultural policy. 
Since the early 1980s, domestic reforms to boost agricultural growth and farm income have 
covered nearly every aspects of the economy, starting from land reform and gradually 
moving to both input and output markets, from policy specific to the agricultural sector to 
policy concerning the macro economy. The reforms have had significant impacts on the 
country's economy. China has not only been able to increase its ability to feed its growing 
population with the extremely limited natural resources, but has also become one of the 
world's major exporters of food and agricultural products. Both household food security 
and the per capita availability of food have improved significantly. Increased domestic 
production is almost solely responsible for increased per capita food availability. 
                                                 
1 See Lohmar and Rozelle (2000) for more details on the rural-to-rural labour force.   77 
Table 2.22  Composition of China's rural labor force, 1988 and 1995 (% of total rural labor force) 
   1995 
Village labor force 
 1988 
Village labor force 
  
Growth rates, 1988-1995 


















   (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
      
Full-time agricultural labor  (1) 67 52 77 81  73 89 -1 0 -1 
    
Non-agricultural labor 
a (2) 33 48 23 19  27 11 12 11 14 
    
Village residents locally  
employed
b 
( 3 ) 1 52 21 2 9  1 3 6 1 31 11 3  
 Self-employed  (4) 11 16 8 6  8 4 14 14 17 
 Village enterprises  (5) 4 6 4 3  5 2 6 5 7 
    
Rural-urban movement  (6) 13 20 6 9  13 3 9 9 11 
 C o m m u t e r s   ( 7 ) 694 5   73 657  
 Migrants  (8) 7 12 3 3  6 0.5 14 13 21 
    
Rural-rural movement  (9) 5 6 5 1  1 2 27 29 24 
 Commuters  (10) 2 3 2 1  0.7 1 18 26 10 
 Migrants 
 
(11) 3 3 3 0.5 0.7 0.3 38 30 53 
Source: authors' survey. 
a Many of these workers also contribute labor to agriculture in addition to their off-farm employment 
b These workers are village residents with off-farm employment in the village
  
c These workers have off-farm employment outside the village but close enough to commute (daily) from their home village 
d These workers have off-farm employment outside the village and must leave for at least one month at a time for their job 
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  China's experience demonstrates the importance of technological development, insti-
tutional change, price and market liberalization, rural economic development and macro-
economic policies in improving agricultural productivity, farm income and food security in 
a nation with limited land and other natural resources. Technology has been the engine of 
China's agricultural economy growth. Institutional arrangement and government food poli-
cies have also played important roles in China's food production and in its efforts to make 
food available to the whole of its society. Rural enterprise development and off-farm em-
ployment also play a substantial role in the country's economy and farm income. Broad 
participation in strong rural economic growth has brought about a tremendous reduction in 
absolute poverty in China. 
  External reforms in general have paralleled domestic reform. During nearly 20 years 
of reform, China's foreign trade regime has gradually changed from a highly centralized, 
planned and import substitution regime, into a more decentralized, market-oriented and 
export-promoting regime. Reform and trade liberalization in China's external sector has 
proceeded gradually. In the initial stage, reformers only implemented measures that pro-
vided incentives to sets of corporations and institutions. Because the experiences gained 
from the reform grew and the objectives of trade could be achieved through alternative set-
tings of institutions and policies, trade liberalization has been implemented smoothly since 
the late 1980s. However, in the late 1990s, China also used various means to protect some 
of its crops, such as maize and cotton.  
  The impact on agriculture, however, is only part of the story. Reforms have also af-
fected the access of households to non-farm employment and the wage they earn for being 
in the off-farm market. In general, China has gained a lot from market liberalization. In-
creasing exports of manufacturing goods have been produced in factories that hire a lot of 
rural labor. These factories have also had spill over effects that have helped to make do-
mestic factories more productive and have increased the demand for labor. In a country 
like China, increasing the demand for off-farm labor is probably the most important factor 
in improving the economy.  
  On the other hand, China's future agricultural sector is matter of increasing concern. 
Rapid industrialization and urbanization will lead to competition for agricultural resource 
uses. The impacts of trade liberalization on China's domestic agricultural sector, which en-
gages hundreds of millions of small farmers, is the other growing concern of the policy 
makers. Rapid economic growth has continued unevenly across regions and among income 
groups, and the income gap among regions and between the rural and urban has not been 
narrowed.  
  Limited options for increasing food and agricultural supplies has made the challenge 
of meeting China's food security target even more formidable. Fiscal constraints may pre-
clude China's leaders from implementing some of the planned policies. The constraints on 
China's leaders resulting from resource scarcity and politico-economic realities increase the 
need to understand the scope for food supply expansion from one of the most important 
sources - investments in agricultural technology - and to understand the scope of income 
growth from non-farming activities (rural enterprise). The nation needs to keep promoting 
policies that facilitate investment and that allow rural households to move to these new 
jobs without constraints.    79






The main instruments used for this study are two economic models. We use a model of 
global trade, which is based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP), and we use a 
detailed model of Chinese agriculture, which is called Chinese Agricultural Policy Simula-
tion Model (CAPSiM). This chapter presents an overview of both models. The two models 
have a different scope of analysis and are based on different assumptions. While the GTAP 
model is a general equilibrium model with a global coverage, CAPSIM is a partial equilib-
rium model of Chinese agriculture. The approach taken in this study is attempting to 
exploit the relative strengths of each approach. For a general discussion of partial versus 
general equilibrium modeling in agriculture see Van Tongeren et al., 2001.  
  The global model is especially strong in analyzing issues pertaining to international 
trade, trade policies and interlinkages between economies. Since its scope is global, the 
model compromises with regard to its detail in representing national economies. The 
strength of the Chinese model, on the other hand, lies in its detailed representation of Chi-
nese agriculture, including the development of crop yields and livestock productivity, but 
also estimates of consumer demand in the face of skewed rural-urban income develop-
ments. These aspects are very crucial for estimating the likely impact of China's role on 
world markets. The CAPSIM model can comprehensively and simultaneously account for 
the major driving forces and policies determining China's domestic food demand and sup-
ply, while the GTAP approach can help us to examine the influence of the linkages of 
China's economy with the rest of the world. 
  It is beyond the scope of this report to give a detailed description of the two models, 
their equations and their underlying databases. This documentation is available elsewhere. 
Key references are Hertel (1997), for the GTAP model and Huang and Chen (1999) and 
Huang and Li (2003) for the CAPSIM model. Here we confine ourselves to a general over-
view that should assist the reader in interpreting the results discussed in later chapters.  
 
 




GTAP was initiated with the goal of supporting high-level quantitative analysis of interna-
tional trade, resource, and environmental issues in an economy wide context. The GTAP 
project is supported by the leading international agencies in trade and development policy, 
as well as a number of national agencies with active research programs on these issues. 
The GTAP project develops and maintains a database, a multi-region multi-sector general   80
equilibrium model. It also provides training courses and organizes an annual conference on 
global economic analysis.  
  This project has grown rapidly since its inception in 1993. There is no doubt that the 
GTAP database and its associated modeling efforts represent a major achievement for ad-
vancing quantitative analysis of international trade, resource and environmental issues. The 
success of this approach is reflected in a high degree of academic recognition as well as the 
increasing usage for policy analysis by international and national agencies. 
 
3.2.2 Model characteristics 
 
There are basically two strands of quantitative modeling in policy analysis. One approach 
is to build issue-specific models, depending on the question at hand. These models will 
usually be capable of capturing many relevant aspects of one specific policy question, but 
are of less use in a different policy context. The other approach sets out to construct more 
general and flexible models, which do not necessarily attempt to capture all detail but are 
flexible enough to allow elaborations in face of specific policy questions. The Global 
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) provides such a modeling framework. 
  The standard GTAP model
1 is a comparative static multi-regional general equilib-
rium model. In its standard version constant returns to scale and perfect competition are 
assumed in all markets for outputs and inputs. A detailed discussion of the basic algebraic 
model structure of the GTAP model can be found in Hertel and Tsigas (1997).
2 
  In the GTAP model each country or region is depicted within the same structural 
model. The consumer side is represented by the regional household to which the income of 
factors, tariff revenues and taxes are assigned. The regional household allocates its income 
to three expenditure categories: private household expenditures, government expenditures 
and savings. For the consumption of the private household, the non-homothetic Constant 
Difference of Elasticities (CDE) function is applied.  
  In the model, a representative producer for each sector of a country or region makes 
production decisions to maximize a profit function by choosing inputs of labor, capital, and 
intermediates to produce a single sectoral output. In the case of crop production, farmers 
also make decisions on land allocation. Intermediate inputs are produced domestically or 
imported, while primary factors cannot move across countries. Markets are typically as-
sumed to be competitive. When making production decision, farmers and firms treat prices 
for output and input as given. Primary production factors land and capital are fully em-
ployed within each economy, and hence returns to land and capital are endogenously 
determined at the equilibrium, i.e., the aggregate supply of each factor equals its demand. 
The production structure is depicted with a production tree with four nests (Figure 3.1). 
The Leontief and the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional forms are used to 
model the substitution relations between the inputs of the production process. In the output 
nest, the mix of factors and intermediate inputs are assembled together, forming the sec-
                                                 
1 We deliberately refer to the 'standard GTAP model' as the model version that is supported by the GTAP 
consortium. GTAP users have developed numerous variations on the standard model. In this study we also 
make some modifications to the standard model. These are discussed more extensively in subsequent chap-
ters. 
2 Or in the internet http:// www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/model/Chap2.pdf   81
toral output. The functional form can be Leontief (fixed proportions) or CES. The substitu-
tion relations within the value added nest are depicted by the CES function. While labor 
and capital are considered mobile across sectors the Constant Elasticity of Transformation 
(CET) function is used to represent the sluggish adjustment of the factor land. That is, land 
can only imperfectly move between alternative crop uses. The CES function is applied in 
the composite intermediate nest depicting the substitution between domestic and imported 
products. The last nest illustrates the relation between imports of the same good from dif-





Region 1 Region 2 Region r
Value added 
Output sector i






Figure 3.1  Production tree 
Source: Hertel and Tsigas (1997). 
 
 
  The GTAP model includes two global institutions. All transport between regions is 
carried out by the international transport sector. The trading costs reflect the transaction 
costs involved in international trade, as well as the physical activity of transportation itself. 
Using transport inputs from all regions the international transport sector minimizes its costs 
under the Cobb-Douglas technology. The second global institution is the global bank, 
which takes the savings from all regions and purchases investment goods in all regions de-
pending on the expected rates of return. The global bank guarantees that global savings are 
equal to global investments. With the standard closure, the model determines the trade bal-
ance in each region endogenously, and hence foreign capital inflows may supplement 
domestic savings. The model does not have an exchange rate variable. However, by choos-
ing as a numeraire an index of global factor prices, each region's change of factor prices 
relative to the numeraire directly reflects a change in the purchasing power of the region's 
factor incomes on the world market. This is can be directly interpreted as a change in the 
real exchange rate.    82
  The welfare changes are measured by the equivalent variation, which can be com-
puted from each region's household expenditure function.  
  Taxes and other policy measures are included in the theory of the model at several 
levels. All policy instruments are represented as ad valorem tax equivalents. These create 
wedges between the undistorted prices and the policy-inclusive prices. Production taxes are 
placed on intermediate or primary inputs, or on output. Trade policy instruments include 
applied most-favored nation tariffs, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, price under-
takings, export quotas, and other trade restrictions. Additional internal taxes can be placed 
on domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be applied at differential rates that 
discriminate against imports. Where relevant, taxes are also placed on exports, and on pri-
mary factor income. Finally, where relevant (as indicated by social accounting data) taxes 
are placed on final consumption, and can be applied differentially to consumption of do-
mestic and imported goods.  
  The GTAP model is implemented in GEMPACK - a software package designed for 
solving large applied general equilibrium models. A description of Gempack can be found 
in Harrison and Pearson (2002).
1 
  Various GTAP users have developed adaptations of the standard model. Such elabo-
ration's, include increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition, dynamic 
equilibrium formulations and incorporation of non-continuous policy instruments such as 
Tariff rate quota that resulted from GATT Uruguay round, or production quota as applied 
in the European milk and sugar sectors. For a model version that uses both increasing re-




The GTAP database contains detailed bilateral trade, transport and protection data charac-
terizing economic linkages among regions, linked together with individual country input-
output databases which account for intersectoral linkages. All monetary values of the data 
are in $US millions and the base year for version 5 is 1997. This version of the database 
divides the world into 65 regions. China being one of the regions for which individual 
country data are available. An additional interesting feature of version 5 is the distinction 
of the 15 individual EU member states. The database distinguishes 57 sectors in each of the 
regions. That is, for each of the 65 regions there are input-output tables with 57 sectors that 
depict the backward and forward linkages amongst activities. The database provides quite 
a great detail on agriculture, with 14 primary agricultural sectors and seven agricultural 
processing sectors (such as dairy, meat products and further processing sectors) 
  The bilateral trade data are derived from United Nations Trade Statistics, and sup-
port- and protection data from various sources (e.g. UNCTAD TRAINS database for 
industrial tariff information, the AMDAD database for agricultural protection, OECD's 
PSE data base for domestic agricultural support). Version 5 is fully documented in Dima-
ranan and McDougall (2002).  
  In this study we make extensive use of the GTAP database version 5. However, as 
we shall explain later, we make some updating adjustments to the Chinese data in the light 
                                                 
1 More information can be obtained at www.monash.edu.au/policy/gempack.htm.   83
of more recent policy information that has become available in the context of WTO acces-
sion and in order to incorporate some of the detailed information on agriculture that is 
embodied in the CAPSIM database (see below). 
 
3.2.4 Relevant GTAP applications on China 
 
There are many GTAP applications, performed by researchers from all over the world that 
focus on China. As the work on China is evolving very rapidly, it is not very useful to 
summarize it here. The best way to keep abreast of the developments is to consult the list 
of applications maintained by the Center for Global Trade Analysis at www.gtap.org. 
Some of the issues studied with the help of the GTAP database and GTAP model are: 
-  China's accession to the WTO: impact on China and/or the rest of the world; 
-  Impact of APEC trade liberalization on China; 
-  Food security in China in the future; 
-  China and world food markets; 
-  Productivity Growth, 'Catching-up', knowledge spillovers; 
- Textiles:  impact  of URAA, WTO and MFA. 
 
  A more elaborate list of China related GTAP applications is given below. Some pa-
pers that focus on trade liberalization use the standard static GTAP model. But there are 
several extensions from the standard model that are relevant for this project. First of all, the 
comparative static model is sometimes used to generate projections of policy impacts at 
some future point in time. Such projections are not to be confused with econometric fore-
casts, but are achieved by constructing an artificial future dataset that is consistent with the 
model's assumptions -a so called baseline-, and subsequently conducting a policy experi-
ment on the basis of this projected dataset. The artificial future dataset is constructed by 
making assumptions on the growth of exogenous variables and parameters and subse-
quently letting the model solve for an equilibrium that is consistent with these assumptions. 
Typical projections with AGE models rely on exogenous forecasts of GDP, factor endow-
ments and factor productivity. Examples of such an extension are for example, Arndt et al. 
(1996), Hertel et al. (1999). The projection methodology is also applied in this study, and 
more fully explained in chapter 4. 
  Other researchers have incorporated dynamic features. The most frequently used ap-
proach is to specify a recursive sequence of temporary equilibria. That is, in each time 
period the model is solved for an equilibrium, given the exogenous conditions prevailing 
for that particular period. In between periods, stock variables are updated, either exoge-
nously (e.g. population) or as a result of the equilibrium outcomes of the preceding period 
(e.g. investment demand leading to a changed capital stock in the next period). Examples 
of this approach are for example, Walmsley and Hertel (2000), Wang (2003), Lejour 
(2000). 
  Recursive dynamics do not guarantee time-consistent behavior. In contrast, in in-
tertemporal equilibrium models agents display optimal behavior over time as well as 
within periods. Intertemporal models are usually tantamount to using rational expectations 
assumptions. Such forward-looking behavior leads to equilibrium time paths that move to-
wards a long-run steady state (if it exists). A main reason to incorporate such intertemporal   84
features into general equilibrium models is the desire to model savings rates endogenously, 
and hence to allow the model to generate alternative (endogenous) growth rates. In such 
models, a policy change can have a lasting effect on the economy's growth rate through 
changes in the accumulation of capital stocks. A feature, which is impossible with a fixed 
savings rate assumption. An example of an application to China is McKibbin and Woo 
(2003). 
  Other interesting extensions relevant to China are Adams et. al. (1998) who linked 
the GTAP model to a CGE model of the Chinese economy and van Meijl and van Ton-
geren (1998) who model endogenous trade-embodied technology spillovers.  
 
 




China's Agricultural Policy Simulation Model (CAPSiM) is a partial equilibrium (PE) 
model of the agricultural sector. Its structure is typical for a family of PE models that has a 
well-established history. See Van Tongeren et al. (2001) for a detailed discussion. CAP-
SiM is a formal framework that has been regularly used by the Center for Chinese 
Agricultural Policy (CCAP) for agricultural commodity projection and policy simulation, 
including agricultural sector wide and commodity specific policies, and macroeconomic 
and trade policies. The model development was initiated in 1989 and has been continually 
updated with available new estimates on demand and supply elasticities conducted at 
CCAP and new and reliable data from both CCAP's various primary surveys and other 
secondary data sources. 
  CAPSiM is the first and most comprehensive model for China's food demand, supply 
and trade analysis. Most of the elasticities and parameters used in CAPSiM are estimated 
econometrically with imposition of theoretical constraints. In the projection or policy simu-
lation, prices can be determined endogenously or exogenously. The model explicitly 
accounts for urbanization and market development (demand side), technology, agricultural 
investment, environmental trends and competition for labor and land use (supply side), as 
well as the price responses of both demand and supply. The model can be used for both 
short- and long-run policy simulation and projection for key agricultural variables in re-
sponse to the changes in exogenous shocks to the economy. It is also designed for 
analyzing the likely impact of specific policies on key variables such as sown area, yield, 
production, prices, consumption, commodity demand and its components (food, feed and 
other use), stock formation, and export and import for agricultural commodities. 
  The model covers a wide range of agricultural products (11 crops
1 plus 7 livestock 
products
2) and can be used for long-term projections as long as 25 years. The database 
starts from 1980 and is mainly fed with primary data, or with secondary data supplemented 
with field surveys. The included commodities account for about 90% of China's agriculture 
                                                 
1 Rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, other coarse grains, soybean, cotton, oil crops, sugar crops, vege-
tables. 
2 Pork, beef, mutton, poultry, egg, milk, fish.   85
  The major components of CAPSiM include the models for production (supply), con-
sumption (demand) specified separately for rural and urban consumers, stocks change, 
trade, and marketing clearing for 18 food and agricultural commodities or commodity 
groups. Agricultural supply is assumed to respond to the product's own-price, prices of 
other commodities and inputs, quasi-fixed inputs, and other exogenous shocks. Output is 
also a function of the stock of agricultural research, the stock of irrigation infrastructure, 
and three environmental factors: erosion, salinization, and the deterioration of the local en-
vironment. 
 
3.3.2 General Framework of CAPSiM 
 
3.3.2.1  Overview of CAPSiM 
 
CAPSiM is driven either by endogenous or by exogenous determinants of supply and de-
mand. Supply equations, which are decomposed by area and yield for crops and output for 
meat and other products, allow producer own- and cross-price market responses, as well as 
the effects of shifts in technology stock on agriculture, irrigation stock, ratio of erosion 
area to total land area, ratio of salinity area to cultivate area, yield change due to exogenous 
shock of climate, and yield change due to other exogenous shock. 
  Demand equations, which are decomposed by urban and rural, allow consumer own- 
and cross-price market responses, as well as the effects of shifts in income, population 
level, market development and other shocks. 

























































Figure 3.3  Schematic diagram of the macroeconomic linkages 
 
 
3.3.2.2  Linkage with World Market 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the interactive response between China's and world agricultural markets.  
  Panel A of Figure 3.4 shows that in the absence of trade, China produces and con-
sumes at point A at P1, while Rest of the World produces and consumes at point A' at P3 in 
panel C. Panel B represents trade market in the world. With the opening of trade, the price 
of agriculture products in the world market will be somewhere between P1 and P3 since 
China is a large country. Otherwise, if China is such a small country that its supply will 
have less effect on the total world supply, the equilibrium price of agriculture products in 
the world market will be almost the same as that in the rest of the world market, that is, P2 
will be almost the same as P3, supposing that the food markets in the rest of the world are 
totally opened.   87
Figure 3.4  The Partial Equilibrium Price of Agriculture Products with Trade 
 
 
  Assume that the production of agriculture products in China increases and that in the 
rest of the world, production is still at the same level as before. Then, the supply curve in 
panel A will shift from SC to SC', and in turn, the supply curve in panel B will shift from 
SW to SW' because China will export more and the equilibrium price in the world market 
goes down from the price at E
* to the price at E
*'. If China is a small country, the supply 
curve in panel B will be unchanged. 
  The decrease in world market price will induce less export from China, more import 
into China, increase in Chinese consumption and decrease in Chinese food production, so 
that, in panel A, the supply curve will shift inward and demand curve shift outward. These 
shifts will induce changes in world market again. These two markets will interact continu-
ally until a new equilibrium point is reached. 
  A similar analysis can be done whenever there is some change in the demand in 
China, as well as some changes in the supply and/or demand in the rest of the world. 
Therefore, given the fact that China is not a price-taker in the world market, the price of 
agriculture products in the world market will be subject to change endogenously in order to 
reach the equilibrium point of the market whenever there is some change in the supply of 
or demand for agriculture products in the world market. 
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3.3.3 Specifications of CAPSiM 
 
3.3.3.1 Domestic  Production 
 
Crop Production 
Crop production is obtained by multiplying harvested area and yield. Crop harvested area 
is a Cobb-Douglas function of the crop's own price and other crops' prices, and responds to 
the exogenous shocks from climate, policy and the other sources. Yield is a Cobb-Douglas 
function of the crop's own price, agriculture technology stock and irrigation stock, and re-
sponds to the exogenous shocks from climate and other sources. Most of parameters used 
in these modules are econometrically estimated. 
 
Area: 




















it = Ait * Yit 

















A: Crop harvested area. 
Z
A1: percentage change in area due to exogenous shock of climate. 
Z
A2: percentage change in area due to exogenous shock of policy. 
Z
A3: percentage change in area due to other exogenous shock. 
p
S: prices of output and input for producer. 
Y: crop yield per hectare. 
R: agriculture technology stock. 
I: irrigation stock. 
Erosion: ratio of erosion area to total land area. 
Salinity: ratio of salinity area to cultivate area. 
Z
Y1: percentage change in yield due to exogenous shock of climate. 
Z
Y2: percentage change in yield due to other exogenous shock. 
i: index crop, including: rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, other coarse grains, soy-
bean, cotton, oil crop, sugar crop, vegetable, and other crops. 
j: index crop output and input, including: rice, wheat, maize, sweet-potato, potato, other 
coarse grains, soybean, cotton, oil crop, sugar crop, vegetable, and other crops, fertilizer, 
labor, and land. 
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Constraints
1: 








S. It means that the area's 




ij b = 0 because of homogenous of degree zero. It means that an equal percentage 
change in all prices leads to no change in the crop area response. 
When i ≠ j, b
Y
ij = 0, it means that crop yield responds to the change in its own price only. 
 
Livestock Production 
Livestock production is a Cobb-Douglas function of prices of output and input for pro-
ducer and responds to the exogenous shocks from disease and the other sources. 
 
Production: 
















 q: total livestock production. 
 Z
q1: livestock production change due to exogenous shock of disease. 
 Z
Y2: livestock production change due to other exogenous shocks. 
p
S: prices of output and input for producer. 
i: index meat production, including: pork, beef, mutton, poultry, egg, milk, fish. 




When i ≠ j, b
q
ij = 0, it means that livestock production responds to the change in its own 
price only 
 
Supply by mode of production: 
In China, livestock is produced in three production modes: backyard, specialized house-
hold, and commercial intensive production. In order to analyze the technological 
coefficients of input and output in livestock production, the total livestock production is 
decomposed into three parts according to these three modes. The share of output in each 
production mode is subject to be changed from year to year. 
qikt = θikt * qit 
 θikt = θik(t-1) + γik 
 Σkθikt = 1 
                                                 
1 In this crop production model, if CAPSiM runs in endogenous mode and if Ait is fixed exogenously, at least 






it, must be endogenized. Similarly, if Yit is fixed exogenously, at 




it, must be endogenized. 
When i ≠ j, b
A
ij varies yearly due to the first constraint   90
 Where: 
 θ: share of each production mode. 
 γik: annual change in θ. 
 k: index production mode, including: backyard, specialized household, and commercial in-
tensive production. 
 
3.3.3.2 Domestic  Demand 
 
On the demand side, the changes in urban economy have made urban consumers almost 
entirely depend on markets for their consumption need. In this sector, prices and income 
changes will likely be the fundamental forces driving change in consumption patterns. 
  Rural residents live in a very different environment from their urban counterparts and 
exhibit a different kind of demand behavior. Taking this fact into account, the demand 
models for urban and rural areas are given separately, which differ in the inclusion of the 
food market development index. 
  Among the domestic demand models, grain consumption is divided into two parts: 
grain that is directly consumed for food and grain that is fed to animals and consumed indi-
rectly which is inputted from underlying demand equations for pork, beef, mutton, poultry, 
fish, eggs and milk. 
Similar to supply side, this part of the analysis uses econometrically estimated parameters. 
Demand parameters are estimated using an Almost Ideal Demand System framework and 
based on household survey data. Elasticities of expenditure are estimated to vary according 
to the level of income. 
 
Food Demand 
Food demand is a Cobb-Douglas function of consumer prices, per capita income and food 
market development index in rural area. At first, per capita demands in rural and urban ar-
eas are calculated separately, then, national per capita demand is calculated by using rural 









































U: per capita demand in rural, urban. 
d: national per capita demand. 
D: national total demand. 
p
D: consumer price. 
Y
R, Y
U,: per capita income in rural, urban. 
MKT: food market development index. 
b
R, b
U: price elasticity matrix of demand in rural, urban. 
e
R, e
U: income elasticity vector of demand in rural, urban. 
m: market development elasticity of demand in rural. 
θ
R, θ
U: rural share, urban share in the total population.   91
Pop: total population 
i: index non-livestock food, including: rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, other 
coarse grain, soybean, sugar, oil, fruit, vegetable, and other food, pork, beef, mutton, poul-
try, egg, milk, and fish. 
 
Constraints: 
When i ≠ j, b
R
ij = Expenditure Sharej * (b
R





ij b *Expenditure Sharei + Expenditure Sharej (The properties of Cornot and 
Engel aggregation). It means that total expenditure cannot change in response to a change 
in prices. 
The constraints on b
U
ij are the same as those on b
R
ij except there is no Market Development 
in the first constraint.
1 
 
Total Feed Demand 
In this model, feed demand in different grains is obtained by tracing the quantity of grain 
consumed by different livestock produced in different production modes. Once the demand 
for meat and other animal products is known, the implied feed demand is calculated by ap-
plying a set of feed conversion ratios. Then total feed demand is calculated by using the 
grain's share as weight. The feed/meat ratio, efficient gain in feeding livestock and grain i's 
share in total feed grain are estimated from other surveys out of CAPSiM. The feeding ef-
ficiency of hogs is expected to increase slightly over time. Meat products are assumed to 
be produced in China and to be sufficient to satisfy demand. The alternative assumption of 
net import of meat is also made to investigate the effects of meat imports on the demand 
for total grain. 
D
FeedG
jt = Σk(1 + δjkt)βjkθjktqjt 
















FeedG: Total Feed Demand. 
θ: share of each production mode. 
 γik: annual change in θ. 
β: Feed/meat ratio. 
δ: Efficient gain in feeding livestock. 
f: grain i's share of total feed grain. 
rf: annual growth rate of f. 
i: index individual grain and other feed, including: rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, other 
coarse grain, and soybean. 
                                                 




ij vary yearly due to the first constraint.   92
j: index meat product, including: pork, beef, mutton, poultry, egg, milk, and fish. 
k: index production mode, including: backyard, specialized household, and commercial in-
tensive (company) production. 
 
Other Grain Demand 
Other grain demand includes grain used as seed, grain used in industry and grain wasted 
due to post-harvest loss. Quantity of grain used as seed depends on the crop-harvested area. 
Quantity of grain used in industry this year is calculated based on that used last year. 
Quantity of grain wasted is calculated as share of crop production. 
D
Seed


























A: Crop harvested area. 
D
Seed: Seed grain use. 
D
Ind: Industrial grain use. 
D
Waste: Grain post-harvest loss. 
d
Seed: Seed grain use (kg) per hectare. 
d
Waste: Waste (loss) as share of production. 
β
S: annual growth of seed use per ha. 
β
I: annual growth of industrial grain use. 
β
W: annual growth of post-harvest loss. 
i: index individual grain, including: rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, other coarse 
grain, soybean. 
 
Total Grain Demand 
Total grain demand is the summation of total food demand, total feed demand, seed use, 

















G: Total Grain Demand. 
D
FoodG: Total Food Grain Demand. 
i: index individual grain, including: rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, other coarse 
grain, soybean. 
 
3.3.3.3 Grain  Stock 
 
Grain stock this year is inferred by referencing the increase in gain demand and grain stock 
















G: Grain stock. 
p
D: consumer price.   93
L: marginal change in grain stock due to grain price change.
1 







ing the change in stock is a linear function of consumer price. It is this formula that is used 
in this study since we are doing long-term simulation and projection. 











it, implying the change in the ratio of stock to consumption is 
a linear function of consumer price. This formula is used in short-term (usually less than 5 
years) simulation and projection. 
  In terms of this formula, the stock change will be directly affected by domestic con-
sumer price, and indirectly affected by world market price through trade because domestic 
consumer price will be affected by world market price via trade model. Because the value 
of L is negative, if the consumer price keeps decrease, the stock will keep increase (in the 
case of Ψ = 1, if the stock grows faster than consumption). In this case, according to the 
government stock policy, we give a maximum stock for each commodity (30% of each 
product production). If the stock grows so that the stock level is greater than the maximum, 
the export will be forced to increase exogenously while the stock level will be maintained 
unchanged. In the opposite case, the minimum stock level is set at 5% of production. In 
this case, if the stock decreases due to the increase in consumer price so that the stock level 
is less than the minimum, the import will be forced to increase while the stock level will be 
maintain unchanged. 
 
3.3.4 Trade Behavior 
 
After estimating the changes in production of and demand for agriculture products by us-
ing the models given above, we can get the percentage changes in import and export by 
decomposition equation derived from constant elasticity of substitution (CES) mechanism, 
in response to the percentage changes in their prices domestically and abroad. In this trade 
model, FOB and CIF prices are first translated into domestic currency. After that, they are 
transformed into domestic market prices at the national level by deducting producer sub-
sidy expenditure. Then, the percentage changes in the quantities imported and exported are 
given in the form of equation (V.7), in which the percentage changes in composite quantity 
and price are the percentage change in total quantity demanded and weighed averages per-
centage changes in producer price, consumer price, import price and export price by using 






































                                                 
1 L: rice -0.19, wheat -0.2, maize -0.3, sweet potato -0.3, potato -0.3, other grains -0.2, soybean -0.35. 
2 CIF price and FOB price are subject to changes in the prices of traded commodities in world market which 
are estimated based on projection of world market prices made by World Bank. Alternatively, in trade liber-













netimport: Net import. 
XR: Exchange rate. 
p
rural: Rural consumer price. 
p
cif: CIF price. 
p
fob: FOB price 
PSE: Producer subsidy equivalent 
σ : the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported varieties. 
 
The circumflex ^ denotes a relative change. 
i: index individual grain, including: rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, other coarse 
grain, soybean, sugar, pork, beef, mutton, poultry, egg, and fish. 
 
3.3.5 Market Clearing 
 
Finding a market equilibrium in any simulation period entails the solution of a simultane-
ous system of demand and supply equations. The equilibrating variables are the prices in 
each market. 
  Supply equations, which are decomposed by area and yield, grain and meat, allow 
producer own price and cross market responses as well as the effects of shifts in technol-
ogy stock of agriculture, irrigation stock, ratio of erosion area to total land area, ratio of 
salinity area to cultivate area, yield change due to exogenous shock of climate, and yield 
change due to other exogenous shock. 
  Demand equations, which are decomposed by urban and rural areas, grain and meat, 
allow consumer own price and cross market responses as well as the effects of shifts in in-
come, population level, market development and other shocks. 
  The market clearing equation also establishes the fundamental link between domestic 
Chinese markets and the world market for each of the commodities distinguished. It as-
sures that the overall demand - supply balances are satisfied and it implicitly determines 
market prices. Schematically: 
 
Total demand equals final demand plus stock changes: 
Dit = D(pit, pjt , incomet, other demand factorst) +Bit – Bi(t-1)       i   ≠ j 
 
Total supply equals domestic supply plus net imports: 
X
netimport





it + Sit        for all i = 1..n 
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3.3.6 Welfare 
 
A measure of welfare changes in CAPSiM is obtained from the traditional producer and 
consumer surplus calculations. Total welfare is the summation of the producer's surplus 
and the consumer's surplus. 
 
3.3.6.1 Producer  Welfare 
 
From section 3.2.1 we obtain the supply equations for each commodity. For crops, these 
will depend on yield, and factors that influence yield such as salinity. Similarly, for live-
stock, the feed conversion rate will enter into the picture. 
  As shown in Figure 3.5 (in the market of product i), the equilibrium point will move 
from P
0 to P





ceteris paribus. If the prices of other products or other factors change also, the supply curve 
will shift from S
0 to S
1 and the equilibrium point will change to P
2. Our method takes into 
account both the movements along the supply curve and shifts of the supply curve (as in 
figure 3.5). Let A
P
t be the area between O and p
S
it and to the left of S
0, A
P
(t-1) the area be-
tween O and p
S
(t+1) and to the left of S
1. Therefore, the change in the producer welfare will 
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Figure 3.5  Welfare analyses: producers 
 
 
3.3.6.2 Consumer  Welfare 
 
From section 3.2.3.2 (Food Demand), we can derive total demand: 
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As shown in Figure 3.6 (in the market of product i), the equilibrium point will move from 
P
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If the prices of others products or other factors change also, the demand curve will shift 
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Figure 3.6  Welfare analysis: consumers 
 
 
  Taking into account that there is no intersection between the demand curve and the 
price axis and that these two lines get closer as the price goes up, we can approximately 
calculate the consumer welfare as the area below the price 10P
D
it, the error resulting from 
the approximation in the change in consumer welfare will have the second order and higher 
order derivative property and can be ignored. Therefore, when consumer price is P
D
it, the 
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3.4  Linkage between CAPSiM and GTAP 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of China's capacity to feed its growing population 
given its limited natural resources, and the impact of China's growing economy on the rest 
of the world and vice versa, the CAPSiM model is used in tandem with the GTAP model.  
  Linking -or even coupling- two models with different theoretical starting points and 
consequently different statistical concepts to support the modeling is not easy, and may 
sometimes even be foolish. In our case, linking has two dimensions. First, the commodity 
classifications and content should be comparable for those sectors where the two models 
overlap, i.e. in primary agriculture in China. Second, since CAPSIM is a PE model for 
China, while GTAP is a GE model of the world economy, there can be a fruitful exchange 
of model output between the two models. While we do not attempt a full-fledged coupling 
of the two models, we aim for a maximum amount of compatibility between them, such 
that endogenous results of one model can fruitfully be utilized as input into the other 
model. For example, GTAP generates changing border prices in the wake of global trade 
liberalization. These estimates can be fed into CAPSIM to generate the detailed supply and 
demand responses for Chinese agricultural sectors.  
  Clearly, the two models differ in many respects as should be evident from the forego-
ing sections. In the following we summarize key conceptual differences, and, we discuss 
our approach to bridge them where this is a sensible strategy.  
 
While CAPSiM is a partial equilibrium model within agricultural sector, GTAP is a com-
putable general equilibrium (CGE) model that covers all industries in the economy 
worldwide. 
 
  CAPSiM focuses on the agricultural sector. It is based on a more detailed database 
and it includes more agricultural sector-specific modeling than GTAP. It is therefore better 
positioned to simulate sector-specific developments in the Chinese agricultural sector. 
CAPSiM is obviously limited as regards the impact of shocks to non-agricultural industries 
and with regard to the impact of shocks that occur outside China. Those two aspects are the 
raison d'être for a general equilibrium model such as GTAP. There is, therefore, a clear 
complementarity between the two models. 
  By modeling the entire economy, GTAP can provide insights into interdependencies 
between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Of course, results obtained from a gen-
eral equilibrium analysis will only differ significantly from partial equilibrium results if 
agricultural and trade policies lead to noticeable price shifts in other sectors. Even in indus-
trialized countries, where agriculture typically contributes only a small share of GDP and 
employment, important indirect effects occur through factor markets, most notably the land 
markets. In developing economies, the second-round effects through labor markets, and to 
a lesser extent capital markets, are potentially significant. For example, if a reduction of   99
border protection by main trading partners improves export and growth prospects of certain 
industrial sectors, the increase in labor demand will typically raise economy-wide wage 
rates. This in turn raises the opportunity cost of farm labor, and will influence the farm-
household decisions on allocating their resources between farm and off-farm activities. 
CGE models provide the only coherent way to analyze these general equilibrium effects. In 
contrast to CAPSIM, the GTAP model includes factor markets.  
  More directly, agriculture has strong linkages with sectors that are closely related, ei-
ther because they deliver key inputs such as fertilizers, herbicides, agricultural machinery, 
or because they process primary agricultural products, such as beef processing and dairy 
industries. Typically, these backward and forward linkages are stronger in industrialized 
economies.  
 
Approach to model linkage 
  Given the conceptual differences and the consequent differences in data, a full-
fledged linking of the two models does not seem to be very informative. Essentially we 
have chosen to design a model closure for GTAP that has as exogenous certain variables 
from CAPSiM, such as agricultural production and at the same time we use a model clo-
sure for CAPSiM that has as exogenous certain variables from GTAP such as border price 
changes. Table 3.1 shows which variables are liable to exchanging between the two mod-
els.  
  Feeding into CAPSiM border price changes, GDP and factor prices from GTAP is 
essentially a tops-down approach. If we go one step further, we can let CAPSiM determine 
Chinese import demand and export supply for agricultural commodities, and subsequently 
feed those into GTAP. GTAP, in turn, will then produce a new set of import and export 
prices for China - next to all the other variables that characterize global equilibriums in all 
the markets. These in turn can be fed into CAPSiM to find a new equilibria on Chinese 
markets. This iterative process can be continued until prices and volumes do not change 
anymore. Convergence is in fact guaranteed by the convexity of the system. While none of 
the simulations reported in this report exploits this iterative procedure Ninghui (2002) dis-
cusses its use at great length. 
  In order to assure consistency in the trade response between the two models, CAP-
SiM has been modified to bring its modeling of trade more in line with GTAP (see section 
3.2.4) The procedure chosen is grossly consistent with GTAP results, as long as the elastic-
ities are derived from GTAP itself. 
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Table 3.1  Interfacing variables 
 CAPSIM  GTAP 
Output import  by  commodity 
export by commodity 
Export prices (fob) by CAPSiM  
commodity 
Import prices (cif) by CAPSiM  
commodity 
Volume of GDP  
Factor prices, land, labor and capital 
 
Input  Export prices (fob) by CAPSiM commodity 
Import prices (cif) by CAPSiM commodity 
Volume of GDP  
Factor prices, land, labor and capital 
import (by CAPSiM commodity) 




CAPSiM is a recursive-dynamic model for projections with equilibriums being attained 
within the period of one year. GTAP is a static model for comparative static simulations.  
 
Generally speaking, dynamic models allow the analysis of lagged transmissions and ad-
justment processes over time. Alternatively, the comparative static approach studies the 
differences between equilibria resulting from different assumptions on exogenous data or 
policy variables. The time path between equilibria is ignored in comparative static models.  
  CAPSiM specifies a recursive sequence of temporary equilibria. That is, in each time 
period the model is solved for an equilibrium, given the exogenous conditions prevailing 
for that particular period. In between periods, stock variables are updated, either exoge-
nously (e.g. population) or as a result of the equilibrium outcomes of the preceding period 
(e.g. in CAPSiM grains stock develops as functions of past stocks and stock to consump-
tion ratios). 
  Comparative static models are sometimes used to generate projections of policy im-
pacts at some future point in time. Such projections are achieved by constructing an 
artificial future dataset that is consistent with the model's assumptions –a so called base-
line-, and subsequently conducting a policy experiment on the basis of this projected 
dataset. The artificial future dataset is constructed by making assumptions on the growth of 
exogenous variables and parameters and subsequently letting the model solve for an equi-
librium that is consistent with these assumptions.  
  This is precisely the approach followed in this study. The GTAP baseline projection 
for the whole world, including country projections for China until the year 2020 and its 
underlying assumptions is more fully discussed in Chapter 5. As far as China is concerned, 
we make full use of the detailed information generated along the time path of the CAPSiM 
projection. Some of the important inputs being the implications of changing rural-urban 
consumption behavior and the implied aggregate income and price elasticities for food de-
mand.  
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Differences in data and parameters 
Some variables used in the two models are incomparable, and coverage given by the same 
variable between the two models is different. Differences may result from the difference in 
demarcation of variables into various categories, the difference in prices used, the differ-
ence in quantities referenced, and also to the difference in the definitions of variables 
between the two models. 
  Next to defining which variables can travel between the two models, it is important 
to make the databases compatible. A successful interfacing can only be realized if the defi-
nitions of variables are clear (and preferably identical across the models), and if the 
discrepancies in variable definition and measurement errors are weeded out. This process 
of tallying the two databases has resulted in numerous adjustments. 
  Classification of commodities and data sources of GTAP and CAPSiM listed in Ap-
pendix 3.1 shows that the sector categories in each model are different. Some of the GTAP 
categories are broader; some of the CAPSiM categories are broader. Based on this infor-
mation, we have developed bridge tables that allow us to exchange information between 
the two models in a way that is as consistent as possible from a statistical point of view. 
The work on the data bridge entails first of all the matching of commodity classifications, 
followed by data adjustments (see also Appendices 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4).  
  Besides constructing bridge tables, we have updated the Chinese component of the 
GTAP database from its base year 1997 to the year 2001. In this process, we have been 
able to incorporate more micro-data based information into the input-output table. This in-
formation has led to an improved representation of the cost structure of Chinese agriculture 
in the GTAP database. Table 3.2 summarizes the differences of cost share estimates be-
tween the original GTAP data and our adjusted data. Note that the bulk of the adjustment 
occurs in the primary factor cost (land, labor capital). According to the new estimates pri-
mary factors account for a larger share of total cost, whereas intermediate deliveries are 
relatively less important compared to the original GTAP database.  
  Next to adjustments to the IO table, we have been able to incorporate recent informa-
tion on Chinese international trade. 
  The so-called baseline simulation starts from the base data for 2001 and adds to it 
many assumptions on policies, technology development and so on. These are documented 
in Chapter 5. In order to assure consistency between the CAPSiM-generated baseline and 
the GTAP baseline we use common assumptions on the developments of the following 
variables over time:  
- GDP; 
- Population; 
- Education  (skilled, unskilled labor); 
- Factor  productivity  by agricultural sector; 
-  Trade policies China; 
-  Industry and services policies China. 
 
  The model results are checked for consistency along the baseline path. Specifically, 
we pay attention to the net trade position by sector and to output growth by sector.  102
Table 3.2  Cost shares in agriculture, China 
  Adjusted data for 2001 
Using sector ► 
Inputs from  
▼  
Rice Wheat Coarse 
grains








Dairy Fish Other 
food 
Land and natural resources  0.23 0.24 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.01 0.00 
Labor 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.31 0.30 0.42 0.41 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.42 0.07 
Capital services  0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.13 
   
Agri-food 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.30 0.07 0.09 0.36 0.43 0.28 0.27 0.62 
Extraction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Manufacturing   0.21 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.22 0.15 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.10 
Services 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.07 
TOTAL 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
   
  GTAP data for 1997 
Using sector ► 
Inputs from  
▼  
Rice Wheat Coarse 
grains








Dairy Fish Other 
food 
Land and natural resources  0.08 0.14 0.20 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.24 0.00 
Labor 0.24 0.28 0.41 0.21 0.26 0.24 0.39 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.07 
Capital services  0.14 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.12 
   
Agri-food 0.38 0.42 0.06 0.39 0.36 0.03 0.09 0.36 0.50 0.34 0.22 0.65 
Extraction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Manufacturing   0.08 0.07 0.17 0.12 0.10 0.39 0.17 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.09 
Services 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.18 0.08 0.14 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.07 
TOTAL 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Source: GTAP database version 5, Dimaranan and McDougall (2002), and own calculations.   103
3.5  Data Improvement in CAPSiM: adjusting livestock statistics
1 
 
It is obvious that a good result produced by CAPSiM will heavily depend on high quality 
database used in CAPSiM. Most analysts believe that China's production side statistics for 
grain are relatively reliable (Fan and Agcaoili, 1997; Huang and Rozelle, 1999). Data ex-
amination also shows that crops data are of reliability and consistency. Unfortunately, 
China does not have a good record in the generation of reliable and consistent data on the 
demand and supply of livestock products (Fuller et al., 2000; ERS, 1999). 
  An examination of livestock data derived from national statistical sources reveals 
that the discrepancy between published demand and supply series has become larger over 
the past fifteen years. Although China's National Statistical Bureau (CNSB) has already 
implicitly admitted that its data series are flawed by making substantive revisions after the 
late 1990s, their changes still have not changed the growth rates of the nation's livestock 
production. By 1999, China's production series reached a level 2 to 3 times as high as its 
consumption series. In contrast, national statistics show that the consumption of pork did 
not rise during the 1990s, even though per capita income in real term during this time pe-
riod rose by 6 percent annually. Recognizing weaknesses in the national government's 
official statistics, several statistical users have spent time adjusting and revising livestock 
databases and rerunning baseline projections on China's grain production, demand and 
trade (e.g., FAPRI, 1999; USDA, 1999). One of the tasks of China's 1997 census of agri-
culture was to assess and adjust livestock production data (FAO, 2000). Despite this effort, 
however, the lack of consistent data is almost certainly affecting the quality of research. 
For example, Zhong (1997) suggests that projections made by previous studies on food 
demand and supply could be subject to serious bias because of faulty data on livestock and 
should be re-examined. If so, the policy recommendations that have been derived from the 
previous studies also may have to be re-examined.  
 
3.5.1 Livestock Demand and Supply Discrepancies 
 
In order to assess the validity of any given set of livestock statistics, several criteria need to 
be met. First, after adjusting for trade and storage, domestic supply must equal demand. 
Second, the production of meat must be consistent with feed statistics. Third, the numbers 
must be consistent with observed trends in the economy. In this section, we show the 
China's official published livestock demand and supply data fail to meet these criteria. 
 
Supply does not Equal Demand 
If China's official statistics on livestock were correct, the supply of livestock products dur-
ing the past two decades would have increased at a rate almost unparalleled in history 
(Table 3.3). Based on production statistics from China Statistical Yearbook, China's offi-
cial publication of major agricultural statistics (managed by a division of CNSB), 
aggregate pork supply rose by 2.4 times, from 11.34 mmt in 1980 to 38.91 million metric 
tons (mmt) in 1999 (column 2). Other livestock products grew even faster. For example, 
poultry supply rose 10.9 times, from 0.94 mmt in 1980 to 11.16 mmt in 1999 (column 5). 
Egg, beef, and mutton supplies rose by at least 5 times (columns 8, 11 and 14). 
                                                 
1 Part of this study was published in Ma et al., 2004  104
Table 3.3  Comparisons between Aggregate Livestock Supply and Demand Statistical Series in China, 1980 to 1999 (Million tons) a) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
    Pork        Poultry      Eggs       Beef       Mutton   
Year  Demand Supply  Ratio Demand Supply Ratio Demand Supply Ratio Demand Supply Ratio Demand Supply  Ratio
 
1980  10.47 11.34  1.08 0.88 0.94 1.07 2.13 2.57 1.20 0.28 0.27 0.97 0.42 0.45  1.05
1981  11.84 11.88  1.00 1.02 1.03 1.00 2.24 2.69 1.20 0.30 0.24 0.82 0.46 0.48  1.03
1982  13.23 12.72  0.96 1.25 1.18 0.94 2.31 2.81 1.22 0.37 0.27 0.72 0.50 0.52  1.04
1983  14.63 13.16  0.90 1.35 1.30 0.96 2.69 3.32 1.23 0.41 0.31 0.77 0.52 0.55  1.04
1984  16.07 14.45  0.90 1.52 1.44 0.95 3.15 4.32 1.37 0.53 0.37 0.70 0.57 0.59  1.03
1985  16.73 16.55  0.99 1.77 1.60 0.90 3.57 5.35 1.50 0.66 0.47 0.71 0.63 0.59  0.93
1986  18.76 17.96  0.96 1.95 1.88 0.96 3.63 5.55 1.53 0.74 0.59 0.79 0.66 0.62  0.94
1987  18.40 18.35  1.00 2.03 2.19 1.08 4.05 5.90 1.46 0.87 0.79 0.91 0.69 0.72  1.04
1988  17.56 20.18  1.15 2.27 2.74 1.21 4.38 6.96 1.59 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.71 0.80  1.13
1989  18.13 21.23  1.17 2.45 2.82 1.15 4.60 7.20 1.57 1.07 1.07 1.00 0.77 0.96  1.25
1990  18.91 22.81  1.21 2.68 3.23 1.21 4.78 7.95 1.66 1.19 1.26 1.06 0.85 1.07  1.26
1991  20.20 24.52  1.21 2.82 3.95 1.40 5.10 9.22 1.81 1.33 1.54 1.16 0.92 1.18  1.29
1992  19.69 26.35  1.34 3.18 4.54 1.43 5.51 10.20 1.85 1.39 1.80 1.30 0.90 1.25  1.39
1993  19.95 28.54  1.43 3.41 5.74 1.68 5.44 11.80 2.17 1.46 2.34 1.60 0.90 1.38  1.53
1994  19.49 32.05  1.64 3.64 7.55 2.07 5.94 14.79 2.49 1.41 3.27 2.32 0.94 1.61  1.72
1995  20.03 36.48  1.82 3.95 9.35 2.36 6.22 16.77 2.69 1.44 4.15 2.88 0.96 2.02  2.09
1996 21.81 31.58  1.45 4.28 8.96 2.09 6.40 19.65 3.07 1.52 3.56 2.35 1.08 1.81 1.67
1997 20.54 35.96  1.75 4.92 9.55 1.94 7.34 18.97 2.58 1.82 4.41 2.42 1.23 2.10 1.71
1998 21.50 38.84  1.81 5.02 10.23 2.04 7.71 20.21 2.62 1.76 4.80 2.73 1.23 2.35 1.90
1999 21.94 38.91  1.77 5.58 11.16 2.00 8.02 21.35 2.66 1.86 5.05 2.71 1.19 2.51 2.12
Source: Livestock production statistics come from Statistical Yearbook of China, 1981-2000. Consumption estimates come data that are found in China Na-
tional Statistical Bureau's rural and urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 1981-2000, and calculations that are shown in detail in Annex 3.5 (for 
pork and poultry), Annex 3.11 (for eggs), Annex 3.14 (for beef) and Annex 3.15 (for mutton).  
a. All figures reported in carcass weight. Retail weight figures (the original units for consumption data) are converted to carcass weight (the original units for 
production data) by use of standard conversion coefficients (0.77 for pork; 1.0 for poultry; 0.74 for beef; and 0.89 for mutton-see Fuller et al., 2000).  105
As supply grew, China's statistics show that the demand for livestock products also in-
creased (Table 3.3, columns 1, 4, 7, 10 and 13). According CNSB's officially sanctioned 
urban and rural Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES-urban and HIES-
rural), total pork consumption doubled from 10.47 mmt in 1980 to 21.94 mmt in 1999. 
Likewise, consumption of other animal products grew. For example, poultry consumption 
rose 5.3 times, while eggs, beef and mutton all grew by at least 2 times. 
  Comparison of initial levels of livestock demand and supply in the early 1980s 
(which were nearly equal through 1987) and analysis of the trends for the past 15 years 
(which were sharply different) illustrate that CNSB's livestock demand and supply data are 
inconsistent. The rising ratio of supply to demand throughout the entire period demon-
strates the extent to which supply figures are growing faster than those of demand (Table 
3.3). For example, in most years in 1980s (1980 - 1987), the ratio of pork supply to de-
mand averaged 0.97, near 1.00 (column 3). China's pork statistics during the time met the 
criteria that the supply equals demand. Between 1988 and 1999, however, the ratio in-
creased monotonically from 1.15 to 1.77. China's reported pork supply exceeded the 
reported demand by 77 percent in 1999. The ratios of other livestock commodities in-
creased even faster (columns 6, 9, 12 and 15). 
 Statistical  tests  of the rising gap between demand and supply provide further confir-
mation of the observation that China's supply figures are growing faster than those of 
demand. Our statistical tests are derived from the following equations, 
 
i t t it u T T R + + + = > ≤ 1987 2 1987 1 0 β β β ,                   (1) 
and  i t it T R ε α α + + = 1 0                                      (2) 
 
where Rit is the ratio of supply to demand over time; Tt≤1987 is a time trend variable for the 
period from 1980 to 1987; Tt>1987 is a time trend variable for the period from 1988 to 1999; 
Tt in equation (2) is either the first time period (1980 to 1987) or the second one (1988 to 
1999). In equation (1), the coefficient on the early time trend variable, β1, would demon-
strate that supply equals demand between 1980 and 1987 if β1=0. It would be greater than 
0 if the ratios were rising and the growth rate of supply was growing faster than demand 
during the early part of study period. If the ratios were accelerating during the late time pe-
riod, 1988 to 1999, the coefficient, β2, on the second time trend variable, Tt>1987, would be 
positive and significantly different from 0 (and significantly different from Tt≤1987). In 
equation (2), if α1 equals 0 and α0 equals 1, then the ratios of supply to demand series con-
verge to one (which means that supply and demand series are equal). 
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Table 3.4  Consistency Tests for the Reported Livestock Supply and Demand Series, 1980-99 
a 
Dependent Variable, Rit = Supply / Demand 
Independent Variable 
Pork Poultry    Eggs Beef Mutton 
Tests for structural change  
1987 ≤ t T    0.02 0.03 0.08
*** 0.08  0.02 
 (0.98)  b)  (1.12)  (3.06) (1.55) (1.08) 
       






  (7.23) (6.44) (10.01)  (6.20) (6.70) 
       
Adjusted R
2  0.86 0.70 0.89 0.77 0.82 
       
Tests for convergence of supply/demand ratio to one c) 
Before 1987: 
1987 ≤ t T    -0.01 -0.00 0.06
*** -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.86) (0.29) (6.01) (0.50) (1.49) 







  (21.64) (18.80) (23.44) (10.35) (33.44) 
F-Statistic   0.04  0.00  3.97  4.21
**   2.84 
(Test: Intercept =1)           
       
After 1987: 






  (6.89) (5.23) (6.38) (7.67) (6.78) 
       
Intercept 0.51
** 0.12  0.53
* -0.94
* 0.37 
  (3.48) (0.96) (1.90) (2.49) (1.98) 
       
F-Statistic   11.61
*** 6.58
** 2.72  26.42
*** 11.67
*** 
(Test: Intercept =1)           
*** Significant at 1 percent level; 
** significant at 5 percent level; 
* significant at 10 percent level. 
a)
 For the tests of structural change (rows 1 to 3), the equation regressing a time trend from two periods on 
the supply/demand ratio, is run with an intercept; parameters are not shown for brevity. Two separate within 
period equations are used to test for convergence of supply/demand ratio to one (rows 4 to 6; and rows 7 
to 9). 
b) The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
c) To test the null hypothesis that the supply/demand ratio is equivalent to one, we test for the significance of 
the intercept. If F-statistics (rows 6 and 9) are greater than 4, we reject the null hypothesis. 
 
 
  Table 3.4 clearly displays that China has a problem with its statistical reporting sys-
tem and that the problem appeared in the late 1980s and 1990s. In the case of all livestock 
products (except eggs), the ratios between demand and supply remained constant between 
1980 and 1987 (the coefficients of Tt≤1987 are not significantly different from 0 -- row 1). 
Meanwhile, in all cases between 1988 and 1999, the ratios rose significantly (the coeffi-
cients of Tt>1987 differ significantly from 0 -- row 2). The F-tests demonstrate that in all   107
cases (except beef), the ratios between 1980 and 1987 statistically converge to 1 (row 6) 
while the ratios (except eggs) between 1988 and 1999 do not (row 9).  
 
 










1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
Unadjusted Supply and 
Demand Series












1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
 
Figure 3.7  Comparison of Pork and Poultry Supply (Production) and Demand (Consumption) Statistical 
Series Before and After Adjustments, 1980-99 (million metric tons) 
Note: Unadjusted pork (poultry) supply and demand statistical series come from Table 3.3, columns 1 and 2 
(columns 4 and 5). The adjusted pork (poultry) supply and demand series come from Table 3.7, columns 3 
and 5 (Table 3.8, columns 3 and 5). 
 
 
  A graphical presentation also clearly illustrates the growing gap between supply and 
demand statistical series (Figure 3.7). Although the two unadjusted series for pork (the up-
permost and lowermost graph lines on the figure) trend together in the early and mid-
Unadjusted Supply 
and Demand Series 
Adjusted Supply and 
Demand Series   108
1980s, supply begins to rise much faster than demand after the late 1980s (Panel A). The 
same rising gap appears for poultry (Panel B). 
 
The Failure to Meet Other Criteria 
China's official livestock figures also fail to pass two other consistency tests. First, official 
demand and supply data clearly fail to provide consistent series of livestock output and 
feed availability data. To show this, we generated approximate feed consumption figures 
by aggregating the feed consumption numbers that are implied by various livestock output 
series.
1 Next, China's supply of feed is assumed to come from its domestic sources and 
trade.
2 Based on these figures, we see that although the feed supply and consumption data 
are nearly the same until the late 1980s, the gap widens noticeably through the 1990s. By 
1999, feed demand is 32.6 percent higher than feed supply. Since most analysts believe 
that China's production side statistics for grain are relatively reliable (Fan and Agcaoili, 
1997; Huang and Rozelle, 1999), it would appear from this exercise that livestock produc-
tion statistics are becoming increasingly overstated in the 1990s. 
  Second, when examining both demand and supply figures, neither reflects the reality 
of what is being observed in the field. Official output statistics say that from 1990 to 1999 
the livestock production rose by 117 percent, which would mean that herd size would have 
had to almost double, on average, in every part of the nation. While certainly there has 
been a healthy expansion of hog production in some areas, at the same time farmers in 
many other areas have reduced their herd size or stopped raising animals altogether.
3 On 
the demand side, although people may not be eating any more pork at home, there has been 
                                                 
1 The first step in creating the estimates involves choosing feed to meat conversion coefficients (Wailes et al., 
1998). Second, we assume that feed-meat conversion coefficient is declining over time due to technology 
progress in livestock sector, the coefficient that is supposed to be consistent with grain consumption of per 
unit live hog gain based on Cost and Return of Agricultural Production Survey of China. Third, we assume 
that feed use that are not included in our study account for 10 percent of aggregate feed consumption. 
Though our study includes major animals that are used for meat production (e.g., swine, poultry, beef cattle 
and sheep and goats), there are still some animals that are either used in dairy farm (e.g., cows) or as agricul-
tural draught (e.g., horses, mutes). As Fuller et al (2000), we assume this part of feed approximately accounts 
for 10 percent of total feed consumption. 
2 After calculating annual food and feed grains available in the economy for consumption use, we approxi-
mate estimated feed supply figures primarily from corn, wheat bran and sweet potato series. We assume that 
all corn and sweet potato is available for feed (Huang et al., 2000). Ten percent of the wheat production (and 
imports), which is assumed to be mostly the bran after milling, is supposed to be used for feed. 
3 For example, a recent survey (henceforth the Rural China 2000 Survey), run by a joint team, the Center for 
Chinese Agricultural Policy of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Department of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics of University of California-Davis and Department of Economics of University of Toronto in 
2000, covered six provinces (Hebei, Shanaxi, Liaoning, Zhejiang, Sichuan, and Hubei) and 1199 rural house-
holds. In this survey, we asked farmers about changes in the number of hogs that they slaughtered between 
1990 and 2000. We found that while 10.4 percent of the households who engaged in hog raising during the 
last decade increased their herd size, 18.4 percent decreased. The number of slaughtered hogs per household 
rose but slightly from 0.96 in 1990 to 1.01 in 2000. Coupled with the expansion of commercial operations 
(thought to have expanded by about 63 percent), our estimates of hog production expansion that are based on 
in-field observations fall far short of the CNSB's production figures. Based on the Rural China 2000 Survey, 
among 677 households that raised hogs, 2.5 percent are specialized or commercial operations (more than 8 
hogs) in 1990, and this percentage reached to 4.1 percent in 2000. It means that commercial enterprises ex-
panded 63 percent during the 1990s.   109
a veritable explosion of restaurants in China's cities and in many rural areas. The per capita 
retail value of the catering industry rose more than 130 percent from 1991 to 1998 (China's 
Catering Industry Yearbook, 1992; 1999), and as anyone who is familiar with China knows 
that when one goes into a restaurant, meat dishes almost always fill the table. Moreover, 
the population of migrants has also risen rapidly. In terms of its impact on consumption, 
Huang and Bouis (1996) show that holding income and prices constant, one salient charac-
teristic of the demand behavior of migrants is that they invariably consume larger 
quantities of livestock products. The surge in consumption that must have come with the 
increased presence of migrants in urban areas (more than 100 million in 2000), however, 
does not seem to appear in either published rural or urban consumption statistics. In sum-
mary, with all of this new consumption occurring, it seems doubtful that consumption 
could be flat. 
 
Data 
Although our new data series will ultimately differ from the current ones, we still assume 
there is valid information in the existing series and build on them throughout our analysis. 
The current production series are based primarily on year-end reports produced annually 
by village accountants who use a variety of means to estimate the slaughter rates of live-
stock in their villages. Village officials send these reports to the township where they are 
aggregated. In the most typical case, the township statistical officer reviews the production 
reports before adding them up to form the township's estimated production figure. This 
procedure is repeated at each successive level of government (i.e., county, prefecture, and 
province) before turning into a national set of livestock production data. Although this pro-
cedure provides an annual census of livestock activities, the main weaknesses of the data 
collection system are that there are no absolute criteria upon which local accountants based 
their estimates and there are no procedures in place to verify the accuracy of the year-end 
reports at any level to ensure that they have not been altered by local officials. Without 
rigorous data collection procedures and verification processes, observers believe that the 
current system has allowed local officials to artificially inflate production figures as a way 
of helping them meet income and food production growth targets (Fuller et al., 2000; 
Zhong et al., 1997). 
  The current consumption series are based on data that are collected on a more con-
ventional basis by the CNSB. Called the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES), each year CNSB's personnel across the nation randomly choose more than 40,000 
urban and 65,000 rural households. Based on year-round diary methods, in addition to all 
other consumption goods, households record the quantities and expenditures of the live-
stock products that they consume. They also record the expenditures that each household 
member makes on food consumed out of the home. National aggregate consumption series 
for each commodity (e.g., pork or chicken), however, are estimated only from that part of 
the data that households have recorded on the quantities of the livestock products that they 
directly consumed at home. Such figures do not include the part of consumption that is 
consumed during meals out of the home. We also believe that respondents systematically 
miss some of the livestock products that they consume as part of processed foods. Al-
though China's statistical reporting system has made great progress for the past 10 years 
and the HIES is thought to be fairly reliable (FAO, 1993; Heilig, 1999), our main concern   110
here is whether or not the categories on which the national aggregates are created are com-
plete.  
  The sample size and the coverage of China's HIESs are changing over time in a 
number of ways (Fang et. al., 1998), all of which might have some effect on data quality. 
For example, the sample size for the rural household survey before 1985 was less than half 
of its current size (and that during the 1990s). Especially when the sample was first being 
formulated, there was some concern that it might not be representative and favored richer 
areas. Moreover, since data are collected primarily on the basis of self-recorded diaries, 
there is also the possibility even after 1985 (when the locality selection is thought to have 
become less biased) that the sample is somewhat biased in favor of richer households. On 
the urban side, the urban HIES initially covered only those households who lived in cities, 
excluding those who lived in county-level towns. If richer rural or urban households have 
both higher production and consumption of livestock products, these features of the data 
system would lead to a sample bias, most likely overestimating production and consump-
tion before 1985. 
  In order to adjust the current official livestock demand and supply series, we will rely 
on several different sets of data (Table 3.5). Our adjustments depend heavily on informa-
tion that is included in China's urban and rural HIES data sets, but which currently is not 
used in creating the national production and consumption series. For example, on the urban 
side (HIES-urban - row 1), since 1991, urban respondents recorded in their expenditure 
diaries their out-of-home food expenditures. We will use this information in conjunction 
with other information from our own surveys to make adjustments to our urban animal 
product consumption series. 
  Two additional pieces of information are used from the HIES conducted in rural ar-
eas (HIES-rural - Table 3.5, row 2). First, as in the case of the urban survey, we use a 
variable that has been asked of rural households about their total expenditures on out-of-
home consumption. In the case of the rural survey, this question has been asked since 
1983. This information is used to adjust rural livestock consumption series.  
  We also use information from the rural survey's production block (Table 3.5 row 2). 
At the end of each year, enumerators from the CNSB make a special visit to the respon-
dents to ask a series of question about the household's annual production activities. In 
particular, the survey asks questions about the household's livestock output, including the 
number of animals that they slaughtered and the quantity of meat that they produced. Such 
data are collected on a disaggregated basis for swine, poultry, beef cattle, sheep and goats, 
and eggs. We use this information in conjunction with data from 1997 Ag Census (de-
scribed below) to make adjustments to the livestock production series.  
  As a check on (and point of calibration for) the production information from the 
HIES-rural data, we also use information generated by the 1997 national census of agricul-
ture (Table 3.5, row 3). Supported by both international and domestic funding sources and 
run by national and provincial Agricultural Census Offices, the main objective of this sur-
vey was to provide sectoral officials with an accurate and unbiased baseline that reflects 
the state of China's rural sector (FAO, 2000). The survey covered all rural households plus 
all non-household agricultural enterprises (e.g., state-owned farms and commercial firms 
engaged in agricultural production). One of the main specific objectives of the survey was    111 






























Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey  
 - Urban 
HIES – urban  China National 
Statistical Bureau 
 - Urban Survey 
Team 
1980-99  In 1999, 40044 urban 
households. 
--  Baseline for annual urban household livestock commodity con-
sumption (by commodity) 
 
-- Trends for out-of-home consumption of livestock products for ur-
ban households 
  
Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey 
 - Rural 
HIES – rural  China National 
Statistical Bureau 
 - Rural Survey 
Team 
1980-99  In 1999, 67430 rural  
households 
 
-- Baseline for annual rural household livestock commodity consump-
tion (by commodity) 
 
-- Trends for out-of-home consumption of livestock products for rural 
households 
 
-- Annual number of slaughtered animals and meat production by ru-
ral households (by commodity) 
 
Agricultural Census 




National and  
Provincial Agricul-
tural Census Office 
 
1996  Complete census data  
(214 million households) 
a 
-- Number of slaughtered animals (by commodity) 
CCAP and CARD live-
stock supply and demand 
survey 
b 
CCAP Survey  Primary data  
collection by 
CCAP/CARD 
1998  -- 250 rural 
 households  
 
 
-- 250 urban  
households 
-- Composition of out-of-home consumption for both rural and urban 
households (e.g., allows us to know how much meat urban and rural 
households are consuming when they eat outside the home). 
 
-- Provides alternative (more comprehensive) estimates of total con-
sumption of livestock commodities against which we can compare 
HIES demand levels. We use our information to make additional ad-
justments to pork, poultry and egg consumption series. 
 
a In addition to the 200 million rural households, the census also surveyed all agricultural enterprises, including commercial livestock enterprises. 
b CCAP is the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy in the Chinese Academy of Science's Institute of Geographical Sciences and Natural Resource Research in Beijing, China, and CARD is the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, in Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, USA.   112
to come up with an accurate estimate of the size of the livestock economy. To meet this ob-
jective, the survey asked all rural households and non-household agricultural enterprises 
about the number of animals that they slaughtered (though not the quantity of meat pro-
duced) during the census period, January 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996. As in the HIES, 
census respondents provided their annual production information for swine, poultry, beef 
cattle, and sheep and goats (but did not supply information on egg production). In CAP-
SiM's database, we assume that these data provide the most accurate and complete picture 
of China's livestock production in the 1990s, and all data series are calibrated using these 
numbers. In all cases, the 1996 observations in our revised data series are exactly those 
figures generated by the agricultural census.  
  However, even with access to the data from national surveys, we still found our-
selves lacking two key pieces of information: the composition of out-of-home consumption 
and estimates of total consumption of livestock products by urban and rural household 
(both direct and indirect including that which is embodied in processed foods). In order to 
have a basis for estimating these two variables, we conducted our own survey in 1999 (Ta-
ble 3.5, row 4).
1 In addition to information about the basic characteristics of the household 
and its individuals, enumerators asked detailed information about its in-home food expen-
ditures and consumption of pork, poultry, beef, mutton, and eggs. Since our survey was 
focused on livestock product consumption, and since livestock products in most rural 
households in China are consumed unequally throughout the year, we also specifically 
asked households about their expenditures and consumption of livestock products during 
major festivals and holidays. 
  In another section, enumerators asked households about their consumption of live-
stock products when they were not at home. Using the same strategy as the HIES, 
enumerators asked households to report their total expenditures on out-of-home consump-
tion. In addition, our survey asked detailed information about the composition of each 
household member's out of home consumption. Using this information in conjunction with 
our estimates of in-home consumption, we were able to create estimates of total per capita 
animal product out-of-home consumption. 
  Finally, we also need to estimates of the consumption by migrants. Based on our 
work elsewhere (deBrauw et al., 2001), we come up with estimates of the number of mi-
grants that are living and working in cities. We then use these data with information about 
the consumption patterns of migrants (Huang and Bouis, 1996). 
 
3.5.2 Adjustments of Demand and Supply Series 
 
In this section, we discuss how we adjust data series for China's livestock demand and 
supply. To do so, we first lay out our assumptions for the demand side. Next we discuss the 
strategy to adjust the supply side. Based on these strategies, in the next section, we empiri-
cally make adjustments to the official livestock demand and supply series. Overall, the 
                                                 
1 Jointly run by enumeration teams from the Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), Chinese Acad-
emy of Sciences (Beijing, China) and the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Iowa State 
University, the survey covered 250 urban households in 5 cities, Chengdu (Sichuan Province), Jiangjin 
(Chongqing Municipality), Changchun (Jilin Province), and Weifang and Feixin (Shandong Province). The 
information was asked on a one-week recall basis.   113
strategy has three main parts. First, we adjust existing consumption data upward to account 
for livestock products that are consumed out-of-home (including animal products con-
sumed in restaurants and those consumed by rural migrant laborers). Second, we adjust 
existing production downward, eliminating the biases that have been introduced by the sta-
tistical reporting system for output since the late 1980s. Finally, in the case of pork, poultry 
and eggs, we also make an additional upward adjustment to consumption in order to ac-
count for the animal products that are missed by the HIES survey (for example, pork, 
poultry and eggs that are consumed in processed foods).  
  To create new series of believable data for China's livestock sector, we need to rely 
on several categories of assumptions regarding the source and nature of the discrepancies. 
In particular, we make assumptions about economic behavior, especially when adjusting 
the consumption data. In addition, we also make a series of assumptions about statistical 
accuracy and misreporting and how they have changed over time. Finally, we rely on sev-
eral implicit assumptions about changes (or consistency) of technical parameters over time.  
 
Demand Side Assumptions and Strategies 
To make the initial adjustment to the demand side data, we rely on three specific assump-
tions. First, we assume that the HIES data, both urban and rural, accurately measure total 
out-of-home food expenditure. Second, although we know how much the household spent 
on out-of-home consumption, we do not believe that commodity-specific consumption sta-
tistics based on HIES data account for the part of the consumption that takes place outside 
of the household. In other words, statistics that report the quantity of meat consumed that 
are based on HIES data are underreported primarily because respondents generally failed 
to include their out-of-home food consumption in this statistical category. Zhong (1997) 
also believes this is the case. Third, to get an assessment of the impact that the trend to-
wards more out-of-home expenditure has on animal product demand, we assume that meat 
consumption that is embodied in out-of-home expenditures rises at the same rate as total 
expenditures on out-of-home consumption. In fact, this is probably a conservative assump-
tion since over time as food expenditures have risen we would expect that meat demand 
would rise relatively faster than that of other foods (Ma, Huang and Rozelle, 2002). Based 
on these three demand side assumptions, we can see that two pieces of information that are 
needed to adjust the demand side of meat data series are precisely those that we discussed 
in the previous section: the trend in out-of-home consumption during the last two decades; 
and the proportion of total food that is consumed out-of-home that is made up of animal 
products (Table 3.6, rows 1 to 5).   114
Table 3.6  Evidence of Underreporting of Out-of-Home and In-Home Urban and Rural Livestock  
Consumption by the China National Statistical Bureau's Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (HIES), 1998. 
  Urban Residents    Rural Residents 


























Per Capita Consumption, 'Out-of-Home' 
Pork  - -  5.30 8.17 - - 1.38 1.85
Poultry  - -  1.10 5.25 - - 0.76 0.70
Eggs  - -  1.20 2.06 - - 0.41 0.94
Beef  - -  1.00 - - - 0.10 -
Mutton  - -  0.45 - - - 0.18 -
 
Per Capita Consumption, 'In-Home' 
Pork  15.88 18.33  21.88 22.55 11.89 11.95 12.42 17.19
Poultry  7.22 7.86  7.99 4.99 2.33 2.27 2.54 4.13
Eggs  10.76 11.00  15.85 13.78 4.11 7.05 7.04 6.10
Beef  2.10 -  3.08 - 0.59 - 1.40 -
Mutton  1.24 -  0.69 - 0.72 - 0.30 -
Note: Beef and mutton data are not disaggregated by province. Yuan et al (1998) also do not provide separate 
estimates for beef and mutton. For complete discussion of data sources, see text and Table 3.4 
a Per capita consumption data (average for all of China's provinces) come from China's national urban and ru-
ral Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES-Urban and HIES-Rural) 1999. HIES per capita 
consumption data only provide the quantities of animal products that are consumed in the home and exclude 
per capita quantities that are consumed out of the home.. 
b Average of 1998 HIES per capita consumption for four provinces in which the CCAP Survey was con-
ducted. Provinces include Jilin, Shandong, Sichuan and Chongqing. 
c CCAP Survey data were collected by a joint data collection effort between the Center for Chinese Agricul-
tural Policy (CCAP), Chinese Academy of Sciences, in Beijing and the Center for Agricultural and Rural 
Development (CARD), Iowa State University.
d Yuan et al. data are reported in Yuan et al. (2001). 
 
 
  After the corrections for out-of-home consumption, we also need to correct that data 
to account for the increasing fraction of the rural labor force has temporarily moved into 
urban areas working as migrant laborers.
1 Although in 1990 only 9 percent of the rural la-
                                                 
1 We actually have to make one more adjustment to the consumption data between 1980 and 1984. Before 
1985, the CNSB's urban household study did not include urban households that lived in county-level towns 
or below. Implicitly, if one were to take per capital consumption levels from the CNSB surveys and multiply 
them by the urban population, the figure would be assuming that the consumption patterns in small county-
level cities are the same as those of larger metropolises. In fact, from our own survey, we know that this is 
not true. Consumers in county-level towns consume only about 67 percent of the meat as those residents in 
larger cities. Using population data of both larger and middle-size cities and county towns from the 1982 and 
1990 national population censuses, we are able to estimate the proportion of population that reside in these   115
bor force migrated, by 2000 nearly 20 percent lived outside their home while they were 
working (de Brauw et al., 2001). As shown by Huang and Rozelle (1998), when migrants 
move from the countryside to the city, within a very short time, changing preferences make 
them alter their dietary patterns (even holding constant income and price changes). The av-
erage rural migrant almost immediately increases the proportion of income spent on meat 
products. Following estimates provided in Huang and Bouis (1996; 2001), we assume that 
the meat consumption of migrants is halfway between the level of consumption for rural 
and urban individuals. This new consumption pattern is assumed to be adopted by all of the 
laborers in the migrant labor force and their family members. It is assumed that (on aver-
age) a family member accompanies one in every five migrants. 
  Adjustments also need to be made for China's growing consumption of processed 
food products at home. Many of these products contain meat, such as, frozen meat-filled 
pastries, dumplings, and pre-cooked noodle mixes, etc. When questioning CNSB survey 
respondents about how they recorded such products, most said they often did not count 
them as meat products. In fact, during our own field survey we found that the average level 
of consumption of animal products was significantly more than that recorded by HIES 
enumerators (Table 3.6, rows 6 to 10). For example, our survey found that per capita pork 
consumption for urban residents was 21.9 kg, about 37 percent more than that reported in 
HIES (row 6). Yuan et al. (2001) found the same result in their survey of rural and urban 
consumers (columns 4 and 8). Therefore, for the cases of pork, poultry and eggs, we be-
lieve that we are justified in making further adjustments based CCAP survey data.
1 
 
Supply Side Assumptions and Strategies 
To make supply side adjustments, we also rely on three assumptions. First, we assume that 
the data published in China's national statistical and agricultural yearbooks were correct in 
the early- and the mid-1980s (although they began to be overstated in the late-1980s). Dur-
ing this period, we are assuming that the annual census of livestock that was carried out 
each year by village accountants was subject to less distortions and that the HIES's produc-
tion data were based on information that is less representative than that generated by the 
current HIES. Indeed, in the early 1980s, CNSB only surveyed 15,000 rural households 
while currently they sample more than 65,000. 
  Second, we assume that the production data collected by the rural HIES in the late 
1980s and 1990s accurately captures the household's livestock production activities, a fact 
that can be used to check the accuracy of the 1997 Ag Census data. Hence, for those live-
stock categories for which production is dominated by household production (e.g., swine), 
trends after the late 1980s based on the rural HIES production data provide a reasonably 
accurate estimate of national production. We recognize, however, that in the case of some 
livestock categories (e.g., poultry and beef), non-household enterprises contribute a signifi-
cant part of the production. In these cases, when we compare our data to the 1997 Ag 
                                                                                                                                                    
different areas. We then are able to adjust the total urban meat consumption for the part of meat consumed by 
those consumers in smaller towns. 
1 Actually, it is a widespread finding that for certain commodities, the estimate from the household survey 
falls short of the known consumption total calculated from data on production, imports, exports and excise 
duties. For example, in the British Family Expenditure Survey, total tobacco expenditure was underestimated 
in 1976 by 21 percent (Deaton and Irish, 1984).   116
Census data (which contains both household and commercial output), we can use the pro-
portion of total production that comes from commercial sources (which is reported 
separately in the Ag Census) to get an estimate of commercial production. The commercial 
production from the Ag Census can then be added to an estimate of household production 
from the HIES survey to assess the overall accuracy of the 1997 Ag Census data. Interest-
ingly, this exercise shows that, in fact, rural household livestock production data are 
overstated somewhat (perhaps, we conjecture, because the sample misses the poorest 
households who, as shown by Chen, 2001, produce relatively fewer animals). 
  Finally, since the 1997 Ag Census was the most comprehensive and carefully moni-
tored agricultural and rural development data collection effort that China has ever 
undertaken, we assume that the number of slaughtered animals for each category (e.g., 
swine, poultry, etc.) from this source constitutes our best estimate of livestock production. 
Unfortunately, the Ag Census only provides animal numbers (slaughtered), unlike the 
Yearbook and the HIES production data that provide both animal numbers (e.g., how many 
hogs were slaughtered) and meat production estimates (that is an estimate of how much 
pork came from the hogs that were slaughtered). In order to provide an estimate of the 
meat produced in 1996 that is consistent with the 1997 Ag Census' animal production data, 
we multiplied the number of animals by a coefficient representing the average weight of 
carcass. This coefficient is derived from the Yearbook by dividing China's meat production 
for each animal product by the number of animals.
1 
  Based on the assumptions above, we believe that we have a strategy that can create a 
complete and consistent picture of China's livestock production that has three defining 
characteristics. First, our estimates from 1980 to 1986 are exactly those that appear in the 
CNSB's Yearbook during that time. Since we assume that 1986 to 1988 are the last years 
that the data generated by the statistical yearbooks were accurate, we set 1987 equal to the 
average of 1986 to 1988 (doing so to avoid distortions that might have arisen had we cho-
sen a single year). Since we assume that we have an accurate assessment for the numbers 
of animals for 1996 (based on the 1997 Ag Census), the 1996 data point in our production 
series is always exactly that found in the Ag Census. Furthermore, we believe that the rural 
HIES production data tell us something about livestock's year-to-year production variabil-
ity. Hence, with the information that we believe is accurate (that is, observations from 
1980 to 1987 and an observation in 1996), the remaining challenge is to figure out a way to 
estimate accurately livestock production trends since the late-1980s. 
  To provide estimates of production from 1988 to 1999 (except for 1996), we create 
point alpha (α), which is our estimate of 1987 production. Next, we define point beta (β), 
which is set equal to the figure reported in data from the 1997 Ag Census. In the third step, 
we fit a linear trend line from α (1987) through β (1996) extending to the final point of our 
                                                 
1 Throughout our analysis, when we refer to the Ag Census, we use national numbers that are sums of the 
figures from China's 31 provinces and provincial-level municipalities (without Taiwan). For example, pork 
production based on the sum of provincial Ag Census pork production figures in 1997 was 28.6 million tons. 
For some reason, when CNSB uses the Ag Census data, they use numbers that they claim are national num-
bers that differ from those based on the sum of provincial figures. In the case of pork production, for 
example, their national figure is 31.6 million metric tons, 10 percent above that reported by the provinces. 
Since we have no reason to believe that provinces would purposely underreport their Ag Census data on live-
stock production, in this paper we use the information that is based on the sum of provincial Ag Census data.   117
adjusted data series in 1999. Finally, in order to maintain the year-to-year variability con-
tained in the HIES household production data in our adjusted data series, we fit a 
regression line through the HIES household production data (from 1987 to 1999), and we 
add the residuals (except for those for 1987 and 1996) from the regression to the fitted 
trend line in step three. It is in this way that our adjusted production data have the special 
characteristic that they always pass through two key points, α and β, and retain the vari-
ability of the HIES data. 
 
3.5.3 Revised Livestock Demand and Supply Series 
 
In this section, we present the results of our work to create adjusted series for China's live-
stock demand and supply. To do so, we first examine how demand and supply series 
converge as we make our three adjustments (defined above). At each step we will assess 
how well our adjusted series are doing in terms of the equivalency criterion. If our adjust-
ments help the demand and supply data become more consistent with one another, we 
should find the ratios in the late period that were reported in Table 3.3 (and tested in Table 
3.4) should improve by moving more closely together (or becoming closer to one). In addi-
tion, we also examine whether or not the revised series meet the other criteria (i.e., whether 
or not the feed use implied by livestock production figures are roughly equivalent to the 
nation's feed grain production; and how well the series seem to reflect the trends that we 
are observing in China). 
  Correcting aggregate consumption data to reflect that fact that urban and rural resi-
dents consume significant quantities of meat outside the home is partly responsible for 
shifting the consumption series up and begins to close the gap between demand and supply 
(Appendices 3.6 and 3.7). Based on the CCAP survey (which asked about the composition 
of food eaten out of the home) and the HIES-urban and HIES-rural surveys (which asked 
about total out-of-home expenditure data), urban residents consumed 1.00 kilogram more 
pork in 1990 and 5.83 kilograms more of pork in 1999 out of the home (Appendix 3.6, col-
umn 5). In 1999, rural residents consumed 1.45 kilograms more pork (Appendix 3.6, 
column 6). According to these findings, when compared to the HIES-based per capita pork 
consumption figures, a significant fraction, 34 percent of China's urban pork consumption 
(5.83/16.91) is consumed in restaurants and other places out of the home. Likewise, rural 
out-of-home consumption accounts for 12 percent of pork consumption by rural residents 
(1.45/11.68). Similar patterns of out-of-home consumption were found for poultry (Ap-
pendices 3.6, columns 7 and 8) and other animal products (Appendices 3.11 and 3.12 for 
egg and Appendices 3.14 and 3.15 for beef and mutton).  
  The rise of migration also has played a role in increasing the divergence between 
livestock supply and demand statistics. While counted as rural residents by the HIES sys-
tem, and implicitly assigned per capita consumption levels of pork of 10.5 kilograms in 
1990 and 11.7 kilograms in 1999, migrants actually consumed significantly higher levels 
(Appendix 3.8, column 6). For example, the average migrant consumed 14.3 kilograms per 
capita in 1999, an increase of 22 percent over his counterpart that still lived in rural China 
(column 5). When this gap multiplied by more than 100 million migrants (column 3) and 
their families (assumed to be an additional 20 percent more), it can account for a lot of the   118
'missing' pork demand. The similar pattern can be found for poultry (columns 8 and 9) and 
other animal products (Appendices 3.12 and 3.17). 
  After making adjustment for out-of-home consumption and the increased consump-
tion by migrants, aggregate pork consumption rises to 27.21 mmt in 1999 instead of 21.94 
mmt (Table 3.7, columns 1 and 2). Between 1987 and 1998, the adjusted consumption se-
ries rises at 2.96 percent annually, more than twice as fast as the unadjusted one (bottom 
row).
1 
  The rises in pork consumption significantly affect the observed supply-demand ratio 
for pork. Whereas the ratio of supply to demand of the unadjusted data rises to 1.83 by 
1999 (Table 3.7, column 6), after correcting the data for out-of-home consumption and the 
increased consumption by migrants, the ratio falls to 1.47 (column 7). The first correction 
to consumption, then, is important and helps reduce the gap between demand and supply, 
but it does not close it entirely.  
  A similar narrowing is found when the same adjustments are made for poultry (Table 
3.8) and the other livestock products (Appendices 3.11, 3.14 and 3.15). For example, the 
ratio for poultry (the consumption of which rises annually by 4.7 percent instead of 6.2 
percent--Table 3.8, columns 1 and 2) falls from 1.94 for the unadjusted series (column 6) 
to 1.53 after we adjust the consumption data to account for out-of-home consumption and 
the increased consumption by migrants (column 7). Like for the case of pork, the adjust-
ments close the poultry gap, but do not eliminate it. 
  Adjustments to production affect the demand and supply series even more (Tables 
3.7 and 3.8). When production trends are forced to go through and become consistent with 
Yearbook data in the late 1980s and the 1997 Ag Census data in 1996 (the data points that 
we believe to be relatively accurate), the reported increases in production are dampened 
considerably. For example, whereas the unadjusted pork production data was shown to 
have risen by 6.57 percent annually between 1987 and 1998, after adjusting the data, the 
pork production series rose only 4.45 percent (Table 3.7, columns 4 and 5). The growth 
rates in production for other animal products, such as poultry, fell even more (by nearly 3 
percentage points from 14.74 to 11.62 percent--Table 3.8, column 4 and 5). When compar-
ing pork demand adjusted for out-of-home consumption (Table 3.7, column 2) to both the 
unadjusted and adjusted production data series (columns 4 and 5), the consistency ratio 
falls sharply from 1.43 to 1.18 (columns 7 and 8). The poultry ratios collapse even more, 
falling from 1.58 to 1.17, implying the degree of overreporting of poultry was even greater 
than that for pork (Table 3.8, columns 7 and 8). 
  Underreporting of total animal product consumption due to incomplete enumeration 
of in-home consumption of pork, poultry and eggs (for example, due to significant quanti-
ties of pork being incorporated into prepared goods that are not recorded by the HIES 
survey as pork consumption) also has played a role in the slow growth rates of animal 
product consumption (Appendices 3.14 and 3.17). In the case of urban pork consumption, 
according to CCAP survey, in 1998 households were consuming 3.33 kilograms per capita 
annually more than they actually were reporting to HIES enumerators (Appendix 3.14, 
column 6). By 1999 (we extended estimates back to 1988 and forward to 1999—see dis-
                                                 
1 In this section, whenever we report growth rates from 1987 to 1998, we are using three-year averages cen-
tered on these years. In other words, we compare the average of 1986-88 to 1997-99.   119
cussion in previous section) unreported in-home urban pork consumption reached 3.63 
kilograms, 21 percent higher than the HIES number (3.63/16.91). Although less than the 
amount unreported due to the omission of out-of-home consumption (e.g., omission of out 
of home urban pork consumption was 34 percent), the impacts in 1999 on rural pork con-
sumption (5 percent) and urban and rural poultry consumption (9 and 12 percent, 
respectively) are significant. 
  After making the final adjustment for in-home consumption to pork, poultry and 
eggs, the supply and demand series for the 5 animal product categories nearly show com-
plete convergence. For example, the annual growth rate of pork consumption from 1987 to 
1998 increases from 2.96 (which was the growth rate after adjustments were made due to 
out-of-home consumption) to 3.76 percent (Table 3.7, column 2 and 3). 
  The rise in consumption due to adjustment for the omission of in-home consumption 
also leads to another decline in the consistency ratio of pork production to consumption. 
The consistency ratio for pork supply and demand in 1999 falls from 1.18 to 1.07 (column 
8 and 9). In fact, the consistency ratios after the final adjustments are almost one after 1987 
(the average of the ratio is only 1.07 from 1987 to 1999). The other animal products, such 
as poultry, show similar patterns of convergence. The final adjustment for poultry con-
sumption (which increases the 1987 to 1998 poultry consumption annual growth rate to 
10.87) makes the consistency ratio fall from 1.17 to 1.08 (Table 3.8, columns 8 and 9).  
  A final set of statistical tests show that after making the adjustments to supply and 
demand, our new series almost certainly meet the equivalency criteria. Like the series be-
tween 1980 and 1987 (which displayed the characteristic of supply equaling demand), after 
the final adjustments to the demand and supply series, the statistical tests for the consis-
tency ratios demonstrate that the revised series meet the equivalency criteria (Table 3.9). 
Though the coefficients of Tt>1987 are still significant, the absolute effect of this variable is 
small. For example, the consistency ratios for pork and poultry are only 0.01 between 1988 
and 1999, meaning that the ratio only increased by 0.01 annually after 1987 (row 2). More 
important, F-tests show that the coefficients of intercept are convergent to 1 (row 6 and 9). 
Although the coefficient of Tt>1987 for poultry is still significant, its impact on the ratio is 
almost equal to 0. 
  Graphically, our adjusted series in Panels A and B of Figure 3.7 (represented by the 
two graph lines that are now 'inside' that two unadjusted series) show the result of our work 
to make livestock demand and supply series consistent. Since the late 1980s, the unad-
justed pork production series (uppermost) that was reported by CNSB has increased more 
rapidly than the adjusted one (the second uppermost); in contrast, the unadjusted pork con-
sumption series (lowermost) has increased but much more slowly than the adjusted one 
(the second lowermost--Panel A). In addition to differing from the unadjusted series, both 
the adjusted production and the adjusted consumption series follow strikingly common 
paths during the entire reform era (both the 1980s and the 1990s). At its widest gap, unad-
justed production had grown to a level 82 percent higher than unadjusted consumption. In 
contrast, the gap in the adjusted series is trivially narrow. The trends for the unadjusted and 
adjusted poultry series are similar; the gap in the unadjusted series that reached its peak in 
1998 (104 percent) is virtually gone in the adjusted series (Panel B). The data series for 
eggs, beef and mutton create similar pictures (Appendix Figure 3.2). 
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Table 3.7  Reconciling China's Pork Production (Supply) and Consumption (Demand) Statistical Series, 1980 to 1999. 
 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
               
Year  Aggregate       Various Supply/Demand Ratios  
  Demand Based           (to Assess the Consistency of  
  on HIES           Data Series Adjustments) 
 and  Trade 
 (mmt) 
a   Adjusted Demand    Aggregate Supply 
        
    for omission of   for omission of  Reported from  Adjusted  for  (4)/(1) (4)/(2) (5)/(2) (5)/(3) 
   out- of-home and   in-home  Yearbook over  reporting 
   migrant consumption   consumption   (mmt)  (mmt) 
   (mmt) 




1980    10.47  10.63 10.63 11.34  11.34  1.08  1.07  1.07  1.07 
1981    11.84  12.04 12.04 11.88  11.88  1.00  0.99  0.99  0.99 
1982    13.23  13.46 13.46 12.72  12.72  0.96  0.94  0.94  0.94 
1983    14.63  14.91 14.91 13.16  13.16  0.90  0.88  0.88  0.88 
1984    16.07  16.39 16.39 14.45  14.45  0.90  0.88  0.88  0.88 
1985    16.73  17.14 17.14 16.55  16.55  0.99  0.97  0.97  0.97 
1986    18.76  19.23 19.23 17.96  17.96  0.96  0.93  0.93  0.93 
1987    18.40  19.01 19.01 18.35  18.83 
d 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.99 
1988    17.56  18.30 18.47 20.18  19.92  1.15  1.10  1.09  1.08 
1989    18.13  18.97 19.31 21.23  20.06  1.17  1.12  1.06  1.04 
1990    18.91  19.79 20.31 22.81  21.01  1.21  1.15  1.06  1.03 
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Table 3.7  Reconciling China's Pork Production (Supply) and Consumption (Demand) Statistical Series, 1980 to 1999 (continuation) 
 
 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Year  Aggregate          Various  Supply/Demand  Ratios 
  Demand Based           (to Assess the Consistency of  
  on HIES          Data Series Adjustments) 
 and  Trade 
 
 (mmt) 
a  Adjusted Demand  Aggregate Supply
 
        
    for omission of  for omission of  Reported   Adjusted  (4)/(1) (4)/(2) (5)/(2) (5)/(3) 
   out- of-home and  in-home  from for 
   migrant consumption  consumption   yearbook  over reporting 
   (mmt) 
b  (mmt) 
c  (mmt) (mmt) 
 
 
1991   20.20  21.18  21.90  24.52 23.58  1.21  1.16  1.11  1.08 
1992   19.69  20.98  21.92  26.35 24.43  1.34  1.26  1.16  1.11 
1993   19.95  21.58  22.75  28.54 25.58  1.43  1.32  1.19  1.12 
1994   19.49  21.74  23.13  32.05 25.98  1.64  1.47  1.20  1.12 
1995   20.03  23.02  24.65  36.48 26.59  1.82  1.58  1.15  1.08 
1996   21.81  25.43  27.31  31.58 28.59 
d 1.45  1.24 1.12 1.05 
1997   20.54  24.53  26.67  35.96 29.75  1.75  1.47  1.21  1.12 
1998   21.50  26.15  28.56  38.84 29.82  1.81  1.49  1.14  1.04 
1999   21.94  27.21  29.91  38.91 32.00  1.77  1.43  1.18  1.07 
Growth 
e 1.43  2.96  3.76  6.57  4.45  5.04  3.50 1.45 0.66 
 
 
a Figures in column 1 are the same as Table 3.3, column 1. They are calculated from the CNSB's urban and rural HIES data as shown in Appendix 3.5,  
column 9. 
b Adjustments to create figures in column 2 are shown in Appendix 3.6, column 9 and Appendix 3.8, column 16. Adjustments include those due to omission 
of out-of-home consumption of urban and rural residents, and for adjustments made due to the differences in consumption patterns of traditional rural 
households and those of rural migrants and their families. 
c Adjustments to create figures in column 3 are shown in Appendix 3.9, column 12. 
d The bold figures are the three-year averages of Yearbook production data from 1986 to 88 and the production supply generated from 1997 Ag Census. 
 
e Annual growth rate between 1987 and 1998, where 1987 and 1998 are three-year averages centered on 1987 and 1998.  122
Table 3.8  Reconciling China's Poultry Production (Supply) and Consumption (Demand) Statistical Series, 1980 to 1999. 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
Year  Aggregate           Various Supply/Demand Ratios 
  Demand Based         (to Assess the Consistency of Data Series 
 on  HIES            Adjustments) 
 and  Trade 
 
   (mmt) 
a   Adjusted  Demand  Aggregate  Supply 
        
    For omission of  For omission of  Reported from  Adjusted (4)/(1) (4)/(2)  (5)/(2) (5)/(3) 
   out- of-home and  in-home  Yearbook for  over 
   migrant consumption  consumption    reporting 
   (mmt) 
b  (mmt) 
c  (mmt) (mmt) 
 
 
1980    0.88 0.88  0.88 0.94  0.94  1.07  1.06  1.06  1.06 
1981    1.02 1.07  1.07 1.03  1.03  1.00  0.96  0.96  0.96 
1982    1.25 1.32  1.32 1.18  1.18  0.94  0.90  0.90  0.90 
1983    1.35 1.43  1.43 1.30  1.30  0.96  0.91  0.91  0.91 
1984    1.52 1.62  1.62 1.44  1.44  0.95  0.89  0.89  0.89 
1985    1.77 1.88  1.88 1.60  1.60  0.90  0.85  0.85  0.85 
1986    1.95 2.07  2.07 1.88  1.88  0.96  0.91  0.91  0.91 
1987    2.03 2.19  2.19 2.19  2.27 
d  1.08  1.00  1.04  1.04 
1988    2.27 2.46  2.50 2.74  2.78  1.21  1.12  1.07  1.05 
1989    2.45 2.67  2.75 2.82  3.08  1.15  1.06  1.05  1.02 
1990    2.68 2.91  3.03 3.23  3.44  1.21  1.11  1.05  1.01 
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Table 3.8  Reconciling China's Poultry Production (Supply) and Consumption (Demand) Statistical Series, 1980 to 1999 (continuation) 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Year Aggregate  Demand          Various Supply/Demand Ratios 
  Based on HIES           (to Assess the Consistency of 
  and Trade           Data Series Adjustments)
 
   (mmt) 
a   Adjusted  Demand  Aggregate  Supply 
        
    For omission of  for omission of  Reported  Adjusted  for  (4)/(1)  (4)/(2) (5)/(2) (5)/(3) 
   out- of-home and  in-home  from over   
   migrant consumption  consumption  Yearbook  reporting 
   (mmt) 
b  (mmt) 
c  (mmt) (mmt) 
              
 
 
1991  2.82  3.08  3.25 3.95  3.91 1.40 1.28  1.13  1.07 
1992  3.18  3.52  3.73 4.54  4.44 1.43 1.29  1.13  1.07 
1993  3.41  3.84  4.09 5.74  4.78 1.68 1.50  1.13  1.06 
1994  3.64  4.23  4.54 7.55  5.09 2.07 1.78  1.12  1.04 
1995  3.95  4.73  5.09 9.35  5.57 2.36 1.97  1.13  1.05 
1996 4.28  5.28 5.69  8.96    6.06 
d 2.09 1.70  1.15  1.06 
1997  4.92  6.05  6.51 9.55  6.67 1.94 1.58  1.15  1.07 
1998  5.02  6.35  6.86  10.23  6.86 2.04 1.61  1.18  1.09 
1999  5.58  7.05  7.63  11.16  7.35 2.00 1.58  1.17  1.08 
Growth 
e  8.61  10.15  10.87  14.74  11.62 5.70 4.23  1.37  0.71 
 
 
a Figures in column 1 are the same as Table 3.3, column 4. They are calculated from the CNSB's urban and rural survey data as shown in Appendix 3.5, col-
umn 10. 
b Adjustments to create figures in column 2 are shown in Appendix 3.6, column 10 and Appendix 3.8, column 17. Adjustments include those due to omis-
sion of out-of-home consumption of urban and rural residents and for adjustment made due to the consumption of rural migrant labors and their families. 
c Adjustments to create figures in column 3 are shown in Appendix 3.9, column 13. 
d The bold figures are the three-year averages of Yearbook production data from 1986 to 88 and the meat production generated from 1997 Ag Census. 
 
e An annual growth rate between 1987 and 1998, where 1987 and 1998 are three-year averages centered on 1987 and 1998.   124
Table 3.9  Consistency Tests for the Adjusted Supply and Adjusted Demand Series, 1980-99 
a 
 
Dependent Variable, Rit = Adjusted Supply / Adjusted Demand 
  Independent Variable 
Pork Poultry    Eggs Beef Mutton 
Tests for structural change  
Before  1987:       
1987 ≤ t T   -0.01 -0.00 0.00  -0.01 -0.01 
 (1.03) 
b (0.06)  (0.21)  (1.19)  (1.56) 
       
After  1987:      





  (2.36) (3.66) (1.96) (3.76) (0.63) 
       
Adjusted R
2  0.64 0.69 0.34 0.75 0.20 
Tests for convergence of supply/demand ratio to one 
c 
Before 1987: 
1987 ≤ t T   -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
  (0.98) (0.55) (0.05) (0.01) (1.89) 







  (20.46) (15.87) (22.06) (11.45) (27.22) 
       
F-Statistic   0.03  0.24  3.64  18.99
*** 1.82 
(Test: Intercept =1)           
       
After 1987: 
1987 > t T   0.00 -0.00
** -0.00  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.20) (2.85) (1.79) (0.53) (0.21) 







  (24.35) (43.44) (59.62) (12.10) (20.57) 
       
F-Statistic  2.57 0.11 3.18 0.20 0.32 
(Test: Intercept =1)           
*** Significant at 1% level; 
** significant at 5 percent level; 
* significant at 10 percent level. 
a For the tests of structural change (rows 1 to 3), the equation regressing a time trend from two periods on the 
supply/demand ratio, is run with an intercept; parameters are not shown for brevity. Two separate within pe-
riod equations are used to test for convergence of supply/demand ratio to one (rows 4 to 6; and rows 7 to 9). 
b The figures in parentheses are t-statistics. 
c To test the null hypothesis that the supply/demand ratio is equivalent to one, we test for the significance of 
the intercept. If F-statistics (rows 6 and 9) are greater than 4, we reject the null hypothesis. 
 
 
  Interestingly, although our adjustments cut the gap dramatically that appeared be-
tween the official supply and demand statistics (e.g., pork from 81 percent to less than 5 
percent in 1998), the magnitude of our 'cuts' would have been larger had not CNSB ad-  125
justed their output data in response to the 1997 census. In the 1997 yearbook, official sta-
tistics reported 1996 meat output to be 40.38 mmt. This figure is a staggering 85 percent 
greater than CNSB's 1996 consumption figure. After the publication of the census data, the 
1998 yearbook revised the 1996 meat output statistics to be 31.6 mmt (the figure we report 
on Figure 3.7, Panel A for hog output). In making these adjustments, CNSB is implicitly 
admitting that their production figures were overstated, even though they made the adjust  
ment without any explanation. However, even after the adjustment, two facts still make the 
CNSB production series questionable. First, although they apparently adjusted their output 
statistics to make their series more consistent with the census data, their 1996 hog output 
figure (31.6 mmt) is still 10 percent higher than the figures published by the national cen-
sus office. Even more troubling, after 1996, despite the fact that it was the unbelievably 
high rate of growth of reported supply that led to the inflation of national livestock statis-
tics, the growth rate of CNSB's production data are almost as fast as before, even though 
the economy noticeably slowed in the late 1990s. Hence, the actions of CNSB to adjust 
their data give credibility to our strategy and their inability to reduce the growth rate from 
their statistical sources means that our adjusted series may be of greater value to those 
wanting to understand China's livestock economy. 
  A decomposition analysis summarizes our adjustments and accounts for the changes 
in the livestock supply and demand series that makes them consistent with one another 
(Table 3.10). In the case of pork in 1999, for example, when using the unadjusted series 
supply is more than 17 mmt more than demand (column 1, row 1). In the course of our ad-
justments, the adjustment down of supply, accounted for 41 percent of the reconciliation 
effort (column 5). Of the adjustments to consumption, 29 percent of the gap was eliminated 
by adjusting for out-of-home (column 2). Adjustments for migration and in-home con-
sumption, account for 5 and 16 percent (column 3 and 4). There is a residual of 9 percent 
after the four adjustments (column 6). Clearly according to this analysis, the over reporting 
of supply has created the most problems for not only pork, but in 1999 it accounts for an 
even a larger part of the discrepancies for poultry (52 percent), eggs (53 percent), beef (69 
percent), and mutton (65 percent-column 5, rows 2, 3, 4, and 5).  
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Table 3.10  Decomposition of Total Gap Between Unadjusted Supply (Production) and Unadjusted  
    Demand (Consumption) Livestock Statistical Series in China in %, 1990 and 1999. 
 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
 
Series Total  Gap 
a  Source of Total Gap (in percentage terms) 
 (mmt)   
   Out-of-Home 
b  Migrant 
c  In-home 
d  Production 
e  Other 
 
 
In 1999:           
Pork 16.97  29 5  16  41  9 
Poultry 5.58  21  6 10  52  10 
Eggs 13.33  3 7  34  53  3 
Beef 3.19  21  6  -  69  4 
Mutton 1.33  30  2  -  65  3 
           
In 1990:           
Pork 3.89  17  6  14  46  17 
Poultry 0.55  32 11 22  30  5 
Eggs 3.17  4  4  66  17  9 
Beef 0.14  48  20  -  30  2 
Mutton 0.22  26 13  -  44  17 
 
 
a The figures are total gap between reported production data from Yearbooks and reported consumption from 
HIES and trade statistics, measured in carcass weight. For example, the total gap for pork is pork supply (Ta-
ble 3.3, column 2) minus pork demand (Table 3.3, column 1).  
b Due to the omission of out-of-home consumption. For example, percent of total pork gap accounted for by 
out-of-home pork consumption is calculated by dividing adjustments made to pork consumption due to omis-
sion for out-of-home pork consumption (Appendix 3.6, column 9 minus Appendix 3.5, column 9) by total 
pork gap (this table, column 1). 
c Due to the omission of migrant consumption. For example, percent of total pork gap accounted for by mi-
grant pork consumption is calculated by dividing adjustments made to pork consumption due to omission for 
migrant pork consumption (Appendix 3.8, column 16 minus Appendix 3.6, column 9) by total pork gap (this 
table, column 1). 
d Due to the omission of in-home consumption. For example, percent of total pork gap accounted for by in-
home pork consumption is calculated by dividing adjustments made to pork consumption due to omission for 
in-home pork consumption (Appendix 3.9, column 12 minus Appendix 3.8, column 16) by total pork gap 
(this table, column 1). 
e Due to over-reported production. For example, percent of total pork gap accounted for over reporting pork 
production is calculated by dividing the overreported number (Table 3.10, column 4 minus column 5) by total 
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Figure  3.8  Estimated Available Feed Grains and Feed Use Implied in Adjusted Production in China, 
1980-99. 
Note: Estimated Available Feed Resource mainly includes corn, wheat bran, sweet potato, rice and other 
coarse grains. Feed Use Implied by Adjusted Production is estimated using livestock production statistics re-
ported in Table 3.6, column 5 (pork), Table 3.7, column 5 (poultry), Appendix 3.11, column 5 (eggs), 
Appendix 3.14, column 5 (beef), and Appendix 3.15, column 5 (mutton) and standard feed-meat conversion 
coefficients. See text for details. 
 
 
  In addition to meeting tests for consistency, our new series also meet the two other 
criteria. To demonstrate that our new livestock production series are consistent with na-
tional feed grain statistics, we use the same assumptions about feed grain consumption that 
we used in Appendix Figure 3.1. Applying these feed grain use conversion to the animal 
production trends, the revised livestock supply series generates a derived demand for feed 
series that is much more consistent than the unadjusted one (Figure 3.8). While at its wid-
est point, the unadjusted feed demand was 53 percent greater than feed supply, when using 
the adjusted livestock numbers, after 1988, the average gap between feed supply and de-
mand are only 3 percent. Our data series are also consistent with some commonly observed 
trends in society. Unlike the unadjusted figures, the rise in pork consumption that appears 
in our revised series is what one expects given the rapid rise in incomes and the noticeably 
increase in meat consumption during the 1990s. Unsurprisingly, the single biggest source 
of upward adjustment of pork (and poultry) is in the consumption of meat out of the home. 
Any one who is in China for any appreciable length of time will notice not only the large 
and growing number of restaurants, but also the high level of meat consumption in them. 
Furthermore, while livestock production has risen in recent years, there is absolutely no 
way that the growth rates implied by the Yearbook production figures could have occurred 
and been sustained for the entire 1990s. In short, the new rates are more believable. 
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3.5.4 Implications of the Adjusted Series for China's Cereal Trade Predictions 
 
To assess the importance of making adjustments to livestock data, we show how the use of 
different data series can affect the results of analyses that depend on accurate estimates of 
China's livestock numbers. In this section, we demonstrate how alternative livestock series 
influence predictions of China's agricultural trade in the future. To do so, we use three al-
ternative sets of data on meat estimated by CNSB, Fuller et al. and ours to predict China's 
cereal trade through 2010. The differences among the predictions will show the importance 
of having accurate information on the number of animals and the production of meat and 
eggs that come from them. 
  Three sets of predictions on free trade model are run using the CAPSiM model-one 
using CNSB livestock numbers, one using those in Fuller et al. (2000), and one using those 
created in this paper (henceforth, CCAP). In addition to the basic assumptions in the base-
line model (which were designed to simulate China's economy prior to the nation's 
accession to the WTO), we simulate China's trade regime if all trade restrictions were re-
moved. The only difference among the three sets of comparative forecasts is the different 
levels of meat and feed grain demands that are in the base year. Starting from these base 
year initial conditions and using the assumptions under a free trade scenario, we predict 
supply and demand for China's main crop and meat commodities. We generate net import 
forecasts for all commodities by taking the gap between consumption and production. 
  There are large differences in simulated agricultural trade forecasts among the three 
sets of comparisons (Table 3.11). According to predictions made when the initial livestock 
production holdings are those generated by CNSB, China's imports will surge to 73.5 mmt 
in 2005 and continue to rise to 98.7 mmt in 2010. The large livestock herd size implied by 
the official national statistics could only be fed by a sharp rise in grain imports. In contrast, 
if the figures of Fuller et al. (2000) were used, China would be exporting grain in every 
year between 2005 and 2010. The livestock production figures reported in Fuller et al. are 
more than 30 percent lower than those reported in this paper. The lower herd size numbers, 
however, would imply that under the baseline assumptions, China's producers could pro-
duce more than enough feed to supply all of its livestock throughout the next 10 years. 
Finally, when we use our supply predictions, imports rise under a free trade scenario. With 
our animal herd size used as a baseline, the CAPSiM model predicts that under free trade, 
importers will bring in 24.2 mmt in 2005, a reasonable amount of imports, given the 
China's TRQ for major grains will be between 20 and 30 mmt in 2004. By 2010, imports 
rise to 44.1, but are still substantially under (less than half) the predictions that are derived 
when using CNSB statistics. In other words, because of the importance of livestock in 
China's future import regime, differences in initial levels of livestock make large differ-
ences in grain supply, demand, and trade predictions. 
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Table 3.11  Cereal Net Import Predictions Based on Various Meat Estimate Datasets. 
 
 
Year  CNSB  CCAP  Fuller et al. 
 
 
  Million metric ton 
 
2005 73.5  24.2  -15.4 
2006 76.8  26.7  -13.5 
2007 82.0  30.9  -10.3 
2008 87.8  35.6  -6.6 
2009 93.4  40.0  -3.2 
2010 98.7  44.1  -0.1 
 
 
Source: Simulation results from CAPSiM model developed by Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences (Beijing China). See Huang et al. (1999). 




  There are also significant differences in grain trade patterns due to different livestock 
production estimates. Since maize is major feed grain source, the levels of livestock pro-
duction estimates will play an important role in determining future maize trade. Hence, the 
higher the livestock production estimates, the higher the projected maize imports. In the 
cases of CNSB and CCAP's datasets, China is forecast to import maize. The figures of 
Fuller et al., however, suggest that China will be able to export maize through 2007. 
 
3.5.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this section, we first demonstrate that China's livestock supply and demand statistics are 
not consistent with even the most basic criteria-supply equals demand; the implied derived 
demand for feed equals the supply of feed; and that the series are somewhat intuitive. We 
then use a number of data sources to create new supply and demand series. After correcting 
demand upward to make up for three omissions in the data, we correct supply down. The 
changes, which are all carefully documented, narrow the gap for all livestock products. The 
adjusted supply and demand series also meet the other criteria. A decomposition analysis 
shows that the single largest source of the discrepancy was the adjustment to supply and 
the adjustment to demand to account for the out-of-home consumption that the CNSB's 
survey failed to account for. 
  If our adjusted data sets are correct, there are implications for the validity of past sta-
tistics and the accuracy of alternative forecasts. We have shown how differences in 
livestock statistical series can create such great discrepancies in predicted feed grain im-
ports, that some analysts believe China will export feed grain for the next 5 years or more, 
while others predict that the nation may have import over 80 mmt. Meat trade would be 
subject to similar differences in forecasts. Beyond supply, demand and trade, gross domes-
tic product (GDP) figures could be significantly influenced. Since livestock makes up 30 
percent of agricultural GDP (AGDP), and since the growth rate of livestock was overstated 
by 37 percent, the reported growth rate of AGDP (which according to CNSB was 4 percent   130
annually between 1987 and 1999) would have to be lowered by 1 percentage point to 3 
percent annually. GDP growth would have to be lowered by 0.11 percent.  
  Making corrections to China's livestock statistics, however, may not be the end of the 
story. Li and Liu (2002) show that fishery statistics are subject to similar statistical prob-
lems. Zheng (2001) says that township and village enterprise output and employment 
statistics were overstated. All of these would support the recent findings by Rawski (2001) 
that China's overall growth data are overestimated.  
  In short, as China develops, and as the correlates of growth move in a direction that 
forecast continued future growth, there will be a continuing and rising demand for higher 
quality data. Clearly, some of the data sets - the livestock data, in particular – are so poor 
that without adjustments it is impossible to have a firm base for investment and policy 
planning. Especially in an economy that is changing so fast and will continue to do so in 





This chapter has attempted to explain the collection of methods used in this study. Our 
main tools are two economic models. The CAPSiM model of Chinese agriculture provides 
great detail on the production structure in crops and livestock. Next to 'standard' production 
relationships, it incorporates numerous environmental constraints to agricultural produc-
tion. Since it is a partial equilibrium model, it takes as exogenous the developments outside 
agriculture. The model is also less suited to model the impacts on world markets. The non-
agricultural developments inside China and world market developments are the realm the 
second model used in this study, the GTAP model. This chapter has discussed our ap-
proach to exchanging information between these two models. 
  Naturally there are many differences in approach and databases used. The databases 
of both models have been updated, and where deemed necessary, they have been adjusted 
to reflect the recent situation in China. This is important as the Chinese economy is grow-
ing at such a rapid pace that structural changes are surfacing within even relatively short 
time intervals of several years. Not capturing important structural changes would imply 
that our future projections will be grossly besides the mark.    131
Chapter 4  Projections of food supply and demand and 





China's per capita food availability has reached the level of developed countries, and since 
the mid 1980s China has been a net food exporter. While successful growth in the past 
should instil optimism, there are still great challenges ahead. On the production side of the 
agricultural sector, the annual growth rates declined from over 7 percent in the early 1980s 
to 3-4 percent in the late 1980s. The most significantly decline was experienced in the 
grain sector: grain production recorded almost zero growth in 1996-2000 and declined in 
2000-2002 (NSBC, 2003). On the demand side, economic growth and rising income will 
continue to boost the demand for agricultural and food products. Trade liberalization fur-
ther challenges China's food and agricultural economy. China's recent accession to the 
WTO has led to a broad debate on its potential effects on both the domestic and the global 
economy. Accession affects all areas of China's economy, but is widely expected to have a 
particularly dramatic effect on agriculture.  
  Concerns about China's food economy have raised a number of questions. What are 
the driving forces behind China's food demand, supply, and trade? What are the prospects 
for China's food economy in the coming decades? Will China be able to feed its growing 
population under a more liberalized economy? Which measures and policies will be the 
most effective in improving China's food security situation in the future? The answers to 
these questions are by no means clear. The overall goal of this chapter is to project China's 
food and agricultural economy in the coming two decades. Because China's future agricul-
tural economy is subject to both domestic policy changes and external environments, this 
chapter focuses on China's food and agricultural economy in the next two decades under 
several scenarios, which consider the majors shifters of demand and supply as well as trade 
liberalization.  
  This chapter is structured as follows. The following section presents an overview of 
food consumption patterns and food balance in China in the past 20 years. Because the 
production or supply of the food economy and major sources of production growth in the 
past 20 years have been extensively discussed in Chapter 2, the discussions of production 
in Section 3 are limited to three supply shifters, namely agricultural technology, irrigation, 
and environment stress (i.e., erosion and salinity). The fourth section presents the devel-
opment of scenarios and assumptions embodied in various scenarios. The baseline 
embodies China's WTO accession, as China has been a member of the WTO since Decem-
ber 2001. Under the baseline, major driving factors of demand and supply are assumed to 
follow the 'business as usual' rule. Alternative scenarios focus mainly on supply shifters, 
particularly the productivity-enhanced investment. Section 5 presents the results of our 
baseline projections (with different income growths) based on a partial equilibrium model 
of the agricultural sector (CAPSiM). The impacts of alternative assumptions of agricultural 
productivity investment - such as agricultural R&D, irrigation, and land erosion control -   132
are explored in Section 6. Because CAPSiM is a country model that does not fully consider 
the impacts of China's trade on the world market, the results presented in this chapter 
should be interpreted with caution. The impacts of China's trade on the world market are 
taken into account in Chapter 5.  
 
 
4.2  Changing Food Consumption Patterns and Improving Food Balance in the Past  
 
4.2.1 Food Consumption Patterns in China 
 
Food consumption patterns in China have changed significantly since the early 1980s (Fan 
et al., 1995). These changes have occurred at the national aggregate level as the urban sec-
tor expanded and the share of the urban population expanded (Huang & Bouis, 1996). The 
changes also occurred in rural and urban areas as a result of income growth and changes in 
other demand factors (Huang & Rozelle, 1998; Halbrendt et al., 1995).  
  Within rural areas, the pattern of food consumption changed rapidly. In rural areas 
per capita food consumption increased for all products except for maize, other cereal 
grains, and sweet potato (Table 4.1). A decline in coarse grains consumption is expected as 
the income elasticities of demand for these grains are negative. While per capita rice and 
wheat consumption reached the highest points between the mid 1980s and the late 1990s 
(rice 104 kg and wheat 86 kg; Table 4.1 the increase in the population has caused the abso-
lute level to continue to rise. The consumption of meat and non-staple foods increased 
more rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s. For example, per capita pork consumption in ru-
ral areas was less than 10 kg in 1981 and reached 20.7 kg in 2000 (Table 4.1). 
  While the consumption of other meats such as beef, mutton, poultry, and aquatic 
products is still very small, the annual growth rates in the past 20 years were much larger 
than the growth rates of pork. The consumption of horticultural products has also been ris-
ing. Among them, fruit consumption growth has been dramatic, increasing from 2 kg in 
1981 to more than 18 kg in 2000. Our previous studies (Huang & Rozelle, 1998; Huang & 
Bouis, 2001) showed that income growth and food market development in rural areas are 
the key driving forces behind food consumption changes. 
  The situation is different in cities. In urban areas, per capita grain consumption has 
been declining since the late 1980s (Table 4.2). At the same time, the consumption of meat 
and non-staple foods has grown rapidly. The most significant increases in demand have 
been for meat, fish, and fruit. In 2000, per capita pork and poultry consumption reached 32 
kg and 10 kg, respectively, which is several times more than is consumed in rural areas. 
Per capita fruit consumption tripled in just 20 years, to reach 61 kg in 2000 (Table 4.2). 
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Table 4.1  Per capita food consumption (kg) in rural China, 1981-2000 
 
 
 1981  1985  1990  1995  2000 
 
 
Milled  rice  88.2 105.0 103.4  103.7 103.8 
Wheat  55.8 75.3 82.8  86.2 85.3 
Maize  30.5 18.2 18.7  14.3 11.2 
Other cereal grains  26.7  19.8  16.5  14.5  13.0 
Sweet  potato  9.0 7.1 4.3  3.3 2.4 
Potato  2.2 2.3 2.8  3.7 4.5 
Vegetables  132.8 131.5 134.0  124.4 169.7 
Fruit  2.0 3.4 5.9  13.0  18.3 
Edible  oil  3.1 4.0 5.2  5.8 6.2 
Pork  9.9 12.0 14.4  16.5 20.8 
Beef  0.2 0.3 0.4  0.6 1.0 
Mutton  0.4 0.4 0.4  0.5 1.1 
Poultry  0.7 0.9 1.8  3.0 5.3 
Egg  1.7 2.8 4.0  5.4 7.2 
Aquatic  products  1.4 1.9 2.7  4.8 6.7 
Share of food in total  
expenditure    60% 58% 59%  59% 49% 
 
 
Note: Fruits and oil consumptions and food expenditure data are from NSBC, the rest are from the CAPSiM 
database. Per capita fruit consumption data (26 kg) from CAPSiM is higher than NSBC's figure because the 
former includes the consumption away from home. 
 
 
Table 4.2  Per capita food consumption (kg) in urban China, 1981-2000 
 
 
  1981 1985 1990  1995 2000 
 
 
Milled  rice  77.3 79.1 67.4  69.7 57.7 
Wheat  61.3 58.3 59.7  43.0 44.4 
Maize  3.3 3.1 2.6  3.0 2.6 
Other cereal grains  5.9  3.6  3.3  3.7  2.7 
Sweet  potato  3.0 2.0 1.2  1.3 0.9 
Potato  3.6 5.6 7.3  9.2  11.5 
Vegetables  160.8 146.7 138.7  145.6 188.1 
Fruit  21.1 28.9 44.7  48.4 61.4 
Edible  oil  3.1 5.8 6.4  7.1 8.3 
Pork  14.8 22.2 27.8  30.2 31.9 
Beef  0.5 1.2 1.8  3.6 4.8 
Mutton  0.9 1.1 2.0  2.2 2.0 
Poultry  2.2 3.3 5.2  7.2  11.5 
Egg 5.6  9.8  12.6  16.6  20.1 
Aquatic products  4.4  9.2  11.1  15.3  19.5 




Note: Fruits and oil consumptions and food expenditure data are from NSBC, the rest are from the CAPSiM 
database. Per capita fruit consumption data (71 kg) from CAPSiM is higher than NSBC's figure because the 
former includes the consumption away from home.   134
  Across Asia, consumer behavior changes dramatically as countries urbanize (Huang 
& Bouis, 2001; Huang & David, 1993). Urban dwellers consume less grain and demand 
more meat, milk products, and fish than their rural counterparts, even after accounting for 
the differences in income and prices. This is clearly demonstrated by the comparison of per 
capita food consumption between rural and urban areas in China (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Ta-
bles 4.1 and 4.2 show that urbanization could lead to a substantial decline in the direct 
consumption of grains. On the other hand, the demand for meat (and for feed grain) and 
other non-staple foods will increase significantly with the increase in the share of urban 
residents in the total population.  
  The ratio of urban to rural residents in China is changing fast. The urban population 
grew from 19 percent of the total population in 1980 to 27 percent in 1990, and to 26 per-
cent in 2000 (NSBC, 2001). The impact of this population shift on consumption in China 
has been documented (Huang & Bouis, 1996 and 2001) and can also be derived from Ta-
bles 4.1 and 4.2. While the structural transformations of the economy should be taken into 
account in any predictions of future consumption patterns, few projections explicitly con-
sider the differences in the consumption between rural and urban consumers. In this study, 
we project food consumption levels for rural and for urban areas. 
 
 
Table 4.3  Market development and per capita food consumption (kg) in rural China, 1997-2001 
 
 
  Percentage of food purchased from market (%) 
   
Per capita consumption  <30  30-45 45-60 >60 
 
 
Grain (unprocessed)  276.2  265.6  249.4  211.3 
Edible oils  6.6  6.8  7.0  7.5 
Meat 22.3  21.5  23.0  29.0 
Aquatic products  1.8  3.1  4.2  8.5 
Vegetables 131.0  119.6  111.5  102.2 
Sugar 1.2  1.7  2.0  2.3 
Fruits 14.5  18.0  22.0  28.6 
 
 
Source: Computed by authors based on rural income and expenditure survey data of 1997 and 2001 con-
ducted by the National Statistical Bureau of China.  
 
 
  Urbanization occurred not only through the expansion of urban areas, but also within 
the rural sector. One of these changes is rural food market development. Table 4.3 shows 
how food market development is associated with food consumption in rural China. The 
food market development can be expressed in the percentage of food consumption pur-
chased from the rural market by rural households. The consumption of grain and 
vegetables - which are largely home-produced commodities - declines with food market 
development (Table 4.3), while other food consumption increases with the expansion of 
food markets in rural areas.  
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4.2.2 Food Supply and Demand Balance 
 
Chapter 2 shows that the increase in food consumption in China was almost entirely a re-
sult of the growth in domestic production. In 1980, China imported nearly USD 2.9 billion 
of food from world markets (Chapter 2). In the same year, China exported more than USD 
3 billion to the rest of world. Since then, China has been a net exporter. Moreover, during 
the 1980s and 1990s, net exports of food increased significantly. In 1999, China's food net 
exports reached USD 4.5 billion.  
  Even in the grain sector - in which China has less of a comparative advantage - the 
nation has been able since the 1950s to almost achieve self-sufficiency. Table 4.4 shows 
the annual cereal grain supply and utilization food balance sheet in China for the past 20 
years. The improved national grain self-sufficiency has mainly come from the rapid growth 
of domestic supply since the early 1980s. Because per capita consumption of cereal grains 
was already very high by the early 1980s, although average income elasticity of cereal 
grains was still positive (but small) for both rural and urban consumers, the increase in 
grain consumption due to income growth was offset by a decrease in its consumption as 
the food market rapidly developed, the later increased varieties of non-staple foods avail-
able in the markets (Huang & Rozelle, 1998). The growth in non-staple food consumption 
- such as meat, vegetables, edible oils, and other foods – has been substantial (Tables 4.1 
and 4.2).  
  The grain balance sheet also shows that cereal production increased by 37 percent 
during the past two decades (row 3). Driven almost entirely by yields, the increase in pro-
duction has come even though the sown area has remained constant (rows 1 and 2). 
Between the early 1980s and late 1990s, consumption in China increased by 30 percent. 
Although this was a large increase, it was less than the rate of production increase. With 
production rising faster than consumption, China - the nation with the world's largest popu-
lation – became grain self-sufficient in 1995 (bottom row). The annual production of food 
(in tons) exceeded the annual consumption that year and has done so ever since. The self-
sufficiency level increased to 104.1 percent in the late 1990s. During this time, China also 
was a net exporter of food (row 5).  
  Table 4.4 also shows that in the past two decades about one-fifth of the increase in 
grain production was effected to meet the increase in demand for cereal grain as food 
(mainly to meet the increase in total population). By reducing the supply pressure on food 
grain demand, China has been able to release a large share of its own produced grains 
(mainly maize) for feed use. The shares of grain as feed use in total grain consumption 
nearly doubled between the early 1980s (14 percent) and the late 1990s (27 percent) (Table 
4.4), which implies that more than 70 percent of the growth in grain production was allo-
cated to feed use.  
  Many factors, including domestic policies, have helped China improve its food secu-
rity in the past 20 years. The increase in yields may have contributed as much as anything 
else has. As discussed in Chapter 2 and as shown in the literature, China's domestic policy 
has played a major role. Decollectivization, new agricultural technologies, irrigation in-
vestments, and increasing access to inputs have helped provide the incentives and materials 
for raising production per fixed unit of land (Lin, 1992; Fan, 1991; Huang & Rozelle,   136
1996). With the equal distribution of land in China, the higher yields have meant that the 
incomes of farmers have risen as a result of the increased output. 
 
 
Table 4.4  Annual cereal grain supply and utilization food balance in China, 1981-2000. 
 
 
 Unit  1981-85  1986-90  1991-95  1996-00 
 
 
Crop  area  1000  ha  95848 94539 93156 93817 
Yield  tons/ha  3.0 3.4 3.8 4.1 
Production  1000  tons  284420 317765 352278 388695 
Stock change  1000 tons  5756  4741  1553  11999 
Net import  1000 tons  9416  8391  2787  -3147 
 Import  1000 tons  11906  13828  12265  5027 
 Export  1000 tons  2490  5436  9477  8174 
Consumption  1000  tons  288080 321416 353513 373550 
 Food use   percent  72  67  65  61 
 Feed use   percent  14  20  23  27 
 Seed use   percent  5  4  4  3 
 Industry use   percent  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.2  
  Waste    percent  6.2 5.9 5.7 5.7   
Per cap. food   kg/person  202  196  194  183  
  Urban  kg/person  149 137 126 109 
  Rural  kg/person  217 217 220 215   
Self-sufficiency level  percent  98.7  98.9   99.7  104.1  
 
 
Source: CCAP's database and authors' estimates. 
 
 
4.3  Productivity-enhanced Investments and Agricultural Growth 
 
4.3.1 Agricultural Research Investment and Technology Changes 
 
Agricultural research in China is overwhelmingly financed and undertaken by the public 
sector (Huang, Hu & Rozelle, 2003). Table 4.2 shows that total investment (including gov-
ernment fiscal expenditure and research institutes' commercial income) in agricultural 
research
1 grew from 1355 million Yuan in 1985 to 6368 million Yuan (current price) in 
1999, an increase of over 400 percent (Table 4.5). However, expenditure on agricultural 
research grew in real terms by only about 4 percent annually between the mid 1970s and 
the late 1990s. Recent concern about China's future ability to meet the growing demand for 
agricultural products has resulted in a significant growth in public investment in agricul-
tural research since the late 1990s. 
 
                                                 
1 Including agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, water conservancy, and agricultural service.   137
Table 4.5  China's agricultural research investment in public research system in 1985-1999 
 
 
  At current price (million Yuan)  At 1998 price (million Yuan) 
     
Year  Total Fiscal  Commercial  Total Fiscal  Commercial 
 
 
1985 1355 1015  340  3923  2939  984 
1986  1346 958 388  3676  2617  1059 
1987  1403 948 455  3572  2413  1159 
1988 1782 1189  593  3827  2554 1273 
1989 2095 1400  695  3820  2553 1267 
1990 2050 1243  807  3661  2220 1441 
1991 2381 1283 1098  4133  2227 1906 
1992 2761 1442 1319  4548  2375 2173 
1993 3273 1558 1715  4763  2267 2496 
1994 4409 2072 2337  5272  2478 2794 
1995 4856 2441 2415  5058  2543 2515 
1996 5238 2754 2484  5143  2704 2439 
1997 5377 2789 2588  5237  2717 2520 
1998 5847 3060 2787  5847  3060 2787 
1999 6368 3358 3010  6565  3462 3103 
 
Annual growth rate 
1985-95  13.3 %  8.4 %  20.9 %  3.6 %  -1.3 %  11.2 % 
1996-99  6.7 %  6.9 %  6.5 %  8.4 %  8.6 %  8.2 % 






  Because the size of sectoral investment is related to its size in the economy, interna-
tionally, investment intensity (i.e., the percentage of agricultural research investment as the 
agricultural GDP) is usually used to measure the level of government investment in agri-
cultural research. Table 4.6 shows that the investment intensity of China's agricultural 
research has been about 0.4-0.5 percent. While this is lower than in the developed coun-
tries (typically 2-4 percent) and above the average of developing countries, it has resumed 
growth since the mid 1990s. On the other hand, the above discussion also implies that there 
might be a lot of room for China to boost its agricultural productivity through increasing 
agricultural research investment in the future.    138
Table 4.6  Intensity (%) of investment in agricultural research and technical extension service in China,  
  1985-1999 
Agricultural research   
Year  Government  
fiscal expenditure 
Commercial 




1985 0.40  0.13  0.53  NA 
1986 0.35  0.14  0.49  0.41 
1987 0.30  0.14  0.44  0.40 
1988 0.31  0.15  0.47  0.37 
1989 0.33  0.16  0.50  0.36 
1990 0.25  0.16  0.41  0.33 
1991 0.24  0.21  0.45  0.34 
1992 0.25  0.23  0.48  0.34 
1993 0.23  0.25  0.48  0.32 
1994 0.22  0.25  0.47  0.30 
1995 0.20  0.20  0.40  0.27 
1996  0.20 0.18  0.38  0.29 
1997  0.20 0.18  0.38  0.31 
1998  0.21 0.19  0.40  0.42 
1999  0.23 0.21  0.44  0.46 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
 
 
  Despite relatively lower levels of agricultural research investment in China compared 
to those in many developed countries, the progress in agricultural technology has been re-
markable. China's agricultural scientists and public financed R&D system developed and 
disseminated technology throughout the People's Republic period (MOA, 1999). Before 
the rest of the world had experienced the Green Revolution, China's breeders released im-
proved, semi-dwarf rice varieties (Stone, 1988). Yuan Longping made his breakthrough on 
hybrid rice in Hunan Province in the early 1970s (Lin, 1991). Agricultural officials also 
pushed hybrid maize as early as the late 1950s and early 1960s. Although the diffusion 
path was not entirely smooth until the mid 1970s, following the release of the new corn-
blight-resistant, single-cross hybrids, by the mid 1980s virtually all of the temperate pro-
duction zones in northern China were planted with hybrids. Somewhat later, wheat 
varieties enjoyed similar technological transformations (Rozelle & Huang, 2000). Tech-
nologies in other crops and livestock have also progressed substantially (MOA, 1999). 
  China's R&D system for agriculture reached its peak in the mid 1980s. Although 
crop yield growth has slowed down since the late 1980s, farmers in China have continu-
ously been adopting new varieties developed by the government's research system. For 
example, in the 1990s rice farmers used about 400 'major' varieties each year (Huang, Hu 
& Rozelle, 2003).
1 
                                                 
1 A 'major' variety in our sample is any variety that covers at least 100,000 mu (6,667 hectares) in a province. 
Since our database is built on this concept, we do not have full coverage. In fact, for the rice, wheat, and most 
maize growing sample provinces, the proportion of area covered by major varieties exceeds 90 percent in   139
China's breeding efforts also have enhanced the quality of its seed stock. Using the ex-
perimental stations' yields of each major variety during the year the variety was certified, 
two measures of quality were developed by Jin et al. (2002): a 'yield frontier' variable and 
an 'adopted yield potential' variable.
1 The yield frontier - which is created by using the 
highest yield of any one major variety in the field in each province during a given year - is 
a measure of the ultimate yield potential of the current technology used by farmers in each 
provinces in each province's research system. The other variable - the adopted yield poten-
tial – is the average of the experimental station's yields of all major varieties that have been 
adopted by farmers.  
 
 
Table 4.7  Experimental stations' yields (yield frontiers and adopted yield potential), actual yields, and yield  





Annual growth rate 
(%) c) 
Rice 







 Adopted yield potential b)  6.1  7.2  1.4 
 Actual yield  4.2  6.2  2.1 
 Percent gap between adopted  






      
Wheat c) 







 Adopted yield potential b)  4.6  5.2  1.0 
 Actual yield  1.9  3.6  3.2 
 Percent gap between adopted yield 






      
Maize 







 Adopted yield potential b)  6.1  7.9  1.8 
 Actual yield  3.0  4.9  3.2 
 Percent gap between adopted yield 






a) Yield frontier is the highest experiment station yield of a variety that has been extended to the field. The 
variable is non-decreasing in the sense that if in some subsequent year the highest yielding variety has a 
lower yield, the previous period's yield is maintained. In this table, the figure is the average of sample prov-
inces. See Appendix Table 4.8 for a complete national series for each crop.  
b) Adopted yield potential is the average experiment station yields of all varieties being adopted by farmers. 
In this table, the figure is the average of sample provinces (Appendix Table 4.9). 
c) Annual growth rates are calculated by running a regression of natural log of various yields on a time trend. 
Source: Jin et al., 2002.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
each province (except in some of the southern soybean provinces). 
1 'Yield frontier' is defined to be non-decreasing. If a major variety is used by farmers in the field has the 
highest yield one year, it is assumed that the yield frontier in that province has reached that yield level and 
will not drop, even in the rare case that farmers have stopped using that variety and all other varieties have 
lower certified yields in the following years.   140
  According to both measures, China's research system has created a steady stream of 
quality technology (Table 4.7). The yield frontier for rice moved up by 2.3 percent per year 
and that for maize by 2.5 percent per year between 1980 and 1995, most likely a function 
of the development of hybrid cultivars. Although more modest, the yield frontier of wheat 
has also increased significantly during the reforms (1.3 percent). 
 
4.3.2 Water Control Investment and Irrigation Development 
 
China is not particularly well endowed with water, yet water has been used as a cheap re-
source to expand agricultural and industrial production. China ranks fifth in total water 
resources among the countries in the world, but on a per capita basis, it is among the poor-
est. The nation's water resources are overwhelmingly concentrated in southern China, 
while northern China (the area north of the Yangtze River Basin) has one-fourth of the per 
capita water endowment of the south and one-tenth of the world average (Bryan et al., 
2003).
1 Northern China, however, remains an important agricultural region and the site of 
much of China's industrial production. Increasing demand for water from the industrial 
sector and for domestic use has challenged China agricultural water use. 
  Because of the scarcity and importance of water in agricultural production, China has 
invested substantially in water control and irrigation expansion, which has contributed to 
crop yield increases. The national government invests in developing the water resources 
from all large rivers and lakes, as well as in projects that cover more than one province. 
Local governments are in charge of projects that are within their administrative district. 
Historically, investment from national funding sources has been heavily biased towards 
new investments, while local governments have been responsible for maintenance funds. 
  China launched the first nationwide, massive-investment water infrastructure project 
in the late 1950s. Investment increased from 0.8 billion (in constant 1990 Yuan) in 1955 to 
7.5 billion in 1960 (Figure 4.1). Although irrigation investment declined in the 1960s, the 
irrigated area continued to expand (Table 4.8). By the late 1980s, serious attention was be-
ing paid to the problem of waning irrigation investment after several successive years of 
poor harvests. Post-reform grain production peaked in 1985, then stagnated in the late 
1980s (Wang, 2000). Some people blamed the low investment in agriculture for this de-
cline (Wen, 1993). Estimates of the impact of irrigation investment on total factor 
productivity show that China's irrigation system was losing its ability to increase output 
and productivity (Huang et al., 2000).  
 
                                                 
1 Loosely speaking, northern China includes three main geographic regions according to China’s own defini-
tions: Northwest, North, and Northeast China.   141
















Percentage of salinized  











1973 100,212.7  6754.0  6.7  39,222.7 
1974 99,912.0  6705.3  6.7  41,269.3 
1975   99,708.0  6970.3  7.0  43,284.0 
1976   99,388.0  7062.0  7.1  44,981.3 
1977   99,247.3  7153.7  7.2  44,999.3 
1978   99,389.3  7245.3  7.3  44,965.3 
1979   99,498.0  7302.0  7.3  45,003.3 
1980   99,305.3  7145.3  7.2  44,888.0 
1981   99,037.3  7243.3  7.3  44,574.0 
1982   98,606.7  7243.3  7.3  44,176.7 
1983   98,359.3  7357.3  7.5  44,650.7 
1984   97,854.0  7331.3  7.5  44,452.7 
1985   96,846.3  7692.7  7.9  44,036.0 
1986   96,229.9  7606.7  7.9  44,226.0 
1987   95,888.7  7636.0  8.0  44,403.0 
1988   95,721.8  7672.0  8.0  44,375.9 
1989   95,656.0  7535.5  7.9  44,917.0 
1990   95,672.9  7539.0  7.9  47,403.1 
1991   95,653.6  7614.0  8.0  47,822.1 
1992   95,425.8  7660.3  8.0  48,590.1 
1993   95,101.4  7655.8  8.1  48,727.9 
1994   94,906.8  7655.8  8.1  48,759.1 
1995   94,975.1  7655.8  8.1  49,281.2 
1996   95,466.5  7724.8  8.1  50,381.4 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, various publications. 
 
 
  After implementation of the 1988 Water Law, investment increased from 4.9 billion 
Yuan in 1990 to 12 billion in 1995 (Figure 4.1). In the Ninth Five-Year Plan (which took 
effect in 1996), officials increased investment from 8 billion Yuan in 1996 to 17.2 billion 
Yuan in 1997 (in real 1990 prices; Ministry of Water Resources, 1999), and the plan is to 
increase investment even more in first decade of the 21st century (interviews with MWR 
officials). 
  The increase in investment has led to the enlargement of the irrigated area. The irri-
gated area increased steadily from about 44 million hectares in the mid 1980s to 47 million 
hectares in 1990, and to more than 50 million hectares in 1996 (Table 4.8). Using the ear-
lier, official cultivated area figures, the percentage of land irrigated increased from less 
than 40 percent in the early 1970s to 45 percent in the 1980s, and to 53 percent in 1996   142
(Table 4.8). The multiple cropping index - one of the main ways irrigated area affects pro-
duction and productivity - increased from 1.55 in 1990 to 1.65 in 1999. 
  More importantly, the increase in food output and productivity since the late 1970s 
can be linked with rising public investment, including investment in irrigation. Huang et al. 
(1995) established a direct link between new investment in water infrastructure and China's 
grain output. The results of their studies have been incorporated into CAPSiM to simulate 
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Figure 4.1  Investment in water infrastructure (in 1990 billion Yuan), 1955-1995 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, 1996. 
 
 
4.3.3 Soil Erosion and Salinization 
 
China suffers from serious land degradation problems. Despite the great efforts made to 
prevent soil erosion and salinity since the 1950s, serious agricultural land degradations - 
particularly erosion and salinization - seem to be getting worse (Rozelle et al., 1997).  
 
Erosion. Almost all case studies show that the area of land suffering from both water and 
wind erosion has increased significantly in the last decades, mostly ranging from 20 per-
cent to 30 percent (Peng & Xu, 1993). While time series data are not available for the land 
area suffering from wind erosion, Table 4.9 shows the trend of eroded land area due to wa-
ter erosion in China in 1973-1997. As Table 4.8 shows, China has experienced a 
significant increase in the eroded area since the 1980s. The average annual growth rate of 
eroded area reached 1.8 percent in 1973-96.
1 By 1996, the area of water-eroded land 
reached 1,826,640 km
2. Recently, however, the growth rate has declined to about 1.5 per-
                                                 
1 A large increase in 1991 may reflect a readjustment of eroded area with better information obtained from 
the second soil census (conducted in the early 1980s) and a large study by CAS in Loess Plateau in 1988-90.   143
cent. The percentage of water-eroded area was about 12.3 percent in the 1970s, 12-14 per-
cent in the 1980s, and 17-19 percent in the 1990s (Table 4.9).  
 
Salinization. Since the 1970s, the area of salinized cultivated land has been fairly constant 
compared to the eroded land areas. The total increase in the area of salinized land was 14.4 
percent in the period 1973-96 (Table 4.8). The average annual growth rate of the salinized 
area based on MOWR's data set was 0.54 percent in 1973-96. The growth rate declined 
from 1.1 percent in the 1970s to 0.65 percent in the 1980s, and to only 0.3 percent in the 
1990s (computed based on the figures in Table 4.8). However, the share of salinized land 
in total cultivated land has increased from 6.7 percent in 1973 to more than 8 percent since 
the early 1990s. 
 
Impacts of erosion and salinization. Erosion and farmland salinization can cause signifi-
cant declines in farm productivity, and can become serious enough to induce producers to 
remove land from production (Wang, 1991). Erosion leads to a decline in soil fertility. 
Poorly-constructed irrigation systems commonly lead to salinization in some environ-
ments, either because of the inadequate application of water or because of substandard 
drainage. Therefore, despite the extent of salinization, the problem is less serious than that 
of soil erosion in the country as a whole. Salinization has, however, caused serious damage 
to crop production in many provinces in China.  
  Three recent studies (Huang & Rozelle, 1995; 1996; Rozelle et al., 1997) have 
shown that the increase in erosion and salinity problems affects the output of grain, rice, 
and other agricultural products. These studies show that environmental factors have had a 
much greater impact on the output of non-rice grains and cash crops (rather than rice), re-
ducing growth by 25 and 15 percent, respectively, between 1976 and 1995. These results 
support the evidence contained in Huang and Rozelle (1995), namely that environmental 
stress is having an important impact on agricultural yields. This means that sector officials 
may need to be more concerned about reducing the adverse consequences of environmental 
stresses, even if their primary goal is food production. 
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Table 4.9  Water-caused land erosion area in China, 1973-1996 
 
 
Year  Water-eroded land area  Percentage of water-eroded  
 (1000  km
2)  area in total land 
   (1) 
 
 
1973 1176.50  12.3 
1974 1165.19  12.1 
1975 1196.30  12.5 
1976 1192.02  12.4 
1977 1187.74  12.4 
1978 1183.46  12.3 
1979 1181.72  12.3 
1980 1183.04  12.3 
1981 1203.33  12.5 
1982 1208.97  12.6 
1983 1203.43  12.5 
1984 1210.37  12.6 
1985 1292.23  13.5 
1986 1310.77  13.7 
1987 1320.18  13.8 
1988 1338.06  13.9 
1989 1348.30  14.0 
1990 1364.00  14.2 
1991 1623.02  16.9 
1992 1626.21  16.9 
1993 1630.40  17.0 
1994 1630.45  17.0 
1995 1630.47  17.0 
1996 1826.64  19.0 
 
 
Note: Interview with officials from the Ministry of Water Resources revealed that the statistics on eroded 
land (soil) areas reported by the Ministry are water-eroded land area. Wind-eroded land or soil areas are not 
included. 
Source: Ministry of Water Resources, various publications. 
 
 
4.4 Scenario  Formulations 
 
The purpose of this section is to formulate scenarios for projection and to provide key as-
sumptions underlining various scenarios. We project China's food economy in the early 
21st century under four alternative sets of scenarios: a baseline run (WTO accession) with 
alternative income growths; the scenarios with different assumptions on agricultural R&D 
investment; the scenarios with different assumptions on irrigation investment; and the sce-
narios with alternative soil improvements (erosion and salinity control). We formulate 
WTO accession as the baseline because China joined the WTO in December 2001. The 
baseline year is 2001 and the projection periods are 2001-2010 and 2011-2020. A complete 
detailing of the structural elasticities used in CAPSiM is available on request. 
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4.4.1 Baseline Scenario 
 
On the demand side, based on the discussions in the previous section, the major factors af-
fecting food consumptions are population growth, rural to urban migration (or 
urbanization), income growth, and demand responses to price, income, and market devel-
opment (or demand elasticities). On supply side, the major factors considered in the 
projection include agricultural technology, irrigation, environment factors (i.e., erosion and 
salinity), and production responses to inputs and output prices.  
 
4.4.1.1 Demand  Shifters 
 
Population growth. Population and income growth will remain an important determinant 
of food balance in the future. Population growth peaked in China in the late 1960s / early 
1970s. Since then, fertility rates and the natural rate of population growth have begun to 
fall. Throughout the 1990s, the annual population growth rate was only 1 percent (Table 
4.10). Relying on the UN's demographic predictions, the nation's population will increase 
from 1.27 billion in 2001 to 1.36 billion in 2010 – an annual growth rate of 0.72 percent 
(Table 4.10). This rate of growth is considered moderate, as the annual population growth 
rate was only 0.70 percent in 2001 (NSBC, 2002). According to the UN's projection, while 
the population will continue to grow after 2010, the annual growth rate will decline to 0.60 
in 2011-2020, a level above the recent projections made by China's demographers. By 
2020, China's population will reach about 14.5 billion.  
 
Table 4.10  Annual growth rate (%) of population and income in recent years and assumptions for 2001-2020 
 Recent  period    Projection  period 
 1991-2000    2001-2010  2011-2020 
Population 1.0    0.72  0.60 
      
Per capita real income: baseline 







- Urban  6.9    6.0  5.0 
      
Per capita real income: low growth 







- Urban  6.9    5.0  4.0 
      
Per capita real income: high growth 







- Urban  6.9    7.0  6.0 
Note: Population estimates are based on United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2002, (New York, 
NY: United Nations, 2002).   146
Urbanization. China's urban sector has expanded rapidly. For example, the share of the 
urban population increased from 27 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 2000. Based on the 
population projections made by the UN (2002), urbanization will continue to expand. The 
shares of urban population will increase from 36 percent in 2000 to 44 percent in 2010, and 
to 51 percent in 2020 (Table 4.11). Because the consumption patterns in urban areas differ 
considerably from those of rural residents (Huang & David, 1993; Huang & Bouis, 2001), 
we expect that urbanization will have significant impacts on the national food demand in 
the coming decades. 
 
Income growth. Given the past trends of urban and rural income growth and recent gov-
ernment concerns about the growing income gap between rural and urban (Chapter 2), we 
assume that the growth of income in urban and rural areas will gradually converge over 
time in the next two decades. We also assume that the growth rates in the future will be 
lower than they were in the 1990s. Under the baseline, per capita real income growth rate 
is assumed to be 5 percent and 4.5 percent in rural areas for the periods 2001-2010 and 
2011-2020, respectively (Table 4.10). In the urban areas, the corresponding figures are 6.0 
percent and 5.0 percent, respectively. The impacts of a 1 percent higher or lower growth 
rate are also simulated to check the sensitivity of the projections to the alternative income 
growth assumptions (Table 4.10). 
 
Market development. Market development has had significant impacts on food consump-
tion in China (Huang & Rozelle, 1998). Recent changes in the urban economy have made 
urban consumers almost entirely dependent on markets for their consumption needs. In this 
sector, prices and income changes will most likely be the fundamental force driving con-
sumption pattern changes. Rural residents live in a different environment than their urban 
counterparts, and exhibit different demand behavior. Farmers in many areas face limited 
choices in their consumption decisions since many of the products they desire on a daily 
basis - such as meat and fresh fruit – are not always available, even as their incomes rise. 
Even with rapid changes in rural markets, in 2000 China's farmers still purchased only 41 
percent of their food (Table 4.11). As markets develop and activity on rural consumption 
markets increases, apart from changes in income and prices, consumption patterns will be 
affected. In this study, we assume that China's farmers will purchase 70 percent and 80 
percent of their food in 2010 and 2020, respectively (Table 4.11). 
 
 
Table 4.11  Urbanization and rural food market development in 1990 and 2000, and assumptions for  
  2001-2020 
  Previous period    Projection period 
 1990 2000 2010 2020
Population share (%) 
- Urban  27 36 44 51
- Rural  73 64 56 49
 
Rural food market development 
(% of food purchased from market) 
45 59 70 80
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4.4.1.2 Supply  Shifters 
 
Following the discussion in Chapter 2 and in Section 3 of this chapter, supply will respond 
most sharply to new technology and irrigation investment, and to some extent to environ-
mental factors, such as erosion and salinity control. 
 
Agricultural research investment. In the past 20 years, agricultural research investment 
in real terms grew by about 4 percent annually. As discussed in the previous section, the 
growth has fluctuated over time. The annual growth rate of investment slowed down in 
1985-95 to only 3.6 percent. But the high growth rate resumed after the late 1990s (Table 
4.5). The recent recovery in research investments, together with the experience of other 
Asian countries and China's commitment to a strong domestic grain economy, leads to the 
expectation that China will sustain its recent upturn in investment funding over the long 
run. Moreover, with China's membership of the WTO and the recent concern about the 
country's future food security under a more trade-liberalized environment, the government 
has been convinced that agricultural productivity can be boosted considerably by investing 
in R&D. 
  Under the baseline, we assume that the annual growth rate of crop research expendi-
ture (excluding the livestock sector) in real terms will be 5 percent in 2001-2020, which is 
slightly higher than that in the 1990s (average 4.7 percent in 1991-99). But given the sig-
nificant increase in agricultural research expenditure from the government in recent years, 
an annual growth rate of 5 percent should not be considered too high. 
 
Irrigation investment. Public irrigation expenditures financed a large part of the construc-
tion of the national water control network. The investment in irrigation facilities has been 
by far the largest component of total construction investment in agriculture, and is several 
times larger than the investment in agricultural research. Changing agricultural strategies 
and periods of fiscal control, however, have made public expenditure on water control fol-
low a more variable path (Figure 4.1). 
  Under our baseline, we assume that the growth of irrigation investment will continue. 
The annual growth rate will remain at 4.5 percent in 2001-2020. This growth rate is higher 
than the average growth rate in the past 30 years, but lower than the rates that have been 
achieved since the late 1990s.  
 
Land erosion and salinity. Trends in environmental degradation – including erosion, 
salinization, and loss of cultivated land – show that considerable stress may be being put 
on the agricultural land base. Recognizing the seriousness of soil erosion problems in re-
cent years, China's leaders have begun organizing a national effort to rectify soil erosion. 
Anti-erosion efforts include afforestation programs, improved pasture management 
schemes, terracing projects, silt dam construction, and policies that encourage the removal 
of vulnerable land from cultivation (e.g., the 'Green for Grain' program
1). The government 
has also been developing varieties of programs that aim at controlling the salinization 
                                                 
1 This is a large national program aimed at transferring the use of sloped land from agriculture to forestry. 
The program was implemented in 1999.    148
problem in major salinized regions. These include improving the irrigation and drainage 




Table 4.12  The annual growth rates (%) of agricultural research investment, irrigation expenditure, and  
    areas of erosion and salinized land in recent years and assumptions for 2001-2020 
 
 
  Recent period in 1990s
 a) Projection  period 
    
   2001-2010  2011-2020 
 
 
Crop research investment 
  - Low    3.0  3.0 
  - Baseline  4.7  5.0  5.0 
  - High    7.0  7.0 
 
Irrigation investment 
  - Low    2.5  2.5 
  - Baseline  n/a  4.5  4.5 
  - High    6.0  6.0 
 
Erosion area 
  - Low    0.5  0.25 
  - Baseline  1.5  1.0  0.5 
  - High    2.0  1.0 
 
Salinized land area 
  - Low    0.1  0.05 
  - Baseline  0.2  0.2  0.1 
  - High    0.4  0.2 
 
 




  While the growth rate of eroded land increased by about 1 percent in the 1980s, re-
cent efforts to control erosion by the government has reduced the erosion area expansion to 
about 0.2-0.8 percent, and the efforts to control salinization have kept the growth of the sa-
line area to a very low level (0.2 percent annually). Our baseline assumes a moderate 
increase but a declining annual growth (1 percent in 2001-2010 and 0.5 percent in 2011-
2020) in the area of eroded land. For the salinized area, the rate of growth in the 1990s (0.2 
percent) is assumed for 2001-2010, and declines to 0.1 percent only in 2011-2020 (Table 
4.12). 
 
4.4.1.3 Trade  Liberalization 
 
Under our baseline, the current tariff rates and non-tariff barriers are assumed to change in 
2002-2010. For those agricultural commodities that have positive nominal protection rates   149
(NPRs; see Chapters 2 and 5 for details), their prices are assumed to decline as China 
changes its policies to meet its commitments resulting from WTO accession. These com-
modities include wheat, maize, other course grains, soybean, edible oils, and sugar crops 
(see Chapter 2). The prices of other commodities such as rice, vegetables, fruits, livestock 
products (except milk), and fish are expected to rise with China's WTO accession. 
  To incorporate the results of the study on NPR presented in Chapter 2 into CAPSiM 
and to formulate our baseline on the protection rates in the baseline year (2001), we 
slightly adjusted the figures on NPRs, as the figures presented in Chapter 2 are NPRs in 
October 2001. The adjustments are based on the price trends of both domestic and interna-
tional prices in the entire year of 2001.  
  Table 4.13 summarizes the NPRs of major agricultural commodities in the baseline 
year (2001) and the assumed NPRs in 2005 and 2010. In the period 2002-2005, the nomi-
nal protection rates of all agricultural products will fall by 50 percent (after deducting the 
difference in VAT between import and domestic products for importable commodities, and 
adding the costs related to SPS for exportable commodities). Trade liberalization is ex-
pected to continue after 2005. We assume that the remaining border distortion will be 
further reduced by half in 2010 over 2005. It is expected that the increase in agricultural 
import will increase and the increase in export will lower the international market prices. 
This is not taken into account because the CAPSiM model is a country model. The impacts 
of China's trade liberalization on the world market prices are examined through its linkage 
with GTAP model, which is discussed in Chapter 3. See also Chapter 5. 
  The fertilizer price is assumed to decline by 1 percent in 2002-2005 (as the import 
tariff is lowered, following China's WTO accession) and then to be constant for the re-
mainder of the projection period. The opportunity costs of land for crop production are 
assumed to grow by 1.5 percent in 2002-2005, by 1 percent in 2006-2010, and by 1 percent 
in 2011-2020. The opportunity costs of labor for the whole agricultural sector are also as-
sumed to increase by 1 percent throughout the projection period. 
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Table 4.13  NPRs of agricultural commodities in 2001 and assumptions in 2005 and 2010 
 
 
  NPRs in  Import:   Export:  NPRs 
 2001  VATi -VATd SPS  ompliance  
         2005  2010 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
 
 
Rice (export + import)  -3.3      -1.6  -0.8 
Wheat 12.0  3.0    4.5  2.3 
Maize: export (w/ subsidy)  30.0    0.0  15.0  7.5 
Maize: import  20.0  3.0    8.5  4.3 
Sweet potato  5.0  3.0    1.0  0.5 
Potato 10.0  3.0    3.5  1.8 
Other course grain  5.0  3.0    1.0  0.5 
Soybean 15.0  3.0    6.0  3.0 
Rapeseed 27.0  7.0    10.0  5.0 
Sugar: high quality  40.0  7.0    16.5  8.3 
Sugar: medium quality  25.0  7.0    9.0  4.5 
Cotton 17.0  3.0    7.0  3.5 
Vegetables -10.0    4.0  -3.0  -1.5 
Fresh Fruit  -10.0    4.0  -3.0  -1.5 
Pork -27.0    8.0  -9.5  -4.8 
Poultry -17.0    4.0  -6.5  -3.3 
Beef -10.0    4.0  -3.0  -1.5 
Mutton -5.0    4.0  -0.5  -0.3 
Egg -4.0    4.0  0.0  0.0 
Milk: products  30.0  7.0    11.5  5.8 
Fish -15.0    4.0  -5.5  -2.8 
 
 
Note: (2) is the estimated difference between value added tax rate (%) on import and domestic products. (3) 
is the costs related to prices (%) to meet SPS. (4) = [(1)-(2)-(3)]/2; (5)=(4)/2. 
 
4.4.2 Alternative Scenarios 
 
High and Low Agricultural Research Investment. Under high and low productivity 
growth scenarios, all assumptions embodied in the baseline are maintained except for the 
assumptions on the growth of agricultural research investment. Previous studies show that 
China's ability to feed its growing population, maintain its current high level of national 
food security, and keep its agricultural sector healthy will highly depend on whether the 
country can continuously generate the technologies that reduce the cost of agricultural pro-
duction and increase agricultural productivity.  
  In order to see how agricultural production, consumption, and trade are affected by 
agricultural research investment policies, the high productivity growth scenario assumes an 
improvement in crop productivity, due to an increase of the annual growth rate of agricul-
tural research expenditure in crop sector from 5 percent (the baseline assumption) to 7 
percent throughout the projection period (Table 4.12). The low productivity growth sce-
nario assumes that the annual growth rate of crop research expenditure will decline from 5 
percent in the baseline to 3 percent.    151
High and Low Irrigation Investment. Investment in agricultural infrastructure, especially 
irrigation, has been an important determinant of China's agricultural growth in recent dec-
ades. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) and the Long-Term Economic 
Development Plan also call for substantial increase in public investment in water control. If 
this is realized, it is likely that China will invest more in irrigation than we assume in the 
baseline (4.5 percent annual growth of irrigation expenditure). On the other land, China has 
been facing increasing financial stress and it is not unlikely that the investment in irrigation 
might fall if the domestic policy moves from productivity-enhanced investment to domes-
tic price or income support policies. To explore the role of irrigation investment in 
agricultural production and trade, we add two alternative annual growth rates of irrigation 
investment: the high growth scenario - which assumes the average annual growth rate of ir-
rigation investment will reach 6 percent in 2001-2020 – and the low growth scenario, 
which assumes 3 percent (Table 4.12). 
 
High and Low Expansion of Eroded and Salinized Land. To test the sensitivity of our 
baseline assumptions on erosion and salinity, we developed two alternative scenarios: dou-
bled rates of growth in erosion and salinity are assumed for unsustainable use of 
agricultural land, and 50 percent of baseline growth rate is assumed for much more effort 
to control the erosion and salinity problems in the future (Table 4.12).  
 
 
4.5  The Results of Baseline Projections 
 
The purpose of this section is to report the projection results of the three sets of scenarios 
discussed in the previous section based on a projection model developed at the Center for 
Chinese Agricultural Policy (CCAP), namely the Agricultural Policy Simulation and Pro-
jection Model (CAPSiM). 
 
4.5.1 Baseline Scenario 
 
Our baseline projections show that the national average of China's per capita food grain 
consumption will decline throughout the projection period. But the trends differ between 
rural and urban consumers. In rural areas, per capita food grain consumption will decline 
after peaking in 2010 (225 kg; Table 4.14), while it has been declining since the mid 1980s 
and will continue to decline in the next two decades. Rising income will not lead to an in-
crease in food grain consumption in urban areas, simply because the income elasticity of 
demand for all grains (rice, wheat, maize, and other coarse grains) are negative. In rural ar-
eas, the negative income elasticities of demand for rice and wheat are also estimated to be 
negative after 2010. The decline of per capita grain consumption in urban areas combined 
with the rapid urbanization, decreases the national average per capita consumption. 
 
   152
Table 4.14.  Projections of per capita major food consumption (kg) under baseline scenario, 2001-2020 
 
 




Grain 221  225  219 
  Cereal  214  218  212 
   - Rice  105  106  104 
 - Wheat  85  92  92 
  - Other  24  20  16 
Edible oil  6  9  10 
Sugar 1.8  2.4  2.9 
Vegetables   182  216  246 
Fruit 26  33  40 
Pork 21  25  29 
Beef 1.0  1.4  1.8 
Mutton 1.2  1.6  1.9 
Poultry 6  8  10 
Fish 7  10  13 
 
Urban: 
Grain 120  112 104 
   Cereal   107  98  90 
   - Rice  58  53  49 
 - Wheat  44  41  38 
  - Other  5  4  3 
Edible oil  8  11  13 
Sugar 3  4  5 
Vegetables   196  234  262 
Fruit 72  88  105 
Pork 32  37  42 
Beef 5  7  8 
Mutton 2  3  4 
Poultry 12  16  20 
Fish 21  27  33 
 
 
Note: Grain includes rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, and other course grain 
Source: Authors' projection 
 
 
  In contrast, the per capita demand for meat and all non-staple foods (non-grain 
foods) is forecast to increase throughout the projection period. Except for vegetables and 
pork, the consumptions of most non-staple foods in both rural and urban areas will increase 
by 60-80 percent in the next two decades (Table 4.14). In the same period, per capita vege-
table and pork consumption will increase by about 25 percent and 35 percent, respectively. 
The relatively lower growth of per capita vegetable and pork consumption is due to the 
higher consumption level of vegetables (182 kg in rural and 196 kg in urban areas) and 
pork (21 kg in rural and 32 kg in urban areas) (Table 4.14). Although the consumption of 
other meats (i.e., except pork) will grow more rapidly, the consumption will still be small 
even by 2020. For example, per capita beef, mutton, and poultry consumption are projected 
to be 1.8 kg, 1.9 kg, and 10 kg, respectively, in rural areas in 2020; combined (13.7 kg),   153
this is less than today's consumption of pork by rural people (21 kg in 2001) and about half 
of the pork consumption in 2020 (Table 4.14). It is worth noting that the projected increase 
in fish consumption is more than the increase in aggregate meat consumption, a food trend 
that has existed in the Far East region since the 1960s (i.e., Japan, South Korea, and Tai-
wan). The consumption of other foods, such as edible oils, sugar, and vegetables, also 
increases over time.  
  Both income growth and urbanization are major driving forces. The income elastic-
ities of meat and other foods range from 0.4 to 0.7 in 2001-2020 and from 0.2 to 0.6 in 
2011-2020 in both rural and urban areas. As more people living in urban areas and urban 
consumers have a higher level of non-staple food consumption, the national average con-
sumption of non-staple foods is projected to increase with urbanization.  
  The projected increase in meat demand will stimulate aggregate feed grain demand. 
Baseline projections of the supply of grain show that although China's domestic total grain 
production will increase from 388 million metric tons (mmt) in 2001 to 438 mmt in 2010, 
and to 460 mmt in 2020 (2
nd row, Table 4.1), it falls below the domestic grain consump-
tion. Consequently, grain net imports will rise to 44 mmt in 2010 and continue to expand to 
56 mmt in 2020. Despite this high level of grain import, grain self-sufficiency will still re-
main as high as 90 percent in the early 21st century. While this level of import is more than 
the government's target (95 percent self-sufficiency), it is not unexpected as China is a very 
land-scarce country (in terms of per capita land).  
  Indeed, for food grains (rice and wheat) that have the most significance for national 
food security, baseline projection shows that net import will be minimal in the future. With 
the gradual opening of the Far East japonica rice market (including Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan), China will be the major beneficiary of rice trade liberalization. Its export will 
increase from the current less than 2 mmt to about 2 mmt in 2010, and then to as high as 8 
mmt in 2020. Since it peaked in the late 1980 (at about 15 mmt), the wheat import has been 
declining (except for 1995 when China's food prices increased by over 40 percent in just 
one year). In 1999-2001, the annual wheat import was less than 1 mmt. Baseline projection 
indicates that while the wheat import will increase in the next decade, the annual import 
will be less than 10 mmt until 2010 (Table 4.14). The wheat import, however, will decline 
after 2010. The projected declining wheat import after 2010 comes from the declines in 
both population growth (Table 4.10) and per capita wheat consumption (Table 4.14), and a 
moderate growth of wheat yield in the coming decades.  
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Table 4.15  Projections of grain production, demand, and net imports under baseline scenario,  
  2001-2020 
 
 





 a) (mmt, rice in paddy)  441  496  521 
Production
 a) (mmt, rice in milled form)  388  438  460 
 Net import (mmt)  -5  44  56 
   - Rice   -1.6  -2  -8 
   - Wheat  0.7  10  5 
   - Maize  -6  34  57 
 Stock change (mmt)  -33  0  0 
 Demand (mmt)  415  482  516 
  Food  233  240  233 
  Feed   126  181  216 
  Others
 b) 56  61  66 
 Grain self-sufficiency (%)  101  91  89 
 
 
a) Grain includes rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, and other course grain. Grain production is re-
ported in two alternatives, as rice is measured in both paddy rice (consistent with the official statistics) and 
milled rice (consistent with all other statistics reported in this chapter). The conversion rate is 1kg paddy = 
0.7 kg milled rice.  
b) 'Others' includes seed, industrial use, and waste. 
Source: Authors' projection. 
 
 
  Baseline projection indicates that the increasing grain import is nearly entirely from 
increasing feed demand, particularly maize. While maize production will continue to in-
crease - and indeed increase more than rice and wheat (not shown in the tables) – in the 
next two decades, it will fall much below domestic feed grain demand as demand for live-
stock (both domestic an export demands) grows. In 2001, China used 126 mmt grain as 
feed (Table 4.15), of which 78 percent was maize (CAPSiM database). At this level of feed 
demand, feed accounted for only 30 percent of total grain demand in China. With only a 3 
percent increase in food grain demand in 2010 over 2001 (from 233 to 240 mmt), feed 
grain demand is projected to increase from 126 mmt in 2001 to 181 mmt in 2010 (Table 
4.15), which will account for nearly 38 percent of total grain consumption in China. After 
2010, all increase in domestic grain production is to meet the increasing feed demand, as 
total food grain consumption will decline in the 2010s. By 2020, feed will account for 
about 42 percent of the total grain utilization in China. 
  The projected increase in feed demand causes domestic maize production to fall be-
low maize demand, which will lead China to import an increasing amount of maize from 
the international market. Baseline projections indicate that China will soon change its 
status as one of major maize exporters to that of a major maize importer after 2005. Maize 
import will reach 34 mmt in 2010 and further increase to 56 mmt in 2020 (Table 4.14). In-
creasing imports imply a decreasing self-sufficiency level. Baseline projections indicate 
that China will import 20 percent of its domestic maize demand from the international   155
market in 2010, and that the percentage will reach 28 percent in 2020 (or 72 percent self-
sufficiency; Table 4.16). 
 
 
Table 4.16  Self-sufficiency in major agricultural commodities under baseline scenario, 2001-2020 
 
 
 2001  2010  2020 
 
 
Rice 101  102  106 
Wheat 99  90  96 
Maize 105  80  72 
Soybean 61  64  60 
Edible oil crop  84  69  66 
Sugar 96  83  76 
Vegetables 101  103  104 
Fruit 100  105  107 
Cotton 100  94  86 
Pork 101  110  105 
Beef 100  98  96 
Mutton 99  96  95 
Poultry 99  106  105 
Milk 97  83  79 
Fish 105  110  107 
 
 
Source: Authors' projection. 
 
 
  Not only will self-sufficiency in maize decrease over time, but also most land-
intensive crops with positive income elasticities of demand will decline over the projection 
period. In the non-grain-crop sector (excluding horticulture), China will have to import 
large amount of products from the international market to meet the growing domestic de-
mand. For example, while China imported 26 percent (or 84 percent of the self-sufficiency 
level) of its edible oil consumption in 2001, this figure will rise to 31 percent in 2010 and 
to 34 percent in 2020. In other words, the self-sufficiency level in edible oil will fall from 
84 percent in 2001 to 69 percent in 2010, and to 66 percent in 2020 (Table 4.16). This con-
cerns soybean, rapeseed, and other edible oil crops. The impact has already been felt in the 
soybean sector. After the nearly complete liberalization of the country's soybean sector in 
the last three years, the import of soybean increased to over 10 mmt in 2000 and to 14 mmt 
in 2001 (NSBC, 2002); the figure in the mid 1990s was almost zero. Although we project 
that the soybean import will continue to increase in the coming years, the increase will be 
less than the increase in domestic demand, which will result in a slight improvement in the 
soybean self-sufficiency rate. By 2020, China will still need to import about 40 percent of 
the soybean demanded by the domestic market (Table 4.16). Sugar and cotton imports will 
also increase and their self-sufficiency levels will fall. The increase in the cotton import is 
mainly due to the rapid expansion of textile industry in the early 21
st century. 
  Baseline projections indicate that labor-intensive agricultural production will expand 
more than domestic demand. Trade liberalization will help China to boost its horticultural, 
livestock, and fishery sectors as the nominal protections of these products are negative   156
(Chapter 2 and Table 4.13). The increase in the prices of these products accompanying the 
rising productivity will enable China's production to exceed its demand in the coming 
years. Exports will increase.  
  Currently, China exports about 1 percent of its vegetable production to the world 
market, and has only minimal amount of fruit for exports. Baseline projections are that al-
though the domestic demand for both vegetables and fruits will increase with income 
growth, China will gradually become an important player in vegetable and fruit export 
markets. We project that about 3 percent of vegetable production in China will be exported 
in 2010, and that this share will increase to 4 percent in 2020. Fruit will enjoy an even 
higher rate. Although China currently is just about self-sufficient in fruit production, its 
export will account for 7 percent of domestic production by 2020.  
  In the livestock sector, the increases in domestic production nearly match the in-
creases in demand for beef and mutton. In the next 20 years, although the growth of the 
domestic production of beef and mutton will remain high, China will need to import 2-5 
percent of its beef and mutton from world markets to meet the increasing domestic demand 
(Table 4.16). However, the annual production growth rates of pork and poultry will exceed 
the demand growth. In the next 20 years, China will be able to export about 5-10 percent of 
its pork and 5-6 percent of its poultry to world markets (Table 4.16). Obviously, some of 
the meat export is due to China's willingness to import maize as is projected under the 
baseline. Cheaper maize and other feed from the world markets will help China to boost its 
livestock sector. 
  Fish has been the number one agricultural export commodity in China. Baseline pro-
jection shows that the export trend will continue in the future. Fish exports will expand. 
The export/production ratio will increase from the current 5 percent to a peak of 10 percent 
in 2010, and remain at 7-10 percent in 2010-2020 (Table 4.16) 
 
4.5.2 Alternative  Income  Growth  Scenarios 
 
Although most of the increases in food availability were mainly a result of China's domes-
tic production during the past 20 years (while China was experiencing its rapid economic 
growth), strong income growth has often been regarded as a warning message concerning 
China's ability to feed itself in the future (OECF, 1995; OECD, 1996; World Bank, 1997). 
Contrary to earlier pessimism about China's food economy, recent studies show that the 
country's ability to feed itself has been declining even under a more liberalized economy 
with higher economic growth (Rosegrant, 2001). For example, Huang et al. (2003) show 
that by the late 1990s, China had strengthened its ability to feed itself. Food, as a share of 
total imports, had fallen. Total exports far exceeded imports, and by the late 1990s China 
had accumulated the second largest foreign exchange reserves (after Japan). Although food 
imports increased (from 3 billion in the 1980s to 6-8 billion in the late 1990s), China 
needed only about 5 percent of its foreign exchange earnings to pay for them. Hence, im-
ports were playing a bigger role in supplementing national food supply. Its relative cost to 
the economy, however, was substantially lower.  
  In this section, we are examining one of the critical issues on whether the policy 
should concern the national food security (particularly grain) that might result from an 
even more rapid economic growth (high income growth scenario) in the future. On the   157
other hand, we are also trying to explore what the impact will be on China's food supply 
and demand balance if the country's economy does not grow as fast as the baseline as-
sumed - a situation that we call the low income growth scenario. The impacts of both high 
and low income growth scenarios on food consumption and food self-sufficiency levels 
were simulated with CAPSiM. The results are presented in Tables 4.17 and 4.18. 
 
 
Table 4.17  Projections of per capita major food consumption (kg) under alternative income growth sce-
narios, 2020 
  Per capita consumption 
(kg) 
  Percentage changes over baseline 
(%) 
 High  Low    High  Low 
Rural:          
Grain 221  219    0.6  0.1 
 Cereal  214  212   0.7  0.1 
  - Rice  105  104   0.7  -0.1 
 - Wheat  94  91   2.1  -1.2 
 - Other  15  17   -7.7  8.3 
Edible oil  11 9   8.1 -7.0 
Sugar  3 3   8.3 -7.9 
Vegetables   264 229    7.2  -6.7 
Fruit  44 37    9.9  -9.0 
Pork 32  27    8.6  -7.9 
Beef  1.9  1.6   10.9  -9.7 
Mutton  2.1  1.8   9.3  -8.8 
Poultry  11  8.5   11.5  -10.3 
Fish  45  11.4   10.9  -9.6 
          
Urban:          
Grain 103  107    -1.4  3.1 
 Cereal   88  94    -1.9  3.8 
  -- Rice  48  51    -1.6  3.7 
 - Wheat  37  42    -1.7  3.5 
 - Other  2.9  3.4   -8.3  8.9 
Edible oil  11 12    8.1  -5.8 
Sugar  5.3 4.5    7.1  -7.3 
Vegetables   277 248    5.8  -5.2 
Fruit  112 98    7.1  -6.8 
Pork 45  40    6.3  -6.0 
Beef  9.2  7.7   9.3  -8.6 
Mutton  3.8  3.2   8.3  -7.7 
Poultry  22  17.8   9.9  -9.1 
Fish  36  30.2   9.2  -6.9 
Note: Grain includes rice, wheat, maize, sweet potato, potato, and other course grain. 
Source: Authors' projection.   158
  Our analyses show that changes in income growth assumptions have very minimal 
impacts on grain production, consumption, and trade. Under the high income growth sce-
nario, the per capita meat consumption in both rural and urban areas in 2020 will be about 
10 percent higher than those of the baseline projection for the same year. Additional 
growth in income does not lead to any meaningful changes in food grain demand. This 
should be expected as income elasticities are either nearly zero or negative in the projec-
tion period. In fact, an increase in urban consumers' income would result in a decline in 
food grain demand (Table 4.17). While per capita food grain consumption will increase 
with higher income growth in rural areas, changes are minimal. 
  Earlier studies (i.e., OECF, 1995; Huang et al., 1999) claimed that a rapid growth of 
the economy would lead to a higher growth of meat demand and therefore feed demand. 
Consequently, grain supply and demand balance could worsen and grain imports would 
rise strongly, even though food grain demand would not increase. This may be partially 
true as demand for meat increases with income growth, which is also confirmed by our 
analyses (Table 4.17).  
 
 
Table 4.18  Self-sufficiency in agricultural commodities under alternative income growth scenarios  
  in  2020 
 
 
  High income  Baseline  Low income 
  growth scenario  growth scenario 
 
 
Grain 88  89  90 
Cereal   89  89  89 
- Rice  106  106  105 
- Wheat  96  96  96 
- Maize  71  72  73 
Soybean 56  60  65 
Edible oil crop  62  66  70 
Sugar 74  76  79 
Vegetables 99  104  109 
Fruit 100  107  114 
Pork 99  105  114 
Beef 87  96  105 
Mutton 88  95  103 
Poultry 96  105  116 
Milk 73  79  87 
Fish 97  107  118 
 
 
Source: Authors' projection. 
 
 
  However, the earlier studies did not fully consider the dynamics of China's agricul-
tural economy and the linkage between domestic meat demand and export. High-income 
growth increases domestic meat demand, which also leads to higher meat prices. Under a 
more open economy, higher meat prices also imply that China's livestock products are less 
competitive in the international markets. Meat export declines with higher domestic meat 
demand. Table 4.18 shows that in 2020 China's pork self-sufficiency level would change   159
from 105 percent under baseline to 99 percent under a high-income growth scenario. China 
changes from being a major pork exporter to a pork importer. A similar result is found in 
the poultry and the fish sector (Table 6.18). For other livestock products (such as beef, 
mutton and milk), higher income growth will result in higher imports or an even lower 
self-sufficiency level. Because income growth will have impacts mainly on livestock de-
mand and trade, the grain economy will remain nearly the same under alternative income 
growths.  
  Alternative income growths are also found to have a significant impact on the con-
sumption and trade of edible oil, sugar, vegetables, and fruits. For these commodities, the 
high and the low income scenario will lead to a 7-10 percent increase or decrease, respec-
tively, in per capita consumption compared to the baseline projection (Table 4.17). Under 
the high income growth scenario, China will have to import some of its domestic demand 
for all food and agricultural products except for rice and vegetables (Table 4.18). Low in-
come growth could increase China's exports of meat and horticultural products, and reduce 
the imports of edible oils, sugar, and cotton, but this is clearly not a goal that China should 
pursue. 
  In sum, the alternative income growth scenario could result in significant changes in 
China's food demand and trade for nearly all commodities except grain. With the central 
goal of grain food security in the nation's agricultural policies, China should not be too 
concerned about the impacts of rapid income growth on national grain security: higher in-
come growth will boost meat demand, which will be offset by lower meat exports. The 
grain supply and demand balance will keep nearly stable, at about 90% in 2020.  
 
 
4.6  Alternative Productivity-enhanced Investment Scenarios 
 
4.6.1 Agricultural Research Investment 
 
Before presenting our simulation results, it is worth explaining how the impacts of agricul-
tural research and irrigation investment on agricultural production are estimated. Because 
our assumptions on the alternative crop productivity growth scenarios are based on the 
changes in agricultural research investment growth rate in 2002-2020, the impacts will not 
occur in the early years of the projection period. This is shown by how the research stocks 
are generated based on the research expenditure:  
 
 
where Stockt is the research stock in year t, Expenditure t-k the research expenditure in 
year t-k, and α(t-k) the timing weight for accumulation of new research expenditures to the 
stock of research. Under the CAPSiM framework, the timing weights α(t-k) accumulate 
the previous 17 years' investment into current research stock and are based on an empirical 
study in Indonesia by Pardey et al. (1992). The values of the α(t-k) are: 0.0 (for Expendi-
ture in year t), 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.010, 0.061, 0.086, 0.112, 0.142, 0.137, 0.120, 0.091, 0.079, 
0.071, 0.051, 0.030, and 0.010 (for Expenditure in year t-17).  
Stock t = ∑ n k =0 α(t-k) Expenditure t-k   160
  Because of lags, the increase in investment in the early years will not have impacts 
on agriculture in the early projection period, and the investment after the early 2010s will 
not come to a full effect before 2020. However, there are a number of other alternatives 
that could boost China's agricultural productivity growth in the short run, such as invest-
ment in agricultural extension and improvement in the seed distribution system. Therefore 
the results presented below should be considered as the impacts that represent a lower limit 
of R&D policy effect. 
  The results of simulations show that agricultural research could play important roles 
in increasing domestic production and China's agricultural comparative advantage in the 
world market. Under the high research investment scenario (7 percent annual growth of 
crop research expenditure vs. 5 percent under the baseline), for example, grain and sugar 
production in 2020 will increase by 1 percent (1
st column, Table 4.19). The impacts of ag-
ricultural research investment on other crops are even greater. The differences in 
production between low and high research investment scenarios will range from 2 percent 
for sugar to 3.4 percent for soybean and edible oils, and to 5.2 percent for fruit. Soybean 
and edible oil crops will gain more from the technological change mainly due to the far 
less progress achieved in the past 20 years. Therefore the potential gains are expected to be 
larger than for such other crops as rice and wheat that have high yields in the baseline year.  
  An increase in production from higher crop research investment will reduce grain 
imports and increase grain self-sufficiency levels in 2020 from 89 percent of the baseline 
to 90 percent, while the low agricultural research investment scenario will increase imports 
by about 1 percent of domestic consumption compared to the baseline (Table 4.18, and 2
nd 
column of Table 4.19). For other crops, the increases in crop self-sufficiency levels are 
even higher, ranging from about 2 percent for soybean to 3 percent for fruits. 
  The significance of the impact can be clearly demonstrated by comparing the costs 
and benefits of research investment. An additional 2 percent increase in total crop research 
expenditure costs less than 36 billion Yuan (in 2000 constant price) in the entire projection 
period of 2001-2020. However, return on this investment will be as high as over 40 billion 
Yuan in 2020 (in just that one year). 
  Food security has been and will continue to be one of the central goals of China's 
policy. While food security has many dimensions, one of the targets set by the Chinese 
government in the late 1990s was to achieve a grain self-sufficiency level of over 95%. Al-
though this level of grain self-sufficiency has since been widely debated, any changes - 
including trade liberalization - that could result in the grain self-sufficiency level falling in 
the long term far below 95% would be hardly adopted by the current government if there 
are no alternative solutions available. The results of our simulation indicate that this high 
level of grain security will be achieved in the next 20 years only if China's investment in 
agricultural research growth at annual rate of over 12 percent (the results are not shown in 
Table 4.19).  
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Table 4.19  Production of and self-sufficiency in major crop commodities with alternative assumptions  
    on crop research and irrigation investments in 2020 
  Agricultural research    Irrigation investment 
 High Low   High Low 
   
Percentage production changes (%) over the baseline 
 
Grain   1.0  -1.0    1.8  2.3 
Cereal  1.0 -0.9    1.8 -2.2 
-  Rice  0.8 -0.8    1.0 -1.3 
- Wheat  1.1 -1.1    1.7 -2.1 
- Maize  1.1 -1.1    2.6 -3.2 
Soybean  1.7 -1.7    3.1 -3.8 
Edible oil crop  1.7 -1.7    4.3 -5.3 
Sugar  1.0 -1.0    3.4 -4.1 
Vegetables  1.6 -1.6    3.9 -4.8 
Fruit  2.6 -2.6    5.5 -6.7 
Cotton  1.5 -1.5    3.3 -4.1 
   
Self-sufficiency (%) 
 
Grain    90 88   91 87 
Cereal    90 88   90 87 
-  Rice  107 105   107 105 
- Wheat  97 95   97 94 
- Maize  73 71   74 69 
Soybean  62 58   63 56 
Edible oil crop  67 65   69 62 
Sugar  77 76   79 73 
Vegetables  106 103   107 100 
Fruit  110 105   113 101 
Cotton  88 85   89 83 
Source: Authors' projection. 
 
 
4.6.2 Irrigation Investment 
 
Table 4.19 also presents the changes in China's crop production and self-sufficiency rates 
under alternative irrigation investment scenarios in 2020. Before proceeding to the discus-
sion on the impacts of irrigation investment on agricultural production and trade, we 
should bear in mind that the public investment in irrigation is more than 10 times higher 
than public crop research expenditure in the baseline year. Therefore the same percentage 
increase in irrigation and research expenditure makes a large difference in the expenditure 
in real terms. The high investment scenario assumes a 6 percent annual growth of irrigation 
expenditure, while under the low investment scenario it is assumed to be only 2.5 percent. 
The annual growth rate is 4.5 percent in the baseline simulation. 
  The high irrigation investment scenario generates a 4.1 percent (1.8 + 2.3) higher 
grain production than under the low irrigation investment scenario (last 2 columns, Table   162
4.19). Irrigation investment will have more impact on maize and wheat than on rice. This is 
because all rice is irrigated in China, while in many areas this is not the case for maize and 
wheat.  
Irrigation investment also has significant impacts on the production of other crops. The 
high investment scenario increases crop production by about 3-4 percent compared to the 
baseline, while the low irrigation investment scenario reduces crop production by 4-7 per-
cent.  
  Although the high irrigation investment scenario or the policies would ensure the 
higher level of grain and other crops self-sufficiency than the high research investment 
scenario, the higher costs related to the high irrigation scenario should also be considered. 
The other caution on the availability of water for agricultural production should be taken 
into account when we compare the irrigation investment scenario with the research invest-
ment scenario. In some areas (e.g., the North China Plain) additional investment in the 
water sector may not bring additional land under irrigation because of the scarcity of water.  
 
4.6.3 Agricultural Research and Irrigation Investment 
 
So far we have discussed the impacts of alternative assumptions of either crop research ex-
penditure or irrigation investment on crop production and trade or self-sufficiency. In this 
subsection, we explore the other alternatives that combine research and irrigation invest-
ment. We assume high research investment is accompanied by a high irrigation investment 




Table 4.20  Production of and self-sufficiency in major crop commodities with alternative assumptions on  
    crop research and irrigation investments in 2020 
 Percentage  production 
changes over the baseline (%) 
 Self-sufficiency 
(%) 
  High research  





 High  research  and 
irrigation  
investment 
Low research and  
irrigation investment 
          
Grain   2.86  -3.27    92  86 
Cereal 2.75  -3.14    91  86 
- Rice  1.78  -2.05    108  104 
- Wheat  2.80 -3.18    98  93 
- Maize  3.72 -4.27    75  68 
Soybean  4.83 -5.46    65  55 
Edible oil crop  6.10 -6.87    70  61 
Sugar  4.36 -5.04    80  72 
Vegetables  5.54 -6.27    109 99 
Fruit  8.33 -9.16    115 98 
Cotton   4.87 -5.54    91  82 
Source: Authors' projection 
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  Several interesting points can be derived from Table 4.20. Under the baseline sce-
nario, while the grain self-sufficiency rate will decline over time, China will be able to 
achieve one of the major components of its food security target (grain self-sufficiency) in 
the future under high research and irrigation investment scenarios. Maize is the only grain 
that will fall below the self-sufficiency level of 95 percent in the long term. Even under 
this high-high scenario, the maize self-sufficiency rate will continue to decline signifi-
cantly from the current 100+ percent to about 75 percent 2020.  
  Table 4.20 also shows that the most effective policy that could improve China's food 
security and increase grain the self-sufficiency level in the long term is to increase the ag-
ricultural productivity enhancement investment, including both agricultural R&D and 
irrigation. For example, Table 4.20 shows that China could maintain its grain and wheat 
self-sufficiency at 92 percent and 98 percent, respectively, in the long term (after 2020) if 
the annual growth rate in agricultural research and irrigation investments is increased to 7 
percent and 6 percent, respectively.  
  The import of edible oils, sugar, and cotton could also be significantly reduced under 
the high investment scenario. The difference in production between high and low scenarios 
may reach 7 percent for grain and over 10 percent for edible oils, cotton, vegetables, and 
fruits.  
 
4.6.4 Alternative  Erosion  and Salinity Control Scenarios 
 
Table 4.21 presents the results of alternative scenarios on erosion and salinity control ef-
forts. Assuming a constant response of production to erosion and salinity as the level of 
environmental deterioration increases, moderate increases in their trends (e.g., an increase 
of 0.2 percent (i.e., from 0.2 to 0.4) percent for salinity and an increase of 1 percent (i.e., 
from 1 to 2 percent) for erosion in 2001-2010, see Table 4.12) have a large impact on crop 
output. Compared with other scenarios presented in Tables 4.19 and 5.20, the impact of 
environmental deterioration is quite substantial. 
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Table 4.21  Production of and self-sufficiency in major crop commodities with alternative assumptions on 
    erosion and salinity control in 2020. 
  Low growth scenario    High growth scenario 
   
Percentage changes (%) in production over the baseline 
 
Grain   0.92    -1.82 
Rice 0.34    -0.69 
Wheat  0.79   -1.57 
Maize  1.39   -2.73 
Soybean  1.62   -3.17 
Edible oil crop  1.74   -3.40 
Sugar  1.63   -3.17 
Vegetables  1.60   -3.13 
Fruit  1.60   -3.13 
   
Self-sufficiency (%) 
 
Grain   90    88 
Rice 106    105 
Wheat  97   95 
Maize  73   70 
Soybean  61   57 
Edible oil crop  67   64 
Sugar  78   74 
Vegetables  106   102 
Fruit  109   104 
Source: Authors' projection. 
 
 
4.7 Concluding  Remarks 
 
Significant changes have occurred in China's food consumption in the past, and it is ex-
pected that such changes will continue in the next 20 years. Over the past 20 years, China 
has had the ability to feed its growing population, despite the changing consumption pat-
terns during this period of reform. Increased domestic food and agricultural supply is 
almost entirely responsible for increasing the nation's demand for food and agricultural 
products. China's experience demonstrates the importance of technological development, 
institutional change, price and market liberalization, rural economic development, and 
other conducive policies in improving agricultural productivity, farmer income, and food 
security in a nation with limited land and other natural resources. Technology has been one 
of major driving forces of productivity growth and the engine of China's agricultural econ-
omy development.  
  Our baseline projection shows that China will experience significant structural 
changes in its agricultural production in the coming decades. For such labor-intensive 
commodities as horticulture, livestock, and fishery, China's food self-sufficiency rates will 
increase over time despite the growing domestic demand for these products. However, the   165
imports of many land-intensive commodities such as feed grain, sugar, edible oils, and cot-
ton will increase significantly in the coming decades. The trade liberalization will facilitate 
these trends. 
  The future import levels of some commodities such as maize, sugar, and edible oils 
under our baseline are substantial and might be considered as reasonable for the world's 
most populous country with such a land shortage, but some of them might not be accept-
able to the country's leaders, who regard food security in general and food self-sufficiency 
in particular as the central goal of food and agricultural policies. Indeed, the new national 
leaders who took over their responsibilities in early 2003 have been trying to establish ef-
fective ways for China to improve its agricultural competitive position and to maintain 
high food security in the coming years.  
  Limited options to increase food supplies, however, intensify the challenge of meet-
ing China's food security target for many land-intensive commodities. Decollectivization 
and fiscal reform have already been tapped for most of their gains. Fiscal constraints may 
preclude leaders from implementing some of the planned policies. The nation's budget cri-
ses, above all, bind the hands of officials even if many public investments promise high 
returns. Chronic budget shortfalls and looming trade agreements also effectively shut off 
the option of using East Asian-style price policies to maintain production levels.  
  When countries near input plateaus, further growth in output must begin to rely more 
on technological change. The country has less than 10 percent of the world's arable land 
and only 25 percent of the world's per capita water availability, but feeds more than 20 
percent of the world's population. To keep pace with increased demands from projected 
population increases, food production in China will have to increase with fewer alterna-
tives. Given the limited amount of arable land, productivity increases will have to be the 
primary source of increases in output. 
  The constraints imposed on leaders by resource scarcity and politico-economic reali-
ties increase the need to understand the scope for supply expansion from one of the most 
important sources of past supply growth, namely investments in agricultural productivity, 
and particularly in agricultural technology and irrigation. Improved technology has been by 
far the largest factor behind agricultural production growth, and as such is a major source 
of increased food availability in China. The analyses and results presented in this chapter 
and in our various recent studies establish a basis for China's leaders and policy makers to 
confidently invest in the nation's agricultural research system.  
  On the other hand, the enormous increase in the quantity and the diversity of food 
production has come at tremendous environmental cost. Many analyses reveal that most of 
the trends in the management of agricultural resources are going in the wrong direction for 
the sustainability of the agrifood system, namely the erosion of cultivated land; the salinity 
of irrigated land; the depletion of groundwater aquifers; soil and water pollution from fer-
tilizers, pesticides, and livestock wastes; grassland degradation; and the burning of crop 
stubble. New technology alone is unlikely to reverse these trends. Policy and institutional 
changes that embody appropriate incentives and regulations for improved environmental 
management are needed.   166
Chapter 5  Projections of the Chinese economy:  
      the impact of agricultural and trade policies 




This chapter simulates the future development of China's food economy and its global im-
plications, under the assumption that no new policy measures are taken either within China 
or with regard to world trade policies. This simulation is the baseline scenario. The possi-
ble impacts of changes in trade policies are discussed in Chapter 6, and those in Chinese 
agricultural policies in Chapter 4. 
  We use the GTAP model as research instrument for the projection. The structure of 
this model and its adaptation to this project is described in Chapter 3. Here, this model is 
updated to the year 2001 (5.2). Next, assumptions are made for the simulations. An impor-
tant assumption is that recent policy decisions, China's accession to the WTO, and the 
phasing out of the Multi Fiber Agreement (MFA) are taken into account. These and other 
assumptions are discussed in section 5.3. The results of the simulations for China and for 
the world markets are presented in sections 5.4 and 5.5. The first-mentioned section deals 
with 2001-2005 and decomposes the simulated developments into economic growth in 
China and other internal developments, China's accession to the WTO, and the phasing out 
of the MFA. Section 5.5 deals with the changes during the entire period 2001-2020. The 
consequences of these changes for the EU are presented in section 5.6. Some conclusions 
are presented in the final section.  
 
 
5.2  The base year (2001) 
 
For this project we have regrouped regions and sectors of the GTAP database. These adap-
tations are described in the following section. This project's base year is 2001, while the 
last available year in the GTAP database is 1997. The updating of the database to 2001 is 
summarized in the following section. Part of the database deals with trade distortions. 
These distortions in the trade with China in 2001 are described in more detail in the final 
section. 
 
5.2.1 Sectors and regions  
 
The starting point for this study was version 5 (public release) of the GTAP database. This 
version's base year is 1997 (Dimaranan & McDougall 2002). The GTAP database contains 
detailed bilateral trade, transport, and protection data characterizing economic linkages 
among regions, accounting for intersectoral linkages among the 57 sectors in each of the 
65 regions. All monetary values are in USD million (see Chapter 3 for more detailed in-
formation). 
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For the purpose of this study, the GTAP database has been aggregated into 12 regions and 
17 sectors, and has been updated to the base year of this study (2001). The 12 regions are: 
- China  (Mainland) 
- Hong  Kong  (China) 
- Taiwan 
-  Japan and Korea 
- Southeast  Asia 
- Other  Asian  countries 
-  Australia and New Zealand 
- NAFTA  countries 
-  South and Central America 
-  European Union (15 Member States) 
-  Central European Associates 
-  Rest of the world 
 
More detailed information is given in Appendix 5.1 
 
The aggregation into 12 sectors is shown in Table 5.1 and more detailed information is 
given in Appendix 5.1  
 
 





Cgrains Coarse  grains 
Oilseeds  Soybeans & other oilseeds 
Sugar  Sugar (plants and processed) 
Pfb  Cotton & other plant-based fibers 
OthCrop  Horticulture & other crops 
Ctl  Beef (cattle and beef products) 
Oap  Pork & poultry 
Milk Milk  &  Diary 
Fish Fish 
Ofood  Other food products 
Extracts  Mining and extraction 
TexLea  Textiles, leather, and garments 
LabintMan Labor-intensive  manufacturing 






5.2.2 Updating of the database to 2001 
 
For all these sectors and regions, the 1997 data have been updated to the year 2001 with 
new data for the Chinese economy. We have incorporated an updated input-output table for 
China, which better reflects the size and input structure of agriculture (see Chapter 2). An   168
important feature of the new table is an improved estimate of primary factor cost shares in 
agriculture and improved estimates of crop yields. The new estimates use micro data from 
farm surveys conducted by a number of ministries led by the State Price Bureau. Another 
feature of the adjusted database is a drastic adjustment of agricultural trade data for China, 
which incorporates trade information for 2001. Between 1997 (the base year for GTAP 
version 5) and 2001, both the structure and the size of Chinese trade changed dramatically, 
and we have adjusted the GTAP data to reflect this. We have also incorporated economet-
ric estimates for income elasticities for livestock products, rice, and wheat (Huang & 
Rozelle, 1998). The updated estimates for income elasticities are lower than the original 
GTAP estimates, and are provided in Appendix 5.2. This concerns especially the medium-





























Figure 5.1  Self-sufficiency ratios, China (base situation 2001) 
Source: GTAP v5, calculations LEI. 
Note: self-sufficiency is defined as the domestic production:domestic absorption ratio. 
 
 
  One of the results of the updating is the self-sufficiency index.
1 This index illustrates 
the specialization pattern and indicates which activities present a country with a compara-
tive advantage (Figure 5.1). Those products of which China imports a large share of 
domestic consumption - such as in the oilseeds, sugar, cotton, oil (Extract), and capital-
intensive industries (CapintMan) - have a self-sufficiency ratio below 1. Here, we will see 
intensified competition with foreign suppliers and an increase in imports if trade barriers 
are lowered as a result of China's accession to the WTO.  
  On the other hand, the processed food industry (Ofood) and textile industries (Tex-
Lea) are clear net-export products, where self-sufficiency exceeds 1, indicating a 
comparative advantage in these products. To a lesser extent, other crops (horticulture) and 
                                                 
1 Self-sufficiency is defined as the domestic production:domestic absorption ratio.   169
fish are also net-export products. For all these sectors, access to foreign markets is impor-
tant.  
  The middle ground is occupied by those sectors in which China is approximately 
self-sufficient in production, namely where trade does not play a large role. Here, we can-
not expect a large impact from improved market access. The share of exports or imports 
in sales is often simply too low to yield a huge production impact from export or import 
growth. This applies especially to services, as well as to rice and the meat products. 
 
5.2.3 Agricultural trade distortions 
 
An important issue for the update of the database is the estimate of trade distortions in 
2001, that is, at the time when China joined WTO. In one of their background papers, 
Huang and Rozelle (2002) estimate a new set of national protection rates (NPRs) on the 
eve of China's accession to the WTO. In particular, they endeavor to understand in a more 
disaggregated way the part of certain markets (in terms of varieties or commodity type) 
that China is protecting. Such an analysis helps us to assess more accurately what the im-
pacts will be after China implements its WTO commitments. 
  Tables 5.2 and 5.3 summarize the major findings of Huang and Rozelle (2002). 
These findings are used as an estimate of the trade distortions in the GTAP database for the 
base year 2001. The results show that for some crops, China's WTO commitments will 
likely lead to a fall in prices and a increase in imports. Maize and cotton may be the most 
affected. It is possible that soybeans and sugar will be significantly affected in the longer 
run. There are also commodities in which China has considerable advantage (e.g., rice, 
meats, and horticulture products) and, hence, accession could benefit those engaged in 
these activities. The prospect of increased imports of feed grains (e.g., maize and soy-
beans) at lower prices means that livestock producers could become more competitive. 
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Estimated at official exchange rate a)
Rice Weighted  average      -3
    Thai jasmine rice  3690 446 380    17
   High quality japonica  2930 354   398  -11
   Medium quality indica  1519 184   185  -0.5
Wheat Weighted  average      12
   US DNS  2350 284 190    49
   Canadian  #3  1800 218 181    20
   Australian  soft  1625 196 175    12
   US hard red  1550 187 169    11
   UK  1350 163 145    12
   China - high quality  1350 163 145    12
   China - medium quality  1250 151 140    8
   China - low quality  1100 133 133    -0.1
Soybean Common  variety  1950 236 205    15
Maize Common  variety  1150 139   105  32
a) The estimated official exchange rate is 8.28 




Table 5.3  Average nominal protection rates (NPRs) for major imports and exports in China,  
  October  2001 

















 Maize  1150  32 
 Soybeans  1950  15 
 Cotton  9500  17 















a 11442  -30 
 Beef 
a 13743  -10 
 Poultry 
a 9904  -17 
 Fresh fruits  5472  -4 
a Average NPRs are created by adding the NPRs of individual varieties' weighting with the sown area (pro-
duction) share 
Source: Authors' survey.   171
  Table 5.4 shows how we arrive at the initial agricultural import protection estimates. 
Column 1 shows the nominal ad valorem tariff for grains. This is the very low in-quota tar-
iff, as tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were not binding in 2001. For other sectors, we use tariff 
estimates supplied by CCAP and the WTO accession documents. We add the difference in 
domestic taxes and VAT on imports.
1 Finally, we add an estimate of price increases result-
ing from State Trading Enterprises (STE) dominating the import market. 
  Table 5.3 shows the updated export protection rates for the base year 2001.  
 
 
Table 5.4  Agricultural import protection estimates for 2001
2 

















Rice  1 13 10 3 7
Wheat  1 13 10 0 4
Cgrains  1 13 10 26 30
Oilseeds  3 13 10 14 20
Sugar  40 17 10 0 47
Pfibers  8 15 13 -2(*) 8
OthCrop  16 15 10 0 21
Cattle  45 15 13 0 47
Oanimalp  20 15 13 0 22
Milk  25(**) 17 15 0 27
Fish  14 13 10 0 17
OthFood  30 15 13 0 32
*Some imports are duty-free. Included as an implicit subsidy here, ** average preferential rates. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Earlier NPR estimates used only the VAT on imports, but we consider this a wrong approach since the goal 
of the protection estimate is to estimate the price wedge between domestic produce and imports created by 
taxation and tariffs. China does not have a VAT system, but currently has a not very transparent taxation sys-
tem that taxes output and inputs at various stages along the production chain. The main visible taxation 
occurs in production, not in consumption. Nevertheless, the consumer/buyer is facing a tax burden on domes-
tic produce that must be taken into account in the protection estimates. It is a matter for fiscal experts to sort 
out exactly how big the tax burden on domestic produce is relative to imported products. For our baseline we 
use estimates supplied by CCAP for domestic taxes and VAT on imports. For example, for rice the domestic 
taxation component is estimated as: intermediate share * tax + income tax + turnover tax retail, leading to: 
l0.4*0.17 +(4653/249200)+0.01  
2 The aggregate ad valorem estimates in Table 5.4 have been converted to bilateral rates for each trade flow 
by proportional adjustments of the original bilateral estimates found in the GTAP database.   172
5.3  Macro-economic and policy assumptions 
 
5.3.1 Macro-economic variables 
 
The exogenous macro-economic assumptions on developments of factor endowments, 
growth in GDP, and population growth are from Walmsley et al. (2000). The macro as-
sumptions for Asia have been updated with information from Economic Outlook (Asian 
Development Bank). 
  The decision in December 1978 to open up the Chinese economy was a major stimu-
lant to economic growth: The pre-reform rate of per capita GDP growth of 3.1% more than 
doubled and has remained above 7% for the last two decades. We assume that this high 
growth rate will continue between 2001 and 2005 (average yearly growth rate of 7.1%). 
Table 5.5 shows that the growth rate of real GDP of China is the highest of all regions 
(31.4% between 2001 and 2005). The expected growth rate for the other Asian regions 
(except Japan-Korea) is also high. For such developed countries as EU, NAFTA, and Ja-
pan-Korea, the annual growth of real GDP is about 2.5%, while for Australia-New Zealand 
it is somewhat higher. The population growth for China slows to less than 1% a year. 
 





 Land  UnSkLab  SkLab  Capital  NatRes GDP  POP 
China 0  1.4  3.9  9.2  0.4  7.1  0.7 
HonKong 0  -0.2  4.6  5.0  0.4  5.4  0.0 
Taiwan 0  0.9  1.2  6.6  0.4  5.8  0.8 
JapKor 0  -0.4  0.2  2.0  0.4  2.3  0.3 
SEA 0  1.5  5.6  3.4  0.4  5.5  1.4 
OthAsia 0  2.1  5.5  5.2  0.4  5.1  1.6 
AusNzl 0  1.1  0.9  3.2  0.4  3.4  0.9 
NAFTA 0  1.3  1.2  3.8  0.4  2.6  1.0 
SAM 0  1.5  5.7  2.9  0.4  4.3  1.4 
EU 0  -0.1  0.0  2.5  0.4  2.6  0.0 
CEEC 0  0.2  0.5  3.2  0.4  4.6  0.2 
RestofWorld 0  2.4  3.2  2.1  0.4  4.2 2.0 
 
 
5.3.2 Policy variables 
 
The assumption for the policy variables in the baseline projection is that no new policies 
will come into force during the projection period. This holds also for the foreign exchange 
policy: We assume that the RMB / USD exchange rate will not change during the projec-
tion period. However, the baseline projection includes a continuation of existing policies 
and the effectuation of important policy events, as they are known to date. The important 
policy changes are: Implementation of the remaining commitments from the GATT Uru-
guay Round agreements; China's and Taiwan's accession to the WTO between 2002 and 
2005; the global phase-out of the MFA under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Cloth-
ing (ATC) by January 2005; and the EU enlargement resulting from the accession of 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). For the baseline projection, this results   173
in a number of assumptions with regard to import tariffs, TRQs, and export subsidies. Most 
important in this respect are China's commitments deriving from its accession to the WTO. 
We discuss these commitments first, and then the policy assumptions for the baseline pro-
jection. 
 
China's accession to the WTO 
China's commitments affecting the agricultural sector can be classified into three major 
categories: market access, domestic support, and export subsidies. As for market access, 
China has committed itself to lower tariffs on all agricultural products, to increase access 
by foreign producers of some commodities through TRQs, and to remove quantitative re-
strictions on others. The import market access commitments made by China appear to be 
substantial (Tables 5.6 and 5.7). Overall agricultural import tariffs (in terms of simple av-
erages) will be reduced from about 21% in 2001 to 17% by 2004 (having already declined 
from 42.2% in 1992 to 23.6% in 1998). Quotas under low tariff will be expanded while 
shares of State trading will be reduced significantly.  
  With a few exceptions (e.g., in the case of some commodities considered to be 'na-
tional strategic products'), most agricultural products will come under a tariff-only regime. 
For this commodity group, all non-tariff barriers and licensing and quota procedures will 
be eliminated, and effective protection will be lowered substantially by January 2002 and 
fall further by 2004 (Table 5.6). However, imports will not necessarily increase corre-
spondingly.  
  The real challenge for agricultural products with tariff-only protection will be for 
such crops as barley and wine and for dairy products. The case of soybeans, for which 
China has no comparative advantage, may be instructive. Before 2000, the import tariff for 
soybeans was as high as 114%, importers required licenses, and Chinese farmers met most 
of the nation's soybean demand. However, in anticipation of China's WTO accession, tar-
iffs were lowered to 3% in 2000 and subsequently import quotas were phased out. 
Consequently, prices fell and the nominal protection rates declined from 44% in early 2000 
(Table 5.3) to less than 15% in October 2001 (Huang & Rozelle, 2001). As a result, im-
ports increased from 4.32 million metric tons (mmt) in 1999 to 10.42 mmt in 2000 and yet 
further in 2001.    174
Table 5.6  Import tariff rates on major agricultural products subject to tariff-only protection in China. 
  Effective as of 1 January 
 
Actual tariff rates in 2001 
2002 2004 
Barley 114  (3)
 a) 3  3 
Soybean 3
 b) 3  3 
Citrus   40  20  12 
Other fruits  30-40  13-20  10-13 
Vegetables 30-50  13-29  10-15 
Beef 45  23.2  12 
Pork 20  18.4  12 
Poultry meat  20  18.4  10 
Dairy products  50  20-37  10-12 
Wine 65  45  14 
Tobacco 34  28  10 
a) Barley was subjected to license and import quotas, the tariff rate was 3% for import within the quota and 
no above-quota barley with 114% tariff was imported in 2001. 
b) Tariff rate was as high as 114% before 2000 and lowered to 3% in early of 2000 
Source: China's WTO Protocol of Accession, November 2001. 
 
 
  Such dramatic movements, however, can expected to be limited for the commodities 
considered to be 'national strategic products'. Indeed, China's WTO agreement allows the 
government to manage the trade of rice, wheat, maize, edible oils, sugar, cotton, and wool 
with TRQs. As shown in Table 5.7, while the in-quota tariff is 20% for sugar and 9% for 
edible oils, it is only 1% for rice, wheat, maize, and wool, but the amount brought in at 
these tariff levels is restricted. The in-quota volumes, however, are to grow over a three-
year period (2002-2004) at annual rates ranging from 4% to 19%. At the same time, tariffs 
on out-of-quota sales will drop substantially in the first year of accession and fall further 
between 2002 and 2005. 
  Four or five years after accession, a number of other changes will take place. For ex-
ample, after 2006 China will phase out its TRQ for edible oils. State trading monopolies 
will also be phased out for wool after 2004, and will gradually disappear for most of other 
agricultural products (Table 5.7). Although China National Cereals Oil and Foodstuffs Im-
port & Export Co. will continue to play an important role in rice, wheat, and maize, in the 
future there will be an increasing degree of competition from private firms in importing 
and exporting grains.  
  China's accession agreement also contains a number of other commitments, some of 
which are specific to China. First, unlike other countries, China must phase out all export 
subsidies.
1 Second, despite its status as a developing country, China's de minimis exemp-
tion for product-specific support
2 is equivalent to only 8.5% of the total value of 
                                                 
1 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (A.o.A.) foresaw the gradual reduction, at different rates for 
developed and developing countries, but not elimination, of export subsidies. Least developed countries are 
exempt from export subsidy reduction commitments. 
2 According to the A.o.A., member countries were obliged to reduce certain categories of domestic support to 
agriculture. Total support under these categories is referred to as the aggregate measure of support (AMS). 
However, a member country is not required to include in the total AMS nor to reduce the product-specific 
support if it does not exceed a given percentage (5% for developed and 10% for developing countries). See 
Agreement on Agriculture, article 6, 4(a).   175
production of a basic agricultural product (as compared to 10% for other developing coun-
tries and 5% for developed countries). Third, investment and input subsidies for the low-
income and resource-poor farmers who are not subject to reduction commitments, must be 
included as part of its aggregate measurement of support (AMS). 
 
 
Table 5.7  China's market access commitments on farm products subject to TRQs 
  Import volume (mmt) 
(State trading share, %) 
Out-of-quota tariff (%) 
















3.76 (50)  5.32
(50)





















5 1 54.4 47.2 40
Wool








15 9 75 71.7 68.3
Sugar 
d 0.64  1.68  1.95 8 20 90 72  50
a: Figures in parentheses are the share (%) of non-State trading in import quota. 
b: Designated trading in 2002-2004 and phased out thereafter. 
c: TRQ regime will be phased out in 2006. In 2005, import quota will be 7.27 mmt with 9% in-quota tariff 
and 65% out-of-quota tariff. 
d: Phased-out quota for State trade. 
Source: China's WTO Protocol of Accession, November 2001; Statistical Yearbook of China, 2001. 
 
 
  China also agreed to a series of specific conditions for anti-dumping and countervail-
ing duties. For 15 years, China will be subject to a different set of rules that make it easier 
for countries to bring, prove, and enforce dumping cases against China. China will, how-
ever, benefit from the same rights in dealing with other countries, such as reciprocity.  
  Also Chinese WTO commitments and privileges in other areas of the agreement will 
directly or indirectly affect its agricultural sector. For example, China has committed itself 
to replace quantitative import restrictions on three types of fertilizers (DAP, NPK, urea) by 
TRQs. Also, tariffs will be cut upon accession and further cuts will be phased in by 2005 
for almost all industrial products (e.g., tractors, pesticides). Furthermore, China will sig-
nificantly reduce its non-tariff measures and eliminate all quotas, tendering, and import 
licensing on non-farm products by no later than 2005. For textiles and clothing, however, 
the current 'voluntary' export restraints will not be completely phased out until the end of 
2008, meaning that exports may not expand as rapidly as they would under a less restric-
tive regime. Substantial commitments to open up services markets in China have also been 
made.   176
Policy assumptions: market access
1 
Table 5.8 summarizes the market access policy landscape in 2001 for China and the as-
sumptions for the baseline projection period 2001-2020.
2 The protection estimates change 
mainly between 2001 and 2005 as a result of China's accession to the WTO. 
 
 
Table 5.8  Summary of import protection estimates and baseline assumptions 
 
 
  Import tariff equivalent % 
   
  Original GTAP  Base2001  Baseline 2005  Baseline  
  rates 1997 a)      2010-2020 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 
 
Rice 105  7  4  1 
Wheat 113  4  4  1 
Cgrains 90  30  4  1 
Oilseeds 64  20  9  6 
Sugar 29  47  27  20 
Pfibers 3  8  3  1 
OthCrop 22  21  11  6 
Cattle 13  47  14  12 
Oanimalp 15  22  14  12 
Milk 17  27  18  11 
Fish 14  17  15  12 
OthFood 32  32  17  15 
Extract 0  1  1  1 
TexLea 24  23  12  12 
LabintMan 15  12  9  9 
CapintMan 13  11  6  6 
Services 0  19  9  9 
 
 
a) GTAP rates are trade-weighted averages. New rates are trade-weighted averages. 
 
 
  All the changes in import protection between 2001 and 2005 are a result of China's 
accession. Accession has the following implications: 
-  Lower nominal tariffs for a number of products (livestock, industry, services). In in 
dustry and services we follow, respectively, Martin and Ianovichina (2002), and 
Francois (2002) (basically halving pre-accession rates in services). 
-  Lower price increasing effect of State trading enterprises (especially coarse grains  
 and  oilseeds). 
-  No reduction of the gap between value added on imported and domestic products in  
 2001-2005. 
                                                 
1 Exports - modelled as export subsidy equivalent. The construction of these estimates is explained below. 
2 Note that our estimates for grains and oilseeds are lower than the GTAP estimates, while our estimates of 
protection in livestock are higher. The new industrial protection estimates do not deviate significantly from 
the GTAP estimates.    177
  The import tariffs, difference in VAT, and other elements relevant to the degree of 
import protection in 2005 are given in Appendix 5.3.  
  Some TRQs may become binding in 2005 (Table 5.9 gives the in-quota and out-of-
quota rates). If a quota does become binding in 2005, the imports will be fixed at the quota 
level and a quota rent will be introduced to balance supply and demand. Furthermore, we 
take into account that the TRQs grow by x% each year in 2001-2005. The binding quota 
levels and the growth rates are given in Appendix 4.4. For 2005-2010, we assume that the 




Table 5.9  Trade weighted import tariffs on Chinese imports in 2001 and after WTO accession 
 
 
   WTO  Accession 
    
 2001*  In-quota  rates  Out-of-quota  rates 
 
 
Rice 7  1  65 
Wheat 4  1  65 
Cgrains 30  1  65 
Oilseeds 20  3  4 
Sugar 47  20  50 
Pfibers 8  1  40 
 
 
* Adjusted from GTAP 1997 data. 
 
 
Policy assumptions: export competition 
On the export subsidy side, we incorporate both existing export subsidies (on coarse grains 
and cotton) and implicit export taxation resulting from non-compliance with importer's 
quality and phytosanitary standards (PSS).
1 Also included is an ad valorem estimate of the 
effect of the export quota under the MFA for textiles and leather.  
  As a result of China's accession to the WTO, we assume the complete abolition of 
any remaining export subsidies between 2001 and 2005. MFA quota rents are also com-
pletely reduced to zero for all regions as a result of the phasing out of the MFA between 
2001 and 2005. This means that we are frontloading the complete elimination of restric-
tions on textiles and garments exports from China to 2005 instead of 2008. Furthermore, 
we assume for each period a 4% reduction of implicit export taxes (if applicable) resulting 
from better compliance with PSS, as long as there is a positive NPR. 
 
Policy assumptions: EU enlargement 
In Europe, the import barriers between the EU15 and the CEEC region are eliminated, as is 
any export subsidization between them. CEEC import protection and export subsidization 
against third countries are increased to the EU15 level. 
                                                 
1 The estimates of implicit export taxation are necessarily rough and should ideally be placed on the import-
ing side as an NTB.   178







2001 2005 2010 2015 2020
R i c e  0 - 1 0 - 5000   export tax, PSS and quality issues
W h e a t  000000   
C g r a i n s  0 3 10000  export  subsidy 
O i l s e e d s  000000   
S u g a r  000000   
P f i b e r s  0 1 00000  export  subsidy 
O t h C r o p  0 - 7 - 3000   export tax, PSS and quality issues
Cattle 0 -8 -4000   export tax, PSS and quality issues
Oanimalp 0 -26 -22 -10 -6 -2  export tax, PSS and quality issues
M i l k  000000   
F i s h  0 - 1 5 - 1 1- 7- 3 0   export tax, PSS and quality issues
O t h F o o d  0 - 1 0 - 6000   export tax, PSS and quality issues
E x t r a c t  000000   
T e x L e a  - 5 - 50000   export tax; MFA quota* 
Labint-







S e r v i c e s  000000    
a) import tariff with duty exemption calculated from Martin & Ianovichina (2002) 
 
 
5.4  Prospects for China's Food Economy, 2001-2005  
 
In the first period we take into account some important policy changes (e.g. China's WTO 
accession and the phase-out of the MFA). In the discussion of the projection results, we 
will focus on the decomposition of these policy effects. Therefore, we discuss the first pe-
riod more extensively than the second period (2005-2020). 
 
5.4.1 Policy shocks 
 
The developments in 2001-2005 are driven by assumptions on the development of macro-
economic variables, such as GDP growth, population growth, growth of factor endow-
ments (Table 5.5), and the policy changes. In this section we summarize the policy 
changes. Some of the major policy events for China are, as explained previously, its acces-
sion to the WTO, the phasing out of the MFA, and to a lesser extent the enlargement of the 
EU. China's accession includes changes in import tariffs, export subsidies, and TRQs. Fig-
ure 5.2 presents the change in import tariff and export subsidy equivalents between 2001 
and 2005. All the changes in import tariff equivalents are a result of China's accession. The 
reductions are highest for cattle, coarse grains, sugar, textiles, and services. In these sec-
tors, it can be expected that the change in imports is highest. For the TRQ commodities,   179
the import volume (e.g. coarse grains and sugar) is limited by the import quota in combina-
tion with the prohibitive out-of-quota tariff. On the export subsidy side, Figure 5.2 
incorporates both the reduction of exports subsidies (31% for coarse grains, 10% for cot-
ton) resulting from accession, and a reduction in the implicit non-tariff barriers by 4% 
resulting from better compliance with importer's quality standards and PSS (for rice, other 
crop, cattle, other animal products, fish, and processed food). Also included in the export 
subsidy equivalent is an ad valorem estimate of the effect of the phasing out of the export 
quota under the MFA (reduction of export quota rent to zero for textiles). The reduction in 
export subsidies in coarse grains and cotton resulting from WTO accession is expected to 
reduce the exports of these sectors. The phasing out of the export quota combined with bet-
ter compliance with importer's quality standards and PSS are expected to increase exports. 
 
5.4.2 Development of output between 2001 and 2005 
 
Table 5.11 gives the percentage change of sectoral output in China between 2001 and 2005 
(first column). This is the total impact, which includes the mentioned policy changes and 
the changes in exogenous macro variables. All the other columns give the contribution of 
the policy changes to the output change. The total contribution of China's accession to the 
WTO is given in the second column. The third to fifth columns split this total accession 
contribution between the impact of the reduction of import tariffs and export subsidies, bet-
ter compliance with PSS and quality issues, and the increase in import quota, respectively. 
The sixth column gives the impact of the phasing out of the MFA under the WTO-ATC, 
and the last column gives the incremental contribution of EU enlargement. As an example 
of how to read this table, we describe the changes for oilseeds. Between 2001 and 2005, 
the production of oilseeds grows by 5.3%. The impact of China's accession on the produc-
tion of oilseeds is – 3.9%, the impact of WTO-ATC is -1.3%, and EU enlargement is 0.1%. 
The impact of non-policy changes (technical change, increase in macro variables) can be 
calculated as the difference between the total and the three policy changes (added together) 
= 5.3 - (-3.9) - (-1.3) - (0.1) = 10.4%. Without the policy changes, the increase in output in 
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Figure 5.2  Change in China's import tariff and export subsidy equivalents between 2001 and 2005  
   (%  point  change).* 
* Change in export subsidy equivalent indicates: 1) Abolition of an export subsidy for coarse grains and cot-
ton; 2) a reduction of an implicit export taxation resulting from better compliance with importer's quality and 
PSS for rice, other crops, cattle, other animal products, fish, and processed food; an ad valorem estimate of 
the effect of phasing out of the export quota (reducing export quota rent) under the MFA.  
 
 
Table 5.11  Development of output in China between 2001 and 2005 (% changes) 
                                         Contribution of: 
  
Base 
















Rice 11.5  1.1 0 1 0.1 -0.6 0.0
Wheat 8.1  1.1 0 1 0.1 -0.6 0.0
Cgrains 1.6  -4.3 -2.5 0.4 -2.2 -0.1 0.0
Oilseeds 5.3  -3.9 -4.5 0.4 0.2 -1.3 0.1
Sugar 4.9  -5.6 -5.7 0 0.1 -1.2 0.0
Pfibers 31.7  -8.8 0.9 -0.8 -8.9 8.7 -0.3
OthCrops 15.8  1.1 -0.1 1.1 0.1 -0.7 0.0
Cattle 25.9  0.4 0.3 -0.2 0.3 3.6 -0.1
Oanimalp 13.7  0 -0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0
Milk 20.6 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.3 -0.1
Fish 20.3  1.4 -0.1 1.4 0.1 -1 0.0
OthFood 22.8  3.6 -0.1 3.5 0.2 -1.7 0.0
Extract 13.6  -0.1 0 -0.1 0 -0.8 0.1
TexLea 41.8  0.7 0.9 -0.8 0.6 8.1 -0.2
LabintMan 28.2  0.6 0.9 -0.3 0 -2 0.1
CapintMan 23.6  -0.9 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 -1.7 0.1
Services 24.9  -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0 -0.1 0.0  181
General trends 
The first column in Table 5.11 shows that the restructuring of the Chinese economy con-
tinues between 2001 and 2005. The manufacturing and service sectors grow faster than the 
agricultural sectors do. The driving factor behind this restructuring is the relatively low in-
come elasticity for agricultural products. When income rises, people spend relatively more 
on services and on manufactured products than they do on agriculture products (Engel's 
Law). Exports could be a way around this tendency and an engine of growth. However, the 
domestic market remains the most important source of growth for almost all sectors (ex-
cept for textiles and processed food; see Figure 5-1), because exports represent only a 
small proportion of output. 
  Growth rates in the textile and leather industries are especially high (41.8%), as they 
are in the related upstream cotton sectors (31.7%). The growth is relatively high also in the 
labor-intensive industries and, within agrifood, for the processed food products. The 
growth in primary crops is relatively minor. It seems that the Chinese economy restructures 
in line with comparative advantage. Relatively labor-intensive industries expand and land-
intensive industries contract. Put in another way, sectors that already showed a compara-
tive advantage in the past (high self-sufficiency ratios in Figure 5.1) belong to the product 
groups that expand relatively fast. Within agriculture, cotton, meat, milk, fish, horticulture, 






























































The impact of accession on output changes in China is, in general, small (column 2 Table 
5.11, or Figure 5.3). The exceptions are the negative impact in the cotton, oilseeds, coarse 
grains, and sugar sectors. The driving forces behind this negative output growth are that   182
there are relatively high reductions in import tariffs or export subsidies in these sectors (see 
Figure 5.2). In addition, imports are relatively important (see low self-sufficiency ratio in 
Figure 5.1). Combined, these factors imply that import competition will be stronger as a 
result of accession, and that imports will partly replace domestic production (imports are 
given in Table 5.12). For cotton, it is especially the increase in the import quota that causes 
the negative result (column 5). The impact on the cattle sector is surprisingly positive de-
spite the highest tariff cut in Figure 5.2. On the one hand, this is because imports are very 
small and the negative impact of the increase in imports on production is small, and on the 
other hand because exports increase due to better compliance with PSS and quality stan-
dards. 
  The WTO accession is positive for sectors that comply better with international PSS 
and quality standards (column 4). In general, the sector for which exports represent an im-
portant share of demand gain the most of the assumed 4% reduction in non-tariff barriers. 
The growth is therefore highest for the processed food sector (3.5%), and lower for the 
fish, other crop, and rice sectors. The growth is surprisingly positive for the wheat sector, 
which does not improve its quality. However, this is caused by an increase in demand from 
the downstream processed food sector. Accession is also positive for the textile and labor-
intensive manufacturing sectors. This is not a result of better compliance with international 
standards, but of the general trend that an economy restructures according to comparative 
advantage when distortions within the economy are removed. As in many countries, in the 
past policies in China have introduced the highest distortions in sectors that have no com-
parative advantage.  
 
Phasing out of the MFA and the enlargement of the EU  
China has a comparative advantage in textiles and is already one of the world's most im-
portant exporters. However, its export expansion is limited by the MFA. The phasing out 
of the MFA is clearly important because it has a large positive output impact on the textile 
complex (column 6). As a result of the MFA phase-out, the textiles and leather industries, 
and the cotton sector, grow by almost 9%. Not surprisingly, the impact of EU enlargement 
on China is limited. There is a small negative output effect in the textile complex as a re-
sult of the trade diversion effect (Eastern European countries get free access to the EU15 
markets, and vice versa). 
 
Development of imports 2001-2005 
Import growth is projected to be high in China between 2001 and 2005, especially for the 
agricultural sector and the extraction industry. A large part of the increase in imports is a 
result of WTO accession. This is in contrast to the development in output, where policy 
changes had only a minor impact. The growth in imports is closely related to the reduction 
of import tariffs resulting from accession and the expansion of import quotas (within 
TRQs). The highest growth of imports is in the cattle sector, where the reduction in import 
tariff was highest (see Figure 5.2). The second highest reduction of import tariffs was in 
the coarse grains sector, but the import growth in this sector is limited by the annual 
growth of the TRQ, which becomes binding. The high import growth in the extraction in-
dustry is caused not by one of the policy changes, but by the high growth rate of the overall   183
economy. Imports increase quickly due to limited resources (oil, gas, etc.) within China 
and a huge demand to fuel the overall economic growth. 
 
 
Table 5.12  Change in import quantity of China (% changes, 2001-2005)  
                                     Contribution of: 
  
Base 





     Total








Rice 40  9 4 5 0 2 0
Wheat 28  0 -3 4 -1 3 0
Cgrains 40  40 0 0 40 0 0
Oilseeds 35  14 13 1 0 2 0
Sugar 42  19 18 1 0 2 0
Pfibers 56  56 0 0 56 0 0
OthCrop 58  24 21 3 0 9 0
Cattle 157  104 102 3 -1 15 -1
Oanimalp 48  18 17 3 -2 5 0
Milk 41  17 16 2 -1 5 0
Fish 21  5 2 3 0 3 -1
OthFood 52  35 32 3 0 4 0
Extract 53  -2 -1 -1 0 -3 0
TexLea 42  28 28 0 0 9 0
LabintMan 9  4 4 0 0 3 0
CapintMan 20  7 7 0 0 1 0
Services 28  15 15 0 0 2 0




















































Figure 5.4  Import growth resulting from WTO access import concessions, 2001-2005 
 
 
Table 5.13  Change in export quantity in China (% changes, 2001-2005) 
                                       Contribution of: 
  
Base 





     Total 






quota       
Rice -1 22 4 17 1 -3  -2
Wheat -31  0 4 -5 1 -5  -1
Cgrains -65  -54 -53 -3 2 -3  0
Oilseeds -6  4 7 -3 0 -4  0
Sugar 0  5 7 -3 1 -3  -1
Pfibers -48  -19 -25 -2 8 -9  0
OthCrop 22  17 4 12 1 -5  0
Cattle 16  22 4 16 2 -9 -1
Oanimalp 15  28 5 20 3 -7  1
Milk 14  2 4 -3 1 -6  0
Fish 28  20 4 16 0 -5  0
OthFood 34  22 5 16 1 -6  0
Extract -36  3 3 0 0 2  0
TexLea 72  10 10 -1 1 20  -1
LabintMan 66  11 13 -2 0 -11  0
CapIntMan 31  6 7 -1 0 -5  0
Services 40  5 6 -1 0 -5  1  185
Change in exports between 2001 and 2005 
The pattern of exports changes a lot between 2001 and 2005. The exports of all land-
intensive crops and of the extraction industries decline, while textiles and the labor-
intensive industries obtain very high growth rates. This is in line with the patterns of com-
parative advantage. The decline is especially large in the coarse grains sector, where export 
subsidies are reduced by 31%, and in the cotton sector, where export subsidies are reduced 
by 10%. The reduction of export subsidies is the major driving force within coarse grains. 
For cotton, the increased domestic demand resulting from an increase in the textile sector 
is another explanatory factor. The reduction in exports of the extraction industry is caused 
by increased domestic demand. 
  The moderate export growth of 15-20% in the meat sectors can largely be explained 
by better compliance with international quality standards. In the other crop (horticulture), 
fish, and processed food sectors this quality effect is only part of the story; the other part is 
the better exploitation of comparative advantage. The growth in exports is very high in the 
other sectors with a comparative advantage, namely textiles (72%) and labor-intensive in-
dustries (66%). The phasing out of the MFA contributes 20% to the total growth in textiles; 
this leaves a large part to be explained by better exploitation of the comparative advantage. 
 
 
5.5  Prospects for Chinese Food Economy, 2005-2020  
 
In this section we describe some characteristics of the baseline projection between 2001 
and 2020. Given the base information for 2001 and all the macro and policy assumptions, 
we project the model in four steps to 2020. The 2001-2005 step was discussed at length in 





























2001 2005 2010 2015 2020
 
Figure 5.5  Development of self-sufficiency ratios, 2001-2020 
Source: GTAP v5, calculations LEI. 
Note: self-sufficiency is defined as the domestic production:domestic absorption ratio.   186
Self-sufficiency ratios 2001-2020 
Self-sufficiency is an important indicator of developments within the economy. Figure 5.5 
clearly demonstrates that most of the trends that we observed in 2001-2005 continue in the 
period to 2020. China will rely more and more on imports for its land-intensive products 
and its extraction industry. Among the land-intensive products, this is especially true for 
oilseeds, sugar, cotton, and (to a lesser extent) coarse grains. 
  On the other hand, the textile-leather complex and the labor-intensive industries be-
come increasingly net exporters. The increase in the self-sufficiency ratio for the labor-
intensive industries is extraordinary: In 2001, the ratio was just below 1 and in 2020 the 
projection shows that it increases to 1.5. The incremental increase in the index gets larger 
as time progresses. The story is different for the processed food sector. In 2001, it – to-
gether with textiles - was one of the sectors with a comparative advantage and a high self-
sufficiency ratio. This ratio increases until 2010 and then declines, because labor resources 
are moving to the more profitable textiles and labor-intensive industries. Therefore, China's 
rising stars in terms of comparative advantage are the labor-intensive industries, and the 
processed food sector is losing share on export markets. 
  All the sectors in the middle ground stay close to a self-sufficiency level of unity. It 
will take a while before international trade becomes very important for a sector. In general, 
the self-sufficiency ratios for all food products (except fish) decline in the long run. China 
will become more dependent on the world markets for its food products. The industrial and 
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Figure 5.6  Development of China's share in world exports (2001-2020) 
 
 
Developments of exports 2001-2020 
The world export share of China moves with its comparative advantage (Figure 5.6). A 
first glance at this picture shows that even in 2020, the world market shares of China are 
low for most of the agricultural and extraction products. The world market shares decline   187
for these products (the exception within agriculture is fish). The export share for services 
and for capital-intensive manufacturing is also low (about 5%), but increases slightly over 
time. The export share of the labor-intensive industries increases rapidly and will be about 
15% in 2020. For textiles, China will become the world's major exporter: Its export share is 
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Figure 5.7  Development of China's share in world imports (2001-2020) 
 
 
Developments of imports 2001-2020 
Will China deprive the world of its food, as Lester Brown suggested? Our projection re-
sults for China's world import share show that this will probably not be the case (Figure 
5.7). The world import share in land-intensive products increases for all agricultural prod-
ucts. However, for almost all agricultural, manufacturing, and services products, the world 
market share is still below 5% in 2020. The exceptions are coarse grains and oilseeds, 
where the import share is projected to be about 10% in 2020. However, this is not a very 
large share, although the growth is impressive. The world import share is high and in-
creases quickly for cotton and the extraction industries. The cotton is imported to be used 
in the expanding textile industry, and the extraction products (oil) are used in the expand-
ing manufacturing sectors as a result of high economic growth. 
 
Development of net trade 2001-2020 
Figure 5.8 shows the development of net trade in China. It shows where China is a major 
player in the world market, whether it is a net exporter or importer, and whether this 
changes over time. China is a relatively large player in the textile complex (exporter of tex-
tile and leather products, and importer of cotton) and the extraction industries. The labor-
intensive manufacturing sectors develop their role in world markets quickly. The role in all 
the other sectors is limited.   188
  We can conclude that high-income growth rates and WTO accession increase China's 
role in world trade, although for most products its world market share is less than 10% in 
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Figure 5.8  Development of 'world export share minus world import share' for China, 2001-2020 
 
 
5.6  China and the rest of the world 
 
As a result of China's high economic growth rate, its share in global GDP in constant 
prices will gradually increase from 4% in 2001 to 7% in 2020. In current prices, this in-
crease will be a little less, as China specializes in products with relatively decreasing world 
prices. Notwithstanding its rising share in world income, China's average income per capita 
in 2020 will still be below world average. Not only China's share but also that of the 
Southeast Asian countries in world output will increase. On the other hand, the share of the 
developed countries shows a decline. These changes are mainly determined by the assump-
tions on economic growth (Table 5.5). 
  For almost all product groups, China's share in world output will increase, particu-
larly its share in plant fibers (cotton) and textiles. Only for oilseeds, sugar, and dairy will 
its share in world output not change. On the other hand, the share in world output of plant 
fibers of the NAFTA countries and other non-Asian countries will decrease. For textiles, 
all developed countries will show an important decline in their share in world output. 
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Table 5.14  Share in world export market (%) a) 
 
 
 China  Jap-Kor  SEA  NAFTA  EU 
           
  2001 2010 2001  2010  2001 2010 2001  2010  2001 2010 
 
 
Rice  8 7  2 2  18 19  21  23 5  7 
Cgrains  5 3  0 0 0  0  66  65 9 12 
OthCrop 4 5  1 1 6  4  16  17  10 13 
Oanimalp  4 6  1 1 3  2  28  27  33 37 
Fish  15 23 4  9 10  5  10  8 11  18 
OthFood 17 23 3  3  7  6  16 17 29  28 
TexLea 26  39  10 6  10 10  5 5  13  8 
LabintMan  3  8  35 27  5  5  20 28 24  20 
CapintMan  6 8  25  21 9 10  17  20  23 21 
Services 2 3  12 9  10 10  25  32  24 20 
Total  6  9  19 15  9  9  18 22 21  19 
 
 
a) World exports excluding intra-regional trade. Products/product groups with an export share of 2% or more 
for China in 2001 and countries/country groups with a total share in world exports of 9% or more in 2001 and 
excluding the RoW category (rest of world). 
 
 
  China's role in world trade increases as a result of its high rate of economic growth. 
China's share in world export of products and services (excluding intra trade) will increase 
gradually from 6% in 2001 to 9% in 2010 (Table 5.14). Its share in world imports (exclud-
ing intra trade) will increase slightly, from 5% in 2001 to 6% in 2010 (Table 5.15).  
  China's world export market share in textiles, fish, processed food, and labor-
intensive industrial products increases as a result of its comparative advantage in these 
products. For Japan-Korea and the EU, this will result in an important decrease in export 
share of textile and labor-intensive industrial products. For land-intensive products, China's 
share in world export decreases. 
  In world imports, China will increase in particular its share in plant fibers (cotton) 
and oil. The increase in the import of plant fibers is driven by the strong growth of China's 
textile industry. China's import shares in fish and land-intensive products will also grow, 
but to a lesser extent. Also the Southeast Asian countries will increase their share in world 
imports of plant fibers. On the other hand, Japan-Korea and the EU will lose import market 
share for plant fibers. These developments are strongly related to the reallocation of the 
textile industry. 
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Table 5.15  Share in world import market (%) a) 
 
 
 China Jap-Kor SEA  NAFTA  EU 
           
  2001  2010 2001 2010  2001 2010 2001  2010  2001 2010 
 
 
Rice  3 5  8 7 4 4 8 7  17 11 
Cgrains  6 9  41  37 6 8 1 1 6  4 
OthCrop 0 0  11 9 5 8  20  20  42 34 
Oanimalp  2 3  27  34 5 7 6 6  17 12 
Fish  5  8  35 27  4 10 12 14 23  13 
OthFood  1  2  21 21  7  8 18 15 20  18 
TexLea  6 6  9 9 4 4 4  27  28 31 
LabintMan  4 3  8 8 7 7  24  16  24 28 
CapintMan  7  8 8  8 10 11 22 19 22  22 
Services  2  2  10 10  5  6 21 16 37  38 
Total  5  6  11 10  8  8 22 18 27  27 
 
 
a) Excluding intra-regional trade. Products/product groups with an important share of 2% 
or more for China in 2001 and countries/country groups with a total share in world import 
of 4% in 2001 and excluding the RoW category (rest of world). 
 
 




As far as trade is concerned, China is important to the EU in three respects: Firstly, the de-
velopment of China's exports and imports may have an important impact on world market 
prices; secondly, the EU may meet increased competition from China on its export mar-
kets; and thirdly, the developments in China may have a direct impact on the EU's trade 
with China.  
  In 5.5.2 was concluded that China's share on the world's import and export market 
will increase for many products. However, for most products these shares will remain lim-
ited. The only exceptions are oil and cotton for imports and textile for exports. On the basis 
of these shares, the impact on world market prices will be limited. This is an important 
general conclusion for the EU's world market trade.  
  It was also concluded in 5.5.2 that China will export, though to a limited extent, such 
labor-intensive agricultural products as horticultural products (vegetables), pork and poul-
try meat, fish, and processed food. With some of these products, the EU will meet China 
on its export markets. It might be expected that some of these markets will be the devel-
oped countries in East Asia, such as Japan and Korea. However, it will be a challenge for 
China to improve the quality of its products in order to meet high quality standards in these 
countries. In this section, we focus on direct trade between China and the EU.  
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5.7.2 Bilateral trade in 2001 
 
The EU is an important export destination for Chinese exports: More than a fifth of all 
Chinese exports go to the EU (Table 5.16). Half of these exports are products from the 
capital-intensive manufacturing sector, mainly electronics and machinery products. Tex-
tiles (25%) and services (20%) are two other important Chinese export products to the EU. 
Within agriculture, processed food (Ofood) and to a lesser extent horticulture (OthCrop) 
and pork-poultry are the main export products. For especially services (50%) and the in-
dustrial sectors (23%), the EU is an extra important export destination, while for 
agricultural products it is less important. These Chinese imports account for only 5% of ex-




Table 5.16  Bilateral trade relation between China and the EU in 2001 
























Rice 0 0.0 0.0 36 11.1  5.6
Wheat 4 0.1 0.3 2 37.4  0.3
Cgrains 34 1.0 3.5 7 0.7  1.1
Oilseeds 308 2.5 7.1 7 10.3  0.1
Sugar 11 0.3 0.6 2 4.1  0.2
Pfibers 2 0.3 0.4 1 1.5  0.0
OthCrop 3 0.0 0.1 238 10.6  1.1
Cattle 1 0.0 0.0 5 9.4  0.2
Oanimalp 72 0.3 1.0 125 13.5  2.8
Milk 27 0.1 0.4 8 13.5  0.7
Fish 91 2.5 14.9 38 4.7  2.7
OthFood 367 0.4 1.2 1817 10.5  8.9
Extract 128 0.5 1.6 151 3.5  0.2
TexLea 650 0.5 1.4 14184 18.8  16.1
LabintMan 3324 0.8 2.4 4125 23.1  3.0
CapintMan 17865 1.5 3.6 28008 23.5  6.3
Services 7500 1.9 3.3 10471 50.3  3.0
Total 30386 1.3 3.1 59225 22.7  5.0
 
 
  China is a less important export destination for the EU: Only 3% of all extra-EU ex-
ports go to China. Again the very aggregated capital-intensive manufacturing sector 
accounts for over half of the exports. Trade in services accounts for a quarter of total trade. 
China is a minor export destination for EU agricultural products. Only for fish and oilseeds 
is China a relatively important export destination. In total, China has a large trade surplus   192
with the EU: The value of exports to the EU is twice the value of Chinese imports from the 
EU. 
 
5.7.3 Baseline projection of development of bilateral trade 2001-2020 
 
Table 5.17 shows the export growth rates of EU exports to China for the main export prod-
ucts. Exports of capital-intensive manufacturing increase by 14% in 2001-2005. Half of 
this can be attributed to China's accession to the WTO, which provides trade opportunities 
for the EU. Service exports grow by 22% in the same period; 14% of this can be attributed 
to China's accession. Exports growth rates for agriculture are higher. Export growth in 
processed food is over 90%. Lower import tariffs resulting from WTO accession contribute 
77%. China's accession also opens possibilities for coarse grains (44%) as a result of the 
expansion of the import quota, and half of the growth in oilseeds (45%) can be attributed to 
China's accession. Also the exports of pork and poultry (Oanimal p.) might increase by 
63%. In this case, China's accession contributes 23%, while macroeconomic growth and 
especially increased consumption contribute the remainder (40%).  
 
 
Table 5.17  Development of EU exports to China between 2001 and 2020 (quantity, % changes) 
 
 
  Value  2001  Base  2001-2005  2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 
 (USD  million) 
 
 
CapintMan 17865  14  4  3  -2 
Services 7500  22  -1 -8  -16 
LabintMan 3324  -2  -15  -19  -26 
TexLea 650  25 -9  -15  -24 
OthFood 367  94  23  38  36 
Oilseeds 308  45  32  59 52 
Extract 128  83  128  159  113 
Fish 91  20  20  42  32 
Oanimalp 72  63  49  106 86 
Cgrains 34  44  49  102  93 





  Section 5.5 shows that for 2005-2020, China might specialize in labor-intensive in-
dustrial products and services, and it might import especially land-intensive products (see 
Figure 5.7). These trends are reflected in the developments of EU exports to China. Ex-
ports of the EU in labor-intensive products will decline, while exports of agricultural 
products and extraction industries will continue to grow. 
  Table 5.18 shows the development of Chinese exports to the EU between 2001 and 
2020. The developments are in general the opposite of the developments described above. 
Chinese exports of labor-intensive industries, textiles, and services will continue to grow. 
Growth of textiles is the highest in the first period (105%). Half of this growth can be ex-
plained by the phasing out of the MFA. After 2005, textile exports will continue to grow,   193
but the growth in labor-intensive manufacturing and services will become higher because 
the products provide better opportunities. The prospects for agricultural exports are less in 
the long run. Better opportunities in industries and services shift resources to these sectors 
and China will become a net importer of most agricultural products. 
 
 
Table 5.18  Development of Chinese exports to the EU between 2001 and 2020 (quantity, % changes) 
 
 
  Value  2001  Base  2001-2005  2005-2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 
 (USD  million) 
 
 
CapintMan  28008 32  40 38 42 
TexLea 14184  105 57  51  53 
Services  10471 39  62 76 88 
LabintMan 4125  72  111  127  147 
Othfood 1817  35 45  -25  -28 
OthCrop 238  10  -8 -50 -50 
Extract  151 -39  -58 -62 -46 
Oanimal p.  125  0  48  -39  -34 
Fish  38 32  48 15 10 





5.8 Concluding  remarks 
 
China's production and trade in agricultural products will undergo an important increase in 
2001-2020. Part of this development can be attributed to China's accession to the WTO and 
the phasing out of the MFA. Both accession and the phasing out of the MFA will allow 
China to exploit more fully its comparative advantage. 
  However, the impact of China's accession will be limited because many policy 
changes directed to more international trade took place during the reform period in the run-
up to accession. China's accession will have a negative production impact in land-intensive 
sectors, such as coarse grains, oilseeds, sugar, and cotton. Positive production impacts, by 
increasing exports, are to be expected in food processing, horticulture, fish, and labor-
intensive industries, such as the textile industry. Positive impacts in agriculture will to a 
large extent be a result of the assumed better compliance with PSS. This underlines the im-
portance for China to strive to better comply with these standards.  
  China's accession to the WTO will lead to a large increase in imports, especially 
those of cattle, cotton (for the fast growing textile industry), coarse grains, and processed 
food. The production impact of these imports will be limited, however, as in most sectors 
imports are still relatively small. The exceptions to this are the land-intensive sectors men-
tioned above: For these products, accession will have, as said, a clear negative effect on 
production growth. 
  The phasing out of the MFA will have a positive impact on the labor-intensive tex-
tile/cotton complex: The export of textiles will show strong growth, and the production of   194
textile and cotton will increase. This will have limited negative production effects on some 
land-intensive products as the production of cotton becomes more competitive.  
  In the longer term, self-sufficiency in almost all agricultural products will decline. 
For most of China's agricultural export products, the country's share in world exports will 
be less than 10%. The only exception will be fish and temporarily processed food. For the 
labor-intensive industries, and particularly the textile industry, the position will be differ-
ent: The Chinese share in world textile exports will grow to over 40%. 
  On the import side, China's share on world markets will grow but remain below 10%, 
with the exception of cotton. In the longer term, this limit will be exceeded somewhat for 
coarse grains and oilseeds. For cotton, China's share in world imports will grow to over 
30%. For non-agricultural products, China's share on world import markets for oil will 
grow considerably. In the longer term, the share in oil will reach over 20%. 
  China's role in world trade will increase further in the course of time. This will be a 
result of China's high income-growth rates and accession to the WTO. However, for most 
agricultural products, the world market share will be less than 10%. In other words, China 
will continue to be able to feed its population, also in the longer term. At the same time, 
China will make use of its competitive advantages, resulting in changes in the composition 
of production without having big consequences for the development of world markets for 
agricultural products. The only exception to this will be cotton.  
  The EU is an important export market for China; however, for agricultural and food 
products China's exports to the EU are limited. High growth rates of China's export to the 
EU are foreseen. For agricultural and food products, growth will be much lower and for 
some products will even become negative. Higher growth rates are expected for the EU 
export of agricultural and food products to China. Both the accession to the WTO and 
macro-economic growth are major explanatory factors for this development.   195
Chapter 6  Beyond the Uruguay Round: An evaluation  





China has become a member of the WTO in November 2001 and has committed itself to 
binding its trade policies and domestic policies in many areas of the economy. See also 
chapter 2 and chapter 4. As part of its WTO commitments China has also agreed to sub-
stantially reduce barriers to international trade. Given these recent developments, what can 
China expect from the new Doha development round? 
  To address this question, this study provides insights in the economic effects of the 
new WTO Doha round for China on basis of the policy proposals of the major participants 
in the negotiations. It places the analysis for China against the background of worldwide 
effects. The study provides insights into the nature and magnitude of the impacts of the 
WTO Doha Round for international trade and the resulting welfare improvements. The 
study focuses on agricultural liberalization, but also includes liberalization in industrial tar-
iffs and liberalization in services trade. It uses the baseline developed in chapter 4 as the 
benchmark against which the effects of a new WTO round are assessed. 
  After the failed attempt in Seattle in late 1999, the Ministerial Meeting of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, in November 2001 launched the agenda for a 
new comprehensive round of multilateral trade negotiations. The ministerial declaration 
(WTO, 2001) emphasizes that this new round provides a major opportunity for developing 
countries. Consequently the agenda for the new WTO round has been coined the 'Doha 
Development Agenda'. 
  The Doha ministerial declaration sets down an ambitious agenda, with a number of 
milestones. The agenda for the agricultural negotiations is especially tight, with frequent 
meetings and deadlines to be met. For example, in the last week of March 2003, an agree-
ment was scheduled on so called 'Formulas and other 'modalities' for countries' 
commitments on agriculture'. This meeting has not resulted in an agreement, despite the ef-
forts of the chairman, Mr. Stuart Harbinson, to draft a compromise proposal that integrates 
the main elements of the proposals that are discussed in this chapter.January 1
st 2005 is the 
deadline for concluding negotiations as part of the Doha agenda's single agricultural policy 
under-taking. 
  Many countries and coalitions of countries have tabled modalities proposals for agri-
culture in the run-up to the Cancun ministerial meeting of September 2003. As this 
meeting was also not successful it will become more difficult to conclude the negotiations 
at the scheduled time. This study provides a partial assessment of three of these proposals, 
the USA proposal, the CAIRNS group proposal, and the proposal put forward by the Euro-
pean Union (EU). Together they give a picture in particular for China of the implications 
of possible comes out of the negotiations.    196
6.2  The Uruguay Round Agreement 
 
The Doha negotiations start where the Uruguay round finished. The most important item 
on the agenda is market access. 
  Tariff negotiations in the GATT/WTO have generally been based on tariff bindings, 
or schedules of concessions tabled under GATT rules. A bound tariff is the maximum al-
lowed tariff for the import of a product. The coverage and level of these bindings is an 
important element of the initial conditions for the negotiations. Industrial tariffs in the 
OECD are generally bound. As a result of the Uruguay Round the increase of the coverage 
for industrial products in developing countries was more than four-fold. Industrial tariffs in 
Latin America are nowadays generally bound. However, many tariffs in Asian and African 
economies remain unbound. (Abreu 1996). Besides, for almost all developing countries, 
existing bindings are, on average, well above applied rates. This reflects a combination of 
relatively high initial bindings, and the subsequent wave of reductions in applied rates. 
(See Blackhurst et al 1996, Francois 2001).  
  The gap between bound rates and current applied rates is called a 'binding overhang.' 
This overhang is typically very small in OECD countries, but for developing countries, the 
binding overhang is large enough that reductions in the range of 50% are necessary to 
force reductions in average applied rates for countries like Brazil, see Francois et al. 
(2003). For many countries, even this will have little or no effect, as tariffs are largely 
unbound. For example, one-third of India's manufacturing tariffs and 90 percent of Sri 
Lanka's tariffs are unbound. Of course, this limits severely the negotiating leverage of 
developing countries in the WTO. This is also why the debate of using bound, applied, or 
'historic' rates as a starting point is important. 
  A major accomplishment of the Uruguay round was the embedding of agriculture 
into the rules-based system of the GATT. This implies that since the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriclulture (URAA), WTO members face rules that discipline their leeway 
on agricultural policies in the areas market access, export subsidies and domestic support. 
As in the case of industrial tariffs, the stage for any future agriculture negotiation was also 
set by the Uruguay Round outcome. The most important results of this agreement are 
summarised in table 6.1. 
  One key difference from industrial products is that essentially all agricultural tariffs 
are bound. The next round of agricultural negotiations was already scheduled in the URAA 
as a 'built-in agenda', while the negotiating parameters (tariffs, tariff-rate-quota levels, 
subsidy commitments, etc.) must also be viewed in the context of the schedules of URAA 
commitments.  
  The system that has emerged is complex and similar to arrangements in the textile 
and clothing sectors, featuring a mix of bilaterally allocated tariff-rate-quotas (TRQs), with 
associated quota rents and tariffs. Viewed in conjunction with industrial protection, the 
basic pattern is that the industrial countries protect agriculture and processed food, while 
protection in developing countries is more balanced (though also higher overall) in its 
focus on food and non-food manufactured goods.  
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Table 6.1  Pillars of the URAA, 1994 
Commitment Developed  countries 
(1995-2000) 
Developing countries (1995-2004) 
Market access     
- Average tariff reduction  -36%  -24% 
- Minimal tariff reduction  -15%  -10% 
- Expanding tariff rate quota  From 3% to 5%   
    
Export support     
- Budget of export support  -36%  -24% 
- Volume of export support  -21%  -14% 
    
Domestic support     
- Amber box (AMS)  -20%  -13% 
 
 
  The URAA had a stated goal of no backsliding and modest liberalization. However, 
negotiating parties (generally the relevant agriculture ministries) gave considerable leeway to 
themselves with regard to selection of the appropriate reference period from which to measure 
export subsidy reductions and other reductions. In addition, the move to a price-based system 
for protection has, in many cases, been subsumed into an effective adoption of explicit quotas.  
  The disciplines on domestic subsidies have also been weakened by a relatively soft 
definition of the AMS vis-à-vis individual subsidies and the scope for reallocation of 
expenditures within the AMS. (See Tangermann 1998 for discussion.) Despite the goals of 
subsidy reductions and a shift toward price-based border measures, one of the more striking 
features of the regime that has actually emerged is the prominent role that quantity measures 
have taken in the new architecture. Basically, the agricultural trading system is complicated 
and still evolving. Policy measurement in this area has converged on the use of price-based 
measurements that emphasize the tax/subsidy equivalent of policy. (As this approach reflects 
available data, this is the approach we employ in this study as well.)  
 
6.2.1 The proposals compared 
 
As the Doha round has unfolded between late 2001 and early 2003, the most important 
players in the negotiations were the USA, the EU and the CAIRNS group. In this para-
graph we compare the proposals for agricultural liberalisation of these participants in the 
negotiations. Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 summarize the main elements of these proposals.
1 
  The USA proposal is perhaps the most straightforward of the three.  
Three features distinguish it from the other 2 proposals discussed. A first distinction is that 
all reductions have to be from applied levels of policy measures, as opposed to bound 
rates, which resulted from the URAA. A second one is that its main trust is the harmoniza-
tion of protection levels across sectors and countries. This also implies the elimination of 
special safeguards and the limitation of special and differential treatment of developing 
countries. A third distinction is that it consists of two stages, with the 1
st stage paving the 
ground for the 2
nd stage of complete liberalisation.  
                                                 
1 The text of these proposals can be obtained from the WTO website at www.wto.org.   198
 To  increase  market access the USA proposes a Swiss formula reduction of tariffs 
for all countries, such that the maximum applied tariff will be 25%. It wants to expand tar-
iff rate quota and like the two other proposals, it wants to improve TRQ management. The 
features of the Swiss formula are highlighted in the box. 
  In the area of export competition it wants to eliminate export subsidies, and puts dis-
cussions on disciplines on export taxes and state trading enterprises (STEs) on the agenda. 
 
BOX: Different Types of Tariff Reduction (Swiss Formula) 
A widely used form to reduce tariffs in trade negotiation rounds is a proportional reduction: 
 
0 1 *t k t =     
 
The initial tariff (t0) is multiplied with a constant factor k, whose value is between 0 and 1. In the URAA an 
average tariff reduction of 36 % was decided, with a minimum of ???% per tariff line. Hence, the average 
value of k was 0.64, but it could differ per tariff line. A mayor drawback of proportional tariff reduction is 
that high tariffs are not reduced substantially. In the Tokyo-Round (1973-1979) of the WTO several proce-
dures were discussed in order to reduce high tariffs more drastically. The negotiations resulted in the so-










=     
a is a positive parameter. In the Tokyo Round a value of 0.14 was chosen. a is also the limit for t1 as t0 ap-
proaches infinity. This implies that no tariff would remain above a applying the Swiss Formula. Following 
Francois and Martin (2002) the Swiss formula has a number of desirable features. It is simple, with a single 
application of the formula being sufficient to bring about the required transformation of tariff rates. It is par-
ticularly effective in reducing peak tariffs. And, finally, it has the desirable feature of reducing higher tariff 
rates by more, in both absolute and relative terms, than lower tariff rates.  
 


























The figure above depicts both types of tariff reduction. While the horizontal axis presents the initial tariff, t0, 
and the new reduced tariff, t1, is shown on the vertical axis. A linear reduction of 36 % results in a straight 
line, which is intersected by the Swiss Formula reduction at a certain point (in this case the intersection is at 
an initial tariff of 7.9%. The figure shows that a) high tariffs are reduced more under the Swiss Formula, and 
(b) small tariffs are reduced less by the formula compared to a linear reduction.   199
  In the area of domestic support, the USA wants to eliminate the so-called blue box, 
which contains domestic subsidies exempt from reductions commitments under the 
URAA. It wants to limit the aggregate measurement of support (AMS) to 5% of the value 
of domestic production, while maintaining 'de minimis' exemptions for OECD countries. 
Special and differential treatment for developing countries is to be limited according to the 
USA proposal. 
  The proposal of the CAIRNS group
1, an association of major agricultural exporting 
countries, is similar to the USA proposal in the demands for market access in OECD coun-
tries, i.e. a Swiss formula reduction of tariffs and expansions of TRQs to increase market 
access. Unlike the USA proposal, the CAIRNS proposal mentions final URAA bound 
rates as the basis for discussions on further reductions. For OECD countries, the CAIRNS 
proposal calls for elimination of export subsidies, and like the USA proposal it wants as far 
as domestic support concerns to eliminate the blue box. A distinguishing feature of the 
proposal is its demand for a 50% down payment of reductions in tariffs and domestic sup-
port by OECD countries in the first implementation year. That is, OECD countries should 
avoid back loading of commitments by acting already in the first year of implementation. 
  However, unlike the USA proposal the CAIRNS proposal specifies more limited re-
ductions of tariffs for developing countries, as it is recognizing the difficulty for 
developing countries to reduce the sometimes extremely high tariffs (e.g. above 250%) to 
just 25%. The special and differential (S&D) treatment for developing countries, and espe-
cially LDCs, is mentioned in all areas of discussion, not only for market access but also for 
export competition and domestic support.  
  The proposal of the European Union looks like a repetition of the URAA outcomes, 
except for the fact that proposal contains numerous exceptions for developing countries. 
For example, the OECD countries are asked with regard to market access to reduce their 
bound tariffs on average by 36% (with an minimum of 15% per tariff line), but LDCs 
would be completely exempted from such reduction commitments. Also, the EU proposes 
unrestricted access, i.e. tariff- and quota free, to OECD markets by LDCs. The proposal 
also addresses tariff escalations in OECD markets and improved management of TRQs.  
  The formulation of 'average reductions' in tariffs deserves some attention. An aver-
age reduction percentage of 36% can in practice be achieved by reducing - or even 
eliminating - very low tariffs of, say, 2% to 1% while keeping high tariffs largely intact. In 
contrast, a reduction of the average provides much more scope to reducing tariffs across 
the board.  
  In terms of export competition, the EU proposes a 45% reduction of the budget ex-
penditures on export subsidies, and a complete elimination of subsidies for some key 
products such as wheat and oilseeds. The EU also calls for disciplines on export credits, 
food aid and STEs. 
  In the area of domestic support, the EU proposes a reduction of AMS by 55% from 
final bound rates for OECD countries, and elimination of 'de minimis' exemptions for 
OECD countries. The EU wants to maintain the blue box. 
                                                 
1 Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Fiji, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay    200
Table 6.2  Proposals to improve market access 
 USA  CAIRNS    EU 
Tariffs, OECD  Swiss formula, max tariff = 
25% 
Swiss formula, max tariff = 
25% 
-36% average reduction 
-100% on LDC imports 
 
Tariffs, LDC  Swiss formula, max tariff = 
25% 
3 types of reductions, allow-
ing import protection (max 
tariff = 125%) 
 
No change 
Base  Applied rates  Final bound rates URAA  Final bound rates URAA 
 
Other TRQ  management 
TRQ volumes + 20% 
Eliminate special safeguard 
TRQ volume + 20 % 
(LDC+14%) of domestic 
consumption 
50% down payment of total 





Table 6.3  Proposals to improve export competition 
 USA  CAIRNS    EU 
Export subsidies, 
OECD 





Eliminate for key prod-





n.a. S&D  treatment  n.a. 
Base  Applied rates  Final bound rates URAA  Final bound rates URAA 
 
Other Disciplines  on: 
Export credits, ex-
port taxes, STEs 
 
  Disciplines on export 
credits, food aid, STEs 
 
Table 6.4  Proposals to reduce domestic support 
 USA  CAIRNS    EU 
OECD  AMS ceiling  
<= 5% of value of domestic 
production 
 
Eliminate blue box 
 




Eventually eliminate blue box 
 




Maintain blue box 
LDC  Limit S&D treatment   S&D treatment  Development box: no  
reductions 
 
Base  Applied rates  Final bound rates URAA  Final bound rates URAA 
 
Other  Maintain green box  Maintain green box 
50% down payment by OECD 
countries in first year 
Eliminate de minimis for 
OECD   201
  The proposal of the USA for reduction of domestic support will have more conse-
quences for the EU than for the USA. Although table 6.5 may suggest otherwise, the USA 
proposal implies that the US does not have to make much reductions of domestic support. 
This follows from the fact that most payments are already 'green', and the rest is within the 
5% de minimis provision (excluded from table 6.5). The EU, in contrast, will have to make 
substantial reductions under this proposal. For CAIRNS group countries and developing 
countries very small reductions arise, if at all, because they do not use their de miminis. 
  The EU proposal implies that both the EU (-38%) and the USA (–17%) will have to 
reduce their applied domestic support. Developing countries are basically exempt from re-
ductions. Compared to the USA proposal, the proposal of the EU will result in a more 
limited decrease in domestic support for the EU and, during the first 5 years, in a bit higher 
reduction of domestic support in the USA. 
 
 









ber box and 
blue box  
payments  
USA proposal 
Limit after 5 
years 
Cairns group  
proposal 
EU proposal 
            
USA 19.1  5%  10.4   
(year 1998)  
 
10.0 0  9 
EU 67.2  20%  48.9  (amber) 
+20.6 (blue) 
10.9 0  30  (maintain 
blue) 
Source: Josling, 2003(table 1 and table 2), and own calculations from EU notification to the WTO: 
G/AG/EEC/38 (27 June 2002) and US notification to the WTO: G/AG/USA/36 (26 June 2001) 
Note: current AMS excludes de minimis support. 
 
 
6.2.2 Modelling issues 
 
The evaluation of the proposals will be concentrated on the proposals to reduce import tar-
iffs (and to increase TRQs), export subsidies and domestic support. Other proposals as 
more disciplines on food aid (EU) and export credits (EU and USA) will have also an im-
pact on international trade. However, modelling of these proposals is difficult and they will 
remain out of the scope of the model simulations in this study.  
  The evaluation of market access proposals is not based on evaluations by detailed 
tariff line, but is applied to GTAP aggregate sectors. This is admittedly a crude approxima-
tion, as it does not allow the study of certain tariff peaks that may exist within the broader 
product groups that we distinguish. Although the GTAP database does not distinguish 
bound and applied rates, we nevertheless treat the binding overhang by using scaling fac-
tors from Francois and Martin (2002) to approximate difference between bound and 
applied rates. This implies that the tariff reductions for OECD countries, except Japan, fol-
lows the reduction of bound rates (zero binding overhang), and for developing countries 
the actual reduction of applied rates depends on the size of the binding overhang. By and   202
large, this means that developing countries have to make only minor reductions in their ap-
plied rates. 
  The modelling of reductions of domestic support necessarily relies on some ap-
proximations. This is so, because the actual rules for AMS calculations are not only very 
product specific, but also allow for some leeway in the calculations and the notifications. 
Table 6.5 provides some background on the current AMS and the implications of the vari-
ous proposals for the AMS ceilings. The table also includes the Harbinson compromise 
proposal as a reference. For the simulations in this chapter, we have used the countries' 
AMS commitments for the year 2000. In order to break down the implications for the do-
mestic support categories (amber, blue and green box) according to the USA and CAIRNS 
proposals we have used information from Brink (2002). For EU proposal we calculated 
these ourselves from EU (2002). The aggregate AMS reductions had to be translated to 
GTAP subsidy parameters, mainly payments to land, capital and output. This makes it nec-
essary to identify the portion of exempt payments (green and blue if applicable) included in 
the GTAP data. This is done by using information from Jensen 2002 (in the GTAP data 
documentation) and from ERS (2002,Appendix table 2.1). 
  While our study attempts to assess the impact of the proposals of the USA, the EU 
and the CAIRNS-group on agriculture, it maintains also assumptions on reductions of bar-
riers in manufacturing and services. This involves a 50 % reduction in industrial tariffs and 
export subsidies, a 50% reduction in the tariff-equivalent of services barriers and a partial 
reduction in trading costs, related to trade facilitation measures. Estimates of services pro-
tection are taken from Francois et al. (2003). The results of the evaluation have to be seen 
as the combined effect of liberalisation in all three sectors. 
  The simulations are relative to the baseline situation for 2010. That is, we assume a 
successful completion of the Doha round in 2005, and an implementation period between 
2005 and 2010. Our results in the subsequent section reflect the situation in 2010 with the 
proposals implemented relative to the baseline without further liberalisation.  
  No matter how complex, an economic model remains a necessary simplification of 
reality. Thus this model is heavily dominated by clearly quantifiable factors, such as re-
duced import tariffs, reduced export subsidies and reduced domestic support. Non-
quantitative trade restrictions, such as those facing the services sector, are usually not in-
cluded in quantitative analyses. This carries the risk of underestimating the importance of 
these less visible trade restrictions. Effects of and reducing administrative barriers facing 
exporters and importers at border-crossings, effects of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary stan-
dards, and effects of quality standards in food trade may be attempted in the future. 
 
 
6.3  Assessment of global effects 
 
The implementation of the proposals would increase global trade volumes in all commodi-
ties and services by 3% to 3.5% in 2010 (Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2). This is a positive 
result as such, as more trade enables countries to better utilize their own strengths. Agricul-
tural exporters, such as South America and Australia, are expected to gain most from 
improved market access to agricultural markets. The more drastic market access proposals 
by the USA and CAIRNS yield the largest export effects.   203
  Asian countries are expected to show more export growth also in manufactures. Es-
pecially poor Asian countries that currently limit their participation in the global trade 
system and other developing countries start to compete on the global market with supplies 



















Baseline Doha development round
 
Figure 6.1  Expansion of global trade volumes 
Source: Model simulations. 
 
 












Figure 6.2  Export trade effects in 2010 (%)  
Source: model simulations   204
  As a result of liberalisation worldwide static income gains from the proposals are es-
timated to be in the order of magnitude of 0.3% of world GDP (100 billion USD) in 2010 
(Table 6.6). Dynamic gains and scale economies, which are not included in this study, po-
tentially multiply these gains.  
  The global income effect of the EU proposal is about ¾ of that of the USA and 
CAIRNS proposal. In particular the income gains for the OECD countries are less than 
those of both other proposals. In all three proposals the income gains for the non-OECD 
countries amount between 35 and 40 billion dollar. Although the absolute income gains in 
this group are not as high in dollar terms as the gains for the OECD group, the non-OECD 
countries register the higher benfits relative to their current income levels. 
  In table 6.6 a distinction is made in liberalisation in OECD countries and in non-
OECD countries. About sixty percent of the income gains are the result of liberalisation by 
the OECD countries and about 40% of these global income gains can only be realized if 
non-OECD countries participate actively in the reform process. The developing countries 
not only profit from the liberalisation in the OECD countries, but they profit also from par-
ticipation in the liberalisation process. About 37% of there own gains are a consequence of 
own reforms. So it is important for developing countries themselves to participate actively 
in the liberalisation process.  
  For developed countries even more than forty percent of the income gains depend 
from active participation of developing countries in the liberation process. The smaller in-
come gains of the EU proposal for the OECD countries is due to both a limied 
liberalisation effort by OECD countries and to a smaller contribution of liberalisation of 
non-OECD countries. 
  In table 6.7 a decomposition of income gains is made by sectors, and in table 6.8 we 
decompose by liberalisation measures and group of countries. Both tables provide insight 
to which extent sector policies in OECD countries effect income in non-OECD countries 
and the other way around.  
 
 
Table 6.6  National income effects of implementation in OECD and non-OECD countries in 2010 in bil-
lions of dollars (based on equivalent variation), relative to baseline 'no Doha' 
 
 
 TOTAL  (%)  OECD  non-OECD 
 
 
OECD EU  proposal  40  (53)  22  19 
 USA  proposal  62  (61)  36 26 
 CAIRNS  proposal  64  (63)  39 26 
 
Non-OECD EU  proposal  35  (47)  22  12 
 USA  proposal  39  (39)  25 14 
 CAIRNS  proposal  38  (37)  24 14 
 
WORLD EU  proposal  75  (100)  43  32 
  USA proposal  101 (100)  61  40 
  CAIRNS proposal  102 (100)  62  41 
 
 
Source: model simulations.   205
  About one third (EU proposal) to about the half (USA/CAIRNS proposals) of the in-
come gains are due to agricultural liberalisation. On average 24% of the global income 
gains are from manufactures and 32% from services. Liberalisation in manufacturing in 
developed countries will result in income gains for non-OECD countries, however in in-
come losses for OECD countries themselves (see Appendix 6.1). On the other hand OECD 
countries will benefit of liberalisation in manufacturing in non-OECD countries. Within in 
the services sector in particular OECD countries will gain from liberalisation in developed 
countries (see Appendix 6.1).  
  Liberalisation in agriculture appears, as far as income gains are concerned, to be 
more important for developed countries than for the developing countries. The same holds 
for the services sector. On the other hand liberalisation in the manufacturing sector is more 
important for the developing countries as about 50% of their income gains comes from lib-
eralisation in this sector.  
 
 
Table 6.7  National income affects for OECD and non-OECD countries in 2010 in billions of dollars  
    (based on equivalent variation), relative to baseline 'no Doha' 
 
 
   TOTAL  (%)  Agriculture  Manufactures  Services 
 
 
OECD  EU proposal  40 (53)  15  4  22  
 USA  proposal  62  (61) 37  3  22 
 CAIRNS  proposal  64  (63) 40  3  22 
 
Non-OECD EU  proposal  35  (47)  7  18  9 
 USA  proposal  39  (39) 11  19  9 
 CAIRNS  proposal  38  (37) 10  19  9 
 
WORLD EU  proposal  75  (100)  23  22  30 
  USA proposal  101 (100)  49  22  30 
   CAIRNS proposal  102 (100)  51  22  30 
 
 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
  As said above agricultural liberalisation appears to be particularly profitable for the 
OECD countries. To a large extent this will be the fruit of liberalisation in the OECD coun-
tries themselves (see table 6.8). The contribution of decreasing domestic support is almost 
equal to the contribution of trade barriers. Hence, domestic agricultural reform benefits 
mostly the taxpayers and consumers in OECD countries, because these countries have the 
highest distortions. However, agricultural liberalisation in the non-OECD countries also 
contributes to income gains in the OECD countries.   206
 
 
Table 6.8  National income effects of reduction agricultural protection according proposals for OECD and non-OECD countries in 2010 in billions of 






Reduction trade  
barriers by OECD 
Reduction domestic support by 
 
 
       OECD  Non-  OECD 
        
OECD  EU proposal   40 (53)  15  5  4  6 
   USA proposal   62 (61)  27  14  10  13 
   CAIRNS proposal   64 (63)  40  14  13  13 
        
Non-OECD  EU proposal   35 (47)  7  5  -1  3 
   USA proposal   39 (39)  12  7  -1  5 
   CAIRNS proposal   38 (37)  10  7  -2  5 
        
WORLD  EU proposal   75 (100)  23  10  3  10 
   USA proposal   101 (100)  39  21  10  18 
   CAIRNS proposal   102 (100)  41  21  11  19 
Source: model simulations. 
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  For the non-OECD countries the effect on income of agricultural liberalisation in 
OECD countries is as important as agricultural liberalisation within their own group of 
countries. The income gains to non-OECD countries from better market access to OECD 
countries are expected to be limited to USD 5-7 billion. However, agricultural reform in 
OECD countries is not necessarily beneficial for developing countries. As trade barriers 
are lowered, domestic support is reduced and export subsidies are lowered, world prices 
for staple commodities such as grains are expected to rise. As a consequence, importers 
will witness higher import prices. 
 
 
Table 6.9  Agricultural income, Percent change in 2010, relative to baseline 'no Doha' 
 Proposal: 
 EU USA CAIRNS
EU15 -5% -11% -11%
USA 1% 7% 3%
AUS & New Zeal  8% 23% 24%
South America  2% 5% 6%
 
China 3% 4% 5%
LDCs 7% 2% 3%
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
  Zooming in on the effect of implementation of the proposals on agricultural incomes, 
we estimate wide differences between the proposals (see table 6.9). Each proposal maxi-
mizes benefits for the own agricultural sector, or in the case of the EU minimizes the loss, 
by maintaining the blue box support. Even with maintenance of the blue box, the EU ap-
pears to be willing to accept a reduction of agricultural incomes by 5%. Both the USA and 
CAIRNS proposal benefit agricultural exporting countries by improving market access, 
and world prices are rising more than under the EU proposal. 
  The EU proposal appears to be the most favourable for LDCs, by allowing substan-
tial exemptions and by limiting the upward effects on world market prices. Not too high 
world prices are beneficial for agriculture-importing LDCs.  
  The effects on China's agricultural incomes are not estimated to be very large. The 
USA and CAIRNS proposal have comparatively greater effects, because they more aggres-
sively open the protected markets of Japan and Korea through the Swiss formula approach.  
 
 
6.4.  Assessment of effects on China 
 
Given that China has already reduced its own import barriers in the WTO accession proc-
ess, there is not much to gain on the import side. Most gains can be expected on the export-
oriented industries. However, the share of exports relative to domestic production is rather 
low, except for some processed food products and textile and garments. Hence, even sub-
stantial tariff cuts by importers will have only a small impact on production.    208
6.4.1 National  income  effects 
 
In terms of national income, China belongs to the countries that gain most from the new 
round. China is estimated to capture about 8% of the global income gains in 2010 (static 
gains, measured as equivalent variation), while its share in world GDP is around 3%. The 
estimated income gains amount to about US$ 8 billion, or US$ 6 per head. This is about 
0.8% of national income while, as mentioned above, total global gains amount to 0.3% of 
global income.  
  More than seventy percent of the gains for China are due to liberalisation in the 
manufacturing sector. About 60% of the gains are attributed to improved market access for 
manufacturing products in OECD markets, and 12% is due to liberalisation in the manufac-
turing by non-OECD countries. About 13% (EU proposal) to 17% (USA proposal) of the 
income gains are due to agricultural liberalisation (see figure 6.3). This is to a large extent 
the result of increased access to OECD markets. The contribution of domestic agricultural 
reforms in OECD countries is very limited and smaller than 2% of the total national in-
come gains to China. Also for services the income gains are limited. 
  An important share in the gains is due to the textile sector. While export quota for 
textiles and garments are (supposed) to be eliminated under the phase out of the MFA un-
der the WTO-ATC by 31 December 2004, there are currently still import tariffs in 
developed countries and developing countries. Under the Doha round proposals these are 
expected to be reduced, and this will lead to an additional boost for Chinese textiles and 
garments industries. Additional export growth under the Doha proposals is estimated at 
around 8% in 2010. This will have also an effect on agriculture, as it will increase the de-





























Figure 6.3  Liberalisation proposals, size and sources of national income gains for China 
Source: Model simulations. 
 
 
  However, an important observation has to be made with regard to the development of 
Chinese competitiveness. The Chinese manufacturing industries sees an erosion of their   209
terms of trade, driven by its growth in textile exports, combined with increased competi-
tion from other low wage countries. Natural competitors, such as India, currently limit their 
participation on world markets through a mix of import and export barriers. Rationalization 
in this area by developing countries leads to heightened competition against China in a 
number of sectors, with the result being income losses for China driven almost entirely by 
manufacturing and agricultural liberalization in the developing world.  
  The differences in estimated income gains between the proposals is limited, for the 
USA and CAIRNS proposal it is a bit more and for the EU proposal a bit less than US$ 8 
billion. This has to a large extent to do with differences in the proposal for agricultural lib-
eralisation. Chinese exports encounter high tariffs on some agricultural products (see, 
Figure 6.4). This is mainly due to the high import barriers in the main export destinations 
Japan and Korea. Because import tariffs are very high for some agricultural products there 
will be a big difference between linear tariffs cut used in EU proposal and Swiss formula 
cuts in USA and CAIRNS proposal. Cuts will be much higher in the USA/Cairns proposals 
for these products.  
 
 
6.4.2 Structural effects 
 
In this section we explain the structural impact of the three WTO proposals. To increase 
understanding we first describe the policy landscape for China and the self-sufficiency in-
dex

































Figure 6.4  Average import tariffs (%), China, 2005 
                                                 
1 self-sufficiency is defined as the ratio of domestic production over domestic absorption.   210
and imports. The development of exports and imports together with their importance, as 
measured by the self-sufficiency index, determines partly the production impact. 
  Figure 6.4 shows that in general the tariffs are higher on Chinese exports than on 
Chinese imports. Exceptions are sugar, cotton (plant fibres), fish and labour intensive 
manufacturing. Chinese exports encounter high tariffs for rice, wheat and coarse grains. 
This is mainly due to the high import barriers in Japan and Korea. Because import tariffs 
are very high for these products there will be a big difference between linear tariffs cut 
used in EU proposal and Swiss formula in USA and CAIRNS proposal. Cuts will be much 






























Figure 6.5  Growth in Chinese exports (% change) 
Source: Model Simulations. 
 
 
  A reduction in these tariffs leads to expected export and import changes in China 
(see Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.7). It matters a lot which formula is used. With the Swiss for-
mula (USA and Cairns proposal) the increase in Chinese exports of rice and wheat is very 
high (see Figure 6.5). However, we have to take into account that the wheat exports are 
almost zero, so the additional value of wheat exports is very limited. The higher initial tar-
iffs on Chinese exports of sugar, cattle and dairy create also export opportunities, although 
the export value in these products is low. Within the non-agricultural sectors, processed 
food and textiles obtain the highest export growth rates. For example, exports of processed 
foods are estimated to grow respectively 6% (EU proposal), 16% (USA proposal) and 14% 
(CAIRNS proposals) in 2010. This growth is mainly attributed to improved access to 
OECD markets (see figure 6.6).  

































Figure 6.6  Growth in Chinese imports (% change) 
Source: Model Simulations. 
 
 
  The growth is not so high as expected in 'other crops' (mainly horticulture) and 
coarse grains. For other crops the main reason is that competitors on Chinese important 
export markets SEA and to a lesser extent the EU encounter even higher protection (or 
other product mix) and they gain relatively more: i.e. they gain a price advantage over 
Chinese exports on these markets. For coarse grains the tariff is especially high on Japan-
Korean market. However, after opening of the market, SAM and NAFTA profit more than 
China. 
  Imports increase for most products. This is due to the reduction in import tariffs and 
also to the relatively high increase in real factor prices. Real factor prices increase more in 
China because it benefits more (see previous section). However an implication is that it 
makes Chinese products more expensive relative to imports from other countries were the 
increase in factor prices is less.  
  Imports increase relatively fast in processed food and textiles. Tariffs are relatively 
high in these sectors and markets are very competitive. Imports decrease for extraction and 
wheat because tariff on imports are very low.  
  For oilseeds, sugar, cotton, extraction and capital-intensive industries imports are 
important as the self-sufficiency ratio is below one. Here, we observe an intensified com-
petition with foreign suppliers and an increase in imports if trade barriers due to China's 
WTO accession are lowered. On the other hand, we have the processed food industry and 
textile industries. These are clear net-export products, where self-sufficiency exceeds one, 
and which indicate a strong comparative advantage in these products. To a lesser extent 
'other crops' (horticulture) and fish are also net-export products. For all these sectors access 
to foreign markets is important. 
  Figure 6.8 displays the net effect of changing imports and exports in the sectoral 
trade balance for China. It is clearly seen that the trade balance for agricultural products is   212
affected only very little, while the manufacturing an services trade balances show larger 
changes in dollar terms.  
 
























Figure 6.7  Liberalisation proposals: size and sources of Chinese export growth of processed food  




































































































Change under USA/CAIRNS proposal Change under EU proposal
Baseline 2010 (non Doha)
 
Figure 6.8  Chinese sectoral trade balance (exports minus imports) 
Source: Model Simulations.   213
  Figure 6.9 shows the impact of the three proposals on production. There are some 
important differences between the impact of the EU and USA/Cairns proposals. In the lat-
ter the larger cut in the higher tariffs due to the Swiss formula creates more trade and 
production opportunities for rice, wheat, coarse grains, and processed food. Coarse grains 
contracts in the EU proposal and grows in USA/Cairns proposal. The latter is caused by 
large reduction in Japan/Korea reductions in import tariffs, however other exporters profit 

































Figure 6.9  Growth in Chinese production (% quantity change) 




  Processed food and textiles obtain the highest production gain. In these sectors, 
China has already a comparative advantage, and exports are an important part of total de-
mand. For processed food tariffs cuts are relatively high and exports are important (see 
high self-sufficiency ratio). For textiles tariff cuts are modest but exports are very impor-
tant, so export growth leads to growth production. There is also an increase in dairy and 




By and large, the further liberalisation stimulates a development to exploit the comparative 
advantage of China in these sectors. This holds in particular for horticultural products and 
processed food. While exports are estimated to grow in some products, the further reduc-
tion of remaining import barriers also enables China to import more products. Imports in 
such commodities as coarse grains, sugar, cotton, dairy and intensive livestock products 
are expected to rise.    214
  It can be concluded that China can gain a lot from a new WTO round, but most from 
liberalisation in manufacturing. Around 60% of the potential income gains can be attrib-
uted to improved market access for manufacturing goods into OECD countries. Labour 
intensive manufacturing and food processing industries have the potential to absorb labour 
and generate incomes in activities outside primary agriculture. Expanding labour intensive 
industries in rural areas may be part of a rural development strategy.  
 
 
6.5  Effects on the European Union 
 
The various proposals will have different impacts on the European Union. The European 
Union is a customs union, with a common external tariff against supplies from third coun-
tries, and practically zero tariffs within the union. The formation of the EU customs union 
leads, by definition, to trade preferences amongst the members of the free trade area. As a 
consequence the share of trade that is within the EU (intra-EU trade) is typically biased 
upward, and trade within the EU is larger than might be expected on the basis of geo-
graphic proximity and other trade promoting factors alone. With the recent eastward 
enlargement the preferences are extended from the current 15 EU members to the 10 new 
member states. Recall that the enlargement process has been incorporated in our baseline 
scenario. 
The lowering of external trade barriers by the EU will inevitably lead to the erosion 
of the intra-EU trade preferences. Suppliers with lower cost will be able to enter the EU 
markets once the tariff barriers have come down that currently shield domestic producers 
from foreign competition. Consequently, we can expect the current bias towards intra-EU 
trade to be reduced. Table 6.10 nicely illustrates this effect by breaking down the simulated 
change in EU15 export values for two of the liberalisation scenarios. 
  The 1% growth in EU15 exports is small compared to the 3% - 3.5% growth in world 
trade. A first driver of this result is that EU countries mostly trade amongst themselves. 
The share of intra-EU exports amounting to more than 56%.The benefits from removing 
the intra-EU barriers have already been realised in the past and there are no additional 
gains for intra-EU trade in a new WTO round. A second driver of this result is the in-
creased competition from non-EU countries on EU markets. Simulated intra-EU trade 
shrinks by more than 3% as other suppliers enter the EU markets.  
  Comparing the USA proposal and EU's own proposal reiterates that the more modest 
EU proposal leads overall to smaller increases in trade. The EU's exports typcially decrease 
in those agricultural sectors that are currently subject to much government intervention: 
Grains, sugar and beef. In contrast, 'other crops'(horticulture), processed foods and even 
dairy witness increased export revenues.  
  The dairy industry is an interesting case. Under the USA proposal dairy exports to 
China are simulated to decline, whereas under the EU proposal we simulate a slight posi-
tive growth. This indicates that the EUs dairy exports would benefit from less drastic 
reductions in export subsidies and in domestic compensation payments. Note, that table 
6.10 reports export revenues f.o.b., i.e. including export subsidies.  
  However, the largest changes in EU-China exports are observed in manufacturing 
exports. One should not be mislead to the conclusion that EU manufacturers would   215 
 
 
Table 6.10  Exports of the European Union in 2010 
  Export values baseline 2010 (no Doha) (*)  USA proposal  EU proposal 
 Total
(bln US$)
of which intra 
EU (%)
of which to 
China (%)
Change (%) of which intra 
EU (%)
of which to 
China (%)
Change (%) of which intra 
EU (%)
of which to 
China (%) 
Rice 1.2 67.3 0.0 -35.4 -50.1 n.a. -24.1 -35.4 n.a. 
Wheat 4.9 56.6 0.2 -31.0 -33.8 -25.0 -13.8 -15.9 -12.5 
Cgrains 3.6 64.1 1.9 -37.4 -29.8 -51.5 -15.9 -15.6 -13.6 
Oilseeds 12.6 58.1 4.0 -8.1 -11.0 3.3 -4.1 -7.5 7.3 
Sugar 3.4 41.0 0.4 -56.8 -55.0 -66.7 -28.2 -33.9 -25.0 
Pfb 0.6 27.5 0.7 10.3 6.1 50.0 4.3 1.2 25.0 
OthCrop 32.3 73.7 0.0 7.8 -1.1 33.3 0.9 -3.6 16.7 
Ctl 10.8 72.6 0.0 -40.7 -42.8 -66.7 -11.0 -14.6 0.0 
Oap 23.5 61.8 0.6 11.8 -1.3 20.3 5.4 -2.2 21.0 
Milk 21.2 68.5 0.2 2.3 -14.4 -15.8 0.3 -5.3 2.6 
Fish 4.2 77.8 2.8 -0.8 -1.6 9.5 -0.1 -1.7 12.9 
Ofood 82.2 58.8 0.9 4.8 -11.1 50.4 1.2 -8.1 34.5 
Extract 37.2 66.5 1.4 0.9 -0.4 3.1 0.6 -0.3 3.3 
TexLea 100.5 59.4 0.7 -3.5 -12.1 30.2 -2.9 -11.4 29.3 
LabintMan 445.3 66.9 0.6 1.3 -3.0 28.5 0.8 -3.3 26.9 
CapIntMan 1197.1 55.6 1.6 1.2 -2.1 12.6 1.0 -2.2 12.0 
Svces 413.9 41.3 2.1 2.0 -3.2 9.3 1.4 -3.6 8.6 
Total 2394.5 56.2 1.4 1.0 -3.7 13.7 0.7 -3.4 12.8 
Notes: (*) Values including export subsidies   216
successfully compete with labour intensive Chinese produce. The imports from China are 
increasing much faster. However, the results indicate that there might still be certain mar-




6.6 Discussion  and  conclusion 
 
This chapter shows that the static gains from global liberalisation in the Doha round may 
amount to about 0.3% of world GDP. This estimate does not take into account dynamic ef-
fects such as capital accumulation and technology spillovers. Relative to their GDP, low 
income countries are the greatest beneficiaries of improved market access and reduced 
domestic support to agriculture in OECD countries. For some poor African and Asian 
countries the income gains can be as high as 1.5% - 2% of their GDP. However, the reali-
zation of these potential gains for LDCs depends very much on an active participation of 
LDCs in the liberalisation effort.  
  Under the proposals studied here, the main beneficiaries from agricultural liberalisa-
tion are exporting countries, especially in the USA and CAIRNS proposals because they go 
further in improving market access than the EU proposal. As far as the effects of domestic 
reforms in OECD countries are concerned, the simulations show that the world market ef-
fects are not very big and are not always positive for everyone. Especially LDC food 
importers may witness rising world food prices.  
  China can clearly gain from the Doha round. It is estimated to capture 8% of global 
income gains while its share in world GDP is around 3%. However, its interests in agricul-
ture seem to be covered by proposals that other players have already made. Therefore, 
China might very well want to free ride on proposals by others, rather than developing an 
own position in the negotiations on the 'classic' agricultural agenda. This may be quite dif-
ferent in the areas of food quality and food safety, where China clearly has an active 
interest in SPS and TBT issues. Modelling of food safety related impediments to trade is 
clearly an area of future research.  
  The largest gains for China are not to be found in the agricultural dossier, but in im-
proved markets access for labour intensive manufacturing. As far as the textile industry 
and the food industry are concerned this will increase the demand for agricultural products 
like cotton and raw materials for the food processing industry. Expanding labour intensive 
industries, fostered also by new export opportunities, may be part of a rural development 
strategy that includes labour absorption into industries outside primary agriculture.   217
Chapter 7  Biotechnology boosts to crop productivity in  
      China: trade and welfare implications 
 
 
Genetically modified (GM) cotton is widely adopted and the list of GM technologies in tri-
als is impressive in China.
1 At the same time there is an active debate on when China 
should commercialize its GM food crops. This chapter provides an economy-wide assess-
ment of some of the issues surrounding the adoption and commercialization of 
biotechnology. Based on unique data from empirical micro-level study and field trials in 
China and a modified GTAP model, our results indicate that the development of biotech-
nology has an important impact on China's production, trade and welfare. Welfare gains far 
outweigh the public biotechnology research expenditures. Most gains occur inside China, 
and can be achieved independently from biotech-unfriendly polices adopted in some indus-





Because biotechnology - one of this century's most promising and innovative technologies 
- employs genetic modification techniques, it has spurred worldwide debate. The debate 
has been going on for decades now and has had a significantly depressing impact on the 
supply of biotechnology. In the meantime, the demand for the technology has continued to 
grow rapidly: the global area of GM crops increased from 1.7 million ha in 1996 to 52.6 
million ha in 2001 (James, 2002). 
  China was one of the first countries to introduce a GM crop commercially, and cur-
rently has the fourth largest GM crop area, after the USA, Argentina and Canada (James, 
2002). China's agricultural biotechnology development is an interesting case and is unique 
in many respects. The public sector dominates the industry and the list of GM crops under-
going trials differs from those being worked on in other countries where the technologies 
are dominated by the private sector (Huang et al., 2002a). The Chinese government views 
agricultural biotechnology as a tool to help China improve the nation's food security, in-
crease agricultural productivity and farmers' incomes, foster sustainable development and 
improve its competitive position in international agricultural markets (SSTC, 1990). In 
2001, approximately four million small farmers in China adopted Bt cotton (Pray et al., 
2002). 
  On the other hand, there is growing concern among policy makers regarding the im-
pact of the ongoing global debate about biotechnology on China's agricultural trade, 
biosafety and the potential opposition derived from public concerns about the environ-
mental and the food safety of GM products. Because of this, although GM crops are still 
cultivated in public research institutes, the approval of GM crops (and particularly of food 
crops) for commercialization has become more difficult since late 1998 (Huang et al., 
                                                 
1 The chapter has benefited from statistical support provided by Ninghui Li and Cunhui Fan.     218
2001). This reflects the influence of the global debate about GM crops on Chinese policy 
makers, in particular restrictions on imports to EU countries. China also appears to take a 
more cautious stance. For example, in January 2002 the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) 
announced three new regulations on the biosafety management, trade and labeling of GM 
farm products. These regulations came into effect on 20 March 2002 and require importers 
of GM agricultural products to apply to China's MoA for official safety verification ap-
proval, leading US producers to accuse Beijing of using the new rules to hinder imports 
and protect Chinese soybean farmers. 
  China, like many other developing countries, now has to decide how to proceed on 
the further commercialization of GM crops. Policy makers have raised several issues. 
Should China continue to promote its agricultural biotechnology and commercialize its 
GM food crops (i.e. rice and soybean)? How important are the trade restrictions imposed 
on GM products, particularly those imposed by the EU and by other countries in East 
Asia? What will be the impact of alternative biotechnology policies (in both China and the 
rest of world) on China's agricultural economy and trade? Answers to these questions are 
of critical importance for policy makers and the agricultural industry. 
  The central theme of this paper is to provide a cost-benefit analysis of research and 
development of GM crops in China in the face of likely international policy developments. 
To achieve this, the paper is organized as follows. In section two, a general review of agri-
cultural biotechnology development in China is provided. The impacts of Bt cotton 
adoption in China are presented in Section three. The results from the empirical studies on 
Bt cotton and the hypothesized results of GM rice commercialization are the data used for 
the later simulation analyses with a tailored version of the multi-country general equilib-
rium GTAP model. Section four presents the model and scenarios that are used in the 
impact assessments. The results of the impacts of alternative biotechnology development 
strategies are discussed in section five. The final section provides concluding remarks and 
areas for policy actions. 
 
 
7.2  Agricultural Biotechnology Development in China 
 
7.2.1 An overview 
 
Biotechnology in China has a long history. Several research institutes within the CAAS 
(the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences), the CAS (the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences) and various universities initiated their first agricultural biotechnology research 
programs in the early 1970s.
1 However, the most significant progress in agricultural bio-
technology has been made since China initiated a national high-tech program (the '863' 
program) in March 1986. Since then, agricultural biotechnology laboratories have been es-
tablished in almost every agricultural academy and major university. There are now over 
100 laboratories in China involved in transgenic plant research (Chen, 2000). By 2000, 
eighteen GM crops had been generated by Chinese research institutes; four of these crops 
                                                 
1 The research focus of biotechnology in the 1970s was cell engineering, tissue culture and cell fusion. Re-
search in cell and tissue culture covered such crops as rice, wheat, maize, cotton, vegetables, etc. (KLCMCB, 
1996). Several advanced rice varieties were generated through anther culture in the 1970s and 1980s.   219
have been approved for commercialization since 1997.
1 GM varieties in such crops as rice, 
maize, wheat, soybean, peanut, etc. are either in the research pipeline or are ready for 
commercialization (Chen, 2000; Li, 2000; Huang et al., 2002a). 
  A cotton variety with the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) gene to control the bollworm is 
one of the most oft-cited examples of the progress of agricultural biotechnology in China. 
Since the first Bt cotton variety was approved for commercialization in 1997, the total area 
under Bt cotton has reached nearly 1.5 million ha (2001), accounting for 45% of China's 
cotton area (Table 7.1). In addition, other transgenic plants with resistance to insects, dis-
ease and herbicides, or which have been quality-modified, have been approved for field 
release and are ready for commercialization. These include transgenic varieties of cotton 
resistant to fungal disease, rice resistant to insect pests and diseases, wheat resistant to the 
barley yellow dwarf virus, maize resistant to insects and with improved quality, soybeans 




Table 7.1  Bt cotton adoption in China 
   1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Cotton area (000 ha)  4091 4064 3423 3732 4447
 Region I  1641 1530 1366 1655 2012
 Region II  919 848 573 613 731
 Region III  1531 1686 1484 1464 1704
Bt cotton area (000 ha)  27 254 633 1153 2011
 Region I  21 237 594 1043 1704
 Region II  0 1 8 33 131
 Region III  6 16 31 77 176
Bt cotton (%)  1 6 18 31 45
 R e g i o n  I   1 1 54 36 3 8 5
 Region II  0 0 1 5 18
 Region III  0 1 2 5 10
Note: Region I includes Hebei, Shangdong and Henan, regional II includes Anhui, Jiangsu and Hubei, and all 
rest of China are in region III. 
Source: Author's surveys. 
 
 
Progress in plant biotechnology has also been made in recombinant microorganisms such 
as soybean nodule bacteria, nitrogen-fixing bacteria for rice and corn, and phytase from re-
combinant yeasts for feed additives. Nitrogen-fixing bacteria and phytase have been 
commercialized since 1999. In animals, transgenic pigs and carps have been produced 
                                                 
1 These are Bt cotton, tomatoes with resistance to insects or with improved shelf-life, a petunia with altered 
flower colour, and sweet pepper resistant to diseases. However, before these four crops were approved for 
commercialization, the first commercial release of a GM crop in the world occurred in 1992 when Chinese 
farmers first adopted transgenic tobacco varieties. But Chinese farmers have not been allowed to grow GM 
tobacco since 1995 due to strong opposition from tobacco importers in the USA and certain other countries.   220
since 1997 (NCBED, 2000). China was the first country to complete the shrimp genome 
sequencing in 2000. 
 
7.2.2 Research priorities 
 
Rice, wheat and maize are the three most important crops in China. Each accounts for 
about 20 percent of the total area planted. The production and market stability of these 
three crops are a prime concern of the Chinese government as they are central to China's 
food security. National food security, particularly related to grains, is a central goal of 
China's agricultural and food policy and has been incorporated into biotechnology research 
priority setting (Huang et al., 2001). 
  China's biotechnology program has also selected cotton as a targeted crop because of 
its large sown area, its contributions to the textile industry and trade, and the serious prob-
lems with the associated rapid increase in pesticide applications to control insects (i.e., 
bollworm and aphids). Pesticide expenditures in cotton production in China increased con-
siderably in the past decades, reaching RMB yuan 834 (approximately US $ 100) per 
hectare in 1995. In recent years, cotton production alone consumed about US$ 500 million 
annually in pesticides. 
  Genetic traits viewed as priorities may be transferred into target crops. Priority traits 
include those related to insect and disease resistance, stress tolerance, and quality im-
provement (Huang et al., 2002). Pest resistance traits have top priority over all traits. 
Recently, quality improvement traits have been included as priority traits in response to in-
creased market demand for quality foods. In addition, stress tolerance traits - particularly 
resistance to drought - are gaining attention with the growing concern over water shortages 
in northern China. 
 
7.2.3 GM cotton and rice 
 
China is one of the world's leading countries in the production of GM cotton and rice and 
the related technology (Table 7.2). The Biotechnology Research Institute (BRI) of CAAS 
developed insect-resistant Bt cotton. The Bt gene's modification and plant vector construc-
tion technique was granted a patent in China in 1998. The Bt gene was introduced into 
major cotton varieties using the pollen tube pathway developed in China (Guo and Cui, 
1998 and 2000). By early 2002, sixteen Bt cotton varieties with resistance to bollworms 
generated by China's public institutions and five Bt cotton varieties from Monsanto had 
been approved for commercialization in nine provinces. 
  The BRI of CAAS recently made the other breakthrough in plant disease resistance 
by developing cotton resistant to fungal diseases (Table 7.2). Glucanase, glucoxidase and 
chitnase genes were introduced into major cotton varieties. Transgenic cotton lines with 
enhanced resistance to Verticillium and Fusarium were approved for environmental release 
in 1999 (BRI, 2000). 
  More efforts have been put on the GM rice sector. Numerous research institutes and 
universities have been working on transgenic rice resistant to insects since the early 1990s. 
Transgenic hybrid and conventional Bt rice varieties, resistant to rice stem borer and leaf 
roller were approved for environmental release in 1997 and 1998 (Zhang, 1999). The   221
transgenic rice variety that expressed resistance to rice plant hopper has been tested in field 
trials. Through the anther culture, the CpTi gene and the Bar gene were successfully intro-
duced into rice, which expressed resistance to rice stem borer and herbicide (NCBED, 
2000; Zhu, 2000). 
 
 
Table 7.2  Research priority and available GM plant events in China by 1999. 
Crop   Introduced trait  Field 
Trial 
Environmental 
release  Commercialized 
Insect resistance       
 Bollworm (Bt)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Bollworm (Bt+CpTI)  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Bollworm (CpTI)  Yes  Yes  No 
 Bollworm (API)  Yes  No  No 
Disease resistance       
 Verticillium & Fusarium (Chi)  Yes  Yes  No 
 Verticillium & Fusarium (Glu)  Yes  Yes  No 
Cotton 
 
 Verticillium & Fusarium (Glu+Chi)  Yes  Yes  No 
Insect resistance        
 Stem borer (Bt)  Yes  Yes  No 
 Stem borer (CpTI)  Yes  Yes  No 
 Rice planthopper  Yes  Yes  No 
Disease resistance        
 Bacteria blight (Xa21)  Yes  Yes  No 
 Fungal disease  Yes  Yes  No 
 Rice dwarf virus  Yes  Yes  No 
Herbicide resistance  Yes  Yes  No 
Salt tolerance (BADH)  Yes  No  No 
Rice 
Ac/Ds (rice mutant)  Yes  No  No 
Source: Authors' surveys. 
 
 
  Transgenic rice with Xa21, Xa7 and CpTi genes resistant to bacteria blight or rice 
blast were developed by the Institute of Genetics of CAS, BRI, and China Central Agricul-
tural University. These transgenic rice plants have been approved for environmental 
release since 1997 (NCBED, 2000). Significant progress has also been made with trans-
genic plants expressing drought and salinity tolerance in rice. Transgenic rice expressing 
drought and salinity tolerance has been in field trials since 1998. Genetically modified ni-
trogen fixing bacteria for rice was approved for commercialization in 2000. Technically, 
various types of GM rice are ready for commercialization. However, the commercializing 
GM rice production has not yet been approved as the policy makers' concern about food 
safety, rice trade (China exports rice though the amount traded is small compared to its 
consumption) and its implication for the commercialization of other GM food crops such 
as soybean, wheat and maize. 
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7.3  Impact of Bt cotton in China: factor biased technical change  
 
One cannot simply assume that the GM technologies imply a Hicks-neutral productivity 
boost.
1 The productivity impact of GM technologies in crops is typically factor-biased.
2 
That is, cost reductions on some of the production factors can be achieved in varying de-
grees. See for example European Commission (2001) for a survey and Van Meijl and Van 
Tongeren (2002) for an application to Bt maize and Ht soybean technology. 
  To examine the impact of biotechnology on various input uses and crop yield (after 
control for input uses) in the cotton production, Pray et al (2001) and Huang et al (2002b) 
used both farm budget analysis and damage control production function approach based on 
the production practices of 282 cotton farmers (including Bt and non-Bt farmers) in 1999 
in Hebei and Shandong provinces, where the bollworm has seriously damaged the local 
cotton production (Region I in Table 7.1). A budget analysis by Pray et al (2001) shows 
that while there is no significant difference in fertilizer and machinery uses between Bt and 
non-Bt cotton production, significant reductions were recorded in pesticide and labor use 
(labor used for spray pesticide). More sophisticated measures based on the same data that 
applied multivariate regression to estimate the pesticide use and cotton production func-
tions show similar results for the effect of Bt cotton on input uses. The results of their 
studies demonstrate that Bt cotton adopters spray 67 percent fewer times and reduce pesti-
cide expenditures by 82 percent (Huang et al. 2002b). Because the reduction on the farmers 
spraying pesticide time (from an average of 20 times during one crop season to eight 
times), Bt cotton technology is also considered as a labor-saving technology.  
  While costs of pesticides and labor inputs are reduced, seed costs of Bt varieties are 
higher than those of non-Bt cotton by about 100-250 percent (based on author's survey in 
1999, 2000 and 2001 in 5 provinces where Bt cotton is adopted, the price difference be-
tween Bt and non-Bt cotton declined over time). But this is much lower than the market 
price ratio of Bt cotton seed (40-50 yuan/kg) and non-Bt conventional cotton seed (4-8 
yuan/kg) in our sampled areas. The lower seed use per hectare in Bt cotton production and 
farmers' saved Bt cotton seed partly offset the seed price difference.  
  After controlling for all input differences and geographical location, Huang et al 
(2002b) found that adoption of Bt cotton also impacts on cotton yield. Bt cotton contrib-
uted to about 7-15% (with an average of about 10%) of yield increase in the Hebei and 
Shangdong (cotton region I) in 1999.
3 These results are re-confirmed by two similar sur-
veys conducted in 2000 (which also covered Henan province) and in 2001 (which also 
covered Anhui and Jiangsu provinces, cotton region II). However, new surveys in 2000-
2001 also revealed that the extent of the impacts (pesticide and labor inputs and yield) de-
cline with moving Bt cotton from the region I to region II (authors' survey).  
                                                 
1 For example Anderson and Yao (2001) recently investigated the potential economic effects of China's adop-
tion of GMOs based on a hypothesized 5% Hicks-neutral gain in productivity with GMO adoption.  
2 Factor biased technical change was introduced by Hicks (1932) to describe techniques that facilitate the 
substitution of other inputs for a specific production factor. He called techniques that facilitated the substitu-
tion of other inputs for labor "labor saving" and those designed to facilitate the substitution of other input for 
land "land saving".  
3 The range of the impacts (7-15%) reflects the different specifications of the production function models 
used in the regression.   223
We derive productivity effects of Bt cotton based on our three years (1999-2001) surveys 
of primary cotton farmers (1052 farms) in five provinces, including the two major cotton 
producing regions (regions I and II). We compute the average inputs of pesticides, seed 
and labor and yield of cotton per hectare for both Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton. The produc-
tivity impacts are measured as the difference of input use and yield between Bt and non-Bt 
cotton. These differences or impacts for regions I and II are reported in the first row (2001) 
of Table 7.3. Impacts of Bt cotton in region III in 2001 was estimated by interviewing pro-
vincial agricultural bureaus in the region and from interviews of scientists from 
Biotechnology Research Institute of CAAS. We estimated the impacts separately by region 
because bollworm and other insect diseases differ among the three cotton production re-
gions. The national level figures are the aggregation of the regional data based on the area 
shares observed in 2001.  
 
7.3.1 Projecting adoption rates 
 
Chinese farmers have adopted Bt cotton at an impressive speed. The question is whether 
and how the adoption behavior develops in the future and how the associated productivity 
differentials can be expected to behave. While we have the benefit of historic observations 
on Bt cotton, the likely technology diffusion of GM rice must necessarily be based on 
some assumptions. 
  Existing theory on technology diffusion provides some guidance. New technologies 
with superior characteristics compared to their predecessors are typically not adopted at 
once by all potential users. (see e.g. Karshenas and Stoneman 1995, Geroski 2000, Sunding 
and Zilberman 2001 for overviews). One approach that describes innovation adoption as a 
process of information spread is the epidemic diffusion model.
1 An alternative approach is 
to take different characteristics of potential adopters into account in a decision theoretic 
framework. Potential adopters vary over characteristics like farm size, market share, mar-
ket structure, input prices, labor relations, farm ownership, and current technology. These 
factors affect the profitability of adoption, and hence the adoption behavior.  
  Given the uncertainty about adoption patterns we follow a rather stylized approach to 
the projection of adoption rates. Our basic projection assumes that technical change in GM 
technologies is higher than in non-GM technologies. The new technologies are assumed to 
be so attractive to farmers that the maximum technically feasible adoption will be realized. 
As this assumption may be too optimistic we subsequently subject the adoption rates to a 
sensitivity analysis.  
 
                                                 
1 Markets for new technologies are characterized by a lack of transparency, by imperfect information and by 
uncertainty on the operating conditions, risks and performance characteristics of the new technology. The 
number of adopters of the innovation increases as information is generated in the process of innovation use 
and gradually spreads among potential adopters.   224
Table 7.3  Hypothesized yield and input difference (%) between GM and Non-GM crops and GM  
  adoption  in  2001-2010. 
    Yield by region    Input cost at national level 
    National  Region I  Region II Region III Pesticide Seed  Labor 
Bt cotton           
 2001    5.85  8.30  5.80 3.00 -51 120  -5.1 
 2002    5.97  8.47  5.92 3.06 -53 120  -5.3 
 2005    6.34  8.98  6.28 3.25 -58 120  -5.8 
 2010    7.00  9.92  6.93 3.59 -67 120  -6.7 
GM rice           
 2002    6.00    -52 50  -7.2 
 2005    6.37    -56 50  -7.9 
 2010    7.03    -65 50  -9.1 
           
          Adoption rate (%) 
    National  Region I  Region II Region III       
Bt cotton               
 2001    45  85  18 10       
 2002    51  90  30 15       
 2005    78  95  85 55       
 2010    92  95  90 90       
GM rice               
 2002    2           
 2005    40           
 2010    95           
Source: author's estimates. 
 
 
  For the impacts after 2001, we assume that the technical progress of Bt cotton will be 
continued as there is a range of forthcoming improved technologies (Table 7.2). Based on 
the above empirical study on Bt cotton adoption and its impacts on various inputs and 
yield, we hypothesize the future patterns of Bt cotton adoption by region and its impacts on 
inputs and yield as those presented in Table 7.3. All figures in this Table represent the dif-
ference (in percentage) of input and yield between Bt cotton and non-Bt cotton. For Bt 
cotton adoption, we estimated them by region as bollworm and other insect diseases differ 
among three cotton production regions. The national level figures are the aggregation of 
the regional data based on the area shares observed in 2001.  
  Because the commercialization of GM rice has not been approved yet, examination 
of its impacts on rice production inputs and yield are impossible from the farm level sur-
vey. However, the government has approved a number of insect, disease and herbicide 
resistant GM rice varieties for field trial and environmental release since the late 1990s. In-
terviews were conducted in the trial and environmental release areas by the authors. The 
results from these interviews are used to hypothesize the impacts of GM rice commerciali-
zation on rice yield and input uses (Table 7.3). It should be noted that Table 7.3 assumes 
the seed price difference between GM and non-GM varieties to be constant over time. This 
is a conservative assumption, which will tend to an underestimation of GM gains if seed 
prices will in fact converge to a lower level in the future. On the other hand, the hypothe-
sized adoption rates for rice are perhaps overestimating the speed of GM rice adoption.    225




The impact assessment of Chinese biotechnology developments has been done with the 
help of the GTAP modeling framework (see chapter 3). 
  The comparative static model has first been used to generate a so-called baseline pro-
jection for 2001-2010. In the second step, the impact of alternative biotechnology scenarios 
is assessed relative to the baseline projection for 2010. The baseline is constructed through 
recursive updating of the database such that exogenous GDP targets are met, and given ex-
ogenous estimates on factor endowments -skilled labor, unskilled labor, capital and natural 
resources- and population (see Chapter 5). 
  The baseline projection also includes a continuation of existing policies and the ef-
fectuation of important policy events, as they are known to date. The important policy 
changes are: Implementation of the remaining commitments from the GATT Uruguay 
round agreements, China's WTO accession between 2002 and 2005; global phase out of the 
Multifibre Agreement under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) by 




The central question of this chapter is the assessment of economic benefits of research and 
commercialization of GM crops in the face of likely international policy developments. 
Towards this end four scenarios have been developed. The first scenario is designed to 
study the impact of Bt cotton adoption. This impact consists of the part that is already real-
ized in 2001 (Tables 7.1 and 7.3) and the subsequent productivity gains during the period 
2001-2010, as summarized in Table 7.3. Since the potential cost savings affect only farm-
ers who have adopted the GM crop varieties, we weigh the productivity and seed cost 
estimates by adoption rates to arrive at an average impact on the cotton sector. 
  The second scenario adds the commercialization of GM rice during 2002-2010 to the 
adoption of Bt cotton. Again, we use the productivity estimates and adoption rates from 
Table 7.3. Given the uncertainty in the magnitude of the GMO impacts on input usage and 
yields and the uncertainty with regard to the adoption rates we conduct a sensitivity analy-
sis on these parameters. The third scenario focuses on a possible import ban on GM 
products from China. Given that China has commercialized both Bt cotton and GM rice, an 
import ban on GM rice by the main trading partners is simulated. 
  Finally, we investigate the effects of the recent regulation on labeling of imported 
soybeans that came into effect in March 2002. This scenario is unfolding in the situation 
where both the cotton and rice crops have been commercialized. In addition to labeling 
imported soybeans, the scenario includes labeling of domestic GM rice. The scenario de-
sign is 'additive', by adding new elements one at a time, and we disentangle the separate 
effects of each new element where appropriate. 
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7.5  Economic impact assessment  
 
7.5.1 The impacts of commercializing Bt cotton 
 
The farmers' decision to adopt Bt cotton weighs the cost savings due to its increased yields, 
labor cost savings and reduced pesticides cost against increased seed costs. Table 7.4 
shows the total impact of adopting Bt cotton and the contributions of these components to 
the supply price of cotton, relative to the situation without Bt cotton in 2010.  
 
 
Table 7.4  Main sectoral effects of adopting Bt cotton (percent change, relative to situation without  
    Bt cotton in 2010) 









 Supply price  -10.9  -7  -3.3  -1.7  1.1 
 Output  4.9  3.1  1.5  0.8  -0.5 
 Dom demand  4.8  3  1.5  0.8  -0.5 
 Exports  58  37.3  17.5  9  -5.8 
 Imports  -16.6  -10.8  -4.9  -2.5  3.1 
 Trade balance  
 (million USD)  389 253  114  59  -71 
 
Textiles 
 Supply price  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  0  0 
 Output  0.7  0.4  0.2  0.1  0 
 Exports  0.9  0.6  0.3  0.1  0 
 Imports  -0.3  -0.2  -0.1  0  0 
 Trade balance 
 (million USD)  1067 670  341  155  -41 
Source: model simulations  
 
 
  The supply price will be 10.9% lower in 2010. The yield increasing and labor saving 
impacts of Bt cotton contribute, respectively, 7%-point and 3.3%-point to this total effect. 
The pesticides saving impact lowers the price with 1.7% while the higher seed price in-
creases the supply price with 1.1% (Table 7.4). 
  The lower supply price increases demand. Domestic demand increases with 4.8% 
and exports with 58%. However, the share of exports in total demand is very low at 0.24%, 
and export growth does therefore contribute only mildly to the total cotton demand growth. 
The rise in domestic demand is almost completely caused by increased demand from the 
textiles sector. The lower domestic price also implies that cotton imports decrease with 
16.6%, relative to the 'no-Bt' case. Higher exports and lower imports imply that the trade 
balance for cotton will improve with 389 million USD (Table 7.4). 
  The textiles sector is the other main benefiting sector from adopting Bt cotton. The 
lower supply price of cotton implies that the supply price of textiles decreases with 0.3%. 
The cost share of cotton in textiles amounts to 2.5% of total cost. The 10.9% decrease in 
cotton price leads to 0.27% (-10.9% x 2.5%) decrease in textiles costs. Output and exports   227
increase with 0.7% and 0.9%, respectively, while imports decrease with 0.3%. This causes 
the textiles trade balance to improve with 1067 million USD. 
 
7.5.2 The impact of commercializing both Bt cotton and GM rice  
 
7.5.2.1  Impact on the rice sector 
 
This scenario assumes GM rice commercialization on top of the adoption of Bt cotton dur-
ing 2002-2010. This mimics the current adoption process, where Bt cotton continues its 
rapid adoption path, but GM rice is yet to be released for commercial purposes. Conse-
quently, the results incorporate both the Bt cotton effect and the GM rice effect, but the 
interaction effects between rice and cotton are negligible. This becomes evident by com-
paring the second and third column in Table 7.5. The adoption of GM rice generates cost 
savings due to its yield increasing, labor saving and pesticides saving impact. If the adop-
tion will take place according to the assumed scenario the supply price of rice will be 12% 
lower in 2010. Almost 8 percent-points can be contributed to the yield increasing impact of 
GM rice, 4.4% to the labor saving impact, and 0.9% to pesticides saving (Table 7.5). The 
higher seed price increases the supply price with 1.1%. Despite the sharp decrease in price 
the output response is only 1.4%. This is due to the low income and price elasticities of 
domestic demand. People do not demand much more rice if the price decreases or their in-
come increases. The increase in exports is very high (67%), but the impact on output is 
limited since only a small portion (1.2%) of production is exported. 
 
Table 7.5  Impacts on rice sector of adopting GM rice (percent change, relative to situation without GM  
    products in 2010 
 
 
  Total impact  Total impact   Yield   Labor   Pesticide  Higher  
  Bt cotton  GM rice    increasing  saving saving seed  price 
 &  GM  rice       
 
 
Rice    
-  Supply  price  -12.0  -12.1  -7.8 -4.4 -0.9  1.1 
-  Output  1.4  1.4  0.9 0.6 0.1  -0.1 
- Dom. demand  1.1  1.1  0.7  0.4  0.1  -0.1 
- Exports  66.9  66.2  43.5  24.1  5.2  -5.8 
-  Imports  -23.2  -23.4  -15.3 -8.4 -1.8  2.1 
- Change rice trade  
balance (million USD)  173.2  175.1  113.8  63.1  13.7  -15.5 
 
 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
7.5.2.2 Macro  impact 
 
The commercialization of both GM crops has substantial welfare effects. Table 7.6 sepa-
rates aggregate macro effects into the Bt cotton and GM rice components. The adoption of 
Bt cotton enhances welfare in China by 1097 million USD in 2010. (equivalent variation,   228
EV). The adoption of GM rice enhances welfare in China by 4155 million USD (Table 
7.6). The impact is therefore 4 times larger than in the case of Bt cotton, which is explained 
by the larger size of the rice sector in 2010. This implies that with the same productivity 
gains more resources are saved in the rice sector.  
  The impact on factor prices varies across factors. Land is a 'sluggish' production fac-
tor that is not easily reallocated between alternative uses. Hence we allow for land rent 
differentials across crops. Land prices decline because factor demand is lower due to the 
yield increasing effect of the GM technology. At the same time, the output expansion falls 
short of the yield increase, and consequently less land is demanded in the aggregate.  
 
 
Table 7.6  Macro impact of adopting Bt cotton and GM rice a) 
  Bt cotton  GM rice   Total 
Welfare (EV, million USD)   1097  4155  5249 
Percent changes (%)       
 Factor prices       
 Land  -0.2  -2.1  -2.4 
 Unskilled labor  0.2  0.1  0.3 
 Skilled labor  0.3  0.4  0.7 
 Capital  0.3  0.4  0.7 
Real exchange rate change (%)  0.2  0.1  0.3 
Change aggregate trade balance, (million USD)  -671  -1223  -1894 
a) Numbers do not exactly add up to the 'Total' column because of small interaction effects. 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
Labor and capital are perfectly mobile across domestic sectors. Although the demand 
for labor decreases in both crops, the aggregate demand for labor increases. In the cotton 
case the additional labor demand originates mainly from the unskilled labor-intensive tex-
tiles sector. Due to the positive technical change impact the real exchange rate
1 improves in 
both experiments, and this leads to a deterioration of the trade balance. 
 
7.5.2.3  Impact on other sectors 
 
The two major price effects of adopting GM rice are the lower price of rice itself and the 
lower land price. Sectors that use rice or land intensively will therefore achieve the biggest 
cost gains and can lower their prices and expand output. Land intensive sectors such as 
wheat, coarse grains, cotton and other crops can use the extra land that is not necessary 
anymore to produce the demanded quantity of rice. Animal products (mainly pork and 
poultry) output will grow because they use land and can use the cheaper coarse grains. Es-
pecially the other food sector (mainly food processing) can lower its price because the rice 
they use as inputs has become much cheaper. This generates an output growth in the other 
foods sector, which in turn leads to more intermediate demand for its inputs such as wheat 
and other crops.  
                                                 
1 The real exchange is defined as the ratio of the regional factor price index relative to a global factor price 
index. The global factor price index is taken to be the numeraire of the model   229
Table 7.7  Impacts of adoption of Bt cotton and GM rice on other sectors in 2010 (percentage change  











Rice -12.0  1.4  1.1  66.2  -23.2 
Wheat -0.3  0.7  0.1  1.1  -0.2 
Coarse  grains  -0.4  0.6  0.8 0.9 0.0 
Oilseeds  -0.1  0.6  0.2 0.0 0.4 
Sugar  -0.1  0.5  0.4 0.3 0.3 
Cotton -11.4  5.1  7.2  61.9  -17.4 
Other  crops  -0.3  0.7  0.3 0.6 0.4 
Cattle  -0.3  0.5  0.4 0.9 0.0 
Other animal products  -0.4  0.5  0.4  1.6  -0.4 
Milk  -0.3  0.5  0.4 0.8 0.0 
Fish -0.6  0.6  0.6  1.4  -1.0 
Other food  -1.2  1.5  0.8  4.4  -2.1 
Extract 0.1  0.0  0.5  -0.3  0.0 
Textiles- leather  -0.2  0.6  0.6  0.7  -0.1 
Labor intensive 
Manufacturing 0.2  -0.2  0.5  -1.7  1.0 
Capital intensive 
Manufacturing 0.2  -0.2  0.5  -1.0  0.6 
Services 0.3  0.3  0.4  -1.0  0.9 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
  Although not apparent from Table 7.7, it should be noted that the effects of GM 
adoption differ in one important aspect between the two crops. Not only is rice a much lar-
ger sector than cotton in terms of its contribution to agricultural output and employment, 
we also observe completely different demand side effects. Consumers demand not much 
more rice if price is lower or income higher. This means that consumer can spend their in-
creased income and money they save on buying rice on other products. These income 
effects increase the demand for many other sectors. Such indirect demand effects are not 
much observed for Bt cotton.  
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Table 7.8  Impact in different periods: adoption of Bt cotton and GM rice (incremental contribution of  
    adoption within a period in percent changes) 
Past impact 
(before 2001)  2001-2005   2005-2010 
 
GM rice Bt cotton GM rice Bt cotton   GM rice Bt cotton
Rice  
Supply price  0 0.1 -5.1 0.1   -8.6 0
Output volume  0 0 0.7 0   1.2 0
Export volume  0 -0.3 23.6 -0.3   37.9 -0.2
Trade balance (mil. USD)  0 -1 74 -1   139 -1
   
Cotton  
Supply price  0 -5.3 -0.2 -4.8   -0.3 -3.6
Output volume  0 2.0 0 2.1   0.1 1.7
Export volume  0 24.4 0.7 19.4   1.1 13.3
Trade balance (mil. USD)  0 88 3 96   9 99
   
Macro  
Welfare (mil. USD)  0 410 1474 381   2697 314
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
7.5.2.4  Impact in different periods 
 
Table 7.8 shows the impact of adopting Bt cotton and GM rice over time. The incremental 
contribution of adoption within three periods is given. The first two columns show the im-
pact of past adoption that is already achieved in 2001. In 2001 the welfare gain due to the 
adoption of Bt cotton is more than one third of the total welfare gain of Bt cotton realized 
by 2010. The additional gains from adopting Bt cotton in the other two periods slow down, 
as most farmers that potentially adopt have already switched to the new varieties. For GM 
rice all the benefits have still to come. Between 2001 and 2005, as adoption of GM rice 
starts to pick up, about one third of the welfare gains in 2010 are realized. In the period 
2005-2010 the adoption rate increase from 40% to 95% and China is expected to arrive at 
the steep part of the adoption curve and a large part of the potential gains will be realized. 
Figure 7.3 shows the cumulative land productivity gains obtained endogenously from the 
simulations. Land productivity is defined here as the ratio of output to land use. Figure 7.3 
displays the change of this ratio, cumulated over the simulation period. Again, the S-
shaped curvature for Bt cotton and GM rice indicates that the productivity gains will level 
off in the future. This pattern is well known from the 'green revolution' that dramatically 
improved rice yields in the 1970s. The productivity growth is not perpetual. 
 
















Figure 7.3  Simulated land productivity growth rates over time 
Note: the graph is obtained from a Spline interpolation of simulated ratios of output growth over land use in 
1997, 2000, 2005 and 2010. 
 
 
7.5.2.5  Trade impact on other regions 
 
Although China witnesses rising exports and/or reduced imports as a consequence of rapid 
GM adoption, the patterns of global trade in both the textiles and garments and the rice 
sectors are not affected very much. Table 7.9 presents the changes in the regional trade 
balance relative to the 'no-GM' case in 2010. The impact is negligible on major rice im-
porters such as Africa and some rice deficit developing countries in Asia. Major rice. 
exporters in South-East Asia (i.e., Thailand, Vietnam and Burma) may witness a drop in 
net export revenues. The Chinese biotechnology research strategy has in the first place 
concentrated on crops that are of great importance to rural livelihoods, and not on those 
that are important in terms of export earnings. Rice exports from China represent only a 
small share in international rice trade 
  There is an immediate negative impact on other major cotton exporters, most notably 
India and Pakistan, which are part of our OthAsia region. The cost savings and yield in-
creases from Bt cotton translate into lower production cost for the Chinese textiles and 
garments industry, but these cost reductions are not of such orders of magnitude that other 
garments producers (e.g., India and Bangladesh) are affected very much. The phasing out 
of the multifibre agreement by 2005 is of greater importance for global textiles and gar-
ments trade than Bt cotton commercialization in China.
1 
                                                 
1 The phase out of export quota under the ATC is included in our baseline. Chinese textile and garments ex-
ports are simulated to grow by 20% between 2001 and 2005 as a result of the ATC. In Other Asia (including 
India and Bangladesh) the growth is 35%.    232
Table 7.9  Impact of adoption of Bt cotton and GM rice in China on the commodity trade balance in  
    various regions (year 2010, comparison against situation without GM crops) 
Rice   Cotton    Textiles   
(million 
USD) 
%   (million 
USD) 
%   (million 
USD) 
%
China 173  62    408  43    756  1 
HongKong 1  0    1  -1    -25  -2 
Taiwan -1  -12    2  1    -73  -1 
JapKor -6  -2    6  1    -124  -10 
SEA -68  -14    7  0    -100  -1 
OthAsia -26  -2    -12  -19    -59  0 
AusNzl -5  -3    -51  -5    -4  0 
NAFTA -21  -4    -203  -8    -137  0 
SAM -10  -7    -6  -1    -50  -1 
EU -11  -2    1  0    -270  -1 
CEEC -2  -2    0  0    -20  -1 
ROW -23  -1    -132  -4    -67  1 
Note: details of country groups are provided in Appendix 5.1. 
 
 
7.5.2.6  Robustness of results: sensitivity analysis on productivity shocks 
 
In this section we conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis (SSA) on the productivity pa-
rameters, given the uncertainty in the magnitude of the GMO impacts on input usage and 
yields and given the uncertainty with regard to the adoption rates. In section 7.3.1 we have 
argued that the maximum technically feasible adoption of the GM technology may not be 
realized. As a starting point for the SSA, we have taken a more conservative projection of 
the adoption rates of Bt cotton, which are obtained from estimating a logistic equation for 
each region.
1 The estimates that are based on historical adoption data do not take fully into 
account that the benefits of GM technologies over non-GM technologies increase over time 
and are therefore lower than those reported in Table 7.3. According to the logistic model 
56% of the area would be Bt cotton by 2010, rather than the 92%, which is believed to be 
technically feasible given increased benefits of GM technologies. For rice, the same proce-
dure has been followed, albeit that we do not have historical observations available. Here, 
we have also reduced the mean adoption rate in 2010 to 56%. The simulation results of the 
previous estimates, as described in section 7.5.2.2, and a scenario where the adoption rates 
are 56% for both cotton and rice are given in Table 7.10. The average effects vary almost 
linearly with the adoption rates. The lowering of adoption rates by about 40% compared to 
the optimistic scenario of Table 7.3, results also in a reduction of values of key variables 
by about 40% (compare the first two columns called 'Total impact').  
 
 
                                                 
1 The estimated equation is f(x) =
a
1b e
c − x ⋅ ⋅ +   
Where x denotes time. The estimated adoption rates asymp-
totically approach the value a. The estimation provide a rather good fit to the data, with more than 90% of the 
variance explained by the equation, in spite of the limited number of observations.   233
Table 7.10  Results of sensitivity analysis. Adoption of Bt cotton and GM rice 
   Adoption rates: 
Cotton:92%;  
Rice:95 % 
 Adoption  rates: 
Cotton: 56%; Rice: 56% 
  Total impact  Total impact SSA   Mean a) SSA Standard 
deviation*
Cotton    
 Supply price  -10.9 -7.2 -7.3 1.2
 Output  4.9 3.2 3.2 0.5
 Exports  58.0 35 34.9 6.7
 Imports  -16.6 -11.1 -11.2 1.8
 Trade balance  
389 260 261 43
 
 
Rice   
 Supply price  -12.0 -7.5 -7.5 1.3
 Output  1.4 0.8 0.8 0.2
 Exports  66.9 36.6 36.5 7.6
 Imports  -23.2 -14.7 -14.9 2.6
 Trade balance  173 101 101 19.5
   
EV  5249 3280 3289 939
a) Systematic sensitivity analyses in 56% scenario around cotton and rice productivity shocks (vary 60%, tri-
angular distribution). 
Source: model simulations.  
 
 
  Next, we performed an SSA to test the robustness of our results with regard to the 
productivity shocks due to uncertainty in GM impacts and adoption rates. The SSA proce-
dure follows Arndt (1996), and uses a Gaussian quadrature. A main advantage of the SSA 
is that it produces estimates of means and standard deviations of model results, while re-
quiring only a limited number of model runs. This approach views the adoption rates as 
random variables with associated distributions.  
  We assume that the productivity shocks fall within a band of plus and minus 60% of 
the mean and the distribution is assumed to be triangular around the mean. Table 7.10 
shows that the standard deviation around the mean values is generally low, and the SSA re-
sults are very encouraging as regards the robustness of the simulation estimates. For 
example, if we subtract two times the standard deviation from the mean EV estimate, we 
still observe a positive macro economic welfare gain, of 1.4 billion USD in 2010. 
 
7.5.3 Assessment: benefits of GM adoption 
 
In the discussion above we have referred to the equivalent variation (EV) concept to pro-
vide a summary indicator of the potential economy-wide benefits of GM adoption. Of   234
course, the conventional EV measure of welfare changes does not take into account other 
important aspects of human well-being. The welfare measurement is based on a compari-
son of utility derived from consumption with and without the simulated changes. The 
utility function
1 does not account for intrinsic, positive or negative, utility that might be at-
tached to the introduction of new crop varieties.  
  Another clear benefit of Bt cotton adoption is the reduced application of insecticides. 
According to Huang, et al. (2000) pesticide poisoning affected between 53,300 to more 
than 123,000 persons each year in China in the past decade. On average China had about 
10,000 deaths due to pesticide poisoning every year, though the number has declined sig-
nificantly since the late 1980s and reduced to less than 4,000 in 1996.  
  Bt cotton has an enormous potential to reduce the health risks of insecticide use. Ac-
cording to Pray et al. (2002) Bt cotton has significantly reduced the number of farmers who 
are poisoned each year. Based on surveys these authors show that 22% - 29% of the non-Bt 
cotton farmers reported poisonings in 1999 and 2000, while only 5%-7% of the Bt cotton 
farmers reported poisonings.
2 Self-reported ailments are only the tip of the iceberg. Both 
visible acute health impairments and invisible chronic health diseases of rice farmers are 
closely linked with the extent of their exposure to pesticides (Hunbag et al. 2000).  
The estimated macro-economic welfare gains of adoption far outweigh the biotech re-
search expenditure in China. The optimistic scenario, with high adoption rates, results in an 
annual income gain of roughly 5 billion USD in 2010, while the lower range estimate with 
lower adoption rates still delivers 3 billion USD. These gains are recurring annually and 
may be compared to R&D expenditures reported in Huang and Wang (forthcoming). They 
estimate biotech research expenditures in 2000 at about 40 million USD. The accumulated 
expenditure between 1986 and 2000 amount to about 450 million USD (in real 2000 
prices). The implied social rates of return to research are certainly very high. 
  On the other hand a number of limitations should be borne in mind when interpreting 
the results. Issues of biosaftey, environmental effects, and food safety are not entering our 
analysis. All these factors should be considered next to the economic assessment in order 
to arrive at a societal evaluation of GM technology.  
 
7.5.4 GMO trade ban on GM rice 
 
The question addressed in this section is whether it is still worthwhile for China to com-
mercialize GM rice if consumer concerns in the enlarged EU, Japan, Korea and South East 
Asia lead to a ban on GM food products. Technically, this is modeled as a non-tariff-
barrier against Chinese rice imports that reduces these countries' imports of Chinese rice to 
zero. 
  Under this scenario exports of GM rice from China decline substantially. Whereas an 
increase of rice exports volume of 67% was projected when both GM rice and Bt cotton 
are adopted, the trade ban results in a drop to just 5% above the baseline result for 2010 
(Table 7.11). This follows immediately from the export shares in the baseline situation in 
2010 (without all the biotech shocks), which amount to 21%, 8% and 9% for South East 
                                                 
1 In the GTAP model, the utlity function is of the Constant Differecences of Elasticities (CDE) form. 
2 Farmers asked if they had headache, nausea, skin pain, or digestive problems when they applied pesticides.   235
Asia, Japan-Korea and the EU27 (enlarged EU with 27 counties), respectively. Rice output 
is also declining, by 0.5 percent points (1.4%-0.9%=0.5%, Table 7.11). The drop is limited, 
because the share of exports in production is only 1.2%.  
 
 
Table 7.11  Impacts of GM import ban on China and other regions (comparison against situation without  
    GM crops in 2010) 
  Adopt Bt cotton 
and GM rice 
GM trade ban 
 
China    
  Rice exports (% change)  67  5 
  Rice output (% change)  1.4  0.9 
  Change rice trade balance (million USD)  173  19 
  Welfare (million USD)  5249  5229 
Other regions    
  Japan & Korea welfare (million USD)  298  212 
  South East Asia welfare (million USD)  13  -33 
  EU-27 welfare (million USD)  -7  -52 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
Table 7.11 also shows the welfare effects for the banning countries. The welfare impact is 
negative but not substantial in these countries. The three banning regions together forego 
177 million USD. Again it should be stressed that our welfare measure does not include the 
(dis-) utility of having GM varieties. In the banning scenario this means that we are not 
taking into account the possible positive utility in the banning countries derived from not 
having the GM rice on the market.
1 Our method, in fact, does exactly the opposite. It 
counts the unavailability of GM rice as a negative contribution to welfare, as consumers' 
choices are more limited under the banning scenario. If we subtract this negative effect 
from the welfare loss of the banning countries, they still forego about 90 million USD. 
This results mainly from negative allocation effects because the banning of imports stimu-
lates domestic production in the heavily protected rice sector.  
  Is it still worthwhile for China to invest in GM rice if other countries ban GM rice 
imports from China? The aggregate welfare measure against which the trade ban impact 
can be evaluated indicates that the export ban does not significantly change the benefits of 
adopting GM rice in China. Although output growth in the rice sector is somewhat damp-
ened, the overall negative effect on China is small. The largest adoption gains are realized 
within China itself. As far as rice is concerned, the negative attitude towards GM food 
products in some high-income countries is of little concern to China.  
 
7.5.5 Labeling  
 
In this scenario, China requires labeling of soybean imports from NAFTA and South 
America. In January 2002 the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture has announced three new 
                                                 
1 Some empirical evidence can be derived from willingness to pay studies that estimate the price premium for 
non-GM varieties. For example Lin (2002) estimates that Japanese consumers were willing to pay a price 
premium of up to 30% for non-GM soybeans in 2000.   236
regulations on the biosafety management, trade and labeling of GM farm products that 
took effect after March 20, 2002. These regulations require importers of genetically modi-
fied agricultural products to apply for official safety verification approval from China's 
Ministry of Agriculture. Since China is a large market for US soybean exports, buying 
more than $1 billion worth in 2001, it is not surprising that US producers have accused 
Beijing of using the new rules to hinder imports and protect Chinese soybean growers. Af-
ter 2-month intensive negotiation between China and US, recently an interim deal was 
reached under which China will temporarily waive its regulations and has agreed to recog-
nize US assurances that its soybeans are safe for human consumption. The other main 
sources of soybean imports into China are countries that also have embraced the benefits of 
herbicide tolerant (Round-Up Ready) GM soybeans: Argentina and Brazil.  
  However, labeling is not only introduced for imports. Domestic produce has to be la-
beled as well.
1 The simulation experiment in this section provides an assessment of the 
economic effects if indeed China is to label its own GM food crops, given that it exercises 
labeling requirements for imported soybeans. In our case, this means that China has to im-
plement a labeling for GM rice only, as there is no GM soybean production within China.  
We do not model separate production-consumption chains for GM and non-GM varieties. 
One consequence of this simplification is that we are unable to quantify any (positive or 
negative) price premium that GM varieties might achieve on the Chinese market. Our 
analysis is based on a rather straightforward assumption on labeling costs for both im-
ported and domestic GM crops. 
  Labeling involves more than just attaching some information to the product. A com-
plete system is needed to separate GM from non-GM products. This leads to an externality 
for non-GM farmers and processors, as they have to make sure that their product is actually 
GM-free. The incidence of labeling cost falls more on conventional farmers than on GM 
adopters. Costs of separation are due to changed agricultural practices (e.g. more space be-
tween fields etc.), monitoring and measurement (e.g . instituting a system for Hazard 
Analysis at Critical Control Points, HACCP), insurance, identity preservation in processing 
and transport. There exist some estimates of the cost of segregation for oilseeds, corn and 
potatoes. Such estimates for the European Union (European Commission, 2002), Canada 
(KPMG, 2000) and the USA (Economic Research Service, 2001; Lin, 2002) show that on 
average segregation may raise unit cost by as much as 28% for oilseeds and 22% for corn. 
These estimates appear to be rather high, and it is questionable whether it is realistic to as-
sume that this high cost will have to be incurred in the Chinese situation. Using the corn 
estimates as a reference, we arrive at a rough approximation of extra cost that have to be 
incurred by non-GM rice producers, and we assume that total production costs will in-
crease by 3 percent through labeling. 
2,3 This is mo
4deled as an increase in the cost of 
                                                 
1 Hence, the Chinese labeling requirements are in accordance with the GATT principle of national treatment, 
as enshrined in article 3 of the GATT.  
2 If we have 40% GM rice farmers in 2005, then 60% * 22% = 13.2% is the average cost increase for the 
whole rice sector. In 2010, with an assumed adoption of 95%, this would become 5% * 22% = 1.1%. 
3 To make it even more complicated: In practice, the separation cost are not constant. As more adoption takes 
place it becomes harder and more costly for the non-adopters to assure a GM free product. 
4 To make it even more complicated: In practice, the separation cost are not constant. As more adoption takes 
place it becomes harder and more costly for the non-adopters to assure a GM free product.   237
services required for rice production. Labeling of imported GM soybeans is modeled as an 
increase in the 'transport/handling' margin between FOB and CIF for soybean exports from 
NAFTA and Southern America (SAM) to China. We assume that these handling costs will 
increase so much that the total import costs (CIF price from NAFTA or SAM to China) 
will increase with 5%. The size of the import cost increase is of course debatable. Existing 
studies on this issue have focused on the additional cost to insure that GM and non-GM 
products are not adventitiously mingled in the hold of ocean ships. This is not relevant in 
the Chinese case, as all US and SAM soybeans for the Chinese market are in fact GM va-
rieties. However, the labeling requirement does undoubtedly lead to additional 
bureaucracy, which acts similar to a tariff in its effect on trade volumes (although no tariff 
revenue is involved). Indeed, the short run effects after the introduction of the new labeling 
requirements in 2002 have resulted in a considerable drop of US soy exports to China.  
 
 
Table 7.12  Impacts of labeling in 2010 (percent change relative to baseline) 
  Bt cotton & GM 
rice adoption with 






 - Supply price  -12.1  -9.3 
 - Output volume  1.4  0.6 
 - Export volume  5.3  -7.2 
 - Import volume   -23.7  -18.5 
 - Trade balance (million USD)  19  -14 
    
Soybean    
 NAFTA  
 - Import price China (cif)  0.0 7.1 
 - Export volume to China  0.4  -14.1 
 South America 
 - Import price China (cif)  0.0  6.2 
 - Export volume to China  0.4  -10.7 
 China 
 - Supply price   -0.1  0.3 
 - Output volume  0.7  2.7 
 - Export volume  0.1  -1.5 
 - Import volume  0.4  -6.1 
 - Trade balance (million USD)  -13  58 
 - Welfare (million USD)  5229  3953 
Source: model simulations. 
 
 
  The assumed cost increases are obviously a rough estimates, and the actual cost for 
the Chinese rice producers and for international suppliers of soybeans may be higher or 
lower. In the absence of better information, this assumption will be sufficient to illustrate 
the effects of labeling, and to give a sense of the order of magnitude of macro-economic 
effects.  
  Table 7.12 shows the economic costs of labeling both imported soybeans and domes-
tic rice. The domestic supply price of rice increases relative to the previous experiment, but   238
still a price decline of almost 10% relative to the baseline is projected. The higher domestic 
supply price leads to fewer exports, less output, and more rice imports. The labeling of im-
ported soybeans increases the equilibrium price of imported soybeans from NAFTA and 
South America with 7.1% and 6.2%, respectively, resulting in a considerable drop of soy-
bean exports from these regions. Total Chinese soybean imports decline with 6% because 
soybeans from NAFTA and SAM cover 77% of all Chinese soybean imports.  
  Labeling is costly. Measured in terms of equivalent variation, and bearing in mind 
that we do not include any positive utility effects that might exist when consumers have 
access to improved product information, the welfare loss to China is about 1.3 billion 
USD. However, even when a trade ban and labeling are occurring together, we still ob-
serve a very positive welfare impact of adopting GM crops (almost 4 billion USD). 
  This experiment highlights an important trade-off that China is facing. Labeling of 
imported soybeans raises the domestic price of soybeans, and benefits Chinese soybean 
farmers, who will see a shift towards domestic demand, and are able to increase output at 
higher prices. This also has an adverse effect on the users of imported soybeans in the live-
stock sector. However, domestic labeling of GM foods also raises the price of domestic 
rice, and this affects rice consumers. Hence, labeling improves the competitive position of 
domestic (non-GM) soybean farmers, as they become cheaper relative to imports, but it 






China is developing the largest public plant biotechnology capacity outside of North Amer-
ica. The international debate on GM technologies has its influence on Chinese policy 
making and on agricultural industry. Adoption of Bt cotton has been proceeding at a rapid 
pace in recent years. The largest part of the potential productivity gains from Bt cotton will 
be realized already by 2005, thereafter the productivity growth is slowing down. In con-
trast, GM rice is not yet available to farmers on a commercial basis, and our estimates 
indicate that large productivity gains are yet to be realized between 2005 and 2010.  
  This chapter uses productivity estimates for GMOs that are based on empirical mi-
cro-level data for the cotton sector and tentative experimental data for the rice sector in 
China. Biotechnology leads to crop specific factor biased technical change, and the results 
show that the distinction between yield and production factors effects is important. Factor 
markets for labor and land will witness different effects, depending on the type of biotech-
nology being adopted. The scarce land resources can be utilized more effectively with 
land-saving technologies. Even though labor is relatively abundant in China, the adoption 
of somewhat laborsaving GM crops does not necessarily lead to falling wages. This is es-
pecially the case in Bt cotton. Here, the expansion of the cotton sector itself, together with 
rising labor demand from the unskilled labor intensive textiles sector more than compen-
sate for the savings in labor inputs obtained by adopting the GM crop. The use of empirical 
                                                 
1 Our experiments considered only a unilateral GM labeling by China. As a consequence some soybean trade 
is diverted towards EU markets, which does not adopt labeling in our scenario. If this alternative outlet for 
US and South American soybeans does not exist, the price effects on imported soybeans would be smaller.   239
estimates that give a better indication of the magnitudes of the productivity impact of 
GMOs is certainly very important.  
  The economic gains from GMO adoption are substantial. In the most optimistic sce-
nario, where China commercializes both Bt cotton and GM rice, the welfare gains amount 
to an additional annual income of about 5 billion US$ in 2010. This amounts to about 3.5 
USD per person. This is not a small amount in a country, where according to the World 
Bank 18% of the population had to survive with less than 1$ per day in 1998.1 If actual 
adoption rates are lower, we still observe an income gain of 3 billion USD in 2010. Given 
the importance of rice for agricultural production, employment and food budget shares, the 
gains from GM rice adoption are orders of magnitude larger than the Bt cotton gains. The 
estimated macro economic welfare gains far outweigh the public biotechnology research 
expenditures.  
  Although the productivity gains for China are significant and translate to rising ex-
ports or reducing imports, the patterns of global trade in both the textiles and garments and 
the rice sectors are not affected very much. The impact is negligible on major rice import-
ers such as Africa and some rice deficit developing countries in Asia, but major rice 
exporters (i.e., Thailand, Vietnam and Burma) may experience a drop in net export reve-
nues. The Chinese biotechnology research strategy has in the first place concentrated on 
crops that are of great importance to rural livelihoods, and not on those that are important 
in terms of export earnings. Rice exports from China represent only a small share in inter-
national rice trade. There is an immediate impact on the export revenues of major cotton 
exporters, most notably India and Pakistan. The cost savings and yield increases from Bt 
cotton translate into lower production cost for the Chinese textiles and garments industry, 
but these cost reductions are not of such orders of magnitude that other garments producers 
(e.g., India and Bangladesh) are affected very much. The phasing out of the multifibre 
agreement by 2005 is of greater importance for global textiles and garments trade than Bt 
cotton commercialization in China.  
  Our results indicate that trade restrictions do not significantly lower the gains from 
biotechnology research in China. A trade ban on GM rice (food crop) has only a minor ef-
fect since the portion of rice exported is very small. The effects of unilateral labeling of 
soybean imports are larger and it has clear distributional impacts. Our experiments high-
light an important trade-off that China is facing. If China wants to label GM products, this 
raises the domestic price of soybeans, and benefits Chinese soybean farmers. However, 
domestic labeling also raises the price of domestic GM rice, and this affects rice consum-
ers. Our findings suggest that it would be economically advantageous for China to continue 
the promotion of its GM biotechnology, including commercializing its GM food crops. The 
economy-wide benefits associated with more productive crops outweigh R&D expendi-
tures by a wide margin.  
  Our findings also suggest that most gains occur inside China, and can be achieved 
independently from biotech-unfriendly polices adopted in some industrialized countries. 
This stands in contrast to the findings of Anderson and Yao (2001), who argue that the ef-
fects of GM adoption depend to a considerable extent on the trade policy stance taken in 
high-income countries opposed to GMOs.  
                                                 
1 World Development Indicators. International poverty line of 1$ (PPP adjusted) in 1998.   240
  This chapter offers an economic analysis of some of the issues surrounding rapid 
adoption of biotechnology in China. Despite being based on the comprehensive general 
equilibrium model and an associated global database, a number of limitations should be 
borne in mind when interpreting the results. First of all, in this paper no utility is attached 
to improved product information. We are therefore unable to quantify the possible positive 
effects that labeling may have on consumer's welfare. We are also unable to provide esti-
mates of the price premium that may occur due to preference shifts, because we do not 
consider the separation of GM and non-GM supply chains. While we have concentrated on 
trade policy issues relating to primary products, more complicated issues may arise with 
respect to trade in processed foods.    241






One of the objectives of this study is to identify business opportunities for the Dutch agri-
business sector. In this chapter we identify in only a very general way a number of 
business opportunities, as the study is focused more on product categories than on prod-
ucts. In addition, the realization of business opportunities depends on a wide range of 
factors, such as institutional aspects, regulations, tax regime, cultural aspects, etc. In this 
chapter we take into account only general economic aspects and changes in trade regime. 
There are three kinds of business opportunities for the Dutch agribusiness sector, namely 
trade in products and services, trade in property rights (such as licenses), and foreign direct 
investment. Here, the focus is on trade in products and on direct investment. 
  In the first part of this chapter we present some considerations regarding the general 
economic background because to a large extent this background determines the opportuni-
ties for the agribusiness sector. In the second part we present an analysis of the 
development of trade with China since 1990. For this analysis we used TSA-Express (Time 
Series Analysis-Express), a software package developed by LEI based on the UNCTAD 
trade database. We then discuss the business opportunities for the Dutch agribusiness sec-
tor on the basis of the simulated development of Chinese demand, Chinese exports, and 
Chinese imports in the scenarios analyzed in the previous sections. In the third part of the 
chapter, we sketch the development of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China since it 
opened up in the 1980s. Also the reasons for FDI and the relations with trade are elabo-
rated on the basis of a literature study. Finally, the possible implications for FDI in China 
are analyzed against the background of the simulated development of the Chinese economy 
and of the Chinese agribusiness sector and the Chinese market for agricultural products 
and food. We end the chapter with some concluding remarks.  
 
8.2 General  economic  background 
 
Opportunities for the Dutch agribusiness sector in China must be seen against the back-
ground of the development of the Chinese economy. The development toward a socialist 
market economy and the gradual opening up of the Chinese market to foreign companies 
since 1978 have made an important contribution to China's strong economic growth in the 
past 25 years. Both international trade and FDI have contributed to this development. The 
importation of inputs required by the export-processing industries grew as a result of re-
ductions in trade barriers.  
  On the other hand, China's exports grew at an annual average rate of 16 percent dur-
ing the period 1979-2000. The relatively low, fixed exchange rate of the Chinese yuan 
against the US dollar contributed to this development. If this rate of export expansion con-
tinues, China will become the world's largest exporter within five years. Half of these   242
exports will be produced by foreign companies or joint ventures with foreign companies. 
However, China's import of final products has grown rapidly in recent years as a result of 
the expanding domestic market; consequently, its surplus on the current account of its bal-
ance of payments is decreasing. Also net FDI inflow has played an important role in the 
development of the Chinese economy. These investments have contributed to the growth 
of exports. The importation of inputs as well as FDI may enhance productivity growth in 
China by technological spillovers. These spillovers occur when China receives productiv-
ity benefits from technologies developed by others.  
  Because of these developments, the composition of China's output changed from the 
production of importables to the production of exportables and non-tradables. In other 
words, China has taken advantage of its low labor costs. In 1977, before the reforms, 
China's two-way trade accounted for a mere 0.6 percent of the world total, while in 2002 
this figure was 5 percent. China's share in world trade is expected to grow to 6 percent in 
2003 and to 7 percent in 2004 (CPB, 2003). The contribution of Chinese trade to the na-
tion's GDP increased from less than 10 percent to more than 40 percent between 1977 and 
2002. Participation in the international trading system has become vital for China maintain 
its economic growth.  
  As a consequence of economic growth, the domestic market is gradually growing 
and this holds in particular for products and services with high-income elasticities. How-
ever, trade barriers to final consumption goods are in general still very high in China. The 
growing domestic market may increase the interest of foreign companies in FDI. 
  Furthermore, China's accession to the WTO has made the country a more reliable 
trading partner. This applies particularly to its most important trading partner, the USA. 
Before its accession, China needed the US Congress to renew each year its status as most 
favored nation. The accession of China has diminished the risk premium for export-
oriented production in China. 
  What does all this mean for foreign agribusiness companies? First of all, China is in-
terested in importing inputs for the supply chain for agricultural products. This applies not 
only to goods but also to management skills and knowledge that can be used in the local 
situation. This means that new technologies have to be suited or adopted to the local cir-
cumstances, namely land scarcity, a limited availability of capital and an institutional 
system that differs from that in developed countries. The inputs that are particularly impor-
tant are those for labor-intensive agricultural products. This is for two related reasons. 
Although the rural regions are undergoing a process of restructuring, there is a huge sur-
plus of labor in rural areas and, in general, wage costs are relatively low in China 
compared to those in developed neighboring countries such as Japan, South Korea, etc. 
China is therefore interested in importing inputs to boost the production of labor-intensive 
agricultural export products as far as these inputs are not available in China. Important in 
this respect are not only inputs for the agricultural production process itself, but also all the 
inputs in the supply chain that are necessary to meet the requirements of the import mar-
kets in developed countries. 
  Secondly, the importation of China's labor-intensive intermediate agricultural prod-
ucts is of particular interest to foreign agribusiness companies. Thirdly, incomes in China 
are rising and particularly in the big cities in the eastern part of the country – which have 
the highest incomes - a clear change in consumption patterns and distribution systems is   243
occurring. This offers increasing opportunities for foreign agribusiness companies to sup-
ply Chinese consumers with new products.  
  Thus, China offers opportunities also for Dutch agribusiness companies. The Nether-
lands is specialized in the production of labor-intensive products, and supplies markets in 
the developed countries of Western Europe. Land for agricultural production is scarce in 
the Netherlands, just as it is in China. However, there are also big differences. For exam-
ple, labor and land productivity in Dutch agriculture are much higher than they are in 
Chinese agriculture as a result of the Netherlands' use of more capital- and more know-
ledge-intensive production systems. The similarities in combination with the differences 
can make Dutch agribusiness companies an interesting partner particularly for importing 
inputs into China and for developing the supply chain for agricultural products in China. In 
addition, China's growing domestic market offers opportunities for Dutch companies to 
export to China technology-intensive products with a high value added per kg of product.  
 
 
8.3 Sino-Dutch  trade 
 
A distinction should be made between export to and import from China. Both the export of 
agricultural products and food to China and the import of these products from China can be 
of importance for the Dutch agribusiness sector. This is particularly the case when these 
products are intermediate products for the Dutch agribusiness sector or when they compete 
with Dutch products. Both export to and import from China are dealt with in this chapter. 
 
8.3.1 Trade in general 
 
China's major trade partners include Japan, South Korea, the USA, and Hong Kong. The 
Netherlands ranks as China's 27
th most important importing partner, with a value of USD 
1.2 billion in 2000. Compared to the small position of the Dutch trade in China, China is 
much more important for the Netherlands: it ranks number seven among the Netherlands' 
importing partners, following Germany, the USA, the UK, Belgium, France, and Japan. 
During the last decade, Dutch imports from China have increased sharply, reaching USD 
6.6 billion in 2000. China has a great trade surplus with the Netherlands. On the list of 
China's export destinations, the Netherlands ranks number nine. However, some of China's 
exports to the Netherlands are re-exported from the Netherlands to other countries. 
  Figure 8.1 shows the Dutch share in China's total imports during the last decade. The 
percentage of China's imports from the Netherlands is both insignificant (less than 1%) and 
declining. As Figure 8.2 shows, the Dutch share in all of China's importing categories is 
negligible, except for the categories beverages & tobacco (a modest 7.8%) and food & live 
animals (1.4%). Dutch beer accounts for 99 percent of the export value in the beverage & 
tobacco category.  









1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 















Figure 8.2  The Dutch share in China's import categories in 2000 (%) 
1: food & live animals; 2: beverages & tobacco; 3: crude materials & inedibles;  
4: fuels, lubricants, etc.; 5: animal, vegetable oils, fats, & wax; 6: chemicals & related products; 7: manufac-
tured goods; 8: machines & transport equipment; 9: misc. manufactured articles; 10: other goods 
 
 
  The major categories of Chinese imports from the Netherlands in terms of value are 
machines & transport equipment, chemicals & related products, and crude materials & in-
edibles (see Figure 8.3). In 2000, Chinese imports of Dutch machines & transport 
equipment amounted to USD 416 million. The leading subcategories include electric ma-
chines, special industrial machinery, and general machines. Machinery for agriculture and   245
the agrofood industry also belongs to this category. The second largest category is chemi-
cals & related products (mainly organic chemicals, plastics, and other chemical materials), 
as well as fertilizers & pesticides. Imports of crude materials & inedibles from the Nether-
lands have increased in recent years. This category ranks third; the leading subcategory is 












































Figure 8.3  Total Chinese import value from the Netherlands by category, 1993-2000 (USD millions) 
 
 
  The major categories of Dutch imports from China include machines & transport 
equipment and manufactured articles & goods. Half of the Dutch import value from China 
(USD 3 billion) comes from the machines & transport equipment category, of which the 
import value of office machines and automatic data processing equipment reached USD 2 
billion in 2000, making it one of the largest categories. The importation of manufactured 
articles & goods mainly comprises metal products, mineral products, textile articles, fabric, 
wooden products, clothing, and baby toys.  
 
8.3.2 Trade in agricultural products and food 
 
In 2000, the value of China's agricultural exports to the rest of the world exceeded USD 15 
billion. The largest category was fish products, followed by vegetables & fruits, and meat 
& crude animals. The value of China's agricultural exports to the Netherlands was USD   246
371 million, representing 2.4 percent of China's total agricultural exports. This share is 
relatively high for the product categories oilseed (14%) and crude animal materials (7%). 
In the same year (2000), the total value of agricultural products imported into China 
amounted to USD 12.6 billion. The top four categories that China imported were oilseed, 
cork & wood, fish products, and animal feedstuff.  
  As shown in Table 8.1, the Dutch share in China's total imports of agricultural prod-
ucts was 1.55 percent. The beverages category was the major one, accounting for 32 
percent of China's total imports. As stated earlier, the excellent achievement in the bever-
age category derives from the beer export (Heineken). Other interesting categories include 
crude animal & vegetable materials, meat products, and dairy products. Within the crude 
vegetable materials category, the important subcategories were bulbs, live plants, and seeds 
for sowing. Within the meat product category, 99 percent of China's imports from the 
Netherlands were meat offal. The same applies to dairy products, though 100 percent of 
China's imports from the Netherlands are milk and cream products (i.e. no other dairy 
products such as butter and cheese products).  
 
 
Table 8.1  China's imports of agricultural products in total and from the Netherlands by category  
  (USD  million) 
 
Category  1993 1997 2000 NL 2000  NL % in 2000
101a All agricultural products  3,975.7 8,813.3 12,698.8 196.4  1.55
00 - Live animals  18.7 41.0 52.3 1.2  2.38
01 - Meat, meat preparations  70.0 157.1 651.0 35.0  5.37
02 - Dairy products, bird eggs  51.3 65.6 216.5 10.8  5.01
03 - Fish, crustaceans, molluscs 367.1 544.6 1,210.3 7.2 0.60
04 - Cereals, cereal preparations  1,026.9 934.1 613.3 0.4  0.06
05 - Vegetables and fruit  97.7 335.2 524.4 0.5  0.09
06 - Sugar,sugar preparations,honey  134.0 251.1 178.1 2.2  1.26
07 - Coffee,tea,cocoa,spices  55.0 82.3 94.8 1.7  1.80
08 - Animal feedstuff  307.4 1,791.0 907.9 9.1  1.00
09 - Misc. edible products, etc.  78.1 102.2 309.8 6.7  2.18
11 - Beverages  45.1 65.8 159.8 51.3  32.09
12 - Tobacco,tobacco manufact.  200.3 254.4 204.4 0.1  0.04
21 - Hides,skins,furskins,raw  189.4 405.0 637.8 17.1  2.68
22 - Oilseeds,oleaginus fruit  28.8 873.8 2,943.6 0.1  0.00
24 - Cork and wood  634.0 959.8 2,658.5 8.7  0.33
29 - Crude animal, veg. materials  170.4 266.1 360.0 23.2  6.45
41 - Animal oils and fats  36.3 89.4 143.8 0.9  0.63
42 - Fixed veg. fats and oils  456.6 1,572.4 754.8 19.5  2.59
43 - Animal and veg.fats and oils  8.7 22.4 77.7 0.5  0.70
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8.3.3 Future  development 
 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 show the projection of annual import/export growth rate for various 
commodities as generated by the GTAP model (see Chapter 5). As an exact correspon-
dence between the classification of the SITC and the GTAP database is not possible. We 
made a crude approximation match (see Figure 8.4). One of the problems is that the SITC 
categories used in Table 8.1 include both primary and processed products, while the GTAP 




Classification used in Table 8.1 (UNCTAD)  Classification used in Tables 8.2 & 8.3 (GTAP) 
04  1, 2, and 3 for rice, wheat, coarse grains  
22+42  4 for oilseeds 
06   5  for  sugar 
26   6 for plant fibers  
05+09+29+08  7 for horticulture 
00+01+21+41+43  8 and 9 for cattle and pork and poultry 
02  10 for milk 
03  11 for fish 
07+09+11+12  12 for processed food 
Note about UNCTAD category: 
08 contains both horticulture and processed food 
09 contains other animal products, oilseeds and processed food 
24 cork and wood are in the broader GTAP extraction category 
 
 
  We assume that the Dutch share in the Chinese import as indicated in Table 8.1 will 
not change in the near future. What trade opportunities are there then for Dutch agribusi-
ness companies?  
  The Chinese import of agricultural products consists to a large extent of products that 
do not play an important role in Dutch agriculture or Dutch exports, as indicated in Table 
8.2. This holds particularly for cereals, oilseeds, sugar, and plant fibers. These products ac-
counted for more than two-thirds of Chinese agricultural imports in 2001. Generally 
speaking, these product sectors will not offer significant business opportunities for the 
Dutch agribusiness given the sector's negligible import share in the Chinese total, although 
the import growth in some of these sectors is expected to be high. Although relatively 
lower growth rates are expected for pork, poultry, and fish these categories could offer ex-
port opportunities as the Chinese import values are already high. In other words, an 
important growth in terms of volume is foreseen for these categories. For the other sectors, 
both horticulture and cattle show a high import growth. However, for cattle the import 
value in 2001 was still low, although the Dutch companies seem to be doing better in this 
sector. The most important business opportunities for the Dutch agribusiness seem to lie in 
horticulture. Of the four categories which include horticultural products (i.e. categories 05, 
08, 09, 29), category 29 (crude vegetable materials) is the most important. In 2000, China 
imported more than 12 million crude vegetable items, of which 9 million were bulbs or live 
plants. Other significant imports from the Netherlands were cut flowers, oilseed residue, 
and potatoes.    248
Table 8.2  Projection annual growth rate of China's imports  
 
Commodity  Import value in 2001 2001-2005 2005-2010
  
Opportunities for  
Dutch export a) 
1 Rice  117 8 10 + 
2 Wheat  187 5 8 +   
3 Coarse grains  773 9 11 + 
4 Oilseeds  2953 7 5 + 
5 Sugar  450 8 7 + 
6 Plant fibers  913 12 16 + 
7 Horticulture  109 14 16 +++++ 
8 Cattle and meat  21 36 26 ++++   
9 Pork, poultry, etc.  452 9 8 ++ 
10 Milk  72 8 8 +++ 
11 Fish  348 4 4 +++ 
12 Processed food  1585 11 7  Hard to conclude 
a) based on the value of Chinese imports from the Netherlands and import growth, + = limited and +++++ = 
sizeable opportunities; (+) = not or limited export products of the Netherlands. 
Source: based on Chapter 5. 
 
 
  Not only China's imports but also its exports will grow in 2001-2003 (see Table 8.3). 
However, the increase in Chinese exports will be smaller than the expected growth of 
world exports (see Chapter 5). As a consequence, the share of China in the world export of 
agricultural products will decrease somewhat. This is partly to do with the growth of 
China's domestic market. This development can be seen as favorable for the Netherlands.  
Table 8.3 shows that two commodities have a big export potential in China, namely horti-
culture and processed food, both of which already enjoy a high export value and will 
continue to enjoy a higher export growth rate in the future. This development will increase 
the competition on the world horticultural market, in which the Dutch are leading.  
 
Table 8.3  Projection annual growth rate of exports 
 
Commodity  Export value in 2001 2001-2005 2005-2010
1 Rice  324 -1 -1
2 Wheat  6 -7 -6
3 Coarse grains  562 -13 -6
4 Oilseeds  66 -2 -2
5 Sugar  50 -1 0
6 Plant fibers  47 -10 -7
7 Horticulture  2240 4 3
8 Cattle and meat  50 1 1
9 Pork, poultry, etc.  924 1 5
10 Milk  58 1 2
11 Fish  808 4 5
12 Processed food  17282 4 5
Source: based on Chapter 5   249







Dutch share in 
China (%)* 





1 Cereals  1421  2064 0.06 85 120 
4 Oilseeds  3732  4393 0.01 40 45 
5 Sugar  598  717 1.26 750 900 
7 Horticulture   170  264 6.45 1,100 1,700 
8 Cattle  51  71 2.38 120 170 
9 Pork, poultry, 
   etc.  618 781 4.03 2,490 3,150 
10 Milk  95  123 5.01 480 620 
11 Fish  399  468 0.6 240 280 
* In 2000 for several commodities (e.g. horticulture and cattle) is used their dominant share within their cate-
gories, while for others (e.g. pork & poultry) is used their weighted share. 
 
 
  Based on the GTAP forecast results for China's import value in 2005 and 2010 and 
on the share of China's imports from the Netherlands, we calculated China's estimated im-
port value from the Netherlands in 2005 and 2010 for several commodities as indicated in 
Table 8.4. Pork & poultry products turn out to be the largest Dutch export category to 
China. The export value will amount to over USD 2.5 billion in 2005 and to 3 billion in 
2010. The leading products in these export categories from the Netherlands to China are 
pig meat and meat offal, which reached USD 35 million in 2000. These products are fol-
lowed by hides and skins. The second largest trade opportunity for the Dutch is 
horticulture. Its import value from the Netherlands will exceed USD 1 billion in 2005 and 
reach USD 1.7 billion by 2010. Although processed food is not mentioned in Table 8.4, it 
can be expected that for some processed foods the prospects for Dutch exports are favor-
able, particularly for those goods where the Netherlands has a competitive advantage and 
the price per kg is high.  
 
 




In addition to trade opportunities, direct investment opportunities comprise an important 
category of business opportunities. In this section the focus is on FDI in China. We first 
discuss FDI in the worldwide context, and then in the context of China. Finally, we discuss 
Dutch FDI in China. There are relationships between trade and FDI, particularly when a 
choice can be made between trade and FDI. These relationships and the large variety of 
motives of companies for FDI are discussed in 8.4.3.4 and 8.4.5.2. On the basis of the 
available data and this more theoretical part, the opportunities for the Dutch agribusiness 
sector for FDI in China are discussed in 8.4.5.3.  
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8.4.2 Overview of FDI inflow worldwide 
 
FDI worldwide grew sharply in the second half of the 1990s, and reached a record high of 
USD 1.4 trillion in 2000. FDI consists partly of new investments and partly of acquisitions. 
Developed countries were the dominant recipients, accounting for more than USD 1 tril-
lion, while only 240 billion went to developing countries. The high amount of FDI in the 
developed countries was mainly a result of major mergers and acquisitions across devel-
oped economies in 2000. In other words, new investments played only a limited role.  
  The global inflow of FDI declined sharply in 2001 (Figure 8.5). However, the slump 
in 2001 was concentrated in developed economies, where FDI inflows shrank by 59 per-
cent, compared to 14 percent in developing economies. Of the total inflow of USD 735 
billion FDI in 2001, 503 billion went to developed economies, 205 billion went to develop-
ing economies, and the remaining 27 billion went to the transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The 49 least developed countries (LDCs) remain marginal recipients, 
with only 0.5 percent of the global total (Table 8.5). The decline of FDI to developing 
countries was limited to a small number of host countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and 
Hong Kong.  
  Although its inflow more than halved, the US remained the largest FDI recipient in 
2001, followed by the UK and France. Figure 8.6 lists the world's top 10 FDI inflow 
economies. China (excluding Hong Kong) ranks sixth on this list; it regained its position as 
the largest FDI recipient of the developing countries. Including Hong Kong, China ranks 
second on the list for 2001. In 2002, China's FDI reached the level of USD 53 billion 



































Figure 8.5  FDI inflows in the world, 1987-2001 (USD billions) 
Source: UNCTAD database. 
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Table 8.5  World distribution of FDI inflows, selected years (USD millions) 
YEAR 
COUNTRY/GROUP 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001
TOTAL WORLD   12,586 26,580 54,945 57,596 202,782 330,516  1,491,934 735,146
Developed countries   9,477 16,971 46,530 42,693 164,575 203,311  1,227,476 503,144
Western Europe   5,207 10,160 21,427 16,762 96,803 118,265  832,067 336,210
European Union   5,127 9,879 21,317 15,879 90,213 114,439  808,519 322,954
Other Western Europe   80 281 111 883 6,591 3,827  23,549 13,256
North America   3,083 5,947 22,725 21,862 56,004 68,027  367,529 151,900
Other developed countries   1,187 864 2,377 4,069 11,767 17,019  27,880 15,034
Developing countries   3,109 9,609 8,380 14,873 37,567 112,537  237,894 204,801
Africa   747 790 380 2,407 2,483 5,743  8,694 17,165
Latin America and the 
Caribean  1,438 4,295 7,485 7,278 10,282 30,866 95,405 85,373
Asia and the Pacific   924 4,525 516 5,187 24,803 75,928  133,795 102,264
Asia   787 4,501 396 5,110 24,251 75,217  133,707 102,066
West Asia   168 2,610 -3,162 740 2,141 3  688 4,133
Central Asia   - - - - 4 1,484  1,895 3,569
South, East and Southeast
Asia   620 1,891 3,558 4,371 22,106 73,729  131,123 94,365
The Pacific   136 23 119 77 552 711  88 198


















Figure 8.6  World FDI inflows, top 10 economies, 2000 and 2001 (USD billions) 
Source: UNCTAD database. 
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8.4.3 FDI in China 
 
8.4.3.1  Development of FDI in China 
 
Since the birth of the first joint venture in China in 1980, FDI has contributed significantly 
to China's push toward a market-oriented economy. In 1979-2000, China received FDI 
amounting to USD 346.6 billion, accounting for 5.5 percent of the world FDI inward stock. 
China is by far the largest FDI recipient among the developing countries. Based on the size 
of China's FDI inflow, its development can be roughly separated into three stages (Figure 
8.7). 
-  Early stage (1979-1991). As China started to open its doors to the outside world in 
the late 1970s, the government first established four Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs)
1 along the south coast in order to attract FDI. However, by 1983 the total 
amount of realized FDI was only USD 1.8 billion. Subsequently, the Chinese gov-
ernment designated another 14 coastal cities
2 and two development zones
3. These 
'open door' regions provided preferential tax policies to attract foreign capital and to 
promote exports. Just as the FDI inflow was starting to take off, the Tiananmen mas-
sacre in 1989 led to FDI activities reaching a record low. 
-  Rapid growth stage (1992-1998). In 1992, China adopted a new policy advocated by 
Deng Xiaoping that emphasized China's commitment to a stronger market-oriented 
economic reform. The Chinese government issued a series of new regulations and 
opened up the whole of China to foreign capital and technology. The impact was im-
pressive: FDI growth rates were over 100 percent in 1992 and 1993. In 1998, FDI 
inflow reached its peak level of USD 45 billion. 
-  Stable stage (since 1999). Chinese FDI inflow slowed down in 1999, partly as a re-
sult of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and partly as a result of the 
slowdown of the world economy. In recent years, the FDI inflow into China has sta-
bilized at around USD 40-45 billion. During the global economic slowdown in 2001, 
China remained one of the most favored FDI destinations. According to China's Min-
istry of Foreign Technical and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), Chinese inward 
FDI continuously performed well, also in 2002. In January through November 2002, 
the contracted FDI reached USD 76 billion, and the actually used FDI reached 48 bil-
lion, up by 14 percent compared to 2001. This positive development of FDI was 
supported by the accession of China to the WTO, as trade liberalization lowers pro-
duction costs and the price of capital goods (Elena Ianchovichina et al., 2003). In 
2003 the increase may slow down because of the impact of SARS on investment de-
cisions.  
 
                                                 
1 Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen. 
2 Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, 
Zhanjiang, and Beihai. 
























Figure 8.7  Chinese annual FDI utilization 1979-2001 (USD 100 millions) 
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. 
 
 
8.4.3.2  Geographic distribution of FDI in China 
 
Appendix 8.1 presents several years of FDI distribution pattern across the country. As a 
consequence of central government policy, the provinces which have SEZs received far 
more FDI than their inland counterparts (Table 8.6 and Figure 8.8). More than 80 percent 
of FDI went to the SEZs. Just one of these Zones - Guangdong Province - absorbed almost 
30 percent of China's FDI, while 14 percent went to Jiangsu Province. The dominant posi-
tion of Guangdong in FDI is connected with its relations with neighboring Hong Kong.  
  Almost all FDI studies related to China have noted this uneven geographic distribu-
tion. Broadman and Sun (1997) regressed provincial FDI stock data on its GDP, labor cost, 
human capital, infrastructure, and geographic location, and found that the most significant 
factors affecting FDI destination are market size of host provinces, infrastructure develop-
ment, quality of labor, and geographic location (coastal areas).  
  In the late 1990s, the Chinese government launched its 'GO WEST' policy campaign. 
Since then, a large amount of government investment has been poured into building infra-
structure in the western regions, in order to attract more FDI. An advantage of these 
regions is that labor costs are lower than they are in the coastal regions.   254
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Figure 8.8  Chinese FDI utilization among SEZs and other zones (USD millions) 
Source: Calculated by authors based on various SSBs. 
 
 
8.4.3.3  Sector distribution of FDI in China  
 
Not only China's FDI geographic distribution but also the distribution across sectors is 
skewed (Table 8.7). Compared with Asia and with the world as a whole, the share of FDI 
in China's primary sector, and particularly in agriculture, is extremely low. Less than 2 
percent of Chinese FDI goes to agriculture, while the figure for Asia in 1993 was around 
12 percent. 
  FDI in China is concentrated in the secondary sector, especially in the manufacturing 
sector and to a lesser extent in the energy sector. More than 60 percent of FDI is in the 
manufacturing sector. Especially in this sector FDI increases productivity and exporting 
foreign companies profit from low labor costs in China. Unfortunately, data about the food   255
industry are not available. The proportion of FDI in the tertiary sector in China is compa-
rable to other parts of the world. However, there are significant differences in internal 
structure. Real estate investment in China contributes to a considerable amount of FDI in 
the tertiary sector. In the top year 1993, as much as 39 percent of total FDI inflow in China 
went to real estate management. Although this figure then dropped, it remains higher com-
pared to the rest of the world. Other areas where FDI could grow further is trade 
distribution and financial services. In these sectors, China could learn from the experiences 
of other Asian countries.  
 
8.4.3.4 Concluding  remarks 
 
Earlier we said that there can be a relation between FDI and trade: FDI can be a substitute 
for trade, and trade can complement FDI. Liu et al. (2001) examined on the economy level 
the causal relations between trade and FDI for China and nineteen home countries/regions 
(including the Netherlands) in the period 1984-1998, and came up with three main find-
ings, namely that there is a one-way complementary causal link: 
-  between the growth of China's imports and the growth of the inward FDI stock from 
the home country/region; 
-  between the growth in the inward FDI stock in China and the growth of China's ex-
port to the home country/region; and 
-  between the growth of China's exports and the growth in its imports.  
 
  Most FDI in China goes into manufacturing and can be considered as efficiency- 
seeking and only to a lesser extent as marketing-seeking. This has to do with the large dif-
ferences in resource endowments. FDI in China is a package of skills (technological, 
management, marketing) and financial capital. An important attraction factor for FDI is the 
relatively cheap labor in China. In this respect we should also mention China's FDI policy, 
which encourages foreign invested firms to export their products. On the basis of these ex-
ports, more foreign exchange is earned to finance imports to ensure the supply of key 
materials and embodied technology.  
  A further growth in Chinese imports and exports of labor-intensive products is simu-
lated in section 8.4, and it might be expected that this will go hand in hand with a further 
growth in FDI. However, one has to keep in mind that the relations that existed in the pe-
riod 1984-1998 might change. A further increase in income will change domestic markets, 
and give a positive impulse to market-seeking FDI.  
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Table 8.7  China's FDI inflow by sector (%). 
 
 
Sector China  Asia  World 
 
     
  1984 1988 1993 1998 2000 2001  1993  1993 
 
 
Primary  40.9  12.3 1.1  2.64 3.1 3.6  33.4  22.1 
  Farming, forestry,  
 animal  husbandry, 
  and  fishery  1.7 2.7   1.4 1.7 1.9  11.8  5 
-  Mining & quarrying   32.9      1.3    1.4  1.7  21.4  17 
 
Secondary  26.9 47.6 45.9 63.1 68.9 70.8  46.1  42.4 
-  Manufacturing      56.3  63.5  66 
-  Electric power, gas, 
and water production  
&  supply       6.8 5.5 4.8     
 
Tertiary  32.1 40.1  53 34.3 27.9 25.6  28.6  38.2 
-  Construction     3.5 4.5 2.2 1.7  2.5  3.4 
- Transport,  storage, 
and post  
&  telecommunications     1.3 3.6 2.5 1.9  1.5  4.4 
  Wholesale & retail trade,  
and  catering  services       4.1 2.6 2.1 2.5  6.1  11.1 
  Real estate  
management    15.4 28.3 39.3 14.1 11.4  11  1.9  4.8 
-  Social  services         6.5 5.4 5.5     
-  Health care, sports, 
and  social  welfare         0.2 0.3 0.3     
-  Education, culture & arts, 
and radio, film & television        0.2  0.1  0.1     
-  Other  sectors  (finance)       4.8 2.5 3.9 2.4  (9.6)  (14.5) 
 
 
Source: Broadman & Sun, 1997; data for 1998, 2000 and 2001 are from SSB. 
 
 
8.4.4 FDI from the Netherlands 
 
8.4.4.1  Development of Dutch FDI in China 
 
In 2000, the stocks of Dutch FDI in the world was EUR 323,640 million. Of this, 40 per-
cent went to the US - the largest recipient - followed by Belgium, the UK, and Germany. 
At EUR 1,375 million, the Dutch investment stock in China was less than 1 percent. The 
development of Dutch FDI was more or less similar to that of total FDI in China. Table 8.8 
and Figure 8.9 show that Dutch investment in China in the 1980s got off to a slow start, but 
a big expansion followed in the late 1990s. It reached a peak in 2000, with a total amount 
of USD 789 million, which is less than 2 percent of total FDI in China. The differences be-
tween contracted and actually used investment indicate that many projects are still in   257
progress. Recently, some Dutch companies postponed decisions to invest in China because 
of the SARS epidemic (Konijn & Wiemers, 2003). 
 
 
Table 8.8  Dutch investment in China (USD 10,000) 
Year   Number of projects Actually used Contracted 
1982 1 0 7
1983 
1984 2 0 188
1985 4 13 266
1986 4 249 29
1987 0 21 0
1988 5 2062 15,314
1989 10 1773 1772
1990 6 1598 2160
1991 14 667 1687
1992 37 2841 4116
1993 109 8400 15,169
1994 95 11,105 36,582
1995 105 11,411 60,232
1996 77 12,511 88,921
1997 80 41,380 56,718
1998 97 71,882 56,268
1999 76 54,168 67,581
2000 102 78,948 341,412
2001 114 77,611 97,397
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Figure 8.9  Dutch direct investment in China (1982-2001)   258
8.4.4.2 Geographic  distribution of Dutch FDI in China 
 
China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) started collect-
ing FDI data for each country at the geographic and the sector level in 2000. We can 
therefore analyze only the data from the last three years. Some 70 percent of all Dutch in-
vestments in the last three years went to the SEZs as presented in bold in Appendix 8.2. 
Jiangsu province is the location with the highest value of actually used FDI (it absorbed 25 
percent of the total amount), followed by Shanghai and Guangdong. However, Guangdong 
is the province with by far the highest amount of contracted FDI. The number of contracts 
was the highest in Shanghai, with a share of almost 25 percent. Noticeably, the Dutch also 
invested a considerable amount in China Natural Gas Co. 
  Generally speaking, there are no remarkable differences in preference in the regional 
distribution of Dutch FDI compared with total FDI in China (Table 8.9). The most favored 
FDI destinations for the Dutch are the coastal SEZs, just as they are for total FDI. 
 
 
Table 8.9  Dutch FDI preferences in China, actually used ( percent) 











China Natural Gas Co. 0,02  
Source: calculated by authors based on SSB. 
 
8.4.4.3  Sector distribution of Dutch FDI in China 
 
Table 8.10 (sector distribution of Dutch FDI in China) shows that two-thirds of Dutch FDI 
went to manufacturing, which is comparable to the total FDI data at the national level. This 
may be a result of the heavy investments made by Philips in China. The Dutch investors 
have only a modest investment in real estate management (4%) and are not as heavily in-
volved in this sector as other foreign investors are. As a country with a strong agricultural 
capacity, the Dutch investment in Chinese agriculture is very low, accounting for only 4.5 
percent of its total. This share is only slightly more than the share of agriculture in total 
FDI. The data for the food industry as such are not available; they belong to the manufac-
turing sector.  
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National total  323 206,762 158,672
Farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery   19 6177 7187
Mining and quarrying  1 175 278
Manufacturing 171 133,770 103,403
Electric power, gas, water production & supply  2 3475 9840
Construction 2 1096 1115
Transportation, storage, postal & telecommunications services 13 5931 1490
Wholesale & retail trade, and catering services  34 8894 9198
Finance and insurance  0 107 0
Real estate management  18 21,578 6908
Social services  46 5759 1964
Health care, sports and social welfare  2 6 5
Education, culture & arts, and radio, film & television  3 600 290
Other sectors  12 19,014 16,330
Source: MOFTEC, 2002. 
 
 




FDI cannot be seen apart from trade. FDI usually comes within the scope of companies 
when trade is less attractive or impossible. In the following subsection we elaborate the 
reasons for FDI. In the last subsection we discuss the FDI opportunities for Dutch agri-
business companies on the basis of the results presented in 8.4 and against the background 
of the discussion in the following subsection.  
 
8.4.5.2  Relations between trade and FDI 
 
There are a number of reasons why Dutch companies choose direct investment as a strat-
egy for internationalization (Bijman & van Berkum, 2001). The first is that it is not 
possible to export the products from the Netherlands at a reasonable price, because of high 
transport costs, high import tariffs, etc. The second reason is that a further growth of pro-
duction in the Netherlands may be difficult or even impossible because of, for example, the 
limited availability of raw materials etc. A third reason is that it may be difficult to realize 
production or marketing by contract. Particularly the efficient exploitation of company-
specific intangible assets (such as knowledge, reputation and management) is difficult to 
realize by contracts. 
  All three reasons are to some extent valid for agricultural FDI in China. The physical 
distance between the Netherlands and China is very large and transport costs are high. 
Therefore, trade to China will be limited to high value added products. Import regulations 
as a motive for FDI are becoming less important because of trade liberalization in China 
within the framework of the WTO. However, there is still a difference in import restric-
tions between the import of inputs and that of final products for the Chinese consumer   260
market, the latter being more restricted. On the other hand, the Chinese government is be-
coming more critical when considering granting privileges to foreign companies. The 
second reason given above holds for a large number of agricultural and food products in 
the Netherlands, as production is already extremely high and a further increase is limited 
by European and national policies. Possibly the third reason given may play a less impor-
tant role as far as agricultural FDI in China is concerned, as a lack of knowledge and 





Dutch companies in China: some examples 
 
Financial services 
Rodamco Asia invests in China and other Asian countries. It owns 60 percent of an apartment block in Bei-
jing and 100 percent of an apartment block in Shanghai. The company plans to make more investments in 
Chinese real estate. 
Fortis and ING are two other financial services companies active in China. Both companies have a license to 
cooperate with a local party. For example, in 2003 ING started a joint venture with the Beijing Capital 
Group, called the ING Capital Life Insurance Company Limited. This company operates in Dalian, where it 
is the first foreign-invested insurance provider. Fortis also has limited activities in the field of asset manage-
ment. 
Consumer market 
Heineken has been cooperating for over 70 years with its regional partner, Fraser & Neavem. The size of the 
Chinese activities is limited; however, Heineken has plans to expand its activities in China. (Big Heineken 
export of beer to China in statistics) 
Unilever. China's share in the total turnover of Unilever is about 2 percent. Unilever aims to double its turn-
over in China in the period 1999-2004. To achieve this target, it has a strategic research laboratory in 
Shanghai and has implemented a restructuring to ease further investments.  
Ahold. Not all the activities of Dutch companies in China have been successful. In 1996, Ahold opened a 
number of TOPS supermarkets in Shanghai. However, the results were disappointing and Ahold decided to 
sell its investments and withdraw from China. 
Industry and services 
Draka has a strong position in the glass fiber cable market as a result of its 37.5 percent share in the company 
YOFC – the market leader in China. However, selling prices are under pressure because of increasing im-
ports. 
IHC Caland supplies dredgers to Chinese state dredging companies. In the future, IHC Caland will be able to 
profit from the gradually opening of the Chinese dredging market. 
Agribusiness companies 
Friesland Dairy Foods has had a dairy factory in Tianjin for a number of years now. During some years, the 
results have been disappointing. 
AVEBE has started a joint venture with a company in Yunnan to produce starch potatoes and to process them 
into starch products.  
Rijk Zwaan – a seed company – has an outlet in Shandong Province. It also has a research station in Qingdao 
(Shandong Province) and a demonstration station in Shouguang (Shandong Province). 
Nutreco – whose main activities are in the production of feed (premixes, specialties), aquaculture, and the 
processing of meat – has a production facility in China. 
Numico – a company specialized in, among other things, the production of food for babies and for those with 
specific dietary needs – has a production facility in China. 
Van Melle – which specializes in confectionary – has a production unit in China for the production of local 
brands.    261
  China has to compete for FDI with other countries. China is disadvantaged not only 
because it is a far-away country but also because of important differences in language, cul-
ture, and political system. Generally speaking, much time has to be invested and patience 
is needed to be successful. Only a few Dutch agribusiness companies have a long tradition 
of doing business in China and have thus thoroughly experienced these differences. This 
may explain the limited Dutch FDI in China. 
  However, these differences will become less important in the future because more 
and more people are speaking English and have studied abroad; increasing cultural ex-
changes are improving mutual understanding; and the political system is becoming 
increasingly market oriented and transparent for foreign companies. Moreover, an increas-
ing number of Dutch agribusiness companies are building up experiences in doing business 
with China and are learning from the experiences of other companies. 
  On the other hand, China has some advantages over other countries in competing for 
FDI: its markets are growing rapidly as a result of urbanization, economic growth, and 
population growth, and labor costs are lower than they are in developed countries, and it is 
expected that these costs will remain low in the medium term because of the huge surplus 
of labor in China.  
  On the basis of the results of section 8.4 and against the background of the discussion 
above, the following is an elaboration of the opportunities for Dutch FDI in the Chinese 
agribusiness sector.  
 
8.4.5.3  FDI opportunities for Dutch agribusiness companies 
 
Horticulture is an important growth sector in China both for the internal market and for ex-
port. The sector is interesting for China as it is labor intensive and labor costs are low. The 
export of horticultural products is directed mainly to neighboring markets, such as Japan, 
Hong Kong, and South Korea. These are high-income markets with high labor costs, and 
they demand high quality products.  
  Generally speaking, the transport costs are too high for many – if not most – horticul-
tural, vegetable, and floricultural products from the Netherlands. In addition, it is expected 
that a number of current Dutch export products in this sector will not be competitive in the 
medium term as a result of the development of the horticultural sector in this part of the 
world. However, the Netherlands has developed much knowledge of and has extensive 
management experience in producing and marketing horticultural products. From this per-
spective, the Netherlands could play a growing role in the development of the horticultural 
sector in China. This applies particularly to the segment of the market that requires high 
quality products. One of the major handicaps is the lack of protection of breeders' rights. 
FDI in this sector could also increase export opportunities; for example, the export from 
the Netherlands of seed for horticultural products and equipment for horticultural produc-
tion.  
  In the international statistics, potatoes are in the vegetable category. It is worthwhile 
to mention this product separately, however. In a relatively short period, the demand for 
processed potatoes in the fast-food market has grown considerably. However, the required 
quality of potatoes is not available. Although the Netherlands is specialized in the produc-
tion of the required quality of potatoes, transport costs are too high to make export   262
possible. The production and processing of potatoes in China could be a challenge for 
Dutch potato processors. The production of processed potatoes should be based on Dutch 
inputs of raw material in order to obtain the required quality. However, this means that the 
current problems with the import of Dutch seed potatoes will have to be solved.  
  A second sector for which FDI could be interesting for Dutch companies is the dairy 
sector. This is not so much because of export growth (as it is for horticultural products) as 
because of the growth of domestic demand. The development of this sector is in its in-
fancy. The average consumption of dairy products in China is still low, although there has 
been a take-off in consumption in such rapidly developing cities as Beijing and Shanghai. 
This consumption consists to a large extent of perishable products, such as fresh milk and 
yogurt. Therefore these kinds of products do not present export opportunities for the Neth-
erlands: they must be produced close to the market. 
  There is a well-developed dairy sector in Netherlands, as well as in, for example, 
France, New Zealand, and the USA. Although increased production by the dairy sector in 
the Netherlands is possible only to a limited extent, the sector could use its extensive ex-
perience to cooperate in the development of the Chinese dairy sector. A handicap in this 
respect, however, is that the Dutch dairy sector is dominated by farmers' cooperatives, 
whose interests differ from those of private companies. Such cooperatives are interested 
primarily in adding value to the milk produced by their members. 
  The production of dairy products comprises the production and the processing of 
milk – and the Netherlands can contribute to the development of both in China. In addition, 
FDI could stimulate the export from the Netherlands of basic materials and equipment. 
 
 
8.5  Conclusion and discussion 
 
The driving forces of economic growth in China are investment (both FDI and domestic), 
domestic demand, and export. The development in the income per capita is to a large ex-
tent determined by technical change, which leads to an increase in total factor productivity. 
Investments play an important role in this respect. Although China has attracted substantial 
FDI in the last few decades, its FDI inflow accounts for only around 3 percent of its GDP. 
However, it may deliver an important contribution to the growth of productivity. More 
than 60 percent of FDI is in the manufacturing sector. FDI has been pouring into the 
coastal regions, although recent policy is shifting towards the western part of China in or-
der to exploit its rich resources and to stimulate domestic demand there. 
  Dutch FDI in China began in the 1980s, but got off to a very slow start. It really took 
off in 1992 after the opening up policy was formally adopted nationwide. The Dutch FDI 
stock accounts for less than 1 percent of China's total FDI. Also Dutch FDI is strongly 
skewed toward manufacturing, which absorbed two-thirds of the total. In terms of regional 
preference, Jiangsu is the first choice of Dutch companies, followed by Shanghai.  
  The Netherlands is one of the world's largest trading countries. However, this study 
shows that the Dutch trade position in China is limited. This is only partly to do with the 
great physical distance between the two countries. An important role is played by the dif-
ferences in culture, and these differences make transaction costs high when doing business 
with China. This is why the role of small and medium-sized companies in trade and FDI is   263
limited and why the multinationals are more active in the Chinese market. China, on the 
other hand, has made more use of – or has more – trade opportunities than the Dutch and 
has generated a huge trade surplus. This also holds for the agricultural sector, where the 
Dutch have only a limited share in China's agricultural import. 
  Sino-Dutch trade has certain strong characteristics. The Dutch export special indus-
trial machinery to China, and import office machines and automatic data processing 
equipment from China. As far as agricultural trade concerned, trade is virtually one-way: 
edible offal and flower bulbs are the major Dutch export categories to China, while China 
exports only a very limited amount of agricultural products to the Netherlands. 
  The question whether Dutch agricultural FDI stimulates or substitutes the trade with 
China remains unanswered. More detailed information on the Dutch FDI destination areas 
is needed in order to answer this question. Important reasons for Dutch companies to make 
FDI are the impossibility of exporting to China at a reasonable price, the limited availabil-
ity of raw materials for production in the Netherlands, and difficulties in realizing 
production in China by contract. What is certain, however, is that the export of Dutch agri-
cultural products and Dutch FDI in the Chinese agribusiness sector are limited. The 
reasons for this may be that other markets are more attractive and/or that it is difficult to do 
business in China. Finally, the Netherlands is primarily a trading nation, which may ex-
plain the limited FDI by the Dutch.  
  China's economy grew by 8 percent in 2002, and many experts predict that this 
strong growth will continue and that China will remain one of the world's hottest invest-
ment destinations. In fact, in 2002 China replaced the USA as the world's no.1 FDI 
recipient. The Economist Intelligence Unit forecasts that China's annual FDI inflow will be 
over USD 60 billion in 2003-2007, putting it into the second position (The Economist, 
April 10, 2003). In the future, Dutch companies considering investing in China should pay 
attention to the Chinese government's policy changes, as the focus is being switched from 
the east to the west of the country. Much of the northwestern part of China is rich in agri-
cultural and natural resources, and remains untapped.  
  In terms of sector preferences for FDI, the Dutch agribusiness could play a much 
more important role in floriculture, animal husbandry, transportation, storage logistics, etc. 
The Dutch agribusiness companies are currently involved in these sectors to various de-
grees, but are focused mainly on trade relations. A long-term commitment from both sides 
is needed to foster a direct investment relationship.    264




Food security: central goal of China's agricultural policy 
Food security has been a central goal of China's agricultural policy. Since the early 1980s, 
domestic reforms aimed at boosting agricultural growth and farm income have covered 
nearly every aspect of the economy, starting from land reform and gradually moving to 
both input and output markets, from policies specific to the agricultural sector to macro-
economic policies. The reforms have had significant impacts on China's economy. China 
has been able not only to increase its ability to feed its growing population with the limited 
available natural resources, but has also become an important food and agricultural ex-
porter. Per capita availability of food and household food security have improved 
significantly. Increased domestic production is almost solely responsible for the increased 
per capita food availability. 
  China's experience demonstrates the importance of institutional change, technologi-
cal development, price and market liberalization, rural economic development and macro-
economic policies in improving agricultural productivity, farmer income, and food security 
in a nation with limited land and other natural resources. Technology has been the main 
engine of China's agricultural economy growth. Institutional arrangement and government 
food policies also play an important role in China's food production and making food 
available for the whole of China's society. Rural enterprise development and off-farm em-
ployment play a substantial role in China's economy and farmer's income. Broad 
participation in strong rural economic growth has brought about a tremendous reduction in 
absolute poverty.  
  External reforms in general have paralleled domestic reforms. During nearly 20 years 
of reform, China's foreign trade regime has gradually changed from a highly centralized, 
planned and import-substitution regime into a more decentralized, market-oriented and ex-
port-promotion regime. Reform and trade liberalization in China's external sector has 
proceeded gradually. In the initial stage, reformers only implemented measures that pro-
vided incentives to selected sets of corporations and institutions. Because the experience 
gained from the reform grew and the objectives of trade could be achieved through alterna-
tive settings of institutions and policies, trade liberalization has been implemented 
smoothly since the late 1980s. However, in the late 1990s, China also used various means 
to protect some of its crops, such as maize and cotton.  
  The impact on agriculture, however, is only part of the story. Reforms have also af-
fect the access of households to non-farm employment and the wage they earn for being in 
the off farm market. In general, China has gained a lot from market liberalization. Increas-
ing exports of manufacturing goods have been produced in factories that hire a lot of rural 
labor. These factories have also had spillover effects that have helped make domestic fac-
tories more productive and have increased the demand for labor. In a country like China, 
increasing the demand for off- farm labor is probably the most important factor in improv-
ing the economy.    265
  China's future agriculture is a subject of growing concern. On the one hand, rapid in-
dustrialization and urbanization will lead to competition for agricultural resource uses. The 
impacts of trade liberalization on China's domestic agricultural sector- that engages hun-
dreds of millions of small farmers- are the other growing concern of the policy makers. 
Rapid economic growth has continued unevenly across regions and among income groups. 
The income gap among regions and between the rural and urban has not been narrowed.  
  Limited options for increasing food and agricultural supplies has made the challenge 
of meeting China's food security target more formidable. Fiscal constraints may preclude 
leaders from implementing some of the planned policies. The constraints imposed on lead-
ers by resource scarcity and political-economic realities have increased the need to 
understand the scope for food supply expansion from one of the most important sources- 
namely investments in agricultural technology- and to understand the scope of income 
growth from non-farming activities, namely rural enterprise. The nation needs to keep 
promoting policies that facilitate investment and that allow rural households to move to 
these jobs without constraints.  
 
 
Quality of data needs improvement for model simulations  
For the purpose of this study, two models are used and adapted GTAP (Global Trade 
Analysis Project) and CAPSiM (Chinese Agricultural Policy Simulation Model). The qual-
ity of the outcomes of the models depends to a large extent on the quality of the data used. 
Particularly China's livestock supply and demand statistics are not consistent with even the 
most basic criteria: supply equals demand and the implied derived demand for feed equals 
the supply of feed. For this reason a number of data sources were used to create new sup-
ply and demand series. As a result demand is corrected upward in the data and supply was 
corrected downward. A decomposition analysis shows that the single largest source of the 
discrepancy was the adjustment to supply and the adjustment to demand to account for the 
out-of-home consumption. 
  If the adjusted data sets are correct, there are implications for the validity of past sta-
tistics and the accuracy of alternative forecasts. We have shown how differences in 
livestock statistical series can create such great discrepancies in predicted feed grain im-
ports that some analysts believe China will export feed grain for the next 5 years or more, 
while others predict that the nation may have to import over 80 mtt. Meat trade would be 
subject to similar differences in forecasts. Beyond supply, demand and trade, gross domes-
tic product (GDP) figures could be significantly influenced. Since livestock makes up 30 
percent of agricultural GDP (AGDP), and the growth rate of livestock was overstated by 
37 percent, the reported growth rate of AGDP (which according to CNSB was 4 percent 
annually between 1987 and 1999) would have to be lowered by 1 percentage point to 3 
percent annually. GDP growth would have to be lowered by 0.11 percent.  
  As China develops, and forecasts point to continued future growth, there will be a 
continuing and rising demand for higher quality data. Clearly, some of the data sets - the 
livestock data, in particular - are so poor that without adjustments it is impossible to have a 
firm base for investment and policy planning. Especially in an economy that is changing so 
fast and will continue to do so in the future, the challenge to improve data collection is now 
more important than ever.   266
Uncertainties in China's food demand and policies to boost China's food supply 
China is highly acclaimed for its ability to feed its growing population with the extremely 
limited natural resources. Over the last four decades, per capita availability of food, house-
hold food security, and nutrition all have improved significantly. Increased domestic 
production is almost solely responsible for increased per capita food availability and sig-
nificantly contributes to poverty alleviation and farmers' income. 
  Determining factors in the CAPSiM-projection of future food consumption are: 
population growth, income growth per capita, urbanization and growing importance of 
consumer markets in the rural area. The most uncertain of these factors is income growth. 
Alternative income growth scenarios result in significant changes in China's food demand 
and trade for almost all commodities except for grain. Higher income growth will boost 
meat demand, which will be offset by lower meat export. However, grain supply and de-
mand balances will keep nearly stable at about 90% in 2020, so the impact of income 
growth on food security will be minimal.  
  On the food supply side China's experience demonstrates the importance of techno-
logical development, institutional change, price and market liberalization, rural economic 
development and other conducive policies in improving agricultural productivity, farmer's 
income, and food security in a nation with limited land and other natural resources. Among 
other factors, technology and irrigation have been major driving forces of productivity 
growth and the engine of China's agricultural economy development.  
  Limited options for increasing food supplies has made the challenge of meeting 
China's food security target even more formidable. Decollectivization and fiscal reform 
have already been tapped for most of their gains. Fiscal constraints may preclude leaders 
from implementing some of the planned policies. The nation's budget crises, above all, 
bind the hands of officials even if investments in agricultural research promise high re-
turns. Chronic budget shortfalls and looming trade agreements also effectively shut off the 
option of using East Asian -style price policies to maintain production levels.  
  The constraints imposed on leaders by resource scarcity and political-economic reali-
ties increase the need to understand the scope for supply expansion from the most 
important sources of past supply growth, investments in agricultural technology and irriga-
tion. Improved technology and irrigation have been by far the largest drivers of agricultural 
production growth, and as such are major sources of increased food availability in China. 
Our analysis shows that extra investments in agricultural research and irrigation will boost 
production and will increase self-sufficiency rates in particular for non-grain products. A 
third factor effecting production is erosion and salinization of land. Slowing down the rate 
at which arable land is declining due to erosion and salinization will have an important 
positive impact on production growth, which consequently results in higher self-
sufficiency rates. The analyses and results with CAPSiM presented in this section establish 
a basis for China's leaders and policy makers to confidently invest in the nation's agricul-
tural research system, in irrigation and in the reduction of erosion and salinization of land.  
  Based on the results of this study and on experience in the rest of the world, if China 
wants its agriculture to continue to supply sufficient food for the country's growing popula-
tion with its rising income and under trade liberalization, it must increase its investments in 
agricultural research, irrigation and reduction of the growth of eroded or salinized land. 
The current agricultural research investment intensity (0.44%) is low. However, a limiting   267
factor for increasing investments in irrigation is the scarcity of water in particular in North-
ern China and the growing competition for water for industrial and urban consumption. 
 
 
Future of China's food economy: limited increase of strategic food import 
Food security is a central goal in China's agricultural policies. Projections with GTAP for 
the period 2001-2020 indicate that this goal can be realized to a large extent and that im-
pacts on global trade will be limited. During this period the self-sufficiency for grains will 
not decline below the policy target of a self-sufficiency rate of 95. This is thanks to an im-
portant increase in China's agricultural production. However, also Chinese international 
trade in agricultural products will grow considerably. Part of this development can be at-
tributed to the China's accession to the WTO and the phasing out of the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA). Nevertheless, the impact of accession to the WTO is limited because 
many policy changes directed towards more international trade took already place during 
the reform period in the run-up to China's accession. Both, China's accession and the phas-
ing out of the MFA, will allow China to exploit more fully its comparative advantage. 
  The accession of China to the WTO will have a negative production impact in such 
land-intensive sectors as coarse grains, oilseeds, sugar and cotton. Positive production im-
pacts by increasing exports are to be expected in food processing, horticulture, fish and 
such labor-intensive industries as the textile industry. Positive impacts in agriculture are to 
a large extent due to the assumed better compliance with SPS standards in the medium 
term. This underlines how important it is for China to strive to further comply with these 
standards.  
  China's accession to the WTO will lead to a high relative increase in imports, espe-
cially of cattle, cotton (for the rapidly growing textile industry), coarse grains and 
processed food. The import growth of dairy is relatively moderate. The production impact 
of these imports is limited, as in most sectors imports are until now relatively small. Ex-
ceptions are the land-intensive sectors mentioned above; as stated, for these products 
accession to the WTO will have a clear negative effect on production growth. These results 
show that China can realize efficiency gains by expanding sectors where it has a compara-
tive advantage. 
  The phasing out of the MFA has a positive impact on the labor-intensive tex-
tile/cotton complex: exports of textile will show strong growth and the production of 
textile and cotton will increase. This will have limited negative production effects on some 
land-intensive products as the production of cotton becomes more competitive.  
  In the longer term, self-sufficiency in almost all agricultural products, including 
China's strategic agricultural products, will decline. China's imports will grow, but its share 
in world markets will in the longer term remain below ten percent or exceed this limit to 
only a small extent (coarse grains and oilseeds). However, an exception will be cotton with 
an increasing world market share to almost 30 percent. For non-agricultural products 
China's share in world import market for oil products will grow considerably. On the 
longer term the share for oil products will be more than 20 percent. For most agricultural 
export products, China's share in world exports will be less than 10 percent. The only ex-
ception is fish and, temporarily, processed food. For the labor-intensive industries, and   268
particularly for the textile industry, the position is different: China's share in world exports 
for textile will grow to over 40 percent. 
  China's role in world trade will increase further in the course of time, as a result of 
high income growth rates and the country's accession to the WTO. However, for most agri-
cultural products, China's world market share is less than 10%. In other words it can be 
concluded from this analysis that China will to a large extent be able to feed its population, 
also in the longer term. At the same time, China will exploit its comparative advantages, 
resulting in changes in composition of production without having serious consequences for 
the development of world markets for agricultural products. The only exceptions to this are 
cotton, textile and vegetable oil. 
 
 
Evaluation of Doha Development Round proposals: important gains for China 
The static gains from global liberalization in the Doha round as formulated in the proposals 
of the USA, the EU and the CAIRNS group may amount to about 0.3% of world GDP. 
This estimate made with GTAP does not take into account such dynamic effects as capital 
accumulation and technology spillovers. Relative to their GDP, low income countries 
(LDCs) are the greatest beneficiaries of improved market access and reduced domestic 
support to agriculture in OECD countries. For some poor African and Asian countries the 
income gains can be as high as 1.5 - 2 percent of their GDP. However, the realization of 
these potential gains for LDCs depends very much on an active participation of LDCs in 
the liberalization effort.  
  Under the proposals studied here, the main beneficiaries from agricultural liberaliza-
tion will be exporting countries, especially in the USA and CAIRNS proposals, because 
they go further in improving market access than do the EU proposal. As far as the effects 
of domestic reforms in OECD countries are concerned, the simulations show that the world 
market effects are not very great and are not always positive for everyone. Especially LDC 
food importers may see rising world food prices.  
  China can clearly gain from the Doha round. It is estimated to capture 8% of global 
income gains while its share in world GDP is around 3%. However, its interests in agricul-
ture seem to be covered by proposals already made by other players. Therefore, China 
might very well want to free-ride on proposals of others, rather than develop an own posi-
tion in the negotiations on the 'classic' agricultural agenda. This may be quite different in 
the areas of food quality and food safety, where China clearly has an active interest in SPS 
and TBT issues. Modeling of food-safety-related impediments to trade is clearly an area of 
future research.  
  The largest gains for China will not to be found in the agricultural dossier, but in im-
proved markets access for labor-intensive manufacturing. As far as the textile industry and 
the food industry are concerned, this will increase the demand for agricultural products like 
cotton and for raw materials for the food processing industry. Expanding labor-intensive 
industries, also fostered by new export opportunities, may be part of a rural development 
strategy that includes labor absorption into industries outside primary agriculture.   269
Biotechnology in rice and cotton: substantial gains of GM rice adoption 
China is developing the largest public plant biotechnology capacity outside of North Amer-
ica. Adoption of Bt cotton has been proceeding at a rapid pace in recent years. The largest 
part of the potential productivity gains from Bt cotton will be realized already by 2005. In 
contrast, GM rice is not yet available to farmers on a commercial basis, and our estimates 
indicate that large productivity gains are yet to be realized between 2005 and 2010.  
  The economic gains from the adoption of GMOs are substantial. In the most optimis-
tic scenario made with GTAP- where China commercializes both Bt cotton and GM rice- 
the welfare gains amount to an additional annual income of about USD 5 billion (about 
USD 3.50 per person) in 2010. If actual adoption rates are lower, there will still be an in-
come gain of 3 billion USD in 2010. The gains from GM rice adoption will be 
considerably larger than the Bt cotton gains. 
  The patterns of global trade in both the textiles and garment sector and the rice sector 
will not be affected very much. The Chinese biotechnology research strategy has concen-
trated on crops that are of great importance to rural livelihoods, and not on those that are 
important in terms of export earnings. Rice exports from China represent only a small 
share in international rice trade. There will be an immediate impact on the export revenues 
of major cotton exporters. The cost savings and yield increases from Bt cotton will trans-
late into lower production cost for the Chinese textiles and garments industry, but these 
cost reductions will not be so large that other garments producers will be affected very 
much.  
  Our results indicate that trade restrictions will not significantly lower the gains from 
biotechnology research in China. A trade ban on GM rice (food crop) would have only a 
minor effect since the portion of rice exported is very small. The effects of unilateral label-
ing of soybean imports would be larger and have clear distributional impacts. If China 
wants to label GM products, this would increase the domestic price of soybeans, and there-
fore benefits Chinese soybean farmers. However, domestic labeling also increase the price 
of domestic GM rice, and this would affect rice consumers.  
  Our findings suggest that it would be economically advantageous for China to con-
tinue the promotion of its GM biotechnology, including commercializing its GM food 
crops. The economy-wide benefits associated with more productive crops far outweigh 
R&D expenditures. Our findings also suggest that most gains occur inside China, and can 




Trade and FDI: limited role of the Netherlands 
China has attracted substantial foreign direct investments (FDI) in recent decades, and in 
2002 it became the world's most important FDI recipient. More than 60% of FDI is in the 
manufacturing sector. FDI has been pouring into the coastal regions although recent policy 
is shifting to the western part of China to exploit its rich resources and stimulate domestic 
demand there. 
  Dutch FDI in China began in the 1980s, but it took off in 1992 after the opening up 
policy was formally adopted nation-wide. The Dutch FDI stock accounts for less than 1% 
of China's total FDI. Also Dutch FDI is strongly skewed toward manufacturing, which ab-  270
sorbed two-third of the total. In terms of regional preference, Jiangsu is the Netherlands' 
first choice, followed by neighboring Shanghai.  
  The Dutch trade position in China is limited. This also holds for the agricultural sec-
tor: the Netherlands has only a limited share in China's agricultural imports. China, on the 
other hand, has generated a huge trade surplus with the Netherlands. As far as agricultural 
trade concerns flower bulbs and edible offal are the major Dutch export categories to 
China, while China's exports of agricultural products to the Netherlands are very limited.  
  It can be concluded that both the export of Dutch agricultural products and Dutch 
FDI in the Chinese agribusiness are limited. This has only partly to do with the great dis-
tance between the two countries. An important role is played by the differences in culture, 
which make transaction costs high when doing business with China. This explains why the 
role of small and medium-sized companies in trade and FDI is limited and why multina-
tional companies are more active in the Chinese market.  
  It is expected that China's strong economic growth will continue and that China will 
remain one of the most favored investment destinations. In order to better utilize the eco-
nomic opportunities, Dutch investors need to pay much attention to the policy changes of 
the Chinese government, which is shifting its focus from the east to the west. A large part 
of northwest China is rich in agricultural and natural resources, and remains untapped.  
  FDI and export opportunities for the Dutch agribusiness exist in horticulture, inten-
sive livestock products and -to much lesser extent- dairy products. Dutch companies are 
currently involved in these sectors to different degree, but mostly focusing on trade rela-
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Appendices tables Chapter 3 
 
Appendix 3.1  Classification of commodities and data sources GTAP and CAPSiM 
GTAP Code  CAPSiM 
1 Rice  0113: Rice, not husked 
0114: Husked rice 
2316: Rice, semi- or wholly milled 
Milled rice 
 = 0114+2316 
2 Wheat  0111: Wheat and meslin  Wheat < 0111 
3 Cgrains  0112: Maize (corn) 
0115: Barley 
0116: Rye, oats 
0119: Other cereals 
Maize = 0112 
Other coarse grains 
 > 0115 + 0116 + 0119 
4 Oilseeds 014: Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit 
2163: Soya-bean, ground-nut, olive, sunflower-seed, safflower, cotton-seed rape, colza and 
mustard oil, crude 
2164: Palm, coconut, palm kernel, babassu and linseed oil, crude 
2165: Soya-bean, ground-nut, olive, sunflower-seed, safflower, cotton-seed, rape, colza and 
mustard oil and their fractions, refined but not chemically modified; other oils obtained 
solely from olives and sesame oil, and their fractions, whether or not refined, but not chemi-
cally modified 
2166: Maize (corn) oil and its fractions, not chemically modified 
2167: Palm, coconut, palm kernel, babassu and linseed oil and their fractions, refined but not 
chemically modified; castor, tung and jojoba oil and fixed vegetable fats and oils (except 
maize oil) and their fractions n.e.c., whether or not refined, but not chemically modified 
2168: Margarine and similar preparations 
2169: Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their fractions, partly or wholly hydrogenated, 
inter-esterified, re-esterified or elaidinised, whether or not refined, but not further prepared 
217: Cotton linters 
218: Oil-cake and other solid residues resulting from the extraction of vegetable fats or oils; 
flours and meals of oil seeds or oleaginous fruits, except those of mustard; vegetable waxes, 
except triglycerides; degras; residues resulting from the treatment of fatty substances or ani-
mal or vegetable waxes 
218 
Oil crop + Soybean 
 = 014 
Oil 
 = 2163 + 2164 + 2165 + 2166 + 2167 
5 Sugar  018: Plants used for sugar manufacturing 
235: Sugar 
Sugar crop = 018 
Sugar = 235 
6 Pfb  0192: Raw vegetable materials used in textiles  Cotton < 0192 291 
7 OthCrop  012: Vegetables 
013: Fruit and nuts 
015: Live plants; cut flowers and flower buds; flower seeds and fruit seeds; vegetable seeds 
016: Beverage and spice crops 
017: Unmanufactured tobacco 
0191: Cereal straw and husks, unprepared, whether or not chopped, ground, pressed or in the form of 
pellets; swedes, mangolds, fodder roots, hay, lucerne (alfalfa), clover, sainfoin, forage kale, lupines, 
vetches and similar forage products, whether or not in the form of pellets 
0193: Plants and parts of plants used primarily in perfumery, in pharmacy, or for insecticidal, fungi-
cidal or similar purposes 
0194: Sugar beet seed and seeds of forage plants 
0199: Other raw vegetable materials 
Vegetable + potato + sweet potato 
 ≈ 012 
8 Ctl  0211: Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses, asses, mules, and hinnies, live 
0299: Bovine semen 
21111: Meat of bovine animal, fresh or chilled 
21112: Meat of bovine animals, frozen 
21115: Meat of sheep, fresh or chilled 
21116: Meat of sheep, frozen 
21117: Meat of goats, fresh, chilled or frozen 
21118: Meat of horses, asses, mules or hinnies, fresh, chilled or frozen 
21119: Edible offal of bovine animals, swine, sheep, goats, horses, asses, mules or hinnies, fresh, 
chilled or frozen 
2161: Fats of bovine animals, sheep, goats, pigs and poultry, raw or rendered; wool grease 
Beef 
 = 21111 + 21112 
Mutton 
 = 21115 + 21116 + 21117 
9 Oap  0212: Swine, poultry and other animal, live 
0292: Eggs, in shell, fresh, preserved or cooked 
0293: Natural honey 
0294: Snails, live, fresh, chilled, frozen, dried, salted or in brine, except sea snails; frogs’ legs, fresh, 
chilled or frozen 
0295: Edible products of animal origin n.e.c. 
0297: Hides, skins and furskins, raw 
0298: Insect waxes and spermaceti, whether or not refined or colored 
21113: Meat of swine, fresh or chilled 
21114: Meat of swine, frozen 
2112: Meat and edible offal, fresh, chilled or frozen, n.e.c. 
2113: Preserves and preparations of meat, meat offal or blood 
2114: Flours, meals and pellets of meat or meat offal, inedible; greaves 
2162: Animal oils and fats, crude and refined, except fats of bovine animals, sheep, goats, pigs and 
poultry 
Eggs = 0292 
Pork = 21113 + 21114 
Poultry < 0212 
10 Milk  0291: Raw milk 
22: Dairy products 
Milk = 0291 
11 Fish  015: Hunting, trapping and game propagation including related service activities 
05: Fishing, operation of fish hatcheries and fish farms; service activities incidental to fishing 
Fish 
 ≈ 015 + 05 
 292 
Appendix 3.2  Commodity values for China (1997) in CAPSiM and GTAP 
GTAP CAPSiM  Exchange  Rate:  8.2898 
  
VOM 
(M US$)  
Quantity 
(1000 Ton) 
Producer Free Market Price 
(Yuan/Ton) 
Value 
(M US$)  %Diff 
1 Rice  60397  Milled rice  140515  2286  38748   -35.84  
2 Wheat  11275  Wheat  123289  1661  24703   119.10  
3 Cgrains  12864        18200   41.48  
   Maize  104309  1209  15213     
    Other coarse  19184  1291  2988    
4 Oilseeds  19268        13880   -27.97  
   Soybean  14732  3410  6060     
    Edible Oil  7767  8346  7820    
5 Sugar  1623  Sugar  7026  3950  3348   106.27  
6 Pfb  7092  Cotton  4603  13939  7740   9.13  
7 OthCrop  83426        73654   -11.71  
    Sweet Potato  20474  1168  2885    
   Potato  11442  1502  2073     
   Vegetable  239579  2377  68696     
All Crops  195945        180273   -8.00  
8 Ctl  7937        8169   2.93  
   Beef  2834  15092  5159     
   Mutton  1428  17472  3010     
9 Oap  86346        68815   -20.30  
   Eggs  10421  7137  8972     
   Pork  26594  15953  51178     
   Poultry  5929  12115  8665     
10 Milk  2839  Milk  6811  3254  2674   -5.83  
11 Fish  22944  Fish  25625  7498  23177   1.02  
All livestock  120066         102835   -14.35  
Total  316011         283108   -10.41  
Note: VOM, Value of Output at Market prices. 293 
Appendix 3.3  Import value (CIF) for China (1997) in CAPSiM and GTAP 
GTAP CAPSiM    %Diff 
   VIWS    Quantities  Price  Value   
1 Rice  152  Milled rice  330  424   140   -8.05  
2 Wheat  371  Wheat  1860  198   368   -0.73  
3 Cgrains  386        383   -0.85  
    maize  2  146   0    
    other coarse grains  1922  199   382    
4 Oilseeds  3959        2543   -35.76  
    Soybean  5638  303   1709    
    Edible oil  1525  547   834    
5 Sugar  259  Sugar  280  293   82   -68.29  
6 Pfb  1391  Cotton  750  1774   1331   -4.32  
7 OthCrop  997        31   -96.88  
    Sweet Potato  4  764   3    
    Potato  19  330   6    
    Vegetable  53  411   22    
8 Ctl  323        261   -19.29  
    Beef  87  2483   216    
    Mutton  25  1787   45    
9 Oap  2064        372   -81.97  
    Eggs  1  928   1    
    Pork  10  1658   17    
    Poultry  216  1642   355    
10 Milk  263  Milk  251  277   69   -73.59  
11 Fish  104  Fish  151  3478   525   404.91  
Note: VIWS, Value of Imports at World prices by Source. 294 
Appendix 3.4  Export value (FOB) for China (1997) in CAPSiM and GTAP 
GTAP     CAPSiM  CAPSiM        %Diff 
    VXWD     Quantities  Price  Value    
1 Rice  404  Milled rice  940  281   265   -34.51  
2 Wheat  18  Wheat  898  198   178   887.94  
3 Cgrains  933        911   -2.32  
    maize  6620  130   859    
    other coarse grains  316  166   52    
4 Oilseeds  834        251   -69.89  
    Soybean  190  386   73    
    Edible oil  267  666   178    
5 Sugar  144  Sugar  380  349   133   -7.78  
6 Pfb  4  Cotton  1  2320   2   -42.00  
7 OthCrop  2520        2462   -2.29  
    Sweet Potato  22  595   13    
    Potato  14  144   2    
    Vegetable  2765  885   2447    
8 Ctl  129        175   35.45  
    Beef  106  1627   172    
    Mutton  1  2243   2    
9 Oap  2703        1278   -52.73  
    Eggs  46  552   25    
    Pork  275  1883   518    
    Poultry  388  1893   734    
10 Milk  52  Milk  148  410   61   16.72  
11 Fish  598  Fish  720  2622   1888   215.67  
Note: VXWD, Value of exports at World prices by Destination. 
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Appendix 3.5  Aggregate Demand (Consumption) of Pork and Poultry Based on HIES and Trade Data 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)    (8)  (9)  (10) 
Year  
Population  
(million)   
Per Capita Pork  
Consumption (kg) 
Per Capita Poultry Consump-
tion (kg) 
Net Exports  
(mmt) 
Aggregate Consumption Based 
on HIES and Trade (mmt) 
c 
   Urban  Rural    Urban 
b Rural Urban 
b Rural  Pork    Poultry Pork  Poultry 
1980   191.4  795.7   16.38  6.49  1.58  0.66    0.15  0.08  10.47  0.88 
1981    203.3  798.6    16.92  7.43  1.60   0.71   0.17    0.17  11.84  1.02 
1982   206.6  801.6   17.46  8.36  1.74  0.78    0.31  0.31  13.23  1.25 
1983    218.9  804.4    18.00  9.30  1.98   0.82   0.30    0.30  14.63  1.35 
1984    231.5  807.1    17.10  10.62  2.22   0.94   0.30    0.30  16.07  1.52 
1985    250.9  807.6    17.16  10.32  2.49   1.03   0.32    0.32  16.73  1.77 
1986    263.7  811.4    17.55  11.79  2.66   1.14   0.32    0.32  18.76  1.95 
1987   276.7  816.3   17.95  10.98  2.83  1.15    0.31  0.31  18.40  2.03 
1988    286.6  823.7    17.54  10.05  3.33   1.25   0.29    0.29  17.56  2.27 
1989    295.4  831.6    17.53  10.28  3.65   1.28   0.31    0.31  18.13  2.45 
1990   296.5  837.2   18.46  10.54  4.30  1.26    0.35  0.35  18.91  2.68 
1991    305.4  852.8    18.86  11.19  4.40   1.34   0.33    0.33  20.20  2.82 
1992    323.7  848.0    17.70  10.88  5.08   1.49   0.27    0.27  19.69  3.18 
1993    333.5  851.7    17.40  10.96  5.20   1.62   0.30    0.30  19.95  3.41 
1994    343.0  855.5    17.37  10.23  5.43   1.63   0.39    0.39  19.49  3.64 
1995    351.7  859.5    17.24  10.58  5.79   1.83   0.34    0.34  20.03  3.95 
1996    359.5  864.4    17.55  11.85  6.41   1.93   0.31    0.31  21.81  4.28 
1997    369.9  866.4    15.34  11.46  7.03   2.36   0.27    0.27  20.54  4.92 
1998   379.4  868.7   15.88  11.89  7.22  2.33    0.26  0.26  21.50  5.02 
1999    388.9  870.2    16.91  11.68  7.81   2.48   0.21    0.38  21.94  5.58 
Sources: Population comes from Yearbooks (CNSB, 1981 to 2000); meat consumption comes from HIES--rural and urban (see Table 3.5); exports come from Yearbooks. 
a Per capita consumption is measured in retail weight and aggregate consumption is measured in carcass weight.  Retail weight figures (the original units for consumption data) are converted to carcass weight (the origi-
nal units for production data) by using standard conversion coefficients (0.77 for pork; 1.0 for poultry) from Fuller et al. (2000).  
b Before 1985, the urban survey did not cover county-level towns, the residents of which we believe had lower consumption levels than their counterparts in the larger cities.  Therefore, when we multiply the per capita 
pork (poultry) consumption in column 3 (5) by the urban population (column 1), we adjust the figures for 1980 to 1984 downward (by an amount equivalent to 33 percent lower per capita consumption for 66 to 70 per-
cent of urban population (which is our estimate of the proportion of the population that lives in county-level towns). 
c  (9)=(1)*(3)+(2)*(4)+(7) and (10)=(1)*(5)+(2)*(6)+(8). 296 
Appendix 3.6  Adjusted Aggregate Pork and Poultry Demand (Consumption) - Adjusted for the Omission of Out-Of-Home Consumption 
 (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)    (8) (9)  (10) 
Year 
Aggregate Consumption 





Per Capita Omission of 
Pork Out-Of-Home Con-
sumption (kg) 








b   Urban  Rural  Urban 
c Rural 
d Urban 




                        
1980 10.47  0.88    191.4  795.7  0.10  0.03 0.02    0.02  10.52  0.88 
1981 11.84  1.02    203.3  798.6  0.15  0.04 0.03    0.02  11.92  1.06 
1982 13.23  1.25    206.6  801.6  0.20  0.06 0.04    0.03  13.34  1.31 
1983 14.63  1.35    218.9  804.4  0.28  0.08 0.06    0.04  14.79  1.42 
1984 16.07  1.52    231.5  807.1  0.36  0.10 0.08    0.06  16.29  1.60 
1985 16.73  1.77    250.9  807.6  0.45  0.13 0.09    0.07  17.02  1.86 
1986 18.76  1.95    263.7  811.4  0.55  0.15 0.11    0.08  19.11  2.05 
1987 18.40  2.03    276.7  816.3  0.70  0.19 0.14    0.10  18.86  2.16 
1988 17.56  2.27    286.6  823.7  0.86  0.22 0.18    0.12  18.14  2.42 
1989 18.13  2.45    295.4  831.6  0.98  0.25 0.20    0.14  18.80  2.62 
1990 18.91  2.68    296.5  837.2  1.00  0.25 0.21    0.14  19.59  2.85 
1991 20.20  2.82    305.4  852.8  1.05  0.27 0.22    0.15  20.95  3.01 
1992 19.69  3.18    323.7  848.0  1.64  0.30 0.34    0.17  20.76  3.43 
1993 19.95  3.41    333.5  851.7  2.14  0.36 0.44    0.20  21.34  3.73 
1994 19.49  3.64    343.0  855.5  2.80  0.55 0.58    0.30  21.44  4.11 
1995 20.03  3.95    351.7  859.5  3.75  0.74 0.78    0.41  22.71  4.59 
1996 21.81  4.28    359.5  864.4  4.35  1.02 0.90    0.56  25.15  5.11 
1997 20.54  4.92    369.9  866.4  4.75  1.15 0.99    0.63  24.31  5.85 
1998 21.50  5.02    379.4  868.7  5.30  1.38 1.10    0.76  25.90  6.12 
1999 21.94  5.58    388.9  870.2  5.83  1.45 1.21    0.80  26.83  6.76 
a The figures in column 1 come from Appendix 3.5, column 9;  
b The figures in column 2 come from Appendix 3.5, column 10; 
c The figures in column 5 come from Appendix 3.7, column 4; 
d 
The figures in column 6 come from Appendix 3.7, column 10; 
e The figures in column 7 come from Appendix 3.7, column 6; 




Appendix 3.7  Estimates of Per Capita Out-of-Home Pork and Poultry Consumption in Urban and Rural China, 1980 to 1999. 
  (1) (2)    (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Urban Per Capita Consumption, Out-of-home  Rural Per Capita Consumption, Out-of-home 










































1980  4.47  0.02  -  0.10  -  0.02  0.93  0.02 -  0.03  -  0.02 
1981  6.22  0.03  -  0.15  -  0.03  1.32  0.03 -  0.04  -  0.02 
1982  8.62  0.04  -  0.20  -  0.04  1.89  0.04 -  0.06  -  0.03 
1983  12.08  0.05  -  0.28  -  0.06  2.70  0.06  -  0.08  -  0.04 
1984  15.55  0.07  -  0.36  -  0.08  3.52  0.08  -  0.10  -  0.06 
1985  19.08  0.08  -  0.45  -  0.09  4.52  0.10  -  0.13  -  0.07 
1986  23.69  0.10  -  0.55  -  0.11  5.17  0.11  -  0.15  -  0.08 
1987  29.89  0.13  -  0.70  -  0.14  6.31  0.14  -  0.19  -  0.10 
1988  36.70  0.16  -  0.86  -  0.18  7.49  0.16  -  0.22  -  0.12 
1989  42.07  0.19  -  0.98  -  0.20  8.39  0.18  -  0.25  -  0.14 
1990  42.87  0.19  -  1.00  -  0.21  8.29  0.18  -  0.25  -  0.14 
1991  44.96  0.20  -  1.05  -  0.22  9.20  0.20  -  0.27  -  0.15 
1992 70.27 0.31    - 1.64  - 0.34  10.16 0.22  - 0.30  - 0.17 
1993 91.77 0.40    - 2.14  - 0.44  12.04 0.26  - 0.36  - 0.20 
1994  119.88  0.53    - 2.80  - 0.58  18.51 0.40  - 0.55  - 0.30 
1995  160.66  0.71    - 3.75  - 0.78  24.88 0.54  - 0.74  - 0.41 
1996  186.21  0.82    - 4.35  - 0.90  34.15 0.74  - 1.02  - 0.56 
1997  203.44  0.90    - 4.75  - 0.99  38.62 0.83  - 1.15  - 0.63 
1998 227.01 1.00    5.3 5.30  1.10  1.10  46.41  1.00  1.38 1.38  0.76  0.76 
1999  249.59  1.10    - 5.83  - 1.21  48.73 1.05  - 1.45  - 0.80 
a Figures come from HIES--urban and rural (see Table 3.5). Since there was no information about out-of-home consumption in urban areas before 1991, these figures had to be estimated.  To do so, we calculated the 
average ratio of urban out-of-home consumption to rural out-of-home consumption for 1992 to 1999.  This ratio was approximately 2.  Since we have information on rural out-of-home consumption between 1982 and 
1991, we estimate urban out-of-home consumption for this period by multiplying the rural figures by 2.  The rural and urban out-of-home consumption figures for 1980 to 1982 are projected backward from figures in 
later years.   
b Index of total out-of-home food expenditures calculated from column 1 or 7 using 1998 as a fixed base.  
c Figures come from CCAP Survey (described in Table 3.5).  Statistics also shown in Table 3.6.  
d (4)=(2)*5.3 (from column 3),  (6)=(2)*1.1 (from column 5),  (10)=(8)*1.38 (from column 9) and (12)=(8)*0.76 (from column 11). 298 
Appendix 3.8  Adjusted Aggregate Pork and Poultry Demand--Adjusted to Account for Omission of Consumption Due to Increased Migration in Rural China, 1980 to 1999 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17) 
    Per Capita Consumption, in-home 
b (kg)  Per Capita Consumption, out-of-home 




(million)  Pork  Poultry Pork  Poultry  Adjusted for Omission of Mi-
grant Consumption (mmt) 
   Urban  Rural in home  Migrant  Urban  Rural  Migrant Urban  Rural  Migrant Urban  Rural  Migrant Urban Rural Migrant Pork 
d Poultry 
e 
1980  191.4  779.4  16.2  16.38  6.49  11.44  1.58  0.66    1.12  0.10 0.03 0.07  0.02  0.02  0.02  10.63  0.88 
1981  203.3  779.6  19.0  16.92  7.43  12.18  1.60   0.71   1.16  0.15  0.04  0.10  0.03  0.02  0.03  12.04  1.07 
1982  206.6  781.0  20.6  17.46  8.36  12.91  1.74  0.78    1.26  0.20 0.06 0.13  0.04  0.03  0.04  13.46  1.32 
1983  218.9  782.4  22.0  18.00  9.30  13.65  1.98   0.82   1.40  0.28  0.08  0.18  0.06  0.04  0.05  14.91  1.43 
1984  231.5  782.5  24.6  17.10  10.62  13.86  2.22   0.94   1.58  0.36  0.10  0.23  0.08  0.06  0.07  16.39  1.62 
1985  250.9  781.5  26.0  17.16  10.32  13.74  2.49   1.03   1.76  0.45  0.13  0.29  0.09  0.07  0.08  17.14  1.88 
1986 263.7  781.7  29.7  17.55  11.79  14.67  2.66  1.14    1.90  0.55 0.15 0.35  0.11  0.08  0.10  19.23  2.07 
1987  276.7  783.9  32.4  17.95  10.98  14.47  2.83  1.15    1.99  0.70 0.19 0.45  0.14  0.10  0.12  19.01  2.19 
1988  286.6  790.1  33.5  17.54  10.05  13.80  3.33   1.25   2.29  0.86  0.22  0.54  0.18  0.12  0.15  18.30  2.46 
1989  295.4  795.6  36.0  17.53  10.28  13.91  3.65   1.28   2.47  0.98  0.25  0.62  0.20  0.14  0.17  18.97  2.67 
1990  296.5  798.3  38.8  18.46  10.54  14.50  4.30  1.26    2.78  1.00 0.25 0.63  0.21  0.14  0.18  19.79  2.91 
1991  305.4  806.4  46.4  18.86  11.19  15.03  4.40   1.34   2.87  1.05  0.27  0.66  0.22  0.15  0.19  21.18  3.08 
1992  323.7  797.6  50.4  17.70  10.88  14.29  5.08   1.49   3.29  1.64  0.30  0.97  0.34  0.17  0.26  20.98  3.52 
1993  333.5  794.2  57.5  17.40  10.96  14.18  5.20   1.62   3.41  2.14  0.36  1.25  0.44  0.20  0.32  21.58  3.84 
1994  343.0  792.2  63.3  17.37  10.23  13.80  5.43   1.63   3.53  2.80  0.55  1.68  0.58  0.30  0.44  21.74  4.23 
1995  351.7  787.1  72.3  17.24  10.58  13.91  5.79   1.83   3.81  3.75  0.74  2.25  0.78  0.41  0.60  23.02  4.73 
1996  359.5  786.8  77.6  17.55  11.85  14.70  6.41   1.93   4.17  4.35  1.02  2.69  0.90  0.56  0.73  25.43  5.28 
1997  369.9  780.7  85.6  15.34  11.46  13.40  7.03   2.36   4.70  4.75  1.15  2.95  0.99  0.63  0.81  24.53  6.05 
1998  379.4  774.7  93.9  15.88  11.89  13.89  7.22  2.33    4.78  5.30 1.38 3.34  1.10  0.76  0.93  26.15  6.35 
1999  388.9  760.5  109.7  16.91  11.68  14.30  7.81   2.48   5.15  5.83  1.45  3.64  1.21  0.80  1.01  27.21  7.05 
a Rural in-home population includes those who live and work in rural China.  The migrant population includes those rural residents who live and work in urban China. Migrant population comes from Rozelle et al 
(1998) and is adjusted here by multiplying by 1.2 to account for the family members of migrants who live in urban areas. Rural in-home population equals Yearbook's total rural population (in Appendix 3.7, column 2) 
minus migrant population in column 5. 
b Urban and rural per capita consumption comes from Appendix 3.5, column 3 and 4 for pork and column 5 and 6 for poultry.  Per capita migrant consumption is assumed to be the average of per capita urban and rural 
consumption. 
c  Per capita out-of-home consumption comes from Appendix 3.6, columns 5 and 6 for pork and columns 7 and 8 for poultry. 
d Pork aggregate consumption, (10)={(1)*[(4)+(10)]+(2)*[(5)+(11)]+(3)*[(6)+(12)]}*1.2987/1000 plus trade in Appendix 3.5, column 7.  The figure 1.2987 is the meat-carcass conversion factor.  
e Poultry aggregate consumption, (11)= {(1)*[(7)+(13)]+(2)*[(8)+(14)]+(3)*[(9)+(15)]}/1000  plus trade in Appendix 3.5, column 8. 299 
Appendix 3.9  Adjusted Aggregate Pork and Poultry Demand (Consumption)—Adjusted for the Omission of In-Home Consumption for Urban and Rural China,  
    1980 to 1999. 
  (1) (2)    (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7)  (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13) 
Year 
Adjusted Aggregate Demand 
(mmt) 
a    Population 
(million) 
b 
Per Capita Omission of Pork 
In-home consumption (kg) 
c 
Per Capita Omission of Poultry 
In-home consumption (kg) 
d 
Adjusted Demand-- 
for Omission of In-Home Con-
sumption (mmt) 
e 
  Pork  Poultry    Urban  Rural in home  Migrant  Urban  Rural Migrant  Urban  Rural Migrant  Pork  Poultry 
1980  10.63  0.88    191.40 779.40 16.20  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  10.63  0.88 
1981  12.04  1.07    203.30 779.60 19.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  12.04  1.07 
1982  13.46  1.32    206.60 781.00 20.60  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  13.46  1.32 
1983  14.91  1.43    218.90 782.40 22.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  14.91  1.43 
1984  16.39  1.62    231.50 782.50 24.60  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  16.39  1.62 
1985  17.14  1.88    250.90 781.50 26.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  17.14  1.88 
1986  19.23  2.07    263.70 781.70 29.70  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  19.23  2.07 
1987  19.01  2.19    276.70 783.90 32.40  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  19.01  2.19 
1988  18.30  2.46    286.60 790.10 33.50  0.30 0.05 0.18  0.06 0.03 0.04  18.47  2.50 
1989  18.97  2.67    295.40 795.60 36.00  0.61 0.10 0.35  0.12 0.05 0.09  19.31  2.75 
1990  19.79  2.91    296.50 798.30 38.80  0.91 0.14 0.53  0.19 0.08 0.13  20.31  3.03 
1991  21.18  3.08    305.40 806.40 46.40  1.21 0.19 0.70  0.25 0.10 0.17  21.90  3.25 
1992  20.98  3.52    323.70 797.60 50.40  1.51 0.24 0.88  0.31 0.13 0.22  21.92  3.73 
1993  21.58  3.84    333.50 794.20 57.50  1.82 0.29 1.05  0.37 0.15 0.26  22.75  4.09 
1994  21.74  4.23    343.00 792.20 63.30  2.12 0.34 1.23  0.44 0.18 0.31  23.13  4.54 
1995  23.02  4.73    351.70 787.10 72.30  2.42 0.39  1.40  0.50 0.20 0.35  24.65  5.09 
1996  25.43  5.28    359.50 786.80 77.60  2.72 0.43 1.58  0.56 0.23 0.39  27.31  5.69 
1997  24.53  6.05    369.90 780.70 85.60  3.03 0.48 1.75  0.62 0.25 0.44  26.67  6.51 
1998  26.15  6.35    379.40 774.70 93.90  3.33 0.53 1.93  0.68 0.28 0.48  28.56  6.86 
1999  27.21  7.05    388.90 760.50 109.70 3.63 0.58 2.11  0.75 0.30 0.52  29.91  7.63 
a  The figures come from Appendix 3.8, columns 16 and 17.  
b  Source of population numbers are explained in Appendix 3.8, footnote a.  
c The figures in columns 6 and 7 come from Appendix 3.11, columns 3 and  6;  the figures in column 8 are the averages of columns 6 and 7.  
d  The figures in columns 9 and 10 come from Appendix 3.10, column 9 and 12; 
the figures in column 11 are the averages of columns 9 and 10.  
e  (12)=(1)+(3)*(6)+(4)*(7)+(5)*(8) and (13)=(2)+(3)*(9)+(4)*(10)+(5)*(11). 
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Appendix 3.10       Calculations Showing Basis for Adjustments for the Omission of In-Home Consumption Made to Per Capita Pork and Poultry Demand   
                             (Consumption) Statistical Series in China, 1980 to 1999 
a 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 

























































1980  -  -  0.00   -  -  0.00   -  -  0.00   -  -  0.00  
1981  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  
1982  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  
1983  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  
1984  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  
1985  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  
1986  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  
1987  -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00   -  0.00   0.00  
1988  -  0.30   0.30   -  0.05   0.05   -  0.06   0.06   -  0.03   0.03  
1989  -  0.30   0.61   -  0.05   0.10   -  0.06   0.12   -  0.03   0.05  301 
Appendix 3.10  Calculations Showing Basis for Adjustments for the Omission of In-Home Consumption Made to Per Capita Pork and Poultry Demand  
      (Consumption) Statistical Series in China, 1980 to 1999 
a (continuation) 
1990  -  0.30   0.91   -  0.05   0.14  -  0.06   0.19   -  0.03   0.08  
1991  -  0.30   1.21   -  0.05   0.19   -  0.06   0.25   -  0.03   0.10  
1992  -  0.30   1.51   -  0.05   0.24   -  0.06   0.31   -  0.03   0.13  
1993  -  0.30   1.82   -  0.05   0.29   -  0.06   0.37   -  0.03   0.15  
1994  -  0.30   2.12   -  0.05   0.34   -  0.06   0.44   -  0.03   0.18  
1995  -  0.30   2.42   -  0.05   0.39   -  0.06   0.50   -  0.03   0.20  
1996  -  0.30   2.72   -  0.05   0.43   -  0.06   0.56   -  0.03   0.23  
1997  -  0.30   3.03   -  0.05   0.48   -  0.06   0.62   -  0.03   0.25  
1998  19.21   0.30   3.33   12.42   0.05  0.53   7.91   0.06   0.68   2.61   0.03   0.28  
1999  -  0.30   3.63   -  0.05   0.58   -  0.06   0.75   -  0.03   0.30  
a Adjustments are made to the demand data after adjustments are made for omissions due to out-of-home demand and migration. Conceptually, these adjustments in part make 
up for omissions due to factors such as meat demand that was not recorded due to the meat being part of processed foods.  Empirically, adjustments are made by comparing 
in-home demand from the HIES data with in-home demand from our own CCAP survey (see Table 3.6).  It is assumed that such omissions were not present in 1987 and that 
the rise in omissions occurred at a linear rate. 
b Figures in column 1, 4, 7 and 10 come from 1998 CCAP Survey (see Table 3.6). To get  rid of sample selection bias, we multiply CCAP Survey in-home meat consumption 
by the ratio of national HIES estimate to weighted average of HIES estimates of the four provinces from which the CCAP Survey sample households were chosen. 
c This is calculated by taking the total amount by which in-home demand is underreported by HIES in 1998 (from column 3), subtracting the amount by which demand is as-
sumed to be underreported in 1987 (that is 0) and dividing by 11, the number of years between 1987 and 1998.  Likewise, we have created columns 5, 8 and 11. 
d The figure in 1998 is the difference between in-home demand from the CCAP survey (column 1) and the demand reported in the HIES survey (Appendix 3.5, column 3, row 
for 1998).  The rest of the figures are calculated by starting at 1998 and working backwards towards 1987.  Each year's figure is just the next year's figure minus 0.30 (column 
2), the "average annual increase in omitted in-home demand.”  Likewise, we have created columns 6, 9 and 12. 302 
Appendix 3.11  Reconciling China's Eggs Production (Supply) and Consumption (Demand) Statistics Series, 1980 to 1999 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
               
Various Supply/demand Ratios (to Assess the 
Consistency of Data Series Adjustments) 
Year 
Aggregate De-
mand Based on 
HIES and  
Trade Data
























(4)/(1) (4)/(2)  (5)/(2)  (5)/(3) 
               
1980   2.13 2.18 2.18 2.57 2.57  1.20  1.18  1.18  1.18 
1981   2.24 2.29 2.47 2.69 2.69  1.20  1.17  1.17  1.09 
1982   2.31 2.38 2.74 2.81 2.81  1.22  1.18  1.18  1.03 
1983   2.69 2.78 3.34 3.32 3.32  1.23  1.19  1.19  1.00 
1984   3.15 3.26 4.01 4.32 4.32  1.37  1.32  1.32  1.08 
1985   3.57 3.70 4.65 5.35 5.35  1.50  1.45  1.45  1.15 
1986   3.63 3.77 4.95 5.55 5.55  1.53  1.47  1.47  1.12 
1987   4.05  4.23  5.62  5.90   6.14 
d  1.46 1.40  1.45  1.09 
1988   4.38 4.59 6.22 6.96 6.55  1.59  1.51  1.43  1.05 
1989   4.60 4.84 6.70 7.20 6.92  1.57  1.49  1.43  1.03 
1990   4.78 5.03 7.11 7.95 7.40  1.66  1.58  1.47  1.04 303 
Appendix 3.11  Reconciling China's Eggs Production (Supply) and Consumption (Demand) Statistics Series, 1980 to 1999 (continuation) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
               
Year 
Aggregate De-
mand Based on 
HIES and  
Trade Data





















for over reporting 
(mmt) 
Various Supply/demand Ratios (to Assess the 
Consistency of Data Series Adjustments) 
1991    5.10 5.39  7.74 9.22 7.99 1.81  1.71  1.48  1.03 
1992    5.51 5.88  8.48 10.20  8.71 1.85  1.73  1.48  1.03 
1993    5.44 5.87  8.73 11.80  9.27 2.17  2.01  1.58  1.06 
1994    5.94 6.52  9.64 14.79  9.79 2.49  2.27  1.50  1.02 
1995    6.22  6.97  10.36 16.77 10.59 2.69  2.41  1.52  1.02 
1996   6.40  7.29  10.95  19.65   11.35 
d  3.07 2.70 1.56  1.04 
1997    7.34  8.32  12.27 18.97 12.25 2.58  2.28  1.47  1.00 
1998    7.71  8.87  13.10 20.21 13.31 2.62  2.28  1.50  1.02 
1999    8.02  9.32  13.84 21.35 14.26 2.66  2.29  1.53  1.03 
Growth 
e  6.08 7.01  8.02 11.43  7.36 5.05  4.14  0.31  -0.64 
a  Figures in column 1 are the same as Table 3.3, column 7, the calculation that is shown in Appendix 3.12, column 8. 
b  Adjustments to create the figures in column 1 are shown in Appendix 3.12, column 10, adjustments that include the omission of out of home consumption of urban and rural 
residents and the omission of consumption by rural migrant labors and their families. 
c Adjustments to create the figures in column 3 are shown in Appendix 3.12, column 11, adjustments that include the omissions of out-of-home, migrant and in-home con-
sumption. 
d The bold figures are the three-year averages of Yearbook production data from 1986 to 88 and the meat production generated from 1997 Ag Census. 
 
e An annual growth rates between 1987 and 1998, where 1987 and 1998 are three-year averages centered on 1987 and 1998. 304 
Appendix 3.12  Adjustments to Egg Consumption to Account for the Omissions of Out-Of-Home, Increased Rural Migrant and In-Home Consumption 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
  Population (million)  Per Capita Egg Consumption (kg)  Aggregate Consumption after Each Adjustment to 
the Omission of Which Consumption  





mand Based on 














                   
1980   191.4  779.4  16.2  5.68  1.40  3.54  0.06  2.13 2.14 2.18 2.18 
1981   203.3  779.6  19.0  5.74  1.41  3.58  0.07  2.24 2.25 2.29 2.47 
1982   206.6  781.0  20.6  5.88  1.43  3.66  0.07  2.31 2.33 2.38 2.74 
1983   218.9  782.4  22.0  6.90  1.57  4.24  0.07  2.69 2.73 2.78 3.34 
1984   231.5  782.5  24.6  7.62  1.84  4.73  0.07  3.15 3.19 3.26 4.01 
1985   250.9  781.5  26.0  7.35  2.05  4.70  0.07  3.57 3.63 3.70 4.65 
1986   263.7  781.7  29.7  7.08  2.08  4.58  0.07  3.63 3.70 3.77 4.95 
1987   276.7  783.9  32.4  7.72  2.25  4.99  0.07  4.05 4.14 4.23 5.62 
1988   286.6  790.1  33.5  8.50  2.28  5.39  0.06  4.38 4.49 4.59 6.22 
1989   295.4  795.6  36.0  8.65  2.41  5.53  0.04  4.60 4.73 4.84 6.70 
1990   296.5  798.3  38.8  8.85  2.53  5.69  0.04  4.78 4.91 5.03 7.11 
1991   305.4  806.4  46.4  8.96  2.73  5.85  0.04  5.10 5.24 5.39 7.74 
1992   323.7  797.6  50.4  9.45  2.85  6.15  0.03  5.51 5.71 5.88 8.48 
1993   333.5  794.2  57.5  8.86  2.88  5.87  0.03  5.44 5.69 5.87 8.73 
1994   343.0  792.2  63.3  9.68  3.03  6.36  0.03  5.94 6.30 6.52 9.64 
1995   351.7  787.1  72.3  9.74  3.22  6.48  0.03  6.22 6.71 6.97 10.36 
1996   359.5  786.8  77.6  9.64  3.35  6.50  0.04  6.40 7.02 7.29 10.95 
1997    369.9 780.7  85.6  10.13 4.08  7.11  0.06  7.34 8.03 8.32 12.27 
1998    379.4 774.7  93.9  10.76 4.11  7.44  0.05  7.71 8.52 8.87 13.10 
1999    388.9 760.5  109.7  10.92 4.28  7.60  0.05  8.02 8.91 9.32 13.84 
Note: Per capita consumption in column 4 and 5 come HIES--urban and rural (see Table 3.4); trade data come from CNSB’s statistical yearbooks; Source of population numbers are explained in 
Appendix 3.8, footnote a. 
a Figures are the same as Table 3.3 column 7 and (8)=[(1)*(4)+[(2)+(3)*(5)]]/1000+(7). 
b (9)= (8) plus the figures in column 1 multiplying consumption (in Appendix 3.13, column 3), plus the sum of population (in columns 2 and 3) multiplying the consumption (in Appendix 3.14, 
column 6). 
c (10)=(1)*(4)+(2)*(5)+(3)*(6) plus population in column 1 multiplying consumption (in Appendix 3.13, column 3), plus population in column 2 multiplying consumption (in Appendix 3.13, 
column 6), plus population in column 3 multiplying the average  of consumption (in Appendix 3.13, columns 3 and 6). 
d  (11)=(10) plus column 1 multiplying consumption (in Appendix 3.13, column 9), plus column 2 multiplying consumption (in Appendix 3.13, column 12), and plus column 3 multiplying the 
average  of consumption (in Appendix 3.13, columns 9 and 12). 305 
Appendix 3.13  Calculations Showing Basis for Adjustments for the Omission of In-Home Consumption Made to Per Capita Egg Demand (Consumption) Statistical Series  
  in  China,  1980  to  1999 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)   (7)  (8)  (9)   (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Adjustments to Consumption Due to Failure to Include out of home 
consumption    Adjustments to Consumption Due to Per Capita Omission of In-Home Con-
sumption 





































In home   
from 
CCAP    
survey 
e 



























1980  0.02  -  0.02   0.02  -  0.01   -  -  0.00   -  -  0.00 
1981  0.03  -  0.03   0.03  -  0.01   -  0.24  0.24   -  0.16  0.16 
1982  0.04  -  0.05   0.04  -  0.02   -  0.24  0.47   -  0.16  0.33 
1983  0.05  -  0.06   0.06  -  0.02   -  0.24  0.71   -  0.16  0.49 
1984  0.07  -  0.08   0.08  -  0.03   -  0.24  0.95   -  0.16  0.65 
1985  0.08  -  0.10   0.10  -  0.04   -  0.24  1.19   -  0.16  0.81 
1986  0.10  -  0.13   0.11  -  0.05   -  0.24  1.42   -  0.16  0.98 
1987  0.13  -  0.16   0.14  -  0.06   -  0.24  1.66   -  0.16  1.14 
1988  0.16  -  0.19   0.16  -  0.07   -  0.24  1.90   -  0.16  1.30 
1989  0.19  -  0.22   0.18  -  0.07   -  0.24  2.14   -  0.16  1.47 306 
Appendix 3.13  Calculations Showing Basis for Adjustments for the Omission of In-Home Consumption Made to Per Capita Egg Demand (Consumption) Statistical Series  
    in China, 1980 to 1999 (continuation) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)  (6)   (7)  (8)  (9)   (10)  (11)  (12) 
  Adjustments to Consumption Due to Failure to Include out of home 
consumption    Adjustments to Consumption Due to Per Capita Omission of In-Home Con-
sumption 





































In home   
from 
CCAP    
survey 
e 



























1990  0.19  -  0.23   0.18  -  0.07   -  0.24  2.37   -  0.16  1.63 
1991  0.20  -  0.24   0.20  -  0.08   -  0.24  2.61   -  0.16  1.79 
1992  0.31  -  0.37   0.22  -  0.09   -  0.24  2.85   -  0.16  1.95 
1993  0.40  -  0.49   0.26  -  0.11   -  0.24  3.08   -  0.16  2.12 
1994  0.53  -  0.63   0.40  -  0.16   -  0.24  3.32   -  0.16  2.28 
1995  0.71  -  0.85   0.54  -  0.22   -  0.24  3.56   -  0.16  2.44 
1996  0.82  -  0.98   0.74  -  0.30   -  0.24  3.80   -  0.16  2.60 
1997  0.90  -  1.08   0.83  -  0.34   -  0.24  4.03   -  0.16  2.77 
1998  1.00  1.20  1.20   1.00  0.41  0.41   15.03  0.24  4.27   7.04  0.16  2.93 
1999  1.10  -  1.32   1.05  -  0.43   -  0.24  4.51   -  0.16  3.09 
a Figures are the same as in Appendix 3.7, columns 2 and 8. For detail see Appendix 3.7, footnote b. 
b Figures in column 2 and 5 come from CCAP Survey shown in Table 3.6. 
c (3)=(1)*1.20 (in column 2), (6)=(4)*0.41 (in column 5. 
d See Appendix 3.10, footnote a for detail. In the case of egg, as supply series has been significantly more than demand series since 1980, we adjust egg consumption series 
for the omission of in-home consumption from 1980. 
e Figures come from CCAP Survey (see Table 3.6). For detail, reference to Appendix 3.10, footnote b. 
f. For Detail, reference to Appendix 3.11, footnote c 
g Figures in 1998 are the difference between in-home demand from the CCAP survey in column 7 and the demand reported in the HIES survey (in Appendix 3.10, column 1 
row for 1998. The rest of the figures are calculated by starting at 1998 and working backwards towards 1980.  Each year's figure is just the next year's figure minus 0.24 in 
column 8, the "average annual increase in omitted demand."  Likewise, we create column 12. 
 
 307 
Appendix 3.14  Reconciling China's Beef Production (Supply) and Consumption (Demand) Statistics Series 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Various Supply/Demand Ratios (to Assess the Con-
sistency of Data Series Adjustments)  Year 
Aggregate Demand  















Beef Supply  
from Yearbook  
(mmt) 
Adjusted Aggregate 
Beef Supply- for  
overreporting 
(mmt)  (4)/(1) (4)/(2) (5)/(2) (5)/(3) 
                
1980   0.28  0.28  0.28  0.27  0.27  0.97 0.95 0.95 0.95 
1981   0.30  0.31  0.31  0.25  0.25  0.82 0.80 0.80 0.80 
1982   0.37  0.38  0.38  0.27  0.27  0.72 0.70 0.70 0.70 
1983   0.41  0.43  0.43  0.32  0.32  0.77 0.74 0.74 0.74 
1984   0.53  0.56  0.56  0.37  0.37  0.70 0.67 0.67 0.67 
1985   0.66  0.70  0.70  0.47  0.47  0.71 0.67 0.67 0.67 
1986   0.74  0.79  0.79  0.59  0.59  0.79 0.75 0.75 0.75 
1987   0.87  0.93  0.93  0.79   0.78 
d  0.91 0.85 0.85 0.84 
1988   0.98  1.05  1.05  0.96  0.98  0.98 0.91 0.91 0.93 
1989   1.07  1.16  1.19  1.07  1.15  1.00 0.92 0.90 0.96 
1990   1.19  1.28  1.32  1.26  1.33  1.06 0.98 0.95 1.01 
1991   1.33  1.43  1.48  1.54  1.47  1.16 1.08 1.04 1.00 
1992   1.39  1.54  1.61  1.80  1.62  1.30 1.17 1.12 1.01 
1993   1.46  1.66  1.74  2.34  1.58  1.60 1.40 1.34 0.91 
1994   1.41  1.69  1.77  3.27  1.68  2.32 1.94 1.85 0.95 
1995   1.44  1.83  1.93  4.15  1.89  2.88 2.28 2.16 0.98 
1996   1.52  1.98  2.10  3.56   2.22 
d  3.35 1.80 2.36 1.06 
1997   1.82  2.34  2.49  4.41  2.39  2.42 1.88 1.77 0.96 
1998   1.76  2.37  2.51  4.80  2.68  2.73 2.03 1.91 1.07 
1999   1.86  2.54  2.72  5.05  2.84  2.71 1.99 1.86 1.04 
Growth 
e 7.00  9.13  9.76  17.86  11.69 10.25  8.09  7.47  1.84 
Note: Production data from Yearbook and the same as in Table 3.3, column 11.  
a The figures in column 1 are the same as in Table 3.3, column 10.  They are equal to the sum of population numbers (in Appendix 3.5, columns 1 and 2) multiplying the per capita consumption 
numbers (in Appendix 3.17, columns 6 and 7). 
b The figures in column 2 come from Appendix 3.17, column 11. 
c The figures in column 3 come from Appendix 3.17, column 13. 
d The bold figures are the three-year averages of Yearbook production data from 1986 to 88 and the meat production generated from 1997 Ag Census. 
e An annual growth rates between 1987 and 1998, where 1987 and 1998 are three-year averages centered on 1987 and 1998. 
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Appendix 3.15  Reconciling China's Mutton Production (Supply) and Consumption (Demand) Statistics Series 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Various Supply/Demand Ratios (to Assess the 
Consistency of Data Series Adjustments) 
Year 
Aggregate Demand  
Based on the HIES  









for Omission of Mi-




Mutton Supply  
from Yearbook  
(mmt) 
Adjusted Aggregate 
Mutton Supply- for 
over reporting 
(mmt)  (4)/(1) (4)/(2) (5)/(2) (5)/(3) 
                
1980    0.42 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.45 1.05  1.04  1.04  1.04 
1981    0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 1.03  1.02  1.02  1.02 
1982    0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.52 1.04  1.02  1.02  1.02 
1983    0.52 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.55 1.04  1.02  1.02  1.02 
1984    0.57 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 1.03  1.00  1.00  1.00 
1985    0.63 0.66 0.66 0.59 0.59 0.93  0.90  0.90  0.90 
1986    0.66 0.69 0.69 0.62 0.66 0.94  0.90  0.90  0.95 
1987    0.69 0.73 0.73 0.72   0.71 
d  1.04 0.99 0.99 0.98 
1988    0.71 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.81 1.13  1.06  1.06  1.07 
1989    0.77 0.83 0.85 0.96 0.87 1.25  1.16  1.13  1.02 
1990    0.85 0.91 0.94 1.07 0.97 1.26  1.18  1.14  1.04 
1991    0.92 0.98 1.01 1.18 0.95 1.29  1.21  1.17  0.94 
1992    0.90 0.98 1.01 1.25 1.00 1.39  1.27  1.23  0.98 
1993    0.90 1.01 1.04 1.38 1.04 1.53  1.36  1.32  1.00 
1994    0.94 1.09 1.13 1.61 1.22 1.72  1.47  1.42  1.08 
1995    0.96 1.18 1.22 2.02 1.26 2.09  1.71  1.65  1.04 
1996    1.08 1.35 1.39 1.81   1.40 
d  1.67 1.34 1.72 1.00 
1997    1.23 1.53 1.58 2.10 1.61 1.71  1.37  1.33  1.02 
1998    1.23 1.59 1.63 2.35 1.63 1.90  1.47  1.44  1.00 
1999    1.19 1.58 1.60 2.51 1.65 2.12  1.59  1.57  1.03 
Growth 
e  5.31 7.23 7.45 11.30  7.58 5.72  3.82  3.61  0.14 
Note: Production data in column 4 from Yearbook and the same as in Table 3.3 column 14.  
a The figures in column 1 are the same as in Table 3.3, column 13. They are equal to the sum of population numbers in (Appendix 3.6, columns 1 and 2) multiplying 
per capita mutton consumption numbers (Appendix 3.17, columns 1 and 2). 
b The figures in column 2 come from Appendix 3.17, column 12. 
c The figures in column 3 come from Appendix 3.17, column 14. 
d The bold figures are the three-year averages of Yearbook production data from 1986 to 88 and the meat production generated from 1997 Ag Census. 
e An annual growth rates between 1987 and 1998, where 1987 and 1999 are three-year averages centered on 1987 and 1998. 309 
Appendix 3.16  Calculations showing basis for adjustments made to per capita beef and mutton consumption data due to the omission of out-of-home consumption 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  Urban Per Capita Out-of-Home Consumption (kg)  Rural Per Capita Out-of-Home Consumption (kg) 
Beef   Mutton   Beef   Mutton 
Year 
































1980 0.02  -  0.02  -  0.01  0.02  -  0.00  -  0.00 
1981 0.03  -  0.03  -  0.01  0.03  -  0.00  -  0.01 
1982 0.04  -  0.04  -  0.02  0.04  -  0.00  -  0.01 
1983 0.05  -  0.05  -  0.02  0.06  -  0.01  -  0.01 
1984 0.07  -  0.07  -  0.03  0.08  -  0.01  -  0.01 
1985 0.08  -  0.08  -  0.04  0.10  -  0.01  -  0.02 
1986 0.10  -  0.10  -  0.05  0.11  -  0.01  -  0.02 
1987 0.13  -  0.13  -  0.06  0.14  -  0.01  -  0.02 
1988 0.16  -  0.16  -  0.07  0.16  -  0.02  -  0.03 
1989 0.19  -  0.19  -  0.08  0.18  -  0.02  -  0.03 
1990 0.19  -  0.19  -  0.08  0.18  -  0.02  -  0.03 
1991 0.20  -  0.20  -  0.09  0.20  -  0.02  -  0.04 
1992 0.31  -  0.31  -  0.14  0.22  -  0.02  -  0.04 
1993 0.40  -  0.40  -  0.18  0.26  -  0.03  -  0.05 
1994 0.53  -  0.53  -  0.24  0.40  -  0.04  -  0.07 
1995 0.71  -  0.71  -  0.32  0.54  -  0.05  -  0.10 
1996 0.82  -  0.82  -  0.37  0.74  -  0.07  -  0.13 
1997 0.90  -  0.90  -  0.40  0.83  -  0.08  -  0.15 
1998 1.00  1.00  1.00  0.45  0.45  1.00  0.10  0.10  0.18  0.18 
1999 1.10  -  1.10  -  0.49  1.05  -  0.11  -  0.19 
a Come from Appendix 3.7, columns 2 and 8. 
b Figures come from CCAP Survey shown in Table 3.6. 
c (3)=(1)*1.00 (in column 2) and (5)=(1)*0.45 (in column 4) 




Appendix 3.17  Adjustments to Basic HIES Beef and Mutton Data to Account for Effect of Increased Migrant and Consumption While out of the home 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10)    (11)  (12)    (13)  (14) 
  Per Capita Beef Consumption (kg)    Per Capita Mutton Consumption (kg)     
Year Based  on  HIES 
a Out  of  Home 
b   Based  on  HIES 
a Out  of  Home 
b  
Aggregate Consumption 
after Adjustment-I for 






after Adjustment-II for 
















 Beef  Mutton   Beef  Mutton 
1980  0.48 0.16  0.02 0.00  0.00      1.10 0.25 0.01  0.00  0.00     0.28  0.43   0.28  0.43 
1981  0.52 0.17  0.03 0.00  0.01      1.16 0.26 0.01  0.01  0.00     0.31  0.47   0.31  0.47 
1982  0.56 0.21  0.04 0.00  0.01      1.26 0.27 0.02  0.01  0.00     0.38  0.51   0.38  0.51 
1983  0.62 0.22  0.05 0.01  0.02      1.24 0.28 0.02  0.01  0.00     0.43  0.54   0.43  0.54 
1984  0.88 0.27  0.07 0.01  0.01      1.37 0.28 0.03  0.01  0.00     0.56  0.59   0.56  0.59 
1985  1.01 0.29  0.08 0.01  0.03      1.38 0.28 0.04 0.02  0.01      0.70  0.66    0.70 0.66 
1986  1.15 0.31  0.10 0.01  0.03      1.38 0.29 0.05 0.02  0.01      0.79  0.69    0.79 0.69 
1987  1.28 0.35  0.13 0.01  0.03      1.39 0.29 0.06 0.02  0.01      0.93  0.73    0.93 0.73 
1988  1.42 0.37  0.16 0.02  0.05      1.39 0.29 0.07 0.03  0.01      1.05  0.76    1.05 0.76 
1989  1.56 0.39  0.19 0.02  0.06      1.40  0.33  0.08  0.03  0.01     1.16  0.83   1.19  0.85 
1990  1.69 0.40  0.19 0.02  0.10      1.59 0.35 0.08  0.03  0.01     1.28  0.91   1.32  0.94 311 
Appendix 3.17  Adjustments to Basic HIES Beef and Mutton Data to Account for Effect of Increased Migrant and Consumption While out of the home (continuation) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5)   (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10)    (11)  (12)    (13)  (14) 
  Per Capita Beef Consumption (kg)    Per Capita Mutton Consumption (kg)     
Year Based  on  HIES 
a Out  of  Home 
b   Based  on  HIES 
a Out  of  Home 
b  
Aggregate Consumption 
after Adjustment-I for 






after Adjustment-II for 
















 Beef  Mutton   Beef  Mutton 
1991  1.83 0.42  0.20 0.02  0.13      1.51 0.42 0.09  0.04  0.01     1.43  0.98   1.48  1.01 
1992 2.10  0.44  0.31 0.02  0.02      1.40 0.41 0.14  0.04  0.01     1.54  0.98   1.61  1.01 
1993  2.08  0.46  0.40  0.03  0.05     1.28  0.45  0.18  0.05  0.01     1.66  1.01   1.74  1.04 
1994  1.93  0.44  0.53  0.04  0.06     1.28  0.46  0.24  0.07  0.02     1.69  1.09   1.77  1.13 
1995  1.97  0.46  0.71  0.05  0.03     1.29  0.47  0.32  0.10  0.02     1.83  1.18   1.93  1.22 
1996  2.01  0.47  0.82  0.07  0.05     1.29  0.58  0.37  0.13  0.02     1.98  1.35   2.10  1.39 
1997  2.37  0.56  0.90  0.08  0.05     1.33  0.70  0.40  0.15  0.02     2.34  1.53   2.49  1.58 
1998  2.10  0.59  1.00  0.10  0.06     1.24  0.72  0.45  0.18  0.03     2.37  1.59   2.51  1.63 
1999  2.21 0.62  1.10  0.11 0.05    0.89 0.80 0.49 0.19 0.04   2.54  1.58  2.72  1.60 
a Figures come from HIES--urban and rural (see Table 3.5), the italics are estimated based on the ratios of beef to mutton production. 
b Come from Appendix 3.16, columns 3, 5, 8 and 11. 
c Come from statistical yearbooks. 
d (11)=(5) + [(1)+(3)] multiplying the population (in Appendix 3.5, column 1), plus [(2)+(4)] multiplying the population (in Appendix 3.5, column 2) and then divided by 
0.74 (in Table 3.2);  (12) = (10) + [(6)+(8)] multiplying the population (in Appendix 3.5, column 1), plus [(7)+(9)] multiplying the population (in Appendix 3.5, column 
2), and then divided by 0.89 (in Table 3.2).  
e (13)=(5) +  [(1)+(3)] multiplying the population (in Appendix 3.12, column 1), plus [(2)+(4)] multiplying the population (in Appendix 3.12, column 2), plus 
[(1)+(2)+(3)+(4)]/2 multiplying the population (in Appendix 3.12, column 3) and then divided by 0.74 (in Table 3.3);  (14)=(10) + [(6)+(8)] multiplying the population 
(in Appendix 3.12, column 1), plus [(7)+(9)] multiplying the population (in Appendix 3.12, column 2), plus [(6)+(7)+(8)+(9)]/2 multiplying the population (in Appendix 
3.12, column 3) and then divided by 0.89 (in Table 3.3). 312 




Appendix 5.1  Regional and sector aggregations 
  Description  Original GTAP v5 sector 
Regional aggregation 
China  Mainland, China  Mainland, China 
Hong Kong  Hong Kong, China  Hong Kong, China 
Taiwan  Taiwan, China  Taiwan, China 
JapKor  Japan and Korea  Japan, Korea 
SEA  South East Asia  Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Sin-
gapore 
OthAsia  Other Asia  Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, rest of south Asia 
AusNzl  Australia and New Zealand  Australia, New Zealand 
NAFTA  North American free trade area  Canada, United States, Mexico 
SAM  South and Central America  Central  America, Caribbean, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, 
rest of Andean Pact, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, rest 
of South America 
EU15 European  Union  Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
CEEC Central  European  Associates  Hungary, Pollen, rest of CEEC 
ROW  Rest of World  Switzerland, rest of Efta, Turkey, rest of Middle East, Mo-
rocco, rest of North Africa , Malawi, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Other Southern Africa, 
Uganda, rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, Former Soviet Union, 
Botswana, rest of Sacu,  rest of world 
Sector aggregation 
Rice  Rice, paddy and processed  Paddy rice, processed rice 
Wheat Wheat  Wheat 
Cgrains  Coarse grains  Cereals grains nec 
Oilseeds  Oilseeds and vegetable oils  Oilseeds, vegetable oils and fats 
Sugar  Sugar raw and processed  Sugar cane, sugar beet, Sugar 
Pfb  Plant based fibers  Plant based fibers 
Othcrop  Horticulture and other crops  Vegetables fruit nuts, crops-nec 
Ctl  Cattle and red meat  Cattle, sheep, goats, horses and their meats 
Oap  Pig & poultry- white meat, wool  Animal products nec, wool, silk-worm cocoons, meat prod-
ucts nec 
Milk  Raw milk and dairy products  Raw milk, dairy products 
Fish Fish  Fish 
Ofood Food  products  nec  Food products nec, beverages & tobacco products   
Extract  Natural resources and extract  Forestry, coal, oil, gas, minerals nec 
Texlea  Textiles and leather  Textiles, wearing apparel, leather products 
Labintman  Labour intensive Manfact  Wood and paper products, publishing, metal products, mo-
tor vehicles and parts, transport equipment nec 
Capintman  Capital  intensive  manufact  Petroleum, coal products, chemical rubber plastic prods, 
mineral products nec, ferrous metals, metals nec, electronic 
equipment, machinery and equipment nec, manufactures 
nec 
Svces  Services and activities NES  Electricity, gas manufacture, distribution, water, construc-
tion, trade, transport nec, sea transport, air transport, 
communication, financial services nec, insurance, business 
services nec, recreation and other, pub-
admin/defence/health/educat, dwellings 
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Appendix 5.2  Value of income elasticities in 2010 in China 








Other crops  0.6 0.9
Cattle 0.6 1.1
Other animal products  0.4 1.1
Milk 0.8 0.8
Fish 0.9 0.9
Other food  0.9 0.9
Extract 1.2 1.2
Textiles- leather  1 1
Labor intensive Manufacturing  1.2 1.1
Capital intensive Manufacturing  1.2 1.3
Services 1.3 1.1314 
Appendix 5.3 Import protection 2001-05 

















1 Rice  1 13 10 0  4 
2 Wheat  1 13 10 0  4 
3 Cgrains  1 13 10 0  4 
4 Oilseeds  3 13 10 3  9 
5 Sugar  20 17 10 0  27 
6 Pfb  1 15 13 0  3 
7 OthCrop  6 15 10 0  11 
8 Ctl  12 15 13 0  14 
9 Oap  12 15 13 0  14 
10 Milk  11 17 10 0  18 
11 Fish  12 13 10 0  15 
12 Ofood  15 15 13 0  17 
13 Extract  0.6 15 15 p.m  0.6 
14 TexLea  11.5 15 15 0  11.5 
15 LabintMan  9.45 15 15 0  9.4 
16 CapIntMan  6.05 15 15 0  6.1 





Appendix 5.4  TRQs China 
  TRQ  In-quota tariff (%)  Out-quota tariff (%)  
  1=yes  2002  2003 2004 2005  2002 2003 2004 2005 (*)  
Rice  1  1  1  1  1  74 71 65 65    
Wheat  1  1  1  1  1  71 68 65 65    
Coarse  grains  1  1  1  1  1  71 68 65 65    
   Maize  1  1  1  1  1  71  68  65  65     
   Other course grain  0  3  3  3  3             
Oilseeds    1/0          n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.    
   Soybean  0  3  3  3  3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.     
   Rapeseed  0  3  3  3  3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.     
   Edible oil   1  9  9  9  9  75  71.7  68.3  64.9  (**)  
Sugar  1  20  20 20 20  90 72 50 50    
Plant  fibres  1  1  1  1  1         
   Cotton  1  1  1  1  1  54.4  47.2  40  40     
   Wool  1  1  1  1  1  38  38  38  38     
                 
            













Rice            3.76 4.54 5.32 6.33   19 
Wheat            8.45 9.05 9.64 10.41    8 
 Coarse grains            5.7  6.45  7.2  8.14    13 
   Maize            5.7  6.45  7.2  8.14    13 
   Other course grain                     
Oilseeds                 
   Soybean                       
   Rapeseed                       
   Edible oil             5.69  6.54  6.81  7.27  (**) 15 
Sugar            1.68 1.82 1.95 2.11   8 
Plant  fibres                 
   Cotton            0.82  0.86  0.89  0.93    5 
   Wool            0.34  0.36  0.37  0.39    5 
(*) 2005 rates and trq volumes are estimates based on extrapolation of annual growth rates, except for edible 
oil, (**) OUT in 2006, Source: WTO China accession documents 
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Appendix 8.1  Actually used foreign direct investment in selected years by region  
($ million) 
Pro Region   1985  1990  1999  2000  Subtotal Percentage 
Guangdong   651  1582  11658 11281 56535 0.29 
Fujian   119  349  4024 3432 18631 0.09 
Jiangsu   33  134  6078 6426 26632 0.14 
Shanghai   108  174 
2837 3160 
15380 0.08 
Shandong   36  186 
2259 2971 
11595 0.06 
Liaoning   25  257 
1062 2044 
8879 0.05 
Hainan      103  484 431 3166 0.02 
Tianjin   56  37  1764 1166 8053 0.04 
Zhejiang   27  49 
1233 1613 
6164 0.03 
Guangxi   31  36  635 525 3295 0.02 
Hebei   8  44  1042 679  4527 0.02 
Beijing   89  279  1975 1684 8809 0.04 
Shaanxi   16  47  242 288 1769 0.01 
Hubei   8  32 
915 944 
3967 0.02 
Sichuan   29  24 
341 437 
1681 0.01 
Hailongjiang 4  28  318 301 2077 0.01 
Hunan   27  14  654 678 3292 0.02 
Henan   8  11  521 564 2564 0.01 
Jilin   5  18  301 337 1596 0.01 
Jiangxi   10  8  321 227 1642 0.01 
Anhui   3  14  261 318 1386 0.01 
Guizhou   10  11  41 25 228 0.00 
Shanxi   0.5  3  391 225 1203 0.01 
Yunnan   2  7  154 128 650 0.00 
Xinjiang   11  5  24 19 125 0.00 
Inner Mongolia   2  11  65 106  363 0.00 
Gansu   0.6  1  41 62 191 0.00 
Qinghai         5  0 7  0.00 
Ningxia         51 17 94 0.00 
Tibet         0  0  0  0.00 
Chongqing        239 244 1301 0.01 
 Ministries         384 382 1301 0.01 
National Total   1317  3436  40319 40715 197103 1.00 
Of which:             
Special Zones  1094  2951  33074.49  33727.47  162857  0.826254 
Subtotal: including years of 1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 317 
Appendix 8.2  Geographic Distribution of Dutch FDI in China  





FDI  Actual Used 
Total   313  479876  209799 
Beijing 31  6193  14846 
Tianjin 10  10301  6402 
Hebei 7  1206  1447 
Liaoning 17  19418  23125 
of which: Dalian  5  140  9261 
Jinli 1  10  0 
Heilongjiamg 1  6 1883 
Shanghai 77  53384  32085 
Jiangsu 30  46663  54362 
Zhejiang 47  7936  8568 
of which: Ningbo  16  3353  2941 
Anhui 3  251  512 
Fujian 6  745  1854 
of which: Xiamen  3  714  1854 
Jiangxi 2  109  165 
Shandong 20  2646  3200 
of which: Qingdao  10  1485  1425 
Henan 1  301  413 
Hubei 4  2609  12451 
Hunan 7  33749  10708 
Guangdong 28  289993  29739 
of which: Shenzhen  8  -711  6572 
Guangxi 2  488  395 
Hainan 1  0  18 
Chongqing 0  -102  778 
Sichuan 7  2575  647 
Guizhou 1  8  8 
Yunan 5  919  630 
Shaanxi 2  350  300 
Gansu 1  62  11 
Qinghai 1  5  5 
Xinjiang 1  51  58 
China Nature Gas Co.    5189 
 









































































































Appendix figure 3.1  The Divergence of Feed Grain Production and Feed Grain Consumption in China, 
1980-99. 
Estimated Available Feed Resource mainly includes corn, wheat bran, sweet potato, rice and other coarse 
grains. Feed Use Implied by Reported Production is estimated using livestock production statistics reported 
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Appendix Figure 3.2  Comparison of Production and Consumption of Eggs, Beef and Mutton  
   Before  and  After  Adjustments  (mmt),  1980-99 
 